Chapter 8

CA Mission
Planning And Preparation

The most likely situation where U.S. national Interests are at stake will occur in situations short of war. Operations short of war, which include peacetime engagement, demand a new proactive planning focus to promote regional stability as a means to deter conflict. By helping HNs provide for their own defense needs and develop sustainable responsive institutions, the Army may reduce the likelihood that it will have to deploy to protect threatened U.S. interests. These operations will emphasize the indirect use of forces in roles that support other nations in their efforts to maintain stability, law, and order.

PLANNING FOR OPERATIONS SHORT OF WAR

Political considerations, usually an integral part of CA planning, may cause operational characteristics of the plan to undergo rapid and significant changes. CA planners are essential from the beginning of the planning process. They will need to plan for participation of CA units in these interagency operations within the C structure of the regional CINC, the DOS, and the COM, normally the U.S. ambassador. The plans, programs, and policy team is the primary asset available during this process. Through the CINC, they coordinate for planning participation by the CONUS CA unit designated to support the OPLAN under development.

Although indirect use of Army capabilities will dominate operations short of war, the Army must also be prepared to use direct force when so directed by the NCA. This direct application such as a strike or raid is normally in support of friends or allies. Operations are guided by Army operations doctrine while remaining consistent with the imperatives developed for SO, namely the primacy of the political element, unity of effort, adaptability, legitimacy, perseverance, and restricted use of force.

Much of the warfighting concept applies to the execution of operations in situations short of war. These operations span the states of peace and conflict. Operations short of war in the conflict state are directly related to the strategic and operational levels. Operations short of war that support peace are generally the same at the strategic level as those
CA planning is based on national policy and begins at the theater level. The theater commander provides a CA plan, usually an annex of the OPLAN. This plan prescribes the CA objectives for military operations. It ensures continuity of policies and uniformity of application. CA guidance relates not only to ultimate objectives but is also pertinent to operational phases.

**PLANNING CATEGORIES**

Operations short of war are primarily focused on support to allies and are classified into the following overlapping categories: support for insurgency and counterinsurgency, combating terrorism, PKO, and contingency operations. All of these may be conducted by Army forces with a warfighting orientation using modified methods and organizations, as necessary. Operations short of war are inherently joint, combined, and interagency. Civilian agencies of the USG such as the DOS, will have the lead. From the operational perspective, military operations short of war are generally indirect and are predominantly in support of our friends and allies. Inherent in support to allies is the requirement that they execute the tasks. All the instruments of national power are united in an integrated, goal-directed effort. The Army’s contribution includes—

- Transferring materiel.
- Training and advice.
- Providing services.
- Executing combat operations for a specific purpose and limited time.

Once U.S. forces become involved in extended combat operations, the conditions for operations short of war no longer exist. The transition to war then occurs.

**Insurgency/Counterinsurgency**

Insurgency and counterinsurgency are two aspects of the same process. Insurgency assumes that appropriate change within the existing system is not possible or likely. It focuses, therefore, on radical change in political control and requires extensive use of covert instruments and methods. Counterinsurgency uses mainly overt methods. Appropriate changes in the existing system are possible and likely. Because of these differences, implementing doctrine varies for insurgency and counterinsurgency, but it is rooted in common principles discussed in FM 100-20. CA support to insurgency and counterinsurgency is best described by using the SO missions of UW and FID as examples. See Chapter 13 for CA support to FID and UW.

**Combatting Terrorism**

Combatting terrorism includes AT and CT. AT includes mainly defensive measures that reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property. CA forces participate in their own AT programs. They also support the AT programs of other units or agencies by planning and conducting CA operations as requested. CT employs specially organized and trained units. It includes the full range of offensive measures to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism. CA units or personnel support CT within their capabilities as required. For more information on combatting terrorism, see Chapter 13.

**Peacekeeping Operations**

The structure of a peacekeeping force ranges from MP and light infantry formations to armored cavalry and mechanized or armor formations supported by CA forces. CA forces present in contested areas contribute to the peacekeeping mission. CA forces conduct various CMO to relieve human suffering of the people in devastated areas. If called upon, CA forces also perform limited support to civilian administration to reestablish the constituted government and provide the essential basic services. Other activities CA forces can perform include observation and the gathering and developing of information for area studies for peacekeeping forces.
Contingency Operations

Contingency operations in peace are politically sensitive military activities normally characterized by short-term, rapid projection or use of forces. They include such diverse activities as nation assistance, disaster relief, CD operations, NEO, shows of force and demonstrations, rescue and recovery, and strikes and raids (Figure 8-1). These activities often take place in crisis avoidance or crisis management situations, using military instruments to enforce or support diplomatic initiatives.

