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Chapter 9

Stability Operations and Support Operations

This chapter discusses the Army's role in stability operations and support operations and how ADA may support those operations. The Army performs important roles in these types of operations. The prime focus of our Army is warfighting, that is the use of force, yet its role in stability and support operations is critical. Use of Army forces in activities conducted during periods of peace helps keep the day-to-day tensions between nations below the threshold of conflict. Typical peacetime operations include nation assistance, security and advisory assistance, counterdrug efforts, antiterrorism measures, arms control, support to domestic civil authority, and peacekeeping operations.

THE ENVIRONMENT

9-1. The role of the US Army in stability and support operations is not new. From its beginning, the Army has performed many missions that do not require direct combat. These missions included protecting our citizens as the country's border expanded; building roads, bridges, and canals; and assisting nations abroad. Whether the mission is peacekeeping, nation assistance, civil disturbance control, support for insurgency and counterinsurgency, or noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO), situations of complexity and sensitivity are likely to be present. The solutions to the situations may not be present or may not be in the interest of the long-term objectives. Army leaders may find themselves facing difficult problems that require new thinking and actions.

9-2. A major consideration in these operations is the need to focus clearly on sustaining the legitimacy of the operation and the host government. Legitimacy is the willing acceptance of the right of a government to govern or a group or agency to make and enforce decisions. It is neither tangible nor easy to quantify. Legitimacy derives from the perception that authority is both genuine and effective, and employs appropriate agencies for reasonable purposes. No group or force can create it, but can encourage and sustain it by their actions. Legitimacy is the central concern of all parties directly involved in a conflict. If US military forces solve an immediate problem within a nation or a region, but in so doing detract from the legitimacy of the host government, they will have defeated their own purpose. Stability and support operations are accomplished in the environments of peace and conflict. These activities are also conducted immediately following the cessation of hostilities. Although the nation initiates many of these activities in peace, they extend into the environments of conflict and war.

9-3. Peacetime activities include those Army actions that support a CINC's forward-presence operations and, usually as part of an interagency effort, the US Ambassador's country plan. They promote regional stability and peace, retain US influence and access abroad, and defuse crisis. The conceptual framework of peacetime activity reflects a proactive Army dimension in support of a crucial element of our national military strategy. It employs Army capabilities in activities short of war in the causes of instability, thus minimizing the need for combat operations to protect vital national interests. Many of these operations will likely begin with a predominance of military control and influence.

ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

9-4. The commander-in-chief structures the activity forces to best accomplish the mission. The theater structure is task organized to accomplish the mission. It begins with the National Command Authorities (NCA) under the leadership of the President. It is executed through the various military departments. It creates a defined command, either a combatant command or a joint task force. The defined command integrates the services or forces into an organized structure to accomplish the mission. The theater structure is concerned with war, stability and support operations, and in peacetime requirements. This structure is depicted in Figure 9-1.

Figure 9-1. Joint Force Relationships

AREA OF OPERATIONS

9-5. The structure of an area of operations is focused on the type of support and stability operation that is given a mission. There are three structures:

  • joint operations area
  • joint zone
  • joint special operations area

CHARACTERISTICS OF STABILITY OPERATIONS

9-6. Army forces conduct stability operations in a dynamic environment. Stability operations are normally nonlinear and often noncontiguous. Army forces conduct operations along logical lines of operation, but not necessarily with geographic reference to one another. Stability operations are often time and manpower intensive. Commanders analyze each mission and adapt the operational framework, elements of operational design, and factors of METT-TC to fit the situation. Commanders designate the decisive, shaping and sustaining operations necessary for success. However, determining the military actions necessary to achieve the desired political end state can be more challenging than in situations requiring offensive and defensive operations; achieving the end state may be just as difficult.

9-7. Stability operations often require commanders to understand and use METT-TC differently. Commanders constantly reassess the situation and the application and interrelation of each METT-TC factor. The "enemy," for example, may be a set of ambiguous threats and potential adversaries. Even the mission may change as the situation becomes less or more stable. The mission can be as simple as conducting a briefing to host nation forces in a military-to military-exchange, or as difficult as conducting combat operations to accomplish a peace enforcement mission. Stability may be threatened for a number of reasons, and an enemy may be difficult to define or isolate. Depending upon the progress of stability, the complexity of the mission may change quickly.

9-8. Different factors may be important when analyzing the terrain and the troops and support available in stability operations. What constitutes key terrain may be based more on political and social considerations than physical features of the landscape. The troops assigned or available to a commander could include nontraditional assets such as host nation police units, contracted interpreters and laborers, or multinational forces. The level of integration and cohesion of a force composed of diverse assets is a key consideration for mission success.

9-9. Time considerations normally are substantially different in stability operations. The goals of a stability operation may not be achievable in the short term. Success often requires perseverance, a long-term commitment to solving the real problem. The achievement of these goals may take years. Conversely, daily operations may require rapid responses to changing conditions based on unanticipated localized conflict among competing groups. Civil considerations are especially critical in stability operations. The civil population as well as the host nation government, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and international organizations have great impact on achieving stability.

9-10. Stability operations are inherently complex and place greater demands at the small unit level. Small unit leaders are required to develop interpersonal skills such as cultural awareness, negotiating techniques and critical language phrases while maintaining warfighting skills. They must also remain calm and exercise good judgment when under considerable pressure. Capable, trained, disciplined, high-quality leaders, soldiers, and teams are especially important. Soldiers and units at every level must be flexible and adaptive. Often stability operations require leaders with the mental and physical agility to shift from noncombat to combat operations and back again.

9-11. Stability operations help restore law and order in unstable areas outside of the US and its territories. However, the mere presence of Army forces does not guarantee stability. Offensive and defensive operations may be necessary to defeat adversaries that oppose a stability operation. The ability of Army forces to stabilize a crisis is directly related to its ability to attack and defend.

TYPES OF STABILITY OPERATIONS

9-12. Army forces may conduct stability operations before hostilities, in crises, during hostilities, and after hostilities. Before hostilities, stability operations focus on deterring or preempting conflict. In a crisis, a stability operation may resolve a potential conflict or prevent escalation. During hostilities, it can help keep armed conflict from spreading and assist and encourage committed partners. Following hostilities it can provide a secure environment that allows civil authorities to regain control. Army forces conduct the following ten types of stability operations-

  • Peace operations
  • Foreign internal defense
  • Security assistance
  • Humanitarian and civic assistance
  • Support to insurgencies
  • Support to counterdrug operations
  • Combating terrorism
  • Noncombatant evacuation operations
  • Arms control
  • Show of force

PEACE OPERATIONS

9-13. Peace Operations (PO) support strategic and policy objectives and their implementing diplomatic activities. POs include peacekeeping operations (PKO) and peace enforcement operations (PEO). Although the US reserves the right to conduct PO unilaterally, it will normally participate in PO under the sponsorship of the UN or another multinational organization.

