Overview of CA Operations

CA operations are actions carried out as an integral part of a military mission. They assure local authority and popular understanding of, and compliance with, measures supporting military operations and consolidation activities to attain U.S. objectives. CA operations occur across the operational continuum and are an integral part of SO.

Whether in peace, conflict, or war, military operations are more effective when they include CA support. Although conditions differ throughout the continuum, CA operations establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces and civil authorities and the civilian populace in an AO to facilitate military operations.

CA MISSION

The CA mission is to support the commander’s relationship with civil authorities and civilian populace, promote mission legitimacy, and enhance military effectiveness.

CA operations enhance the military effort in all operational environments. As an element of SOF, CA units support other elements of SOF. They also support GP forces. Most CA activities focus on CS or CSS systems.

CA supporting missions are based on objectives that are directly relevant to the overall objective. The CA unit commander’s restated mission in CA plans and orders most often describes support to other military operations. In a broader sense, CA support to other SOF and GP forces includes—

- Identifying nonmilitary sources for support.
- Providing civilian occupational skills not organic to the supported commander.

CA Supporting Missions

CA operations are divided into two supporting missions (Figure 1-1 page 1-2): conduct CMO and
support civil administration. Each supporting mission is divided into unique mission activities (Figure 1-2).

**Conduct Civil-Military Operations**
CA units conduct CMO to support the commander’s assigned mission and U.S. national policy. CA units support the commander by planning, conducting, supervising, and directing CMO. For more information, see Chapter 10.

**Support Civil Administration**
Support to civil administration is assistance to stabilize a foreign government. Such support results from the direct military involvement in executive, legislative, or judicial areas of civilian government. Support to civil administration ranges from providing assistance to friendly governments to providing civil administration in a U.S. occupied territory. For more information, see Chapter 11.

**CMO Mission Activities**
CA units conduct CMO in support of other military forces. They provide command support to other units and become a force multiplier by bringing government support capabilities to the battlefield. This support aids in maintaining a stable and peaceful society under civilian government. CMO mission activities are described in the following paragraphs. For more information, see Chapter 10.

**Populace and Resources Control**
Successful PRC denies the enemy resources and access to the population. It protects the people and denies the insurgent ready access to the populace and both internal and external sources of supply. PRC, although designed for low intensity conflict scenarios, can be applied across the operational continuum to protect legitimate interests of the government.

**Foreign Nation Support**
FNS closes the gap in CSS requirements by acquiring goods and services locally. It is important across the operational continuum where available support is limited.

**Humanitarian Assistance**
HA includes programs to lessen the impact of natural or man-made disasters or other conditions. These programs help reduce human pain, disease, suffering, hunger, and hardship that might present a threat to life, damage to, or loss of, property.
**Military Civic Action**

MCA projects are designed to enhance the effectiveness, legitimacy, and image of a foreign government or military.

**Civil Defense**

Civil defense minimizes the effects of enemy actions on the civilian populace. It also deals with emergency conditions created by such actions. U.S. civil defense is planned and organized action aimed at protecting life and property. Such action involves maintaining or restoring essential services and facilities damaged or lost through natural or man-made disasters.

**Civil Administration Mission Activities**

Support to civil administration fulfills obligations arising from treaties, agreements, or international law (see FM 27-10). The military role in civil administration varies with the operational continuum.

**CA SUPPORT ACROSS THE OPERATIONAL CONTINUUM**

The operational continuum encompasses operations in peace, conflict, and war (Figure 1-3). CA forces are uniquely designed to conduct operations across the continuum (see Chapter 4).

CA forces support conventional operations, SO, and when directed by the NCA, the domestic civil sector. Although conditions differ throughout the continuum, the CA mission remains the same. CA forces are well suited to plan, coordinate, support, and, if directed, supervise various operations to support U.S. objectives. They support the military effort by applying their skills and experience in—

- Linguistics.
- Cultural affairs.

![Figure 1-3. Operational continuum.](#)
- Military-to-foreign-nation advisory and assistance activities.
- Basic government services.

CA support in either peace or conflict is subordinate to the political element of national power (Figure 1-4). One of the most effective methods for providing CA support is through a comprehensive nation assistance program. CA units are well suited for military advisory and assistance activities because of their training, experience, and orientation. For more information, see Chapter 8.