- Show of Force
- Noncombatant Evacuation Operations
- Search and Rescue
- Operations to Restore Order
- Security Assistance
- Counterdrug
- DOD Directed Support to Civil Authorities
  - Civil Disturbance
  - Disaster Relief
  - Civil Defense

Figure 8-1. Contingency operations.

CMO support to military forces during contingency operations must be timely and based on established training relationships. The time available will rarely allow any other forces to train to the required standard necessary for the successful conduct of an operation.

CMO supporting contingency operations are planned to accomplish the basic CMO objectives and any politico-military objectives specified. CA forces in the initial deployment will be DS elements and G5 staff augmentation. CA unit mobilization and deployment will make easier the postmission and redeployment activities of the combat units.

CMO supporting NEO, disaster relief, and support to U.S. civil authorities is described in Chapter 10.

Nation Assistance

The focus of nation assistance is to coordinate the use of all U.S. political, economic, informational, and military assistance for a HN’s program to —

- Promote regional stability.
- Retain U.S. influence and access abroad.
- Defuse crises.
- Help friends and allies attain sustainable development.

Nation assistance activities should address the causes of instability to preclude the need for U.S. military intervention to counter acts of violence. DOD works with other U.S. agencies and at the HN’s request to provide health, technical, management, and other assistance consistent with legislation to achieve the desired goals. CA operations should be a component of a preventive strategy to correct HN ills before lawlessness, subversion, or insurgency becomes a serious problem. CA units, because of their missions and force structure, have unique capabilities to coordinate nation assistance and supporting activities.

One of the keys to a successful nation assistance program is to use the technical skills and resources of CA units and personnel to integrate and coordinate the HN’s efforts. Major considerations for U.S. CA forces include—

- Operating in direct support of HN agencies (civil assistance).
- Crediting the HN for its successes to gain the maximum visibility and strengthen its credibility among the local populace.
- Providing CS and CSS as the dominant elements of U.S. Army support to developing nations.
- Focusing on operations of lasting significance to the supported nations and long-term regional stability rather than short-term tasks.
- Possessing cultural and/or regional expertise to protect and extend U.S. support to allied requirements.
- Assisting developing nations in dealing with nontraditional threats such as trafficking illicit drugs and terrorism.

Depending on the extent of the program, other assets support nation assistance programs. These U.S. agencies are USAID, USIA, DOT, USDA, DOC, and the DEA. Nation assistance programs must be coordinated with the ambassador’s overall country plan and the unified commanders’s theater plan. Other military forces employed in nation assistance programs include the following:

- Engineer units provide support through road building, bridge construction, or the building of schools, hospitals, and other public facilities.
- Medical personnel help identify health needs of the HN. Preventive medical programs provide immediate relief in some instances.
- Aviation units provide air transportation into remote areas.
- MP units advise and assist the HN in law and order.
- Other SOF play an integral part in the success of nation assistance programs.

CA units and personnel also provide the vehicle for a better understanding of the culture of the HN. The focus of nation assistance programs must be to legitimize and stabilize a HN’s political, social, and economic infrastructure. A cultural understanding of the HN will only enhance the U.S. position toward that end. Nation assistance is the military role of providing the technical expertise, advice, and assistance necessary. This assistance forms a better foundation on which a nation can build programs to meet its people’s needs and promote its own sustainable development or growth.

Disaster Relief
Disasters are suddenly occurring and usually mass-casualty producing events. They may be natural or man-made and mayor may not be connected with military operations. The role of CA forces in emergency and disaster relief operations can be significant because of the types and amounts of coordination required. Proper coordination cuts down on duplication of effort of all these disaster relief agencies.

Coordination is very important among—
- Functional teams.
- Other units.
- Higher authority.
- Local officials and agencies.
- Relief agencies.
- USG agencies where additional manpower, expertise, and equipment can be obtained.

Protective or defensive measures to be taken due to a disaster or in the event of attack have to be disseminated to the local populace. The civil information team, PSYOP units, and local media must work together to instruct the populace on what to do. Civil defense is planned and organized action aimed at protecting life and property and maintaining or restoring essential services and facilities damaged or lost through natural or man-made disasters.