9-14. Army forces must always be ready to shift rapidly from their current mission when directed by the NCA or JFC. Optimally, forces should not transition from one PO role to another unless there is a change of mandate or a political decision with appropriate adjustments to force structure, ROE, and other aspects of the mission. As in other operations, it is crucial that commanders and staffs continually assess the mission and prepare contingency plans. In PO, this translates into planning for possible or likely transitions. Examples include transitioning from a US unilateral operation or multinational coalition to an UN-led coalition, from combat to noncombat operations, and from military to civilian control.

PEACEKEEPING

9-15. Peacekeeping operations (PKO) are military operations undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of agreements (cease fire, truce, or other such agreements), and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement. Peacekeeping operations usually involve observing, monitoring, or supervising and assisting parties to a dispute. Army forces conducting PKO rely on the legitimacy acknowledged by all major belligerents and international or regional organizations to obtain objectives. They use or threaten force only in self-defense or as a last resort. The ongoing Multinational Force Observer (MFO) operation in the Sinai Peninsula is an example of a successful peacekeeping operation. Information support is extremely important to PKO primarily to provide force protection and situational understanding and to ensure the success of subordinate PKO related efforts.

9-16. AMD may play a major role in this operation. AMD brigades deter the threat from using TMs, ABTs, and UAVs. They deploy to the area to provide AMD protection over geopolitical targets and critical assets. THAAD and Patriot will be key systems in support of this operation. Support to NATO and the Korean government are historical examples of this type of operation. The continuing presence of US forces in Saudi Arabia provides a current example of peacekeeping operations. Special ROEs apply to this type of operation and are usually more restrictive than those ROEs during war.

PEACE ENFORCEMENT

9-17. Peace enforcement operations are the application of military force, or the threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order. Unlike PKO, PEO do not require the consent of all parties. PEO maintain or restore peace and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement. Operation Restore Hope in Somalia was a PEO. Army forces assigned a PEO mission must be able to conduct combat operations. Units must be able to apply sufficient combat power for self-defense and to forcibly accomplish assigned tasks. Units must also be prepared to transition to PKO. PEO normally includes one or more of six subordinate operations:

  • Forcible separation of belligerents.
  • Establishment and supervision of protected areas.
  • Sanction and exclusion zone enforcement.
  • Movement denial and guarantee.
  • Restoration and maintenance of order.
  • Protection of humanitarian assistance.

9-18. AMD brigades may play a major role in PEO. Depending on the threat, all air and missile defense weapon systems may be involved. The brigades may be required to defend or enforce no fly zones between the belligerents.

Operations in Support of Diplomatic Efforts

9-19. Army forces support diplomatic efforts to establish peace and order before, during, and after a conflict. These operations include preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, and peace building. For example, Army forces support preventive diplomacy by conducting a preventive deployment or show of force as part of the effort to deter conflict. Support to peacemaking operations often includes military-to-military contacts, exercises, peacetime deployments, and security assistance. Army forces support to peace building involves the same activities as longer-term foreign internal defense (FID) operations. Military support of diplomatic activities improves the chances for success by lending credibility to diplomatic actions and demonstrating resolve to achieve viable political settlements.

FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE

9-20. FID is participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any programs taken by another government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. FID is a program that supports friendly nations operating in or threatened with potential hostilities. FID promotes stability by helping a host nation establish and preserve institutions and facilities responsive to its people's needs. Army forces participating in FID normally advise and assist host nation forces conducting operations. FID is also a specified and significant mission for selected ARSOF. When conducting FID, Army forces provide indirect support, direct support (not involving combat operations), or conduct combat operations to support a host nation's efforts. The AMD brigade may well be part of a FID program. The training of host nation AD personnel may be a type of program the AMD brigade will participate in during a FID program.

Indirect Support

9-21. Indirect support emphasizes the principles of host nation self-sufficiency and builds strong national infrastructures through economic and military capabilities. Examples include security assistance programs, multinational exercises, and exchange programs. Indirect support reinforces the legitimacy and primacy of the host nation government in addressing internal problems.

Direct Support (Not Involving Combat Operations)

9-22. Direct support involves the use of US forces providing direct assistance to the host nation civilian populace or military. Direct support includes civil-military operations, intelligence and communications sharing, and logistics. Direct support does not usually involve transferring arms and equipment or training local military forces. The AMD brigade conducts direct support operations by the continual presence of AMD forces in SWA. The AMD brigade soldier's role may be the training of host nation personnel in the use of command and control nodes. This activity would require the AMD brigade commander to coordinate with the ambassador's in-country teams to preclude possible interference with an established security assistance program.

Combat Operations

9-23. Combat operations include offensive and defensive operations conducted by US forces to support a host nation's fight against insurgents or terrorists. Normally, the use of US forces in combat operations is a temporary measure. FID operations are closely scrutinized by a variety of audiences, to include the American public, international organizations, and the host nation populace. Hostile propaganda will invariably attempt to exploit the presence of foreign troops to discredit the host government and the US. Direct involvement by the US military can damage the legitimacy and credibility of the host nation government and security forces. Eventually host nation forces must stabilize the situation and provide security for the populace themselves.

9-24. Most FID activities focus on helping a host nation prevent the development of an active insurgency. If an insurgency already exists or preventive measures fail, FID focuses on the eliminating, marginalizing, or reassimilating the insurgent element into society. Military support to the counterinsurgency effort recognizes that military power alone cannot achieve lasting success. US military power cannot and will not ensure the survival of regimes that fail to meet their people's basic needs. Military programs and US actions promote a secure environment in which to implement programs that eliminate both the causes of the insurgency and the insurgents. As with other FID actions, support to counterinsurgency must continue to balance security with economic development to enhance or reestablish stability.

9-25. Army forces conduct support to counterinsurgencies within the context of the US ambassador's country plan and the host nation's Internal Defense and Development (IDAD) strategy. The goal is to integrate all resources; civilian, military, public, and private; so that host nation combat operations and development efforts complement each other. The intended result is measurable improvement in the economic, social, and political well being of those supported. Army forces can assist in development programs by helping governmental and private agencies provide essential supplies and services.

9-26. Support to counterinsurgencies helps host governments deal with two principal groups: the insurgents and the people. Army forces help host governments protect the people from insurgent violence and separate them from insurgent control. These actions require the use of persuasion, prosecution, and destruction to attack insurgent leadership and organization. The goal is to deny insurgent organizations sources of personnel, materiel, funds, and intelligence

9-27. Army forces help the host government's police, paramilitary, and military forces perform counterinsurgency, area security, or local security operations while respecting the rights and dignity of the people. They provide advice and assistance in finding, dispersing, capturing, and destroying insurgent forces. They emphasize the training of national, state, and local forces to perform essential defense functions. Their aim is to provide a secure environment in which development programs can take effect.