CA operations support the overall military and U.S. policy objectives throughout the operational continuum. Most CA tasks are implied in mission guidance. Combatant commanders include CA operations in their planning guidance. CA commanders derive specific tasks from this guidance during their mission analysis. Common CA objectives are to—

- Support U.S. national and international policies.
- Support commanders in accomplishing their military missions.
- Ensure compliance with operational law requirements.
- Foster popular acceptance of U.S. national objectives.
- Obtain local civilian support for U.S. military operations.
- Advise, assist, or reinforce foreign governments IAW national policy directives and mission requirements.

CA SUPPORT TO OTHER SOF AND GP FORCES

In peace, conflict, and war, CA operations directly or indirectly provide unique support to other military forces. CA units are designed to meet the needs of other SOF commanders and GP forces commanders in all operational environments. For more information, see Chapters 12 and 13. CA organization under the LTOE ensures that other SOF commanders (to SF group level) and GP forces commanders (to brigade level) receive proper CA support for their missions. The CA force structure is flexible enough to allow using CA functional specialists from the CA commands and other CA units to manage more complex operations as required. The TOE and capabilities of CA units are listed in Chapter 4.

CA Support to Other SOF

CA support to other SOF does not differ significantly from support to GP forces. U.S. SOF are specifically trained to conduct, among other missions, FID and UW operations. These operations require politically attuned, regionally oriented, and linguistically capable CA elements. Although GP forces conduct supporting FID
operations, SOF normally conduct SA and FID missions in LIC environments. CA units support other SOF through staff support in planning, supervising, and directing CA operations. They also provide specialists to conduct CA mission and collateral activities. For more information, see Chapter 3.

CA Support to GP Forces
CA units support GP forces through their direct involvement with the civilian populace.

CA APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLES OF WAR

Warfighting doctrine is based on the principles of war. Although war calls for the direct application of military force, CA commanders must consider all facets of the operational environment. They provide input to the supported unit during the planning process. This process supports political, economic, and informational goals, as well as military objectives (Figure 1-5). GP forces commanders use the principles of war as fundamentals for planning combat operations. The planning process must include assessing the impact of military operations on the land and populace. SOF commanders and staffs especially apply the principles of war to CA operations since SO are more sensitive to nonmilitary factors than are conventional operations. Joint Pub 3-05 and FM 100-25 list the principles of war as they relate to SO. The following paragraphs briefly describe how these basic military principles relate to CA operations.

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Figure 1-5. Input to the planning process.
Objective
A strategic military objective is subordinate to, and must fulfill, a political objective. Likewise, operational and tactical objectives must fulfill strategic military objectives and thus realize political objectives. Once strategic, operational, and tactical military objectives are specified, CA assets support commanders by—

- Providing information on the political, cultural, and economic situation in the AO.
- Coordinating in-country resources to provide logistical support for military operations.
- Performing governmental functions when local agencies are unwilling or unable to provide for their people’s needs.
- Planning for and training HN personnel who subsequently will assume and/or expand upon ongoing initiatives.

Maneuver
Related to mass, maneuver incorporates flexibility, mobility, and maneuverability. The local populace can either help or hinder maneuver operations. CA personnel plan and coordinate with local authorities to increase maneuver flexibility. CA units assess the availability and operability of ports and airport facilities. CA units also coordinate for the use of indigenous air and ground transportation. They support maneuverability by—

- Reducing civilian interference with military operations.
- Recommending routes that avoid densely populated areas.
- Identifying nonmilitary transportation assets to support military operations.

Offensive
CA forces are combat multipliers. They support offensive operations by—

- Augmenting the intelligence cycle through direct involvement with the civilian populace.
- Minimizing local populace interference with U.S. military operations.
- Maintaining logistics support to military units using local resources.

Mass
The principle of mass requires the quick assembly of forces and resources at a particular place and time. Surprise is key to the success of operations depending on massing forces and resources. Concealing concentrations of forces from the local populace can be difficult. CA units can recommend secure areas where population density, local support, logistical support, and transportation routes support the massing of forces.

Economy of Force
CA units lessen the need to divert combat-ready troops from essential duties by planning for and using local resources to maintain order and provide logistics services.

Surprise
The element of surprise is difficult to achieve in highly populated areas. CA personnel can enhance the effectiveness of sensitive operations by coordinating with local authorities. Feedback from the populace will indicate the effectiveness of deception measures. CA operations supported by PSYOP can enhance the element of surprise.

Security
Security includes measures taken by a military unit, an activity, or an installation to protect itself against acts that may impair its effectiveness. CA operations support security by—

- Providing a conduit for information of intelligence value from the local populace and government HUMINT.
- Screening local populace groups, separating potential terrorist or enemy SO personnel from the civilian populace.
- Identifying potential cultural, religious, ethnic, racial, political, or economic attitudes that would jeopardize the military mission.
- Planning for and using local civil police in support of the security force.