Ensuring that contingency plans exist can be a function of CA personnel. If no plans exist, CA planners help write them. If there are existing plans, CA personnel review them and ensure their currency. CA planners also recommend ways to improve warning systems and identify equipment and manpower requirements. Establishing a properly functioning emergency operations center should be a priority. RC CA personnel may perform disaster relief operations—
- In lieu of annual training.
- When ordered to active duty as the result of a presidential declaration of emergency.
- When approved by CG USASOC as voluntary active duty for training.

Operations in international disaster relief follow different rules than domestic operations. Operations will begin only at the direction of the unified commander, JCS, or the ambassador and will be coordinated through the USAID.

Disaster relief actions must be reported to the COM. If no representative is available, reports should go
through the chain of command to the specified or unified commander. Any costs incurred must also be reported. Pricing is determined according to mutual agreement between the U.S. and the given country. To better accomplish the mission, there must be coordination with national and international relief agencies and military organizations. (See Appendix D.)

**Humanitarian Assistance**

HA is a group of programs that authorize the use of DOD resources to conduct and/or support operations of a humanitarian nature. The specific operations are listed in Title 10, U.S. Code. See Chapter 10 for more information on HA.

**Security Assistance**

The Secretary of State continuously supervises and directs all SA programs. In consultation with the Secretary of State, the SECDEF administers the—

- International Military Education and Training Program.
- Foreign Military Sales Financing.
- The Foreign Military Sales Program.

The DOS administers commercial sales with significant participation by DOD. In this regard, the DOD advises the DOS on munitions licenses, establishes research and development recuperation, and establishes royalty and asset use charges associated with commercial sales. The SECDEF carries out his SA responsibility through the JCS, the three military departments, the Under Secretary of Defense (Policy), the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs), and the Defense Security Assistance Agency. CMO supporting SA include planning H/CA, civic action, and related activities involving other U.S. agencies. They also include training foreign forces to conduct all required CA activities and developing CA procedures that will work in their country.

When deployed in support of SA operations, CA elements establish and maintain contact and coordinate with the U.S. country team. The country team coordinates activities to achieve a unified program for the HN. The COM represents the President of the United States. The ambassador directs and coordinates the activities of all elements of the U.S. diplomatic mission. The ambassador’s authority does not extend to U.S. military forces operating in the field where they are under the command of a U.S. military commander. Even though both diplomatic and military elements in foreign countries must support U.S. objectives, they operate under policy guidance developed through interagency cooperation. The ambassador must approve military activities and ensure SA activities are—

- Relevant to the current situation.
- Efficiently and economically administered.
- Effectively interrelated to U.S. interests.

Policy directive from the COM will be binding upon all members of the country team. It must specify the goals of the program and the responsibilities and support that each agency is expected to provide.

Technical help, moral support, and limited supplies and resources are types of help that can be given. The amount and type of support varies with funding and policy directives. ARs 12-5 and 12-7 and the U.S. Army Security Assistance Training Program Handbook contain detailed information on the conduct of MTTs.

**Support to the Domestic Civil Sector**

CA assets are subject to priorities of military operations in peace, conflict, or war. They are not organized, trained, or equipped specifically to conduct or support operational missions in domestic territory. However, the functional structure of CA forces and the experience, training, and orientation of CA personnel provide a capability for emergency coordination and administration where civilian politico-economic structures have been incapacitated. In disaster relief operations, the cellular composition of CA forces permits ready tailoring of emergency task elements. These elements possess the skills necessary to assist civil authorities in relief, administration, and control measures appropriate to the situation. As national defense assets, CA personnel and forces may be made available as general capabilities of the Services on a
situation-specific basis. Accordingly, CA personnel or forces may be used, where authorized by law, to—

- Assist in planning for USG interagency (DOD or FEMA) procedures required in emergency situations on either a national or regional basis.
- Assist civil-military planning and military support operations associated with established joint regional defense command and joint state area command organizations of CINCFORSOM or any designated responsible commander.
- Coordinate military resources, as directed, for support to the continuity of federal, state, or local government operations, emergency actions to restore or repair vital facilities, and HA measures to relieve human suffering resulting from natural, man-made, or war-dated causes.

