EAC Air and Missile Defense Operations
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the employment of the EAC ADA brigade in combat operations. EAC ADA brigade combat operations doctrine supports Army operations in protection of the force. Freedom to maneuver, without interference from enemy air and missile attack, and protection from reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition is the objective of the U.S. Army AMD.
7-1. The EAC ADA brigade must be flexible to meet the demands for AMD in a wide range of environments. Those environments range from peace to conflict and finally war. During time of peace, the EAC ADA brigade must train to meet the operational challenges of the mission in all environments of war and other military operations.
7-2. The EAC ADA brigade commander begins his AMD planning by integrating his AMD forces into forces already in the theater. He coordinates his operations with those at the theater level.
Organizing the Joint Force Theater of Operations
7-3. The JFC/Combatant CINC establishes a theater command structure including command/support relationships, and a theater battlefield framework. The JFC/Combatant CINC also develops a joint force strategy and campaign plan. As described in chapter 2, this consists of an operational level concept which arranges a sequence of symmetrical and asymmetrical tactical actions to reduce the enemy's will to fight.
Execution of Service or Component Operations
7-4. Service and component commanders, such as the ARFOR commander and the JFACC, sequence battles and tactical operations to meet the CINC's intent for the theater campaign. This sequencing extends from deployment operations into the theater through all phases of the campaign.
Organization for Sustainment
7-5. The Army operational-level commander establishes support and coordinating relationships with the host nation and with allied forces. Service commanders establish a theater sustaining base to sustain their forces in support of the theater campaign plan. The Army commander provides RSOI and protection of deploying forces as they arrive in theater. This may be accomplished by a tactical or operational headquarters such as a field army, or by an Army service component commander (ASCC) for Army forces. The ASCC additionally establishes linkages to joint, multinational, interagency, non-governmental, or United Nations operations.
7-6. The Army commander conserves his combat power through operational protection means. Centrally planned OPSEC and deception operations protect essential elements of friendly information (EEFI) and conceal key capabilities and dispositions. He implements rear area physical security means, including hardening of key facilities and C2 nodes, organizing a rear operations plan which supports the joint rear area (JRA) plan. Operational protection includes AMD of the rear area and key assets. This is accomplished by joint or combined DCA and TMD operations.
OPERATIONAL AIR DEFENSE
7-7. Ground based AMD units execute the bulk of the force protection mission. The EAC ADA brigade is an important component of Army warfighting force structure, and its role differs fundamentally from that of the corps ADA brigade. The primary purpose of EAC ADA operations is to support operational force protection. AMD at the operational level is an integral function of joint and combined DCA operations. The EAC ADA brigade is involved in many theater level functions and may interface directly with the ARFOR/LCC, the JFACC, the JFC and the ASCC. For example, the 11th ADA Brigade may deploy and fight with Third US Army in the USCENTCOM AOR, with missions ranging from ports of debarkation (POD) defense to JF protection. Operational AMD requirements orient EAC AMD operations on the basic capabilities described in the following paragraphs.
7-8. Force projection operations are described in chapter 3. The EAC ADA brigade must be capable of rapid strategic and intra-theater deployment to support entry operations and operational maneuver. EAC ADA battalions maintain the training proficiency to deploy by strategic airlift or sealift. They also must be trained to deploy by road convoy or rail over long distances within a theater of operations. The EAC ADA brigade plans the force tailoring and sequencing of units and capabilities in the deployment planning process. The brigade coordinates to ensure the integration of its elements into the TPFDL. Additionally, it conducts employment planning with the gaining command.
7-9. The EAC ADA brigade must be well integrated throughout all phases of the theater campaign. Integration is achieved procedurally by integrated planning. In execution, the EAC ADA brigade is integrated through positive and procedural means.
7-10. Integration requires the early deployment of LNOs to higher headquarters within the COMMZ or in the employment area of operations. During employment operations, liaison teams may be required at the following locations: adjacent ADA brigade headquarters, CRC, the JFACC AOC, and the JFC and ARFOR CP. The ADA brigade develops a liaison concept of operation and identifies LNO augmentation requirements during the planning process.
7-11. The EAC ADA brigade C3 requirements include receiving a recognized air picture from a CRC equivalent, C2 links to higher and subordinate headquarters, and integration with strategic TM warning/intelligence systems. EAC ADA battalions may be widely dispersed within a theater of operations. The EAC ADA brigade must be proficient in establishing connectivity with aerial and ground C2 nodes of various services and in some cases with allied national systems. Joint or theater signal assets provide communications to the EAC brigade. The brigade also has an organic signal company to provide limited tactical communications support (FM, MSE).