Unity of Command
To achieve unity of command, CA units must have a clear, concise chain of command that minimizes the number of higher headquarters in that chain. However,
with mostly supporting roles, the CA chain of command cannot be so definitive. The CA chain of command must be flexible enough to synchronize command function activities with OPCON.

**Simplicity**
CA relationships are simplified by using a single-staff focal point. The G5 and/or S5 or CA staff officer can relieve the unit staff and command of many related functions. CA plans and annexes must be simple and direct. They must also be supportable by the available resources, including CA staff personnel. Early coordination and negotiation with civil authorities can ensure effective and successful operations.

### SO IMPERATIVES

Analyzing traditional military fundamentals in terms of political, informational, and economic factors blends the basic principles into military imperatives for SO. The SO imperatives reflect directly the LIC imperatives and the principles of war [Figure 1-6, page 1-8]. They also prescribe key operational requirements for SO in all operational environments. CA operations planned and conducted in compliance with the SO imperatives support the intent of the principles of war and the LIC imperatives.

**Understand the Operational Environment**
Military aspects of the operational environment include the political, economic, geographic, and demographic makeup of the AO. In military operations short of war, commanders must understand all aspects of the operational environment. The political conditions of conflict can change based on—

- Military successor defeat.
- A change in hostile strength or tactics.
- Changing levels of U.S. support.

Commanders must know who the friendly and hostile decision makers are, what their objectives and strategies are, and how they interact. They must ensure friendly decision makers understand the implications of the military mission on the political, social, religious, and/or economic situation. Commanders must remain flexible and adapt their operations to the situation. They must anticipate changes in their environment to promote nonmilitary opportunities.

Any change in the operational environment may require CA forces to help civilian agencies and other military forces adjust their strategy and tactics. Through their CA assets, commanders can draw on the experience and skills in emergency HA of government and/or nongovernment agencies, which include but are not limited to the following:

- UN agencies.
- International Committee of the Red Cross.
- Federation of Red Cross Societies.
- PVOs.
- USG agencies.

**Recognize Political Implications**
Commanders must not anticipate or assume a totally controlled environment where military concerns dominate. When conducting CA operations in support of either SOF or conventional military operations, CA planners must ensure the supported commanders consider the political effects of their military activities.

**Facilitate Interagency Activities**
When participating in an interagency or a combined operation, commanders must strive for unity of effort while recognizing the difficulty of achieving it. Military programs should support and complement civilian programs driven by nonmilitary considerations. CA elements provide the link between political, economic, and informational agencies with the military. This link reduces ambiguous missions, conflicting interests and objectives, and disunity of command. CA personnel provide this link by—

- Requesting clear mission statements and the decision makers’ intent.
- Actively and continuously coordinating with all relevant parties both military and nonmilitary.

**Engage the Threat Discriminately**
The greatest threat to be considered is instability of any form. Economic or social conditions may create threats to the people that military analysis of the situation does not reveal. Commanders must accurately assess
political threats to friendly governments. They must also consider using CA when engaging those threats. Sensible use of force promotes legitimacy of operations and wins popular support.

Consider Long-Term Effects
Commanders must place each problem in the context of the total environment. They must understand U.S. strategic objectives and the ultimate goal of their operations. They must abide by legal and political constraints (such as less than optimal rules of engagement) to avoid strategic failure while achieving tactical success. Commanders cannot jeopardize the success of national and theater long-term objectives by their desire to achieve immediate or short-term effects. Plans, policies, and operations must be consistent with
the theater commander’s priorities and objectives. The most desirable long-term effect is support to a friendly civil administration. To support the commander toward this end, the G5 recommends projects that, although begun by the commander using military resources (civil assistance), can be sustained by the local populace in the future with minimal or no military support.

**Ensure Legitimacy and Credibility of SO**

In operations short of war, there are significant legal and policy considerations. In modern conflict, legitimacy is the most crucial factor in developing and maintaining internal and international support. Without this support, the United States cannot sustain its assistance to a foreign power. The concept of legitimacy is broader than the strict legal definition contained in international law. The concept also includes the moral and political legitimacy of a government. The people of a nation and the international community determine legitimacy based on—

- Methods used to achieve results.
- Their collective perception of the credibility of the cause.

Inconsistency can lead to a loss of legitimacy and credibility at the national level. HA supports moral legitimacy—it is the right thing to do!