### STAFF PLANNING PROCEDURES

FM 101-5 describes planning procedures, including the—

- Formulation of plans.
- Coordination in the preparation of plans.
- Assignment of planning tasks.
- Determination of planning phases and programs.
- Preparation of outline plans.

Planning for the conduct of CA operations is a continuous process. The mission planning overview illustrates steps in the planning process. These steps may overlap to some degree in the dynamic course of events (Figure 8-2, page 8-7). Essential to successful mission planning are mission analysis, communication and understanding of commander’s intent, and the formulation, analysis, and comparison of feasible COAs.

The U.S. national security strategy goal is to ensure and protect national interests. The strategic goal in peace is to prevent and deter aggression and acts of intimidation that may hinder U.S. political, religious, social, economic, and military freedom or security. CA planning plays a significant role in this primarily political environment.

CA support is requested through the theater J3, who queries the Army component to determine if internal CA assets can meet the requirements. If they cannot meet the requirements, the J3 submits support requests through his combatant theater commander to the JCS. Based on the chairman’s review, the request for CA support is forwarded to the USSOCOM for validation. The requirement is then forwarded to the USASOC. In turn it passes the requirement to the USACAPOC. USACAPOC determines whether it can be supported and whether it is an AC or RC mission. If it is an AC mission, direct coordination to the requesting element may be permitted. If it is an RC mission, then the respective senior CA CAPSTONE has priority for support and the unit is identified.

### STAFF PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

The G5 is responsible for CA planning and coordinates with all other staff sections to ensure adequate planning and execution of its activities in support of the overall military operation. This coordination ensures support for and from CA units and activities in the overall OPLAN. The CA annex to the OPLAN outlines relationships with local authorities and the local population. It also outlines the conduct of CA operations. The senior commander delegates appropriate CA tasks to subordinate commanders.

CA operations involve functions and considerations that may not be obvious to the operations planner. Factors that influence the concept of operations include—

- National policy and DOD guidance.
- The manner that may best contribute to the command’s overall mission.
- Coordination of CMO with other operations.
All unit staff members receive briefing from higher headquarters. Request additional information as required.

Commander conducts initial mission analysis. Commander and staff exchange information to formulate planning guidance. Their efforts involve identifying tasks to be performed, commander's general concept and desired end state, and constraints on unit actions.

Commander gives restated mission, which results from initial mission analysis. The restated mission will become the basis for future estimates, will be paragraph 2 (Mission) of the operation plan or order, and will be included in the commander's mission concept. Commander communicates initial planning guidance and general concept of the operation, which may include COAs to be developed or eliminated. Planning guidance provides a common start point for subsequent staff planning as well as a clear statement as to desired end state.

Unit members conduct detailed mission analysis. If COAs have been provided, they can be analyzed and evaluated during the process. If COAs have not been identified, this process can assist in their formulation.

Staff members conduct estimates in assigned areas of responsibility, identify factors that affect formulation, analysis, and comparison of COAs, and analyze the influence of factors on mission accomplishment. This process results in conclusions and recommendations that identify feasible COAs. Members continuously exchange information and coordinate within the staff to ensure the concurrent development of feasible COAs for consideration by the commander. Conduct BOS check. Continue IPOA.

Commander analyzes and validates alternate COAs tentatively considered feasible. Commander selects or modifies COA. Consider METT-T and SO imperatives.

Commander briefs decision, intent, and concept to staff and to higher headquarters and supported CDR. Intent is the commander's general description of how he visualizes the conduct of the operation to achieve his previously defined end state. It should include priority of effort, constraints, statement of RISK acceptances, and end state. The commander's concept is the specific visualization of the operation from start to completion. The concept should be in sufficient detail so that unit leaders understand exactly what they must do and, if necessary, execute the operation without further instructions. It should include task organization, mission tactics and procedures, control measures, and support.

Staff members prepare plans or input for plans within their area(s) of responsibility. Through these plans, unit members develop the chosen COA to accomplish the given mission. Orders are prepared as required and briefed to the XO/Chief of Staff. Staff members provide input for Operations Order.

Supervise execution of mission by subordinate elements.

Figure 8-2. Mission planning process.
U.S. logistics capabilities and the potential shortfalls that FNS may support. Planners must carefully consider the risks involved in logistics planning using FNS resources. They should also consider how to use U.S. supplies to support CMO.