7-12. As the Army level AMDCOORD, the EAC ADA brigade commander makes AMD priority and mission recommendations to the Army commander. AMD missions at this level may have operational significance by protecting theater level sustaining bases, military or political headquarters, or PODs. Enemy attacks of these assets will be undertaken with operational level air or missile weapons for operational or strategic objectives. The AMDCOORD also assists the Army commander in making AMD and airpower apportionment recommendations to the JFC. Further, the force and engagement operations of the EAC ADA brigade are standard tactical operations that are planned and executed in much the same manner as corps or divisional AMD operations. Moreover, the EAC AMDCOORD has the same responsibility as his corps, divisional, and maneuver brigade counterparts to vertically integrate and synchronize adjacent AMD operations within his AO.
Theater Missile Defense
7-13. The Patriot system is the only JF weapon capable of engaging TMs in their terminal phase of flight. Corps Patriot units may provide TM defense, but are primarily oriented on defense of a mobile corps against air attack. The threat to the theater rear may be primarily a missile threat if the enemy has TM weapons. If the enemy has nuclear or chemical capability, effective TMD directly supports operations at the operational and strategic level. The first question to be answered, therefore, in planning the employment of the EAC ADA brigade is, 'what is the enemy TM threat?' The answer to this question largely determines whether the EAC ADA brigade will be tasked under the JFACC or will integrate into TMD operations.
THE EAC ADA BRIGADE THREAT
7-14. The air and missile threat to the EAC ADA brigade AO varies by area in the theater rear. In addition, the threat may change over time.
7-15. Enemy airpower will be used against high value targets throughout the depth of the theater. Friendly forces are most vulnerable to air attack where forces and capabilities are concentrated. During entry operations, enemy air will be a particular threat to PODs. Airpower may be used against these before sufficient DCA firepower can be massed in the AO. As entry operations transition to employment operations, enemy air may continue to be used against operational level targets in the rear.
7-16. TMs and CMs are particularly suited as operational level weapons. The destruction capability of a conventional TM is very limited compared to the combat load of a typical ground attack aircraft. But an aircraft must run the gauntlet of AMD. It is also affected by weather and limited visibility. A TM or CM can be launched from the depth of the enemy's strategic rear area. It is unaffected by weather and, except for the Patriot system, invulnerable to DCA assets. TMs and CMs can strike with great accuracy to destroy high payoff targets in the theater rear. Missile strikes are particularly threatening during entry operations, especially when theater forces are not ready to fight and political will is still formative.
THE EAC ADA BRIGADE CONCEPT OF OPERATION
7-17. The EAC ADA brigade is required to perform many different operations. Its mission and weapons systems are described in the following paragraphs.
THE EAC ADA BRIGADE MISSION
7-18. The EAC brigade executes rapid strategic deployment to a theater of operations when ordered. It provides air/missile defense and counter-RISTA protection of entry operations and subsequent defense in support of Army or joint force AMD priorities.
EAC ADA BRIGADE WEAPONS
7-19. The task organization of the EAC ADA brigade is more dependent on the situation than the corps ADA brigade. The EAC ADA brigade includes a mix of SHORAD and HIMAD battalions and in the future, a THAAD battery.
HIMAD Operational Concept
7-20. Complete coverage of the theater rear is beyond the capability of an EAC ADA brigade. On the other hand, the EAC ADA brigade has the only weapons in the theater rear capable of engaging TMs. Theater assets are typically larger and less mobile than corps and divisional assets. If additional ADA brigades are not available, the brigade employs HIMAD in defense of critical theater assets and relies on the AADC to defend the theater rear with joint DCA weapons. Because of its unique TM defense capability, TMD operations are the main effort for EAC HIMAD operations.
SHORAD Operational Concept
7-21. The requirement for EAC SHORAD battalions stems from two facts. First, no joint theater AMD plan can guarantee that an enemy air force will be destroyed and stopped from penetrating to the theater rear. Second, there will be times when the theater battlefield framework is nonlinear. Theater assets are vulnerable to sustained enemy air attack. Examples include PODs during entry operations. EAC Patriot defenses will be anchored on TMD priorities and might not cover all LOCs. EAC SHORAD is deployed earlier than HIMAD and in much greater numbers to provide initial AMD of a lodgment. It is effective against attack helicopters and has no electronic signature. As entry operations mature and transition toward employment operations, EAC SHORAD may protect critical LOCs forward to the corps rear. It may supplement HIMAD coverage and provide final protective AMD fires in defense of critical assets.
