Command and Control in a Counterinsurgency Environment
|SECTION III PLANNING CONSIDERATION FOR COUNTERINSURGENCY|
2-18. Insurgencies are armed political movements, protracted politico-military struggles using guerrilla tactics and terrorist activities. Planners analyze the mission and develop counterinsurgency concepts to defeat each element of an insurgency. This is done in close cooperation with other governmental agencies to ensure all plans are fully integrated. Army planners use the military decision making process (see FM 5-0) during counterinsurgency planning. (See JP 5-0 for joint planning procedures).
2-19. Before beginning counterinsurgency planning, the staff conducts a thorough mission analysis of the operational environment and threat. This mission analysis establishes the operational framework for counterinsurgency planning. Give special consideration to the following areas.
VIABILITY OF THE HOST NATION GOVERNMENT
2-20. Determine this in conjunction with other governmental agencies and the HN. If there is an existing government, the legitimacy and viability of the existing government may determine the level of military and civilian agency support required.
THREATS TO HOST NATION INTERNAL DEFENSE AND DEVELOPMENT (IDAD)
2-21. Threats may be specific, such as insurgents or illicit drugs, or they may be more general as in instability and social unrest. This requires civil and military leaders to also target long-term causes rather than short-term symptoms. In the event of an insurgency, planners must identify the basis of an insurgency in order to determine its form, centers of gravity, and the root cause. This is key because the form and centers of gravity dictate the most effective type force to employ (police, militia, and military or primarily military and police) and identify insurgent vulnerabilities. A counterinsurgency plan describes a concept of operations to reclaim any cities and towns that have been lost and establish priority of effort and timelines. Concurrently, the critical infrastructure of the state and the government's centers of power are identified and secured.
HOST NATION SOCIAL, ECONOMIC, AND POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT
2-22. Counterinsurgency supports IDAD operations in a manner acceptable to the HN's political and cultural realities. (IDAD is a type of stability operation. See FM 3-07.) Planners consider factors such as the effectiveness of the HN leadership and government as well as existing treaties and the social and economic infrastructure. This assessment may lead to the conclusion the best solution from a US perspective may not be the best solution for the supported HN. This issue is resolved through diplomatic channels. Political authorities may determine that stability operations other than counterinsurgency or foreign humanitarian assistance (a support operation) are the most effective solution for the US and the HN governments.
2-23. An accurate intelligence estimate is essential to identify the threat upon which to base counterinsurgency efforts. The intelligence estimate supporting counterinsurgency operations has an orientation quite different from that of a conventional estimate. A comprehensive and intimate knowledge of the environment is essential in building this estimate.
2-24. The conventional J-2 intelligence estimate concentrates on enemy situation, enemy capabilities, an analysis of those capabilities, and conclusions drawn from that analysis. In counterinsurgency, however, planners expand this concept beyond conventional enemy analysis to focus more on the local population and its probable reactions to potential US or insurgent actions. This emphasis requires knowledge of the ethnic, tribal, racial, economic, scientific, technical, religious, and linguistic groups in the HN, as well as their locations and an understanding of how they may perceive future operations. Understanding the operating environment and the HN's social, economic, and political order are essential to conducting counterinsurgency operations that support the local IDAD program. The counterinsurgency intelligence planner views the battle space very differently from that of the conventional planner.
CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS ESTIMATE
2-25. The CMO estimate examines each military course of action for CMO requirements and CA assistance and reviews potential operations for any civil administration implications. CMO will also complete area studies where operations are likely. For military operations to support counterinsurgency, these assessments focus on social, economic, and political factors that relate to existing or potential lawlessness, subversion, or insurgency. These assessments may include overlays that show local demographics, civil supply support, public utilities, and population displacement. CMO planning must be incorporated into all counterinsurgency planning and operations. (See Appendix A.)
2-26. Planning at the tactical level in counterinsurgency operations requires a far greater analysis of civil considerations than in conventional operations. Civil considerations comprise six characteristics, expressed in the memory aid, ASCOPE. (See FM 6-0, Appendix B.) Consider the following when analyzing civil considerations for a counterinsurgency mission.
2-27. This characteristic addresses terrain analysis from a civilian perspective. Analyze how key civilian areas affect the missions of respective forces and how military operations affect these areas. Factors to consider include political boundaries, locations of government centers, by-type enclaves, special regions (for example, mining or agricultural), trade routes, and possible settlement sites.
2-28. Structures include traditional high-payoff targets, protected cultural sites, and facilities with practical applications. The analysis is a comparison how a structure's location, functions, and capabilities can support operations as compared to costs and consequences of such use.
2-29. Assess capabilities in terms of those required to save, sustain, or enhance life, in that order. Capabilities can refer to the ability of local authorities to provide key functions and services. These can include areas needed after combat operations and contracted resources and services.
2-30. Consider all nonmilitary groups or institutions in the AO. These may be indigenous, come from a third country or US agencies. They influence and interact with the populace, force, and each other. Current activities, capabilities, and limitations are some of the information necessary to build situational understanding. This becomes often a union of resources and specialized capabilities.
2-31. People is a general term describing all nonmilitary personnel that military forces encounter in the AO. This includes those personnel outside the AO whose actions, opinions, or political influence can affect the mission. Identify the key communicators and the formal and informal processes used to influence people. In addition, consider how historical, cultural, and social factors that shape public perceptions beliefs, goals, and expectations.
2-32. Events are routine, cyclical, planned, or spontaneous activities that significantly affect organizations, people, and military operations, such as seasons, festivals, holidays, funerals, political rallies, and agricultural crop/livestock and market cycles and paydays. Other events, such as disasters and those precipitated by military forces, stress and affect the attitudes and activities of the populace and include a moral responsibility to protect displaced civilians. Template events and analyze them for their political, economic, psychological, environmental, and legal implications.
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