9-28. Operations Just Cause and Desert One are two historical examples of this type of operation. AMD brigades must be prepared for this operation. While the brigade itself may not take part in the operation, units from its organization may be deployed. Air defense MANPADS units are ideally suited to this type of operation. Air defense provides force protection and defense of critical assets that support the development of the raiding or attack party. The Iranian Raid in Desert One is an example where air defense MANPADS were used. Avenger might be used if the threat was significant and sufficient lift assets are available. AMD brigades must ensure that its subordinate units are trained and ready for these operations.

SECURITY ASSISTANCE

9-29. Security assistance refers to a group of programs by which the US provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services to foreign nations by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives. Examples of US security assistance programs are foreign military sales, foreign military financing, international military education and training, economic support fund, and Army Export Control Act-licensed commercial sales. Army forces support security assistance efforts through military training teams, maintenance support personnel and training, and related activities such as humanitarian mine removal.

HUMANITARIAN AND CIVIC ASSISTANCE

9-30. Humanitarian and civic assistance (HCA) programs consist of assistance provided in conjunction with military operations and exercises. By law, HCA are authorized by the Secretary of State and planned and appropriated in the Army budget. HCA must enhance the security interests of the US and host nation and increase the operational readiness of the units and soldiers performing the mission. In contrast to humanitarian and disaster relief conducted under foreign humanitarian assistance operations, HCA are planned activities with specific budget limitations. HCA are limited to the following categories:

  • Medical, dental, and veterinary care provided in rural areas of a country.
  • Construction of rudimentary surface transportation systems.
  • Well drilling and construction of basic sanitation facilities.
  • Rudimentary construction and repair of public facilities.
  • Specified activities related to mine detection and clearance, including education, training, and technical assistance.

SUPPORT TO INSURGENCIES

9-31. On NCA order, Army forces support insurgencies that oppose regimes that threaten regional stability or US interests. While any Army force can be tasked to support an insurgency, ARSOF usually receive these missions. ARSOF training, organization, and regional focus make them well suited for these operations. Army forces supporting insurgencies may provide logistic and training support but normally do not themselves conduct combat operations. Depending on the threat, the AMD brigade may support this type of operation. Avenger may play a major role.

SUPPORT TO COUNTERDRUG OPERATIONS

9-32. In 1986, the president issue National Security Directive 221 declaring drug trafficking a threat to national security. It is also a threat to the stability of many friendly nations. The Army participates in counterdrug operations under provisions of the National Drug Control Strategy. Army forces may be employed in a variety of operations to support other agencies responsible for detecting, disrupting, interdicting, and destroying illicit drugs and the infrastructure (personnel, materiel, and distribution systems) of illicit drug trafficking entities.

9-33. Army forces always conduct counterdrug operations in support of another US government agency. These include the Coast Guard, Customs Service, Department of State, Drug Enforcement Agency, and Border Patrol. When conducted inside the US and its territories, they are domestic support operations. When conducted outside the US and its territories, they are considered stability operations. Army forces do not engage in direct action during counterdrug operations. Units that support counterdrug operations comply with US and foreign legal limitations on the acquisition of information on civilians and the conduct of law enforcement activities. Support to counterdrug operations include:

  • Detection and monitoring
  • Host nation support
  • Command, control, communications, and computers
  • Intelligence, planning, logistic, training and manpower support
  • Research, development, and acquisition
  • Reconnaissance

9-34. Air defense sensor surveillance and intelligence reporting will be the primary role for ADA brigade units. The sensors are ideally suited to provide long-range surveillance support to this type of operation. The AMDPCS can provide a pictorial display of the airspace above the international borders. This support will normally be provided to border patrol and US customs organizations along the US border.

COMBATING TERRORISM

9-35. Terrorism is the calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear. It is intended to coerce or intimidate governments or societies in pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological. Enemies who cannot compete with Army forces conventionally often turn to terrorism. Terrorist attacks often create a disproportionate effect on even the most capable of conventional forces. The tactics used by terrorists range from arson to the use of WMD. Army forces routinely conduct operations to deter or defeat these attacks. Offensively oriented operations are categorized as counterterrorism; defensively oriented operations are antiterrorism.

9-36. The Gulf War provides a historical example of how one nation used tactical ballistic missiles to intimidate another country. The AMD brigade possesses two systems, THAAD and Patriot, which provide significant capability against this threat. The AAMDC must provide command and control of a composite enclave and or task force for Patriot and THAAD in support of this operation. Air Defense brigades may play a minor to a major role in this type of operation.

Counterterrorism

9-37. Counterterrorism consists of offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism. Army forces participate in the full array of counterterrorism actions, including strikes and raids against terrorist organizations and facilities outside the US and its territories. Counterterrorism is a specified mission for selected SOF that operate under direct control of the NCA or under a unified command arrangement. Commanders who employ conventional forces against organized terrorist forces operating inside their AO are conducting conventional offensive operations, not counterterrorism operations.

Antiterrorism

9-38. Antiterrorism includes defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorist attacks, to include limited response and containment by local military forces. Antiterrorism is a consideration for all forces during all types of military operations. Acts of terrorism against US forces may have a strategic impact. Commanders take the security measures necessary to accomplish the mission and protect the force against terrorism. Army forces are often most vulnerable in off-duty periods and locations. Soldiers and families that reside outside protected installations are ideal targets for terrorists. Commanders make every reasonable effort to minimize the vulnerability of their force to murder and hostage taking. Typical antiterrorism actions include-

  • Coordinating with local law enforcement.
  • Positioning and hardening of facilities.
  • Taking physical security actions designed to prevent unauthorized access or approach to facilities.
  • Taking crime prevention and physical security actions that prevent theft of weapons, munitions, identification cards, and other materials.
  • Establishing policies regarding travel, size of convoys, breaking of routines, host nation interaction, and off-duty restrictions.
  • Providing for protection from WMD.

NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATIONS

9-39. Noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO) relocate threatened civilian noncombatants from locations in a foreign nation to secure areas. Normally, these operations involve US citizens whose lives are in danger either from the threat of hostilities or from a natural disaster. They may also include host nation citizens and third country nationals. Army forces, normally as part of a JTF, conduct NEOs to assist and support the Department of State. Removing noncombatant Americans and others from the threat of being killed or taken hostage provides humanitarian service. Relocating these potential targets expands options available to diplomatic and military authorities.

