Chapter II

EOD IN A
JOINT ENVIRONMENT

1. Operations
   a. Background. UXO and other hazardous devices in a theater of operations will likely threaten military forces and operations. US personnel have been killed or injured by UXO in virtually every conflict or contingency in which the US has participated. The UXO threat is more serious to noncombatants, who are unfamiliar with military ordnance. While service components usually deploy with, and are supported by, its own EOD assets, the number of these assets is very limited and in high demand. In many situations, the geographic combatant commander, through his directive authority for logistics, can achieve economy of effort by organizing his EOD forces using common servicing. Common servicing may allow the joint force commander (JFC) to provide more efficient and effective EOD support to the joint force depending on the operational scenario. The joint EOD force could also include integration of coalition EOD forces in a joint/coalition EOD task force (TF).

   b. Historical Examples. During recent US contingencies, EOD assets from different services combined their efforts to maximize the efficiency of EOD operations. While effective, most were accomplished in an ad hoc manner, often improvised on site between the local EOD commanders.

      (1) Desert Storm. During the major UXO cleanup effort in Kuwait immediately after Desert Storm, EOD forces from each of the services were organized into a de facto subordinate EOD JTF under Task Force Freedom. The JTF dealt with the large numbers of UXO remaining in Kuwait City. This organizational technique allowed the task force and subordinate EOD commanders to focus all available EOD assets on the major UXO clean-up effort in an organized and efficient manner, thus reducing the need for individual services to bring more EOD assets into the country.

      (2) Somalia. In Somalia, EOD forces from the Army, AF, and Marines operated together to remove UXO by sharing response sectors in Mogadishu. Navy EOD personnel supplemented Army EOD soldiers in destroying captured munitions at an improvised demolition range.

      (3) Bosnia. In support of continued peacekeeping efforts in Bosnia, US EOD forces were integrated to provide EOD services for the elimination of UXO and to support conventional/special operations and coalition forces.

   c. Planning. A common servicing approach for EOD support is often the most efficient means to address the UXO threat, especially when a limited
number of EOD forces are available. Factors affecting the structure of a joint EOD force include intelligence and terrorist threats, parent unit mission (for example: flight operations, demining, or support to Special Operations Forces [SOF]). Appendix B, EOD Planning Checklist for Joint Operations, provides general EOD planning guidance to support contingency operations.

2. Employment Options
   a. Background. The magnitude of the UXO threat in the joint operations area (JOA), coupled with the overall operational situation, normally determines the value added and degree of common servicing desired for EOD support.
   b. JFC Options. This chapter provides three options for structuring a joint EOD force to accomplish the theater mission. Each option and organizational examples depict the use of service forces to accomplish the EOD mission. If the geographic combatant commander uses a functional command structure for the theater, the JFC logistics directorate of a joint staff (J-4) would still have overall responsibility, with service forces performing the EOD mission. Based on the situation, the CJTF can modify or mix any of the following options:
      (1) Service-component responsibility (with DIRLAUTH).
      (2) Lead-service component (with or without TACON or OPCON) of other service EOD forces.
      (3) Subordinate JEODTF.

3. Service Component Responsibility with DIRLAUTH
   a. Utilization. The service-component responsibility employment option is used when each service component provides for and controls its own EOD forces and requirements. It is also the most common method of employing EOD forces, although this option often will not provide the most efficient or responsive use of EOD assets.
   b. Benefits. This option works best when—
      (1) the service component geographical areas of responsibility within the JOA are clear.
      (2) the operational situation allows deployment of each of the service component’s EOD forces.
      (3) the JFC does not require direct control of EOD missions.
   c. DIRLAUTH Option. Commanders may benefit by specifying DIRLAUTH between the service component’s EOD units. Previous EOD operations have routinely operated in this manner; however, DIRLAUTH often was not expressly written in the operation plan (OPLAN) or operation order (OPORD). Formalizing DIRLAUTH often provides a more efficient and
responsive method for coordinating EOD operations among the service components. See Figure II-1, Service-Component Responsibility (with DIRLAUTH) Organization.

d. Employment Considerations. This employment option—

(1) allows each service to retain control of its EOD assets for operations in its area of responsibility (AOR).