OPERATIONAL AND TACTICAL ADA SUPPORT
7-22. The EAC ADA brigade operations may directly support the joint DCA campaign, defend operational level fire and maneuver, reinforce tactical level AMD operations, or provide TMD of critical assets and activities. The EAC ADA planner applies the same planning methodology as do his corps and divisional counterparts in developing the AMD plan. The more static nature of EAC operations means that mobility as a passive AD means is not normally an option. Therefore, AMD mobility is less important to the EAC AMD planner than a strong AMD defense design.
JOINT DEFENSE COUNTER AIR SUPPORT
7-23. DCA operations are described in chapter 2. The objective of DCA operations in the theater rear is to neutralize enemy air interdiction and to protect friendly forces, bases and LOCs. Many of the principals of mobile or area defense described in chapter 6 apply also to DCA operations in the air environment. Based on intelligence preparation of the theater air battlefield, the AADC recommends apportionment of airpower to DCA and joint support relationships for ground based AMD. Sophisticated intelligence and warning systems alert the AADC to the location and probable targets of an incoming air attack. Electronic countermeasures strip away enemy electronic concealment and deception. Mobile DCA air assets function as an aerial covering force to engage and break up attacking aircraft formations. Ground based AMD from the divisional main battle area back to the theater rear provide limited area defense and point defense of probable enemy air targets. Additionally, AMD deployed along avenues of approach drives enemy aircraft up into HIMAD and fighter engagement zones.
7-24. Key events of DCA operations encompass the initial detection of enemy air attack and air to air DCA. They also include DCA electronic warfare final protective fires by ground based AMD.
7-25. Theater AD priorities are highly situation dependent, but normally consist of assets and activities of operational significance to the Army or joint force commander. As mentioned earlier, these would almost certainly include PODs during entry operations. Operational level C2 headquarters might also be AD priorities as well as geopolitical assets.
7-26. The AADC has functional coordinating authority over all DCA forces. If apportioned DCA airpower is insufficient, the JFC may supplement it with OPCON ADA. In this case, the EAC ADA brigade will receive missions from the AADC, while the ASCC retains responsibility for support of the brigade. The AADC may segment the air area of operations and assign primary responsibility for active DCA to HIMAD, SHORAD, or fighters within designated WEZs. EAC ADA operates within an established MEZ, which is bordered by adjacent MEZs or FEZs. AADC missions to EAC ADA may be initially framed in terms of an asset or a defined volume of airspace. In NATO, for example, the RAADC may issue a "coverage mission order" to an EAC ADA unit. The ADA brigade develops a defense design to meet the area or asset defense requirements. It redefines the dimensions of the defended area. If necessary, this is done in coordination with the AADC.
Defense Design Considerations
7-27. Defense design in support of DCA operations begins with analysis of the threat to the defended asset or MEZ. Threat attack options in terms of weapons systems and avenues of approach determine the ADA brigade allocation and disposition of ADA fire units as well as the shape of the brigade defense design. For HIMAD defenses, adjacent AMD to the flanks and rear of Patriot coverage is essential in cases where less than a battalion is involved. Defense design options are further explained in Appendix A. At brigade level, defense design must also consider airspace restrictions, such as base defense zones or low level transit routes. The EAC AMDCOORD coordinates airspace with the ARFOR and ACA to minimize the impact on AMD operations. The brigade should also provide guidance on emissions control in support of the Army commander's concept for OPSEC and deception. EAC battalion defense design positions fire units using ADA employment guidelines and weapon system characteristics. In cases where the unit may receive different types of missile munitions, ADA battalions adjust defense design and the distribution of ammunition to position more capable ammunition where it is most needed.
THEATER MISSILE DEFENSE
7-28. TMD is inherently a joint mission. Therefore, joint force components, supporting combatant commanders, and multinational force TMD capabilities must be integrated. They have the common objective of neutralizing or destroying the enemy's TM capability. TMD must be integrated and support the JFC's overall concept of operations and campaign objectives.
7-29. Key events in TMD include deterrence of aggression and protection of US, allied, and coalition forces, critical assets, and areas of vital interest or political importance from attack by TMs. TMD encompasses the detection and targeting of enemy TM systems. It allows the JFC the freedom to conduct joint operations without undue interference from enemy TM attacks.
7-30. TMD priorities must address critical data/voice links. These are required for an integrated and coordinated operation. Further priorities are the detection, warning, and reporting of TM launches; and the coordination and integration of multifaceted responses to the TM attack. TMD priorities seek to reduce the probability of damage and or minimize the extent of damage caused by a TM attack.
7-31. THAAD and Patriot systems, possibly augmented by Aegis cruisers or destroyers, provide a two-tier defense for selected high-value theater assets, military and geopolitical. The two tiers provide near leak-proof defense of high-value assets, deny the enemy a preferred attack option, and support the theater and corps campaigns and battles. THAAD will provide the upper tier defense against medium- and short-range ballistic missiles. Patriot and Aegis cruisers/destroyers, if available, will provide the lower tier defense against short-range ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and air-to-surface missiles. Patriot also engages the ABT that penetrates the joint defenses.