**Anticipate and Control Psychological Effects**

Military operations can have a positive or negative effect on individuals and the collective behavior of the civilian populace. All operations must integrate PSYOP to help control these effects in favor of U.S. policy and objectives. The supported G5 and/or S5 coordinates PSYOP support with the G3 and/or S3 for support to CA operations focused on the civilian populace.

**Apply Capabilities Indirectly**

Commanders must avoid the attitude that U.S. military forces can and will do it all when supporting a foreign government or dealing with nonmilitary groups. Credit for achievements must be shared with, or given to, the supported government to reinforce and enhance the legitimacy and credibility of that government. Properly planned and executed CA projects (for example, schools, road-building, well-drilling) can positively influence the perception of the local populace toward its government.

**Develop Multiple Options**

Commanders must maintain their operational flexibility by developing a broad range of options and contingency plans. CA operations must be flexible enough to support these options to various degrees depending on the operational continuum and principles of war. CA programs must shift from one option to a more advantageous one before and during execution. The situation of the Kurdish people in northern Iraq is a good example. CA operations were planned to support a military effort during Desert Shield/Storm but quickly shifted priority to that of assisting the civilian populace.

**Ensure Long-Term Sustainment**

The U.S. response to conflict varies from case to case. U.S. support of any effort may also vary. CA projects in support of a government can help sustain progress made in a foreign country. Wells drilled as military training remain in place to remind the HN populace of U.S. concern for essential needs as well as the host government’s support to the populace. Any civic action must be durable, consistent, and sustainable by local resources. Commanders must recognize the need for persistence, patience, and continuity of effort. They should not begin programs that are beyond the economic or technical capacity of the local area.

**Provide Sufficient Intelligence**

This imperative applies primarily to the CA staff. Traditional IPB omits economic and political factors that LIC IPB provides. CA units can collect nonmilitary and military information through their direct involvement with the civilian populace. The civilian populace can be a valuable source of information on territory not under military control or in denied areas.

**Balance Security and Synchronization**

Although security concerns often dominate military operations, key friendly nonmilitary leaders should not
be excluded from planning CA operations. If nonmilitary agencies that can support operations are not included in planning because of concerns about security, their efforts may not be synchronized with military operations. Synchronization prevents situations that hinder support of an operation. An example is the massing of civilians on a military supply route during the execution stage.

**PERSPECTIVE**

The U.S. Army is organized, trained, and equipped for operations in war. Although war is the basis for their employment, Army forces will probably be used in situations short of war to support national objectives. In war, military combat forces are the dominant instrument in pursuing national political objectives. Moreover, political, informational, and economic powers are used to support the military. In situations short of war, the Army is in a supporting role. Political, economic, and informational powers are then the primary means used to realize the strategic aim. Perhaps the greatest difference in modern combat is in emphasis. During war, the emphasis is on combat operations to defeat enemy military forces—warfighting! In peace and conflict, nonviolent aspects often dominate military operations. The relationship between the elements of national power is clearly interdependent. CA activities are important in coordinating U.S. military efforts in all operational environments.

**Wartime Principles and Techniques**

U.S. Army doctrine for CA operations results from the study of principles and techniques used in support of military campaigns from ancient times to the present. The earliest CA techniques supported military occupation of foreign territory by conquering nations. The U.S. concept for CA operations reflects the traditional supporting role of CA. The employment concept of “government support” and “command support” is basic to CA doctrine. Today, that concept is demonstrated in U.S. conduct of CMO and support of civil administration.

The Assyrians first organized occupied areas into provinces and governed through military governors. Their techniques for military control over a large area were later used by Persian, Greek, and Roman conquerors. Under Alexander the Great, Greek power and culture spread over the known world. His military government techniques are still used today in some areas of his former empire. Alexander retained the Persian governors. Since these governors knew the country and customs, they were effective administrators. Other key posts, such as financial officers, he assigned to Greeks. To assist military operations, he preserved the continuity of local laws, officials, and customs to secure support of the people and their resources. Respecting private property and honoring debts and requisitions of his troops also enhanced the effectiveness of the Greek armies in their relationship with conquered people.

Roman military government also influenced modern CA practice. From the time of Emperor Augustus onward, administering an imperial province followed certain well-marked lines of policy. Roman provincial governors had absolute power. Their administration observed local custom, tradition, and law. The governor published proclamations, orders, and ordinances and placed restrictions very similar to those imposed by the Roman law. Codified over the centuries, the Roman system of law served as a basis for current international law. The primary mission of the governor was to restore, establish, and maintain law and order in his province. Military force was used to control dissident native subjects. Law abiding subjects, however, were allowed and encouraged to develop their own commerce, industry, and government, but under Roman supervision. The Romans extended citizenship to large numbers of people to strengthen the empire. This practice did not ensure loyalty to Rome, however. Traditional values and customs remained dominant factors among these diverse peoples.