9-40. NEOs take place in permissive, uncertain, or hostile environments. Ambassadors initiate a NEO in a permissive environment in anticipation of a crisis. Direct military involvement in these evacuations is usually not required. NEOs supported by the military are normally initiated when the local situation has deteriorated and security of the evacuees becomes uncertain or conditions are hostile. These types of NEOs are usually conducted with minimal warning. Often American lives are in immediate danger.

9-41. NEO can be conducted as a prelude to combat actions, as part of deterrent actions, or as part of a PO. Most often, evacuation force commanders have little influence over the local situation. They may not have the authority to use military measures to preempt hostile actions, yet must be prepared to protect the evacuees and defend the force. The imminent threat may come from hostile forces, general lawlessness, dangerous environmental conditions, or a combination of all three. Correctly appraising the threat and the political-military environment in which forces operate is key to NEO planning. The AMD brigade will not normally support this type of operation.

ARMS CONTROL

9-42. Army forces normally conduct arms control operations to support arms control treaties and enforcement agencies. Army forces can assist in locating, seizing, and destroying WMD after hostilities, as occurred after Operation Desert Storm. Other actions include escorting deliveries of weapons and material (such as enriched uranium) to preclude loss or unauthorized use, inspecting and monitoring production and storage facilities, and training foreign forces in the security of weapons and facilities.

9-43. Army forces may conduct arms control during combat or stability operations to prevent escalation of the conflict and reduce instability. This could include the mandated disarming of belligerents as part of a PO. Collecting, storing, and destroying conventional munitions and weapons systems can deter belligerents from resuming hostilities. Specific Army force capabilities including engineers and explosive ordinance disposal personnel are particularly suited to these operations. Air defense units and the AMD brigade do not play a role in this type of operation.

SHOW OF FORCE

9-44. The US conducts shows of force for three principal reasons: to bolster and reassure allies, deter potential aggressors, and gain or increase influence. Shows of force are designed to demonstrate a credible and specific threat to an aggressor or potential aggressor. The presence of powerful and capable forces signals to a potential aggressor the political will to use force. Combatant commanders may have established force deployment options as part of an existing contingency plan. These shows of force are designated as flexible deterrence options.

9-45. For Army forces, show of force operations usually involve the deployment or buildup of military forces, an increase in the readiness status and level of activity of designated forces, or a demonstration of operational capabilities by forces already in the region. Although actual combat is not desired, shows of force can rapidly and unexpectedly escalate. Commanders must organize their units as if the mission requires use of force. An effective show of force must be demonstrably mission-capable and sustainable. Units assigned a show of force mission assume that combat is probable. All actions ordinarily associated with the projection of a force to conduct combat operations pertain to show of force deployments.

9-46. ADA brigade units are ideally suited for this role. A historical example is Operation Desert Storm. Early deployment of AMD shows US national resolve. It positions the unit in country to support follow-on contingency operations. AMD will provide a forward presence and defend APODs and SPODs that support the protecting force in the force projection phase of a contingency operation. AMD brigade planners must be thoroughly familiar with planning functions for this type of operation.

CONSIDERATIONS FOR STABILITY OPERATIONS

9-47. Conducting stability operations is fundamentally identical to conducting offensive, defensive, and support operations. While each stability operation is different, the decision making and troop leading procedure methodologies apply. The considerations supplement those processes and can help commanders develop tailored concepts and schemes for stability operations. Considerations for stability operations include-

  • Leverage interagency, joint, and multinational cooperation
  • Enhance the capabilities and legitimacy of the host nation
  • Understand the potential for unintended consequences of individual and small unit actions
  • Display the capability to use force in a non-threatening manner
  • Act decisively to prevent escalation
  • Apply force selectively and discriminately.

LEVERAGE INTERAGENCY, JOINT, AND MULTINATIONAL COOPERATION

9-48. Unity of effort requires constant coordination with all involved agencies. Stability operations require commanders to adapt to situations where lines of authority and areas of responsibility are unclear. This is important because the military is often the supporting rather than the supported agency. Commanders coordinate and integrate civilian and military activities. Likewise, commanders make clear to other agencies their military objectives and operational schemes. Coordination makes unity of effort and effective integration work in environments where unity of command is not possible. It also lends coherence to the activities of various elements involved.

9-49. Operational and tactical headquarters plan their operations to complement those of governmental and private agencies. Coordinating centers such as the civil-military operations center accomplish this task. Civil-military operations centers include representatives from as many agencies as required. Effective civil-military coordination and cooperation is necessary to mass the effects of all assets, agencies, and forces to accomplish national and multinational objectives. Effective civil-military operations reduce the use of US resources through coordination with host and third nation governmental organizations, NGOs, and international organizations operating in the AO.

ENHANCE THE CAPABILITIES AND LEGITIMACY OF THE HOST NATION

9-50. Army forces consciously endeavor to enhance host nation credibility and legitimacy. They demonstrate the proper respect for host nation government, police, and military forces. Host nation military and police forces are integrated in all aspects of every operation. The civil population will closely watch actions by Army forces. Disrespect toward host nation officials or lack of confidence in host nation capabilities by US forces will discredit the host nation and damage the stability effort.

9-51. Commanders must not allow stability issue solutions to become a US responsibility. Within their capabilities, the host nation must take the lead, in both developmental and security activities. When host nation capabilities are inadequate for the task, Army forces enhance those capabilities through training, advice, and assistance. Commanders, within the restrictions of international law and US policy, make maximum use of host nation forces and personnel for all possible activities. In any successful stability operation, the host nation- not the US forces supporting it- must ultimately prevail. The Army learned this lesson in Vietnam.

9-52. Successful FID demands a long-term investment. The factors that lead to instability or insurgency compound over time. The host nation and its supporters cannot expect to quickly correct years of problems and their consequences. The affected segments of society must see that changes are lasting and that underlying problems are being effectively addressed. The fundamental cause of insurgent activities is widespread dissatisfaction with standing ethnic, religious, political, social, or economic conditions by some sizable portion of the population. For US military power to be effective in supporting a counterinsurgency, the supported government must address or revise its policies toward the disaffected portions of the country's population. There will be few immediate, decisive results in military operations against insurgent forces. When results occur, they will be short lived unless the host government acts just as decisively to address the problems that underlie the insurgency.

UNDERSTAND THE POTENTIAL FOR UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF INDIVIDUAL AND SMALL UNIT ACTIONS

9-53. Given the volatile and politically charged nature of most stability operations, individual and small unit actions can have consequences disproportionate to the level of command or amount of force involved. In some cases, tactical operations and individual actions can have strategic effects. Recognizing and avoiding potential problems requires trained, disciplined, and knowledgeable leaders and soldiers. Every soldier must understand the operational and strategic context of the mission and the potential military, political, and legal consequences of their actions or inaction.