(2) does not always allow the most efficient or responsive use of EOD assets.

(3) will likely increase response time to a major accident or incident when support is required to cross service-component lines.

(4) increases intelligence and operational information sharing between the service components when DIRLAUTH is authorized.

(5) may benefit the JFC and staff by establishing a JEODOC to assist in managing the EOD mission. Paragraph 6 of this chapter provides the conditions for establishing a JEODOC and its functions.

Figure II-1. Service-Component Responsibility (with DIRLAUTH) Organization
4. Lead-Service Component  
(with or without TACON or OPCON) Option

a. Utilization. The combatant commander may use the lead-service component option to support a limited duration mission or to provide more efficient EOD support, especially in a short notice, austere environment mission (for example: Bosnia and Kosovo). In this option, the combatant commander, through his directive authority for logistics, assigns specific EOD-related missions to a specific service component with or without TACON/OPCON of other services' EOD forces.

b. Formation. To establish a lead-service component, the combatant commander, in consultation with his subordinate JFC and service-component commanders, assigns specific common EOD tasks to a lead-service component. Normally, the lead-service component for EOD functions within a JFC is the service component with the majority of EOD requirements in theater. Another consideration for appointing a lead service is to appoint the component most capable of conducting the EOD mission. The combatant commander may place selected EOD assets from one or more of the other service components TACON or OPCON to the lead-service component EOD commander to assist in accomplishing the assigned tasks. Other services providing forces to the lead service may provide, or be directed to provide, staff augmentation to the lead-service EOD commander’s staff. These services should, as a minimum, provide LNOs. Having other service EOD staff augmentation or LNOs within the lead-service EOD staff section expedites planning, coordination, and mission execution. This option must include a support relationship for administrative/logistics support. Figure II-2, Lead-Service (with or without TACON/OPCON) Organization, depicts a typical lead-service command relationship.

c. Employment Considerations. This option—

(1) allows more efficient use of limited EOD assets for JTF-specific missions of limited duration or high priority. This option is not used to provide EOD support for specific service-related missions (to include aircraft support, harbor clearances, and carrier battle-group support). Each service retains select EOD forces to accomplish service-specific missions.

(2) centralizes all routine EOD operation taskings and data tracking with a single point of contact (POC), normally the lead-service component EOD unit operations officer.

(3) improves technical intelligence acquisition and dissemination to all EOD forces.

(4) may benefit the JFC and staff by establishing a J EODOC to assist in managing the EOD mission. The conditions for establishing a J EODOC and its functions are discussed in paragraph 6 of this chapter.

(5) provides a mechanism that plans for fluctuations of service EOD force responsibilities as the operation transitions through different phases. Allows service EOD support to increase or decrease based on operational tempo or the theater EOD mission.
Figure II-2. Lead-Service (with or without TACON/OPCON) Organization

5. Subordinate JEODTF

a. Utilization. A JEODTF is a subordinate J TF that controls (via TACON/OPCON for attached units) two or more service-component EOD organizations and is jointly staffed. Task organizing EOD forces under a JEODTF allows the CJ TF to focus limited EOD assets where they are needed most and provides an opportunity to optimize EOD mission capabilities. It also serves a similar function as a JEODOC, but includes command authority, as opposed to staff management, over assigned and attached EOD forces.

b. Formation. The CJ TF should base the decision to establish a JEODTF on specific mission needs, while also considering ongoing service component EOD requirements. Based on J FC guidance and other considerations, such as an OPLAN and existing agreements, each service component provides assets to fulfill common EOD support requirements within the JOA. However, even when common EOD support is provided for by a lead service or JEODTF, service-unique EOD requirements remain the responsibility of the individual
service components. The combatant and subordinate JFCs should consider the common support requirements needed to allow service-components the ability to execute their service-specific requirements. See Figure II-3, JEODTF Organization. The JEODTF headquarters normally is built around an existing service-component EOD command, with augmentation from other service EOD staff personnel. When using a JEODTF, the CJ TF must ensure that adequate administrative, logistical, and medical support is available to the JEODTF. The CJ TF employs a JEODTF for a limited time for a specific mission to clear hazards that threaten theaterwide operations. See Appendix C for more details on establishing a JEODTF.

c. Employment Considerations. The JEODTF option—

(1) delegates the authority to organize forces to accomplish the EOD mission, based on the CJ TF’s concept of the operation. By design and to avoid duplication of effort, a JEODOC is not established if the JEODTF option is used.

