The enemy employs a variety of sensors to detect and identify US soldiers, equipment, and supporting installations. These sensors may be visual, near infrared (NIR), IR, ultraviolet (UV), acoustic, or multispectral/hyperspectral. They may be employed by dismounted soldiers or ground-, air-, or space-mounted platforms. Such platforms are often capable of supporting multiple sensors. Friendly troops rarely know the specific sensor systems or combination of systems that an enemy employs. When possible, friendly troops should protect against all known threat surveillance systems.
2-1. Many threat forces were trained and equipped by the former Soviet Union. Its long-standing battlefield doctrine of maskirovka is a living legacy in many former Soviet-client states. Maskirovka incorporates all elements of CCD and tactical battlefield deception into a cohesive and effective philosophy. During the Gulf War, Iraq used maskirovka to effectively maintain its capability of surface-to-surface missiles (Scuds) in the face of persistent coalition-force attacks. Enemy forces that are trained in maskirovka possess a strong fundamental knowledge of CCD principles and techniques. Friendly forces must be very careful to conduct CCD operations so that a well-trained enemy will not easily recognize them.
2-2. Typical threat doctrine states that each battalion will continuously maintain two observation posts when in close contact with its enemy. An additional observation post is established when the battalion is in the defense or is preparing for an offense.
2-3. Patrolling is used extensively, but particularly during offensive operations. Patrols are used to detect the location of enemy indirect- and direct-fire weapons, gaps in formations, obstacles, and bypasses.
2-4. Enemy forces use raids to capture prisoners, documents, weapons, and equipment. A recon-in-force (usually by a reinforced company or battalion) is the most likely tactic when other methods of tactical recon have failed. A recon-in-force is often a deceptive tactic designed to simulate an offensive and cause friendly forces to reveal defensive positions.
2-5. A typical enemy force conducts recon activities at all echelons. A troop recon is usually conducted by specially trained units. The following types of enemy units might have specific intelligence-collection missions:
- Troops. An enemy uses ordinary combat troops to perform recon. One company per battalion trains to conduct recon operations behind enemy lines.
- Motorized rifle and tank regiments. Each regiment has a recon company and a chemical recon platoon.
- Maneuver divisions. Divisions have a recon battalion, an engineer recon platoon, a chemical recon platoon, and a target-acquisition battery.
2-6. An enemy collects information about United States (US) forces for two basic reasonstarget acquisition and intelligence production. Enemy weapons systems often have sensors that locate and identify targets at long ranges in precise detail. Soldiers and units should take actions to hinder the enemy's target-acquisition process. These actions include all practical CCD operations expected to reduce the identification of soldiers, units, and facilities.
2-7. An enemy uses sensor systems to locate and identify large Army formations and headquarters (HQ) and to predict their future activities. Enemy detection of rear-area activities, such as logistics centers and communications nodes, may also reveal friendly intentions.
2-8. An enemy uses tactical recon to provide additional information on US forces' dispositions and the terrain in which they are going to operate. The enemy's tactical recon also attempts to identify targets for later attack by long-range artillery, rockets, aircraft, and ground forces.
2-9. An enemy uses many different types of electronic surveillance equipment. Sensor systems are classified according to the part of the EM spectrum in which they operate. Figure 2-1 shows the EM spectrum and some typical enemy sensors operating within specific regions of the spectrum. An enemy uses detection sensors that operate in the active or passive mode:
- Active. Active sensors emit energy that reflects from targets and is recaptured by the emitting or other nearby sensor, indicating the presence of a target. Examples of active sensors are searchlights and radar.
- Passive. Passive sensors do not emit energy; they collect energy, which may indicate the presence of a target. Examples of passive sensors are the human eye, night-vision devices (NVDs), IR imaging devices, acoustic sensors, and photographic devices.
Figure 2-1. EM spectrum
2-10. Visual sensors work in the parts of the EM spectrum that are visible to the human eye. Enemy soldiers' eyes are the principle sensors on a battlefield. They may be aided by binoculars, telescopic sights, and image intensifiers. Civilian populations, enemy agents, recon teams, and patrols are visual-sensor systems from the enemy's intelligence viewpoint. Three types of enemy visual sensors are
- Image intensifiers. Image intensifiers are passive night-observation devices. They amplify the low-level light that is present on even the darkest nights. These devices are used for surveillance and as weapon sights on small arms and vehicles. Airborne platforms are also capable of supporting image intensifiers.
- Low-light television (LLTV). LLTV combines image intensification with television technology, and it is usually mounted on airborne platforms.
- Aerial recon, remote sensing, and imagery. Aerial photography, satellite imagery, and video imagery allow image analysts to record and study visual information. These analysts then produce target nomination lists that are, in effect, priority lists of targets in a given target scene. Since analysts often have to make subjective determinations of the identity and/or importance of a given target, the ranking of targets provides the defender with an opportunity to use CCD to impact an enemy's target-prioritization process. Video systems allow transmission of visual images to the ground while the manned aircraft, satellite, or unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) is still in flight.
2-11. NIR sensors operate at a wavelength immediately above the visible light wavelength of the EM spectrum (Figure 2-1). NIR energy reflects well from live vegetation but reflects better from dead vegetation and most man-made materials. NIR sensors, such as sights and periscopes, allow the human eye to detect targets based on differences in their reflection of NIR energy. NIR sensors are partially blocked by fog, mist, and smoke operations, although not as completely as visual sensors. An enemy's combat vehicles use active NIR sensors that employ searchlights, scopes, and sights; but these sensors are rapidly being replaced with image intensifiers and thermal gun sights.
2-12. IR sensors detect the contrasts in heat energy that targets radiate on the battlefield and display the contrasts as different colors or shades. Because longer wavelength IR radiation is more susceptible to atmospheric absorption than NIR radiation, IR sensors are less affected by typical concentrations of fog or conventional smoke.