TACTICAL ADA REINFORCEMENT
7-32. Reinforcement of corps ADA is always a possible mission for the EAC ADA brigade and may frequently be an explicit contingency. Since corps are normally assigned ADA brigades, reinforcement may be in the form of a support relationship established between a subordinate EAC battalion and the corps ADA brigade.
7-33. AD priority during maneuver operations of a corps could be POL stocks and resupply locations. During defensive operations, AD priority could be corps ammunition points.
7-34. EAC reinforcement of corps ADA focuses on the corps rear area and LOCs forward to division rear boundaries. These may become extended as the corps maneuvers. After a corps maneuver, assets in the rear may move forward to support a subsequent corps maneuver. In both instances, these assets may be vulnerable to air/missile attack. Depending on the threat, the EAC brigade may be required to commit a battalion of either SHORAD or HIMAD for reinforcement.
Defense Design Considerations
7-35. The air/missile threat to the corps and theater rear are similar. The difference in the defense design is that corps assets are mobile. If enemy TMs pose operational risks to the rear, a Patriot battalion will provide TM defense of critical assets with ancillary ABT coverage oriented to threat air avenues of approach. Regardless of the command or support relationship, distance will probably preclude the EAC HIMAD unit from receiving an air picture, missile resupply, or maintenance from its parent brigade. A reinforcing HIMAD unit brings its own DS maintenance unit, while the corps ADA brigade coordinates the logistics requirements with a supporting ASG. The corps ADA brigade will also provide an air picture and fire direction to the augmenting EAC HIMAD unit. Likewise, EAC SHORAD must integrate into the corps EW network. EAC ADA units must establish liaison with either the corps ADA brigade or the supported ADA or maneuver unit.
7-36. The EAC ADA brigade fights in the theater or corps rear. Its operations are affected by tactical offensive or defensive action in the corps AO only to the extent that these are synchronized with operational fires and enemy interdiction efforts. The principal activities in the rear area are sustainment, force protection, and command and control. Enemy attacks against the rear are aimed at disrupting one or more of these activities. Therefore, the EAC ADA brigade operates within a potential battlefield that is highly nonlinear and where the enemy includes air as well as ground forces. The EAC ADA brigade may be assigned to organize the ground defenses of several units within a defined base cluster. Bases are formed within the base cluster. Figure 7-1 displays examples of notional bases and base clusters.
Figure 7-1. Examples of Notional Bases and Base Clusters
7-37. Rear operations consist of activities that assure freedom of maneuver and continuity of operations. Ground threats to the rear area are categorized in three levels of intensity, while rear area defenses focus on four force protection functions.
7-38. There are three threat levels. Level I contain threats that can be defeated by base or base cluster self-defense measures. Level II contains threats beyond the base or base cluster defensive capability, but which can be defeated by initial response forces. Bases and base clusters are responsible for delaying level II threats until the arrival of response forces. Level III contains threats that target several friendly rear elements as part of a larger, coordinated effort, requiring a tactical combat force to defeat them.
REAR SECURITY TASKS
7-39. This requires not only well-coordinated defense plans, but also good threat intelligence, aggressive local patrolling to intercept the threat, and a highly mobile response force to handle rear area attacks. Positioning of units in the rear should incorporate a threat template so that units do not locate near enemy avenues of approach or drop zones.
COMMAND AND CONTROL OF REAR OPERATIONS
7-40. The JFC normally establishes a joint rear area commander (JRAC) who has coordinating authority to ensure the security of the rear area. The JRAC coordinates requirements with component or service commanders. The ASCC coordinates rear operations for Army forces. He may delegate this function to the senior logistics headquarters, which in turn organizes a rear operations center (ROC) to carry out these functions. Encompassing several tenant units, local defenses are organized around base clusters, established by the ROC. The rear area commander tasks selected commanders to function as base cluster commanders and to organize the defenses of these clusters.
THE EAC ADA BRIGADE ROLE IN REAR OPERATIONS
7-41. If the EAC ADA commander is also a cluster commander, he may establish a separate operations center to organize the rear battle effort within his cluster. This will involve a combination of his own staff and LNOs from other tenant units within the base cluster. The ROC will establish reporting requirements for base clusters and tenant units. Tenant units as well as base cluster commanders must coordinate movements within the rear area to maintain the integrity of rear area defenses. The EAC ADA brigade provides an air defense element to the ROC to assist in planning and alert the force of rear area enemy air insertions.
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