(2) provides the EOD force with unity of effort, centralized planning, and decentralized execution.

(3) consolidates the capabilities of each service’s EOD force in a joint effort to solve theaterwide UXO hazards.

(4) facilitates the combatant commander/CJ TF control over EOD forces and missions.

Figure II-3. JEODTF Organization
(5) expedites technical intelligence/data acquisition and dissemination to end-users.

(6) provides a command structure for the integration and control of coalition EOD forces.

(7) may be most appropriate for a major theater war (MTW), munitions storage or transportation disasters, large operations, or post-hostilities UXO clean-up operations.

6. JEODOC

a. Formation. The JFC and J-4 staff determine the need for the JEODOC. The JEODOC is useful whenever joint EOD management requirements are beyond the capability of the JTF’s J-4 staff or subordinate EOD force headquarters. The scope of the assigned mission and allocated force structure determines the staffing level and overall support requirements. The JEODOC is a fully integrated and mobile facility, manned and equipped by the individual service components under the auspices of the JTF J-4. To avoid duplication of effort, a JEODOC is not established when a JEODTF is formed. Both the Army and Navy have existing C^2 EOD units around which a JEODOC is built. Specifically, using the Army’s battalion (O-5 command) and group (O-6 command) headquarters, or the Navy’s Mobile Unit (O-5 command) and group (O-6 command), provide a ready EOD headquarters unit to quickly establish a JEODOC.

b. Functions. The JEODOC is a multifunctional operational center under the auspices of the JTF J-4. Its primary purpose is to manage theater-level UXO hazard-reduction operations and EOD planning, integrating, coordinating, and tasking functions (through the direction and authority of the commander) when there is no subordinate JEODTF formed to accomplish this task. The JEODOC provides the JTF oversight over all EOD operations in theater, tracks critical EOD assets, monitors and recommends changes in priorities, and resolves issues between service components. The JEODOC tasking authority enables the JTF to change service-component EOD force responsibilities as the operation transitions through different phases. This allows service EOD support to increase or decrease based upon operational tempo or the theater EOD mission. The major functions resident in the JEODOC are—

(1) Operations/Intelligence (Ops/Intel) Section. The ops/intel section ensures current theater-EOD operations are synchronized with CJTF intent. It monitors, synchronizes, and reports EOD operations to ensure maximum efficiency throughout the JOA. The section also monitors and interprets the enemy and friendly situation for the commander and informs forces of significant changes in operations, objectives, and priorities.

(2) Administrative/Logistics (Admin/Log) Section. The admin/log section identifies immediate or potential problems in the support or material system. The section determines logistics support resource requirements,
coordinates airlift requests, and special transportation requirements, and provides feedback (on request) for mission-essential repair and support items.

(3) Communications-Electronics (C-E) Section. This section provides information systems planning, coordination, and support to the JEODOC and all joint, coalition, and external organizations, as required.

7. Information Management and Reporting

a. Information Management (IM). IM refers to the processes a JTF J-4, JEODOC, and JEODTF use to obtain, manipulate, direct, and control vital EOD-related information. IM for EOD operations includes all processes involved in the creation, collection and control, dissemination, storage and retrieval, protection, and destruction of critical EOD information. The goal of IM for EOD operations is to provide a timely flow of quality information, enabling the commander of any EOD force to anticipate and understand the consequences of changing conditions. See FM 3-99.4 (FM 101-4)/MCRP 6-23A/NWP 3-13.1.16/AFTTP(I) 3-2.22, Multiservice Procedures for Joint Task Force-Information Management.

b. Reporting Requirements. See Appendix D, Standardized EOD Reports.