2-13. Differences in thermal mass and surface properties (reflectivity) of man-made and natural materials result in target-to-background contrasts. These contrast levels change dramatically over a daily cycle. For example, operating vehicles and generators, heated buildings and tents, and soldiers are usually hotter than their background. Also, equipment exposed to direct sunlight appears hotter than most natural backgrounds. At night, however, equipment might appear cooler than its background if it is treated with special emissivity coatings. In other words, military equipment, particularly metallic equipment, generally heats up and cools off more quickly than its background.
2-14. Sophisticated, passive IR sensors (such as the Forward-Looking Infrared System [FLIRS]) can be mounted on aircraft. FLIRS sensors provide aircrews and enemy ground forces with real-time IR imagery that is displayed on video monitors.
2-15. Recon aircraft often employ special IR films to record temperature differences. Due to film processing, however, these systems are subject to time delays in obtaining the data. Newer versions of this sensor produce non-film-based images.
2-16. The UV area is the part of the EM spectrum immediately below visible light. UV sensors are more important in snow-covered areas, because snow reflects UV energy well and most white paints and man-made objects do not reflect UV energy very well. Photographic intelligence systems with simple UV filters highlight military targets as dark areas against snow-covered backgrounds. These backgrounds require specially designed camouflage that provides a high UV reflectance.
2-17. Radar uses high-frequency radio waves to penetrate atmospheric impediments such as fog, mist, and smoke. Radar works by transmitting a very strong burst of radio waves and then receiving and processing the reflected waves. In general, metal objects reflect radar waves well, while radar waves are either weakly reflected by or pass through most other objects. The shape and size of a metal object determine the strength of the reflected signal. A large, metal object generally reflects more signal than a small object. Therefore, large, metal objects can be detected from greater distances. The method by which the received radio wave is processed determines the type of radar. Radar systems commonly used against ground forces on the battlefield include
- Moving-target indicators (MTIs). When an EM wave hits a moving target, the wave is reflected and changes frequency. The faster the target moves, the larger the changes in frequency. The simplest and most common battlefield radar detects this frequency change. Threat forces use MTIs for target acquisition. More sophisticated developmental radar systems, such as the Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS), use airborne surveillance platforms that downlink captured data to ground-station modules in near real time. Ground-based operators are then able to manipulate the data and gain heightened situational information, which is forwarded to command-and-control (C2) nodes to enhance tactical decision-making.
- Imaging radar. An imaging radar's receiver and processor are so sensitive that an image of the detected target is displayed on a scope. Imaging radar, such as side-looking airborne radar (SLAR), is generally used on airborne or space-borne platforms. Imaging radar typically does not provide the same resolution as the FLIRS and is less likely to be used for terminal target acquisition.
- Countermortar (CM) and counterbattery (CB) radar. CM and CB radar usually transmit two beams of energy that sweep above the horizon. An artillery or mortar round or a rocket passing through the beams reflects two signals that are received and plotted to determine the origin of the round.
2-18. The three predominant types of acoustical detection systems are
- Human ear. Every soldier, whether engaged in normal operations or at a listening post, is an acoustic sensor. However, visual confirmation is usually preferred.
- Flash-sound ranging. Flash-sound ranging is used against artillery. Light travels faster than sound, so enemy sound-ranging teams can determine the distance to a gun tube by accurately measuring the time between seeing a muzzle flash and hearing the sound. If the sound is detected by two or more teams, analysts plot the ranges using automated data-processing computers. The target is located where the plots intersect.
- Ground-based microphone array. Ground-based microphone-array systems allow listeners to record acoustic signatures and accurately triangulate their positions.
2-19. Threat forces make a great effort to search for, detect, and locate the sources of US radio communications. They use various direction-finding techniques to locate opposing emitters. Once an emitter is detected, an enemy can take a number of actions, ranging from simply intercepting the transmissions to jamming or targeting the emitter for destruction. (See FM 34-1 for more information on radio sensors.)
MULTISPECTRAL AND HYPERSPECTRAL
2-20. Recent advancements in sensor acquisition and information-processing technologies have fostered the advent of multispectral and hyperspectral sensors:
- Multispectral. Multispectral sensors typically scan a few broad-band channels within the EM spectrum. An example of a multispectral sensor might be one which coincidentally scans the visual and thermal IR portions of the EM spectrum. Such sensors allow an enemy to assess a cross section of EM wavelengths and acquire a target in one wavelength even though it might be effectively concealed in another.
- Hyperspectral. Hyperspectral sensors collect data across a continuous portion of the EM spectrum. These sensors scan many channels across a relatively narrow bandwidth and provide detailed information about target spatial and spectral patterns. Absorption and emission bands of given substances often occur within very narrow bandwidths. They allow high-resolution, hyperspectral sensors to distinguish the properties of the substances to a finer degree than an ordinary broadband sensor.
CCD VERSUS THREAT SENSORS
2-21. Target acquisition can be accomplished by a variety of sensors that operate throughout the EM spectrum. This poses a challenge in CCD planning and employmentdetermining which enemy sensor(s) that CCD operations should be designed to defeat. Unfortunately, no single answer is correct for all situations. Unit commanders without specific guidance from higher echelons assess their tactical situation and plan CCD operations accordingly. If intelligence data indicate that an enemy will use visual sensors for recon and target acquisition, then visual countermeasures must be employed. For IR or radar sensors, countermeasures that are effective in those spectra must be employed. If a multispectral or hyperspectral threat is anticipated, CCD operations are conducted to protect a unit in its most vulnerable EM bandwidths. Very few available camouflage materials or techniques provide complete broadband protection.
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