9-54. Stability operations occur in the public view. This includes continuous observation by host nation, domestic, and international populations as well as the media. Knowing this, opponents of stability efforts will seize on relatively minor incidents to achieve strategic advantages. Potentially, a single act of indiscipline or rash application of force can undo months and years of disciplined effort. Likewise, actions that are destructive to the natural or cultural environment may introduce negative perceptions that must be overcome.

DISPLAY THE CAPABILITY TO USE FORCE IN A NON-THREATENING MANNER

9-55. Army forces must be capable of limited combat operations for self-defense. A corollary to the concept of being prepared to conduct offensive and defensive operations is the need to display such preparedness in a non-threatening manner. The intent is to demonstrate strength and resolve without provoking an unintended response. The aim of a show of force is deterrence, not an attempt to goad or bully an opponent into an attack.

9-52. Within mission constraints, units display preparedness by routinely con6ucting demanding combat training. Training should challenge soldiers to react to situations involving weapons use, levels of force, and ROE. Consistent with OPSEC demands, commanders make known to all parties the breadth and depth of available resources. It is not prudent to allow a potential adversary to know of all available Army force capabilities. However, displaying offensive and defensive strength can deter opponents from direct confrontation.

ACT DECISIVELY TO PREVENT ESCALATION

9-57. The nature of stability operations may limit the ways and means available to accomplish military objectives. Operational restraints do not necessarily impede the effectiveness of an Army force. Army forces act with speed and determination. Opponents may perceive hesitation to act decisively as weakness. Being overcautious can also damage the confidence of the uncommitted populations in the stability effort. Army forces must pursue military objectives energetically and, when necessary, apply military power forcefully. This does not imply that soldiers act with belligerence. Rather, in cases where force is required, commanders ensure that it is applied rapidly and decisively in a manner calculated to end the crisis and deter future confrontations.

APPLY FORCE SELECTIVELY AND DISCRIMINATELY

9-58. An extension of the need to act decisively is the requirement to apply force selectively. Commanders ensure their units apply force consistent with and adequate to assigned objectives. They employ combat power selectively in accordance with assigned missions and prescribed legal and policy limitations. In military operations, commanders consider requirements to prevent unnecessary suffering, distinguish between combatants and noncombatants, and minimize the loss of life and damage to property. These considerations constrain or dictate the level of force acceptable. Excessive or arbitrary use of force is never justified. It may lead to the need to apply ever-increasing force to maintain the same degree of order, as well as to the loss of sympathy and support of the local populace.

9-59. Conversely, using inadequate force jeopardizes the credibility of the force. Inadequate force emboldens potential opponents and raises doubts in the minds of protected groups. Operational commanders issue ROE to guide the tactical application of combat power. Ordinarily, the commander on the ground is best qualified to determine the required degree of force, consistent with the ROE.

9-60. When available, nonlethal capabilities can provide additional tools to augment, but not replace, the traditional means of deadly force. Nonlethal means expand the number of options for confronting situations where deadly force is not warranted. However, each soldier must retain the capability to immediately apply deadly force for self-defense.

CHARACTERISTICS OF SUPPORT OPERATIONS

9-61. Support operations are usually nonlinear and noncontiguous. Adaptive and creative leaders tailor the application of the operational frame- work, elements of operational design, and METT-TC to fit each situation. Commanders designate the decisive, shaping and sustaining operations necessary for mission success. However, identifying centers of gravity, decisive points, and even the desired end state can be more complex and unorthodox than in offensive and defensive operations. When visualizing a support operation, commanders recognize that they may have to use a different definition of the enemy. In support operations, the adversary is often disease, hunger, or the consequences of disaster.

TYPES OF SUPPORT OPERATIONS

9-62. The two types of support operations are domestic support operations (DSO), and foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA). Army forces conduct DSO in the US and its territories and FHA outside the US and its territories. Army forces have broader requirements and more significant and extensive obligations in DSO than FHA. Army forces normally conduct FHA operations only in a permissive environment. In uncertain and hostile environments, Army forces conduct FHA operations as part of larger stability or offensive and defensive operations.

DOMESTIC SUPPORT OPERATIONS

9-63. A presidential declaration of a major disaster or emergency usually precedes DSO. Army support to DSO supplements the efforts and resources of state and local governments and organizations. The Federal Response Plan (FRP) provides a national level architecture to coordinate the actions of all supporting federal agencies conducting consequence management, including DOD. DSO require extensive coordination and liaison among interagency, joint, multi-jurisdictional (state and local), and AC and RC entities.

9-64. Under the Constitution, civilian government is responsible for preserving public order and carrying out governmental operations within its territorial limits, if necessary by force. The Constitution allows the use of the military to execute or enforce the law to protect the states against invasion, and upon request of the state, to protect it against domestic violence. However, the Posse Comitatus Act, as amended, significantly restricts the use of military forces in federal status. It prescribes criminal penalties for the use of the Army or the Air Force to execute laws or to perform civilian law enforcement functions within the US, except as otherwise authorized by the Constitution or Congress. DOD policy extends this prohibition to the Navy and Marine Corps. The Stafford Act also defines and clarifies the role of US military forces in support of domestic civil authorities. Since the law may prohibit certain types of activities during DSO, commanders need a detailed analysis of their legal authorities for each mission.

9-65. Army forces provide domestic support primarily in accordance with DODD 3025.15, Military Assistance to Civil Authorities (MACA). The MACA directive is wide-ranging; it addresses such actions as civil disturbance control, counterdrug activities, combating terrorism, and law enforcement. Generally, the Secretary of the Army is the DOD executive agent for MACA. In domestic support operations, Army forces always support local, state, and federal civil authorities.

FOREIGN HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

9-66. Army forces usually conduct FHA operations to relieve or reduce the results of natural or manmade disasters. They also conduct them to relieve conditions such as pain, disease, hunger, or privation that present a serious threat to life or loss of property. Army forces supplement or complement the efforts of host nation civil authorities or agencies responsible for providing assistance. FHA is limited in scope and duration and focuses exclusively on prompt aid to resolve an immediate crisis. Longer-term activities designed to support full recovery and a return to pre-disaster conditions will normally become part of a combatant commander's TEP. In such cases, a FHA operation transitions to a stability operation.

9-67. Many FHA and DSO support activities, especially those involving relief operations, are similar. Distinctions relate to the different legal restrictions applied to Army forces conducting support operations inside the US and its territories. DOD has extended the restrictions of Posse Comitatus to US forces overseas (see DODD 5255.5). DODD 5100.46 establishes policy guidance for FHA operations.