CA units and civilian activities supporting tactical operations. If CA specialists or units are not available, CA support may be limited to AC units and individuals from the staff of the major support command or from units that may be employed in CA roles (Figure 8-3).

FNS requirements for CSS operations and the capabilities in the AO to provide such support.

Support agreements, MOUs, and SOFAS that must be coordinated with the legal advisor.

Support for DC operations, to include coordination with PVO, IRC, and UN and other organizations.

The ultimate success of CA operations depends on local popular support. Successful CA operations also depend on PSYOP and PA support. Conditions affecting CA planning that must be considered are—

- The basic aspects of political authority and economic organization prevalent in the country.
- Culture of the community, social organizations and institutions, and forms of expression.
- Forms of social relationship and leadership among inhabitants, national and local traditions, occupational patterns, national and religious observances, sacred or forbidden places, and similar sensitive considerations.

NOTE: In the absence of CA specialists, commanders may designate other personnel to perform CA special functions. The chart below is an example of these collateral functions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Special Forces</th>
<th>Major Support Command</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ODA</td>
<td>ODB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Government Functions:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Public Administration</td>
<td>CDH</td>
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<tr>
<td>b. Legal</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>c. Public Education</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>d. Public Finance</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>e. Public Safety</td>
<td>18Z</td>
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<td>f. Public Health</td>
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<td>g. Public Welfare</td>
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<tr>
<td>h. Labor</td>
<td>18Z</td>
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<tr>
<td>i. Civil Defense</td>
<td>18B</td>
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</tbody>
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2. Economic Functions:

| a. Economics and Commerce | - | - | RMO | ACoFs, RM | G/S 4 | Comptroller |
| b. Civilian Supply | 18C | XO | PBO | ACoFs, Material | G/S 4 |
| c. Food and Agriculture | 18D | - | SURG | ACoFs, Material | G/S 4 |
| d. Property Control | 18C | 18C | S4 | ACoFs, Material | G/S 4/PBO |

3. Public Facilities Functions:

| a. Public Works and Utilities | 18C | 18C | ENG | ACoFs, Material | G/S 4 |
| b. Public Communications | 18E | 18E | CEO | ACoFs, CE | CEO/Signal Officer |
| c. Public Transportation | 18C | 18C | S4 | ACoFs, Trans | G/S 4 DTO/CTO |

4. Special Functions:

| a. Dislocated Civilians | 18OA | XO | S5 | ACoFs, PMO | PMO/MP Unit Cdr |
| b. Arts, Monuments, and Archives | - | - | S5 | ACoFs, Historian | G/S 1 / G/S 5 |
| c. Civil Information | 18F | - | PAO | PAO | PMO |
| d. Cultural Affairs | - | - | S5/CH | Chaplain | Chaplain |

Figure 8-3. Military functions collateral to CA specialties.
• Attitudes toward the presence of occupying, liberating, or guest military forces. Troop behavior strongly affects this attitude.

• Effects of military operations, especially combat, on the population and the economy.

• Endemic diseases and geographic, climatic, and social factors that may affect the health of the command.

• CMO conducted in remote areas that may cause personnel to be vulnerable to hostile activities. These forces must be protected and provided with communications capabilities. CA units have only light arms and limited transportation and communications assets. Planners must consider these limitations and provide additional support where required.

• Medical factors. For a discussion of medical planning factors refer to FM 8-55. For a discussion of medical planning factors for low intensity conflict refer to FM 8-42.

Planning requires extensive coordination and liaison with U.S. and foreign government agencies, international organizations, HN military, and all U.S. forces operating in the AO. Included in these requirements are attachment, assignment, or liaison with supporting PSYOP and PA forces. Using PSYOP and PA ensures U.S. forces in the AO receive positive publicity for their efforts. CA planners must consider PSYOP and PA and their effect as an integral part of the overall CA plan.

PLANNING FOR FOREIGN NATION SUPPORT

CA planners base FNS implementation on capabilities, reciprocal requirements, national policy, and international law. Theater or higher level plans establish basic policies and procedures for using FNS prior to conflict. These plans include estimates of initial U.S. force requirements and available resources. During conflict and war, senior CA staff officers provide information and recommend changes to the support requirements. They determine the—

• Extent of civilian relief and economic aid from the United States.

• Manner in which assistance is furnished.

• Degree of use of local resources, properties, and services to support military operations.