From the fall of the Roman Empire until the nineteenth century, there were few military occupations of conquered territories. During this period the only significant advances in regard to belligerent occupation were in the field of international law. These deliberations gave rise to the way occupation forces would rule territory. In most cases they tried to mirror the Roman traditions of ruling conquered territory.
In the conduct of military government in Mexico in 1847, General Winfield Scott demonstrated that properly conducted CMO save the combat commander problems with the civilian populace. He maintained that CMO saved lives, money, and supplies and often guaranteed military success when no other factor was effective. General Scott exercised the specialized functions of CA that we know today as the CA functional specialties [Chapter 4]. In using these functions under military control, he used reliable native personnel in existing civilian agencies of government in support of his military control over the populace. Although he lived nearly a hundred years before the Second World War, General Scott often used words very similar to those of General Eisenhower in addressing the military government detachments destined to land in Sicily: “Remember, gentlemen, that each one of you will represent America to the people among whom you are going, each one of these people will judge America by your conduct.”

The Secretary of War Stimson convinced President Franklin D. Roosevelt not to put CA under a civilian agency but to leave it under the Provost Marshal Corps. Roosevelt modified his view and, in 1943, activated the U.S. Army Civil Affairs Division under MG John Hildring. CA personnel in World War II found themselves encountering problems in the field unimagined in their classrooms at the University of Virginia’s School of Military Government. CA activities ranged from procurement of a bell for the church in Adano, Italy, to rescue and restoration of thousands of works of art. CA organizations served in the traditional role of “government support” to provide assistance to allied governments and establish military government in occupied countries. CA forces also used varied techniques in the different theaters based on the situation and personalities of senior leadership. CA operations in the Pacific and European theaters during World War II provide the foundation for future CA operations.

**Principles and Techniques in Operations Short of War**

CA principles established through our military experience are evidenced in situations for military operations short of war. The following paragraphs provide a historical perspective of CA operations conducted in situations short of war.

**Korea**

Although the U.S. Army had deactivated its CA units, CA functions still required personnel to support military operations. The most dramatic need was control of thousands of displaced persons fleeing the battlefield. Government support was simplified in this conflict because the government of the Republic of Korea continued to function. In a subsistence agrarian economy, CA personnel learned that draft animals and local ways were more important than electrical power and U.S. standard technologies.

**Vietnam**

During the Vietnam conflict, CA operations were in the U.S. public view as never before in the well-worn phrase, “winning the hearts and minds of the people.” The present SO connection between CA forces and other SOF, such as SF, began in Vietnam. Support to civic action developed as a successful technique to confront threats to a vulnerable population.

**Urgent Fury**

CA personnel were on the scene early in Grenada. One CA spearheader from Company A, 96th CA Battalion, was aboard the second C-130 to touch down. Other members of the company landed with the 82nd Airborne Division during follow-on operations. Their most pressing job was to care for civilians evacuated from combat areas. During the next two days, they coordinated the feeding, sheltering, and eventual return of about 20,000 people to their homes. Follow-on CA forces also used USAR CA functional specialists. Members of the 358th CA Brigade are still conducting overseas deployment training on the island and throughout the region.

**Just Cause" Promote Liberty**

CA soldiers, Active and Reserve, faced a multitude of tasks created by the hostilities. Troops from the 96th CA Battalion jumped in during the initial assault and quickly assumed the operation of Torrijos-Tocumen International Airport. CA personnel registered, cataloged, and returned indigenous transportation assets used by U.S. forces. Managing the large DC camp in Panama City and coordinating the equitable
distribution of humanitarian relief supplies were some of the tasks performed and supported by CA personnel.

**Operation Desert Shield/Storm**

Support to GP forces conducting theater-level operations exceeded the capabilities of the AC CA force. For the first time, USAR CA units were activated to support military operations. Throughout the region, CA units—
- Coordinated FNS.
- Managed DCs.
- Contacted civil defense officials of the HN.
- Conducted HA and MCA in support of military operations and U.S. national objectives.

The 352d CA Command began support to the government of Kuwait while still at its home station. The completion phase of CENTCOM’s campaign in the KTO required termination of combat on terms favorable to the United States and its friends. Employing CA units during the postcombat activities demonstrated the CA motto, “Seal the Victory.”