9-68. Army forces execute FHA operations, usually as part of a JTF, in conjunction with the US country team of the affected country. They provide support in accordance with appropriate treaties, memorandums of agreement, memorandums of understanding, and US fiscal authority and foreign policy. The US Agency for International Development is the lead US agency for coordinating FHA. Army forces usually conduct FHA operations in support of host nation civil authorities and in concert with other civilian agencies-US, international, governmental and private.

THE ARMY'S ROLE IN SUPPORT OPERATIONS

9-69. The Army is not specifically organized, trained, or equipped for support operations. Army forces are designed and organized for warfighting. However, their warfighting capabilities allow them to support civil authorities in DSO and FHA. The Army is a disciplined force with well-established but flexible and adaptive procedures. Army units have a functional chain of command, reliable communications, and well-trained and equipped organizations that can operate and sustain themselves in an austere environment with organic assets. The Army can rapidly move large forces to the affected location using military transportation. Army engineer, military police, medical, transportation, aviation, and civil affairs assets are especially valuable for support operations.

9-70. The special qualities, capabilities, and geographic dispersion of the RC make it especially suitable for DSO. The long-term relationships with state and local officials and dispersion of RC units are ideally suited for rapid response. The US Army Reserve (USAR) has more than 2,000 units in the US, Guam, Northern Marianas Island, American Samoa, Virgin Is- lands, Puerto Rico, and Germany. The Army National Guard (ARNG) has units in 2,700 communities in all 50 states, the District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands. State control of the ARNG optimizes their applicability to DSO. ARNG units do not require federal authorization to respond to emergencies; non-federalized ARNG units act on orders of the governor of their state. When in a state supporting or non-federalized role, the ARNG is not subject to the Posse Comitatus Act.

FORMS OF SUPPORT OPERATIONS

9-71. During DSO Army forces perform relief operations, support to incidents involving WMD, support to civil law enforcement, and community assistance. In FHA Army forces most often conduct relief operations; however, FHA may also involve support to incidents involving WMD and community assistance. Army forces involved in support operations execute overlapping activities.

RELIEF OPERATIONS

9-72. In case of a disaster, state, local, and host nation authorities are responsible for restoring essential services. To support their efforts or those of the lead agency, the NCA can deploy Army forces. Army forces execute similar actions during relief operations in DSO and FHA. Humanitarian relief focuses on the well being of supported populations. Disaster relief focuses on recovery of critical infrastructure after a natural or manmade disaster. Both normally occur simultaneously. Critical relief functions conducted by the Army are-

Disaster Relief

9-73. Disaster relief restores or recreates essential infrastructure. It includes establishing and maintaining the minimum safe working conditions, less security measures, necessary to protect relief workers and the affected population. This allows effective humanitarian relief and creates the conditions for long-term recovery. Disaster relief may involve consultation on and provision of emergency medical treatment and evacuation, repairing or demolishing damaged structures, restoring or building bridges, roads and airfields, and removing debris from supply routes and relief sites. Army engineer forces are well suited and often critical for disaster relief.

9-74. ADA units will not play a major role in this type of operation. ADA brigade units are not suited to this type of operation because air and missile defense equipment is too specialized to support this type of operation. However, AMD soldiers may be required to support a disaster relief operation. Non-AMD equipment from ADA units may also be used during the operation. In this case, AMD brigade personnel may be deployed for the operation.

Humanitarian Relief

9-75. Humanitarian relief focuses on lifesaving measures that alleviate the immediate needs of a population in crisis. It often includes providing medical support, food, water, medicines, clothing, blankets, shelter, and heating or cooking fuel. In some cases, it involves transportation support to move affected people from a disaster area. Civilian relief agencies, governmental and non-governmental, are best suited to provide this type of relief. Army forces conducting humanitarian relief usually facilitate civil relief efforts.

9-76. The AMD brigade may be ordered by the National Command Authorities to participate in this type of operation. The G5 must coordinate with local authorities to outline the procedures to follow in support of civilian relief efforts. The G4 will establish special requisition procedures to obtain supplies to support this operation. The legal section must provide guidance to unit commanders on any special matters. Care must be exercised not to violate civil laws or create unfair competition to local contractors assisting in the relief operation. The air and missile defense units will not be using its equipment as originally intended. The G3 will establish special training programs to train air and missile defense soldiers on any special requirements and restrictions.

SUPPORT TO INCIDENTS INVOLVING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

9-77. WMD incidents are deliberate or unintentional events involving a nuclear, biological, chemical, or radiological weapon or device, or a large conventional explosive, that produce catastrophic loss of life or property. Until it is determined that the damaged site does not contain a radiological, biological or chemical agent, a large explosive event may be handled as a WMD incident. Army forces assist civil authorities in protecting US territory, population, and infrastructure before an attack by supporting domestic preparedness and protection of critical assets. When directed by DOD, Army forces can respond to a WMD incident and deal with the con- sequences of the event.

Domestic Preparedness

9-78. The National Domestic Preparedness Office, under the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), orchestrates the national domestic preparedness effort. Army forces have an important role in aiding domestic preparedness efforts at the local, state, and federal level. These efforts strengthen the existing expertise of civil authorities through training. They also provide the expert assistance necessary to respond to nuclear, biological, or chemical incidents. Army forces provide training to enhance state and local emergency response capabilities so they can respond to incidents. An interagency agreement establishes the Department of Justice as domestic preparedness coordinator.

9-79. Under the Department of Justice, the Center for Domestic Preparedness at McClellan, Alabama, trains emergency first responders, emergency management officials, and state and local officials to respond to terrorist acts involving WMD. The US Army's Soldier and Biological Chemical Command is engaged in implementing the city training program mandated by The Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996. Also, the Army Medical Department (AMEDD), in close cooperation with federal, state, and local health organizations, presents courses in the medical management of nuclear, chemical, and biological casualties

Protection of Critical Assets

9-80. Hostile forces may attack facilities essential to society, the government, and the military. These assaults can disrupt civilian commerce, government operations, and military capabilities. Critical assets include telecommunications, electric power, public health services and facilities, gas and oil, banking and finance, transportation, water, emergency services, and government continuity. DODD 5160.54 identifies specific civil infrastructure assets necessary to conduct military operations. The integrity, availability, survivability, and capability of these assets are vital for conducting full spectrum operations. In conjunction with civil law enforcement, Army forces may protect these assets or temporarily restore lost capability. Army involvement in protecting critical assets complements and leverages related interagency programs and activities.

Response to WMD Incidents

9-81. Other government agencies have primary responsibility for responding to domestic terrorist and WMD incidents. Local authorities will be the first to respond to a WMD incident. However, Army forces have a key-supporting role and can quickly respond when authorized. For example, the ARNG has specialized WMD response teams that act as advance parties to facilitate follow-on deployment of other DOD assets. In a permissive overseas environment, the NCA may make Army assets available to assist a foreign government after a WMD incident. Such assistance may be linked to concurrent relief operations.