They also provide an assessment of civilian resources to support military operations. The CA commander continually estimates FNS requirements, allocations, and priorities in his AOR in coordination with supported CSS elements. He also develops plans and programs for the distribution, control, and coordination of requests from supported units. At the same time, he maintains records that reflect the current status of FNS operations. FNS includes HNS, support from third countries, and support gained in an occupied or liberated country that was under enemy control. The CA commander makes maximum use of the material resources, facilities, and services in the AO for supporting military operations. He recommends program changes based on continuing assessments of FNS capabilities.

G5 and G4 staff officers should consider the effects of procuring local items on the population and the area economy. Unless otherwise directed, commanders should begin economic rehabilitation only when resources are available in the command. The use of relief supplies is limited to minimum essentials to prevent disease, starvation, or such unrest as might interfere with military operations. The executive and legislative branches of the USG set specific policies as to the kind and extent of support U.S. armed forces are required (or permitted) to provide for each country concerned. Planning that leads to policy decisions should cover every contingency, such as mass movements of DCS into the theater of operations from countries outside the theater and their impact on support requirements.

The G4 determines the availability of military supply items to relieve civilian distress or rehabilitate the economy of a country where U.S. forces are present. The G5 staff officer determines specific requirements
for such supplies. Supplies for relief of distress in the combat AO normally are given a logistical priority second only to military supplies essential for combat.

JOINT AND COMBINED PLANNING

The process of joint planning is continuous. It begins when a task is assigned and continues until the requirement for the plan is cancelled or the plan is implemented.

CJCS prepares strategic plans. He also provides for the preparation of joint contingency plans. Commanders of unified and specified combatant commands perform the CJCS contingency planning.

The JSPS identifies and allocates the military ways and means to achieve the national strategic objectives of preventing, deterring, and responding to armed confrontation. Through this formal means, the CJCS furnishes plans and direction for the armed forces. The JSCP provides military strategy guidance and task assignments to the commanders of unified and specified commands and the chiefs of the services for the accomplishments of military tasks in the short-range period (2 years). The JSCP directs the development of plans to support national security objectives. It also apports major combat forces to the commanders of unified and specified commands. The JSCP is published biennially unless significant events dictate otherwise. For additional information refer to AFSC Pub 1.

The JOPES is used during joint operational planning in either deliberate or crisis action procedures to meet the tasks identified in the JSCP. It establishes procedures to assess military options and to develop executable OPLANs or CONPLANs. JOPES OPLAN format for the basic plan identifies annex “G” as civil affairs. For additional information refer to AFSC Pub 1.

Because of the unique nature of SOF, combined planning plays a substantial role in modern day events. Planning and execution of combined operations require mutual understanding, compromise, and close coordination. During combined planning, planners must consider the goals and objectives of the United States and its allies on mutual security and the military defeat of hostile forces.

The United States and its allies are also joint signatories to internal agreements covering the treatment of civilians and civil property. The ramifications of combined CMO cut across every aspect of political, economic, and social structures. In the NATO, areas of common agreement have been reached on CA organization and concepts of operation through STANAGs and other agreements. The military services of the United States and several of its allies outside NATO have achieved substantial understanding through bilateral and multilateral agreements similar to NATO STANAGs. These agreements endorse the principle of combined organizations and follow general CA policy guidelines.

PLANNING IN SUPPORT OF THE THEATER CAMPAIGN PLAN

Campaign plans are not included in the formal joint planning and execution system. Campaign planning is a deliberate planning process that occurs in peace and war. Through the vision of the CINC and in coordination with the country team, CA supporting plans support specific national goals and objectives. The planner must focus on the current situation and project for future operations. These supporting plans should mature as the situation develops and opportunities arise.

USG agencies and the FN have a prominent role during planning for CA operations. The CMO staff officer coordinates CA supporting plans with the DOS representative and the FN(s) affected to ensure compliance with U.S. and HN national objectives. A major challenge is gaining joint, combined, and interagency consensus. Interagency cooperation in CA operations is critical. Usually, the DOS and other USG agencies are participants with important, sometimes decisive roles. Success of strategic and/or CA
operational planning depends on definable U.S. objectives prior to commitment of the force package.

The national security strategy of the United States defines the strategic aim. Ideally, the CINC has considered political, social, cultural, psychological, economic, and military factors at the national level before giving strategic guidance. The strategic aim is subject to change or modification as national objectives change or the local or global situation changes.