9-82. The FRP is the key plan that affects the use of Army forces in WMD incidents. The distinctions between the responsibilities of DOD and other agencies are embedded in federal law, the FRP and other federal plans, the FRP terrorist incident annex, joint doctrine, and directives. A JTF under US Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) is responsible for C2 of military forces involved in domestic WMD incidents. It also assists civil authorities during consequence management and with protecting critical national assets.

9-83. The resources required to deal with WMD incidents differ from those needed during conventional disasters. Mass WMD casualties may require decontamination and a surge of medical resources, to include antidotes, vaccines, and antibiotics. The sudden onset of a large number of casualties may pose public health threats related to food, vectors, water, waste, and mental health. Damage to chemical and industrial plants and secondary hazards such as fires may cause toxic environmental hazards. Mass evacuation may be necessary.

9-84. The Army possesses capabilities well suited to respond to WMD incidents. Chemical units detect chemical and biological agents and decontaminate equipment and property. The US Army Medical Command (USAMEDCOM) can provide large-scale medical care. Its experienced, clinicians, planners, and support staffs can furnish assessment, triage, treatment, trauma care, hospitalization, and follow-up care for chemical and biological casualties. It can deploy a field hospital or evacuate victims to fixed facilities. It maintains special medical augmentation response teams (SMARTs) that rapidly deploy to assist in medical treatment and response. SMARTs focus on chemical and biological casualties, trauma and critical care, stress management, burns, and preventive medical threat assessment.

SUPPORT TO CIVIL LAW ENFORCEMENT

9-85. Support to domestic civil law enforcement involves activities related to counterterrorism, counterdrug, military assistance during civil disturbances, and general support. Army support involves providing resources, training, or augmentation. Federal military forces remain under the military chain of command while supporting civil law enforcement. The supported law enforcement agency coordinates Army force activities in accordance with appropriate civil laws and interagency agreements. ARNG units in state status can be a particularly useful military resource. They may be able to provide assistance to civil authorities when federal units cannot due to the Posse Comitatus Act.

Support to Counterterrorism

9-86. When directed by the NCA, military assets in support of a lead agency may operate with the Department of Justice. Army forces may provide assistance in the areas of transportation, equipment, training, and personnel. When terrorists pose an imminent threat, the US military may be used to counter these threats. The demonstrated capability to conduct these operations assists in keeping US territory from becoming a target.

9-87. Crisis management of a terrorist incident includes measures to resolve a situation and to investigate a criminal case for prosecution under federal laws. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is the lead agency and has responsibility for crisis management within the US. Army forces may provide specialized or technical capabilities that assist in defusing or resolving a crisis. Support of crisis management includes opening lines of communication for military assistance, evacuating casualties, reconnaissance, and decontaminating or assessing WMD. In the aftermath of a terrorist incident, the military may be involved in consequence management activities including-

  • Bomb dogs
  • Casualty and medical assistance
  • Electrical and structural engineering
  • Imagery
  • Explosive ordnance disposal
  • Linguist support
  • Mortuary affairs
  • Ground transportation
  • Helicopter support
  • Public Affairs

Support to Counterdrug Operations

9-88. The Department of Justice, primarily through the Drug Enforcement Administration, has the responsibility for enforcing US drug laws. Drug-related crime often affects multiple local, state, and federal jurisdictions. Law enforcement agencies at all levels deal in some way with counterdrug activities. Title 10 USC strictly limits Army and federalized ARNG support to counterdrug operations. Title 32 USC, section 112, governs the use of the state-controlled ARNG forces in counterdrug operations.

9-89. Four combatant commands have counterdrug responsibilities: US Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM), US Pacific Command (USPACOM), North American Air Defense Command (NORAD) and USJFCOM. Each commander has dedicated a subordinate organization, in whole or in part, to the counterdrug mission. For example, USJFCOM maintains JTF 6 as a coordinating headquarters for military support to multi-agency counterdrug operations in CONUS.

Civil Disturbance Operations

9-90. The Army assists civil authorities in restoring law and order when state and local law enforcement agencies are unable to control civil disturbances. The ARNG is the first military responder during most civil disturbance situations. It usually remains on state active duty status throughout the operation. The president can, but usually will not, federalize the ARNG for a civil disturbance. Federal Army forces assist in restoring law and order only when the magnitude of a disturbance exceeds the capabilities of local and state law enforcement agencies and the ARNG. Army participation seeks to apply the minimum force necessary to restore order until civilian authorities no longer require military assistance. The law requires federal military forces to be used in tasks or missions appropriate to their organization and training and within legal restrictions.

General Support

9-91. Title 10 USC, sections 371-382, and other federal laws allow for additional limited military support to law enforcement agencies. The military may share information and provide equipment, facilities, and other services. Other exceptions to the provisions of the Posse Comitatus Act are contained in the annual DOD Authorization Act, which allows specific types of military support usually related to the national counterdrug effort. DOD policies for providing military support to law enforcement agencies, including personnel and equipment, are contained in DODD 5525.5.9

9-92. DOD may direct Army forces to provide training to federal, state, and local civilian law enforcement agencies. Such assistance may include training in the operation and maintenance of military equipment. Training of federal, state, and local civilian law enforcement officials is provided under the following guidance:

  • Military departments and defense agencies may provide expert advice to federal, state, or local law enforcement officials in accordance with Title 10 USC, section 373.17
  • Assistance is normally limited to situations when using non-DOD personnel is infeasible or impractical from a cost or time perspective and when the assistance will not compromise national security or military preparedness.
  • Assistance may not involve DOD personnel in a direct role in a law enforcement operation, except as otherwise authorized by law.
  • Except as otherwise authorized by law, assistance is at a location where there is not a reasonable likelihood of armed confrontation with civilians.

COMMUNITY ASSISTANCE

9-93. Community assistance is a broad range of activities that provide support and maintain a strong connection between the military and civilian communities. Community assistance activities provide effective means of projecting a positive military image, providing training opportunities, and enhancing the relationship between the Army and the American public. They should fulfill community needs that would not otherwise be met. Community assistance activities can enhance individual and unit combat readiness. Projects should exercise individual soldier skills, encourage teamwork, and challenge leader planning and coordination skills. They should result in measurable accomplishments and increase soldier proficiency. Commanders of forward-deployed Army units may also apply these concepts when fostering or establishing relationships with host nation communities.

9-94. Community assistance at the national level enhances a cooperative relationship between the military and American people. National efforts take advantage of the technical, vocational, and group skills of military professionals. They supplement programs available from the civil sector and other government agencies. The Army's involvement in a variety of assistance programs focus on economic and social issues that have long-term national security implications. They provide opportunities for the Army to contribute to the growth and welfare of the nation, improving its perception of the military. Army and DOD regulations provide guidance on these programs.