Factors limiting planning for CA operations include constraints (what must be done) and restrictions (what must not be done). The extensive interaction with other nonmilitary assets may also control how resources are applied. This interaction is particularly important when political and diplomatic endeavors are in the lead in CMO planning. Planners must consider other USG agencies. They must consider limiting factors associated with the ability of the FN to accept and use U.S. technology and economic systems.

CA supporting plans support the theater campaign by clearly identifying the country’s vulnerabilities and deficiencies. Once they are identified, CA planners must develop goals and objectives that will lessen the major vulnerabilities and neutralize the capability of the enemy to capitalize on them. They coordinate goals and objectives through the country team for approval by the U.S. ambassador.

When properly planned and coordinated, CA operations support other U.S. and allied agencies to achieve the desired condition(s). The operative word is support. Political, economic, and informational goals and conditions affect the sequence of CA operations.

Planners must coordinate the application of time-phased CA operations with other U.S. and allied agencies.

A CA supporting plan contains several components—CI, logistics, SA, and the CA functional specialties. Joint, interagency, and combined relationships are inherent in the CA plan. Within each component of this portion of the plan are U.S. and allied military and civilian elements. Coordination and support must exist between each individual component. They ensure consistency of purpose and unity of direction toward the goals established for the overall CA supporting plan. See the format in Appendix E.

The available force structure and resources, together with the national CA strategy and combatant commander’s theater strategy, normally provide the major impetus for CA planning. The execution of CA operations is immediate and continuous. Combatant commands must ensure force structure and resource requirements generated by the CA supporting plan are reflected in the appropriate documents (Figure 8-4) and given priority. The combatant commander’s input should include CA requirements that influence—

- The long-term budget process.
- The near-term allocation of resources.
- Modification of the existing force structure.

During execution, the combatant commander must analyze all available feedback to improve and tailor the CA plan to the changing environment. Such analysis requires input from the DOS, the CIA, U.S. allies, and the Joint Center for Lessons Learned. The goal is to ensure all activities are focused on achieving national objectives.

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**National Military Strategy Document**

**Joint Military Net Assessment**

**Defense Planning Guidance**

**Program Objective Memorandum**

**Joint Program Assessment Memorandum**

**Integrated Priority List**

**Annual Integrated Assessment of Security Assistance**

**Figure 8-4. Documents requiring identification of CA requirements.**
PREPARATION AND EXECUTION OF CA OPERATIONS

Preparation is based on the military mission. CA operations focus on the commander’s intent and the specified tasks. CA planners require a thorough knowledge of CA TTP. They synthesize mission guidance, doctrine, and operational information during planning and during mission execution (Figure 8-5, page 8-13). The SO imperatives must be of primary consideration when preparing and executing CA operations.

Planning, Organization, and Deployment
Planning, organization, and deployment may occur simultaneously during preparation for CA operations. During crisis action for disaster relief and for contingency missions, all three will overlap. In the best case, deliberate planning and preparation are progressive. The organization of the CA force is based on the concept of the operation and finalized during the “plan development” phase of the deliberate planning process. Even when the military mission is U.S. unilateral, preparation is of an interagency nature. Support provided by USG, FNs, and international agencies is considered.

Strategic and Operational Level Planning and Coordination
Planning and coordinating at the strategic and operational levels lessen CSS assets and resources needed to support nonmilitary requirements. However, in noncombat AOs supporting national strategic objectives, military involvement in civilian matters may be directed and unavoidable. In any situation, military responsibility in government functions is relative to civil needs. CMO control or support is relative to the military need.

Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
Well-planned and coordinated involvement in civilian matters best supports military operations. Increased involvement in nonmilitary matters detracts from the tactical commander’s ability to accomplish specified combat tasks. The attitude and capabilities of civilians have a direct impact on the military’s role in conducting CA operations. When the civil authorities are willing and able to administer to the civilians’ needs, the military’s responsibility is the lowest. If the civil authorities are unwilling or unable to administer to the civilians’ needs, then the military’s responsibility is the greatest. In the latter case, the need for military resources to support government operations also increases. Procedures used in CA operations incorporate military CSS and civilian procedures typical of commercial and government operations.