9-95. The Army has extensive national level responsibilities related to public works maintenance and management. The Department of the Army exercises its federal engineering executive oversight responsibilities through the US Army Corps of Engineers (USACE). The USACE manages much of the nation's public works infrastructure. Executed principally, but not solely, through the civil works directorate, this military organization integrates complex federal, state, and local regulations and policies governing the national infrastructure. These include the national waterways, environmental remediation and recovery operations, real estate, disaster recovery operations, and general project management functions.

9-96. State and local efforts also improve the community's perception of the Army. Community assistance varies widely, ranging from individual soldier involvement to full installation participation. An installation or organization can enter into an agreement with the local community to provide critical services not available in the community, augment community services unable to meet demand, or ensure that emergency services are available in the shortest possible time.

9-97. Army participation in public events, memorials, and exhibits facilitates interaction between soldiers and the local community. This contact communicates the professionalism, readiness, and standards of the Army. Individual soldiers serve as representatives and role models to the civilian community, promote and inspire patriotism, and generate interest in the Army. This increased public awareness enhances the Army's reputation and secures the confidence of the American people.

9-98. Laws, regulations, and policies limit Army participation in community assistance activities. Commanders consider the objective and purpose of community assistance. They consider limitations under which Army participation in community assistance activities is authorized. Commanders ensure that their initiatives do not compete with local resources or services and will not result in remuneration in any form. Commanders also avoid providing assistance and support to one segment of a community that cannot also be provided to others. Actions that appear to benefit a particular group can foster perceptions of bias or partisanship. Ideally, support should only be provided to events and activities of common interest and benefit across the community.

CONSIDERATIONS FOR SUPPORT OPERATIONS

9-99. Although each support operation is different, VDD, MDMP, and troop leading procedure techniques used in offensive, defensive, and stability operations still apply. The following considerations supplement those processes and can help commanders develop tailored concepts and schemes for support operations.

PROVIDE ESSENTIAL SUPPORT TO THE LARGEST NUMBER OF PEOPLE

9-100. The principle of essential support to the largest number guides prioritization and allocation. Commanders allocate finite resources to achieve the greatest good. Initial efforts usually focus on restoring vital services, which include food and water distribution, medical aid, power generation, search and rescue, fire fighting, and community relations. It may be necessary to complete a lower-priority task before accomplishing a higher one. For example, Army forces may have to restore limited electrical services before restoring hospital emergency rooms and shelter operations.

9-101. Commanders assess requirements to employ Army forces effectively. They determine how and where to apply limited assets to benefit the most people. In some cases, warfighting reconnaissance capabilities and techniques are adaptable to support operation requirements. For example, unmanned aerial vehicles can survey relief routes and locate civilian refugee groups. Standard information collection methods are reinforced and supplemented by civil affairs or dedicated disaster assessment teams, as well as interagency, host nation, and NGO sources. The combination of traditional and nontraditional information support allows commanders to obtain a clear understanding of the situation and adjust plans accordingly.

COORDINATE ACTIONS WITH OTHER AGENCIES

9-102. DSO and FHA operations are typically joint and interagency; FHA operations are also multinational. The potential for duplication of effort and working at cross-purposes is high. Unity of effort requires, at a mini- mum, common understanding of purposes and direction among all agencies. To ensure unity of effort and efficient use of resources requires constant coordination. Army forces enhance unity of effort by establishing a CMOC in FHA operations and by providing liaison elements, planning support, advisors, and technical experts to the lead civil authority in DSO. Commanders determine where their objectives and plans complement or conflict with those of other key agencies through these contacts. Each participant's capabilities will be in constant demand.

ESTABLISH MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS

9-103. In conjunction with supported agencies and governments, commanders establish relevant measures of effectiveness (MOE), similar to the tactical METT-TC factors considered during mission analysis, to gauge mission accomplishment. MOE focus on the condition and activity of those being supported. Because they are discrete, measurable, and link cause and effect, they are helpful in understanding and measuring the progress and success of the operation. In famine relief, for example, it may be tempting to measure effectiveness only by the gross amount of food delivered. This may be an acceptable MOE. However, a better MOE may be the total nourishment delivered, as measured by the total number of calories delivered per person per day or the rate of decline of deaths directly attributable to starvation. MOE depend on the situation and require readjustment as the situation and guidance change.

HAND OVER TO CIVILIAN AGENCIES AS SOON AS FEASIBLE

9-104. The timing and feasibility of the hand over from military to civil authorities is dependent on mission-specific considerations. The two most important of these are the ability of civil authorities to resume operations without Army assistance and the necessity of committing Army forces to competing operations. Commanders identify and include other civil considerations as early as possible in the planning process. Commanders must continually consider long-term goals of the civil leadership and the communities they assist. While the immediate goal of support operations is to relieve hardship and suffering, the ultimate goal is to create those conditions necessary for civil follow-on operations. The successful hand over of all activities to civil authorities and withdrawal of Army forces is a positive signal to the supported population and the Army. It indicates that the community has recovered enough for civil agencies to resume control and that life is beginning to return to normal, and that the Army successfully completed its support mission.

RESOURCE ALLOCATION

9-105. The AMD brigade commander must husband the AMD resources under his command. These resources are personnel, equipment, time, and funds.

PERSONNEL

9-106. The personnel assigned to ADA brigade organizations have very complex specific skills. Some of these skills can be directly applied to stability and support operations. The number of people or manpower available to the brigade is fixed by the applicable table of organization and equipment (TOE). There is a limitation on manpower availability for stability and support operations.

EQUIPMENT

9-107. The equipment assigned to ADA brigade organizations has very specific purposes. Some of their equipment can be used for stability and support operations. The number and types of equipment available to the ADA brigade are fixed by the applicable TOEs. There is a limitation on equipment availability for stability and support operations. Special equipment and logistics support requirements for stability and support operations will have to be identified, received, made operational, and trained upon by the personnel.

FUNDS

9-108. The funding for stability and support operations will have to be made available to support these activities. This funding is usually provided to preselected organizations and units. This allows for the personnel of these units to train for a specific mission or set of missions for the stability and support operations. It would reduce costs in purchasing special equipment for all AMD organizations and or units by selecting certain organizations and or units to handle one or more of the support and stability activities. Expenditures of funds in this manner would provide cost benefits for manpower and or personnel utilization, special support and stability equipment requirements, and better use of time.

TIME

9-109. Effective time management of mission requirements and stability and support operations results in better use of resources. The assignment of specific organizations or units to stability and support operations results in a more effective time management. It achieves this by not requiring all organizations or units to train and equip for those operations. It allows for a more equitable use of time to train for the tactical missions to include force protection operations.



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