The Civil-Military Operations Estimate
Preparation of the CMO estimate is a continuous process. The CMO estimate supports CA planning and contains information on a designated area. The CMO estimate may be a written document at strategic and operational level. At the tactical level, the CMO estimate is more a mental process. CA planners collect and analyze data in advance. They update the estimate as required or when additional information becomes available.

CA planners must consider relevant political, cultural, and economic factors that affect operations. These factors are considered in the supported commander’s potential COAs. Planners also compare these factors to each applicable CA functional specialty to determine which COA is best supported.

CA planners must estimate the probable effect of hostilities. Their estimates provide a base on which to plan for CA support requirements. A CMO estimate must give priority to information required by the mission. The planner organizes the data in an easily retrievable manner. He also ensures all functional areas impacted by the mission are addressed. Sample estimates are found in FM 101-5.

CA Operations and the Battlefield Operating Systems
The Army has adopted a schematic of the battlefield for strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. BOS describe military operations in terms of general functions as related to the operating systems.
Mission

Principles of War

MetT-T

Specified

Implied

Planning and Execution

Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures

C3

BOS

Maneuver

Intelligence

Support

Air Defense

Mobility and Survivability

Combat Service Support

Command and Control

Civil Affairs Operations

Support Civil Administration

- Civil Assistance
- Support of Civil Administration in Friendly Territory
- Support of Civil Administration in Occupied Territory

Conduct Civil-Military Operations

- Populace and Resources Control
- Foreign Nation Support
- Humanitarian Assistance
- Military Civic Action
- Civil Defense

Figure 8-5. Planning and execution.
BOS are major functions at the tactical level of war that must be performed by the force to successfully execute operations. The seven BOS are used to systematically ensure elements of combat power are directed toward the mission. These battlefield functions of BOS are performed in the battle zone by Army units at corps level and below. CA operations are CSS systems and support BOS by their application to—

- **Maneuver:** CA units conducting PRC (DC operations, NEO) assist the tactical commander by freeing the battlefield for maneuver operations.

- **Intelligence:** CA commanders rely on the intelligence system in their planning process. CA personnel, through their interface with the local populace, expand the intelligence collection process through valuable information collection. All available resources and techniques to support the collection process should be exploited.

- **Fire support:** CA units have limited organic lethal fire support means (small arms). First consideration for CA elements is usually going to be in the formulation of protected target lists. Such lists consider things like population density, cultural or historic features, religious and medical facilities, and other factors. PSYOP are considered a nonlethal component of the fire support BOS.

- **Air defense:** CA personnel can assist the HN in developing an early warning system. In turn, this system can support our defense system through various PRC measures, (curfews, travel restrictions).

- **Mobility and survivability:** CA unit mobility may be limited due to mobilization constraints. However, they do have the ability to procure through the HN local resources (transportation—buses, trains, and other means) if available. CA personnel rely on the same measures as GP forces for their survivability (NRC defense measures, physical and operational security, C3I).

- **CSS:** CA operations are considered a component of CSS BOS. PRC, FNS, and civil defense can effectively supplement the logistics needs of the supported military unit. CSS may be considered a critical item as related to ensuring long-term sustainment of the operations.

- **C:** The CA C system performs the same as conventional military C systems. At the tactical level of war, most CA units will be assigned or attached to a corps, division, etc. The service CA headquarters, be it a CA command or brigade, will command other CA units, provide staff support to other services as required, and serve as facilitator, coordinator, and advisor to “other” subordinate CA units.

CA units are users and producers in the BOS. CA planners require a functional understanding of the battlefield structure and the relation to BOS. (See Appendix F.

**Liaison**

CA operations area result of deliberate planning. During execution of military operations, CA units will establish and maintain liaison. Such liaison supports the military mission. It also facilitates restoration to precombat conditions. CA personnel advise supported commanders and their staffs of the civil-military situation and negotiate with nonmilitary organizations for support.

**Planning for Collective Training**

Planning done for collective training is the basis for the execution of operational missions. CA units that do not train regularly with their supported units and/or headquarters are excluded from the organization for operational missions. Some collective training activities that support CA preparation for operational missions are found in Appendix G.

**Staff Interaction**

Staff interaction with the G5 and/or CMO officer and the CA unit commander is essential. The G5 and/or CMO officer is the principal staff planner for the commander and acts as liaison between the military forces, civil authorities, and people in the AO. The senior CA commander provides the support needed to coordinate CA activities in the AO. A close relationship in this staff area is critical for the execution of CA operations.