Military

Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member, and distinguished Members of the Committee:

I am pleased to have this opportunity to speak to you about our policy and our progress in Afghanistan.

The people of Afghanistan, with U.S. and international support, are embarked on a great undertaking. Afghanistan was one of the poorest countries of the world -- before it was ravaged by a communist coup, a Soviet invasion, a long war of liberation, and then a decade of fanatical Taliban rule. To overcome such a legacy is a daunting task. It is unlikely to be accomplished in only a few years’ time. It is a long-term, multi-year effort, to which President Bush and this Administration are totally committed, with the strong support of Congress.

What Has Been Accomplished

It is important to recognize how much has been achieved in the two and a half years since Coalition forces liberated Afghanistan from the Taliban:

• The Bonn Agreement of Afghan leaders in December 2001 created an Interim Government, which was expanded into a Transitional Government by the Emergency Loya Jirga of June 2002.

• In January of this year, the Afghan people as represented in their Constitutional Loya Jirga ratified a new Constitution, one of the most enlightened political charters in the Muslim world.

• Over 8,000 troops of the new Afghan National Army (ANA) have been trained. ANA units have deployed on combat missions, have conducted presence patrols, and have provided stability in key areas after outbreaks of factional fighting.

• In September of this year, national elections are scheduled to be held — the first in decades. Over 1.8 million Afghans have registered to vote, 30 percent of them women. A major voter registration drive will accelerate in the months to come.

• Last December, ahead of schedule, construction of the first layer of the Kabul-to-Kandahar segment of the national ring road was completed, facilitating the transport of goods and people between these two important metropolitan areas.

• Coalition forces continue operations in eastern Afghanistan to disrupt al­Qaida and Taliban forces that are attempting to undermine Afghanistan’s economic reconstruction and political progress. We are on offense, not defense. Our military operations are focused on denying terrorist organizations safehaven and freedom of movement throughout eastern Afghanistan, along the porous border with Pakistan.

U.S. Strategy

Our goal is an Afghan government that is moderate, on a path to democracy, economically self-sufficient, and capable of controlling its national territory. The strategy we have adopted toward that goal has four key elements:

• the redoubled U.S. effort reflected in President Bush’s “Accelerating Success in Afghanistan” Strategy;

• our support for President Karzai’s effort to strengthen the national government;

• the Provincial Reconstruction Teams; and

• our new strategy directed at the South and Southeast of the country.

What have we achieved to date?

Let me begin with what we call the “Accelerating Success in Afghanistan” Strategy.  At President Bush’s direction, and with vital Congressional support, this “Acceleration” strategy increased US assistance in FY-2004 to $2.2 billion and, with this new funding, undertook the following:

• training of 20,000 new policemen of the Afghan National Police (ANP) by June 2004;

• an increase in the training rate of Afghan National Army troops from 6,000 per year to 10,800 per year;

• establishment of the Afghan~ Reconstruction Group, attached to the US Embassy in Kabul, to provide senior-level, expert advice across a range of sectors to Afghan government ministries and departments;

• an increase in counter-narcotics eradication, alternative development, capacity building, and law enforcement training programs.

Second, we have supported President Karzai’s strategy to strengthen the national government.  This includes his efforts to improve provincial governance, reduce the power of the regional commanders and demobilize regional militias. Significant headway has been made to date:

• President Karzai has removed 16 non-performing provincial governors and 17 police chiefs from office.

• Since March 2003, the central government has collected $193 million of a planned $200 million in dOmestic revenues, to include over $100 million in customs revenues.

• Since May of 2003, provincial governors have not been allowed to hold a military title. In Herat, in August 2003, President Karzai removed Governor Ismail Khan from his command of the 4th Corps.

• Pilot disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) projects have demobilized 6,225 and reintegrated 5,125 former combatants in Kunduz, Gardez, Mazar-e Sharif and Kandahar.

• Based on lessons learned from the pilot projects, the Afghan government has agreed on a plan for nation-wide DDR that would eliminate 40 percent of Afghan militia forces and 100 percent of the heavy weapons by June 2004.

The Constitutional Loya Jirga at the end of last year was another step in the building of Afghanistan’s national institutions. Not only does the new Constitution call for a strong Presidency -- as well as guaranteeing women’s and minority rights and the rule of law -- but the conduct of the Loya Jirga itself saw President Karzai demonstrate the effectiveness of national authority.

The Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) have proven to be an effective and flexible instrument for achieving several purposes: facilitating reconstruction efforts around the country; contributing to the facilitation of security where needed; bolstering the presence and authority of the central government; and to provide another vehicle for internationalizing the overall effort.

PRTs typically comprise 60-100 military and civilian personnel representing several agencies in the U.S. Government.  Their composition is meant to be flexible, adapting to the particular needs of a region; they include a civilian-led reconstruction team, engineers, security and military observer teams, linguists, interpreters, and a medical team.  The PRTs work with Afghan government ministries, local officials, UN agencies, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to facilitate their efforts.

Thirteen PRTs, as you know, are already deployed, and three more should be deployed in the next few months.  The growing international role in the PRTs is another success story.  The U.K., New Zealand, and Germany are leading some of these teams.  NATO has committed itself to the establishment of five new PRTs in the North and West in the coming months.

As Afghan government capacity increases and indigenous security forces are developed, leadership of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams will be gradually transferred to the Afghan government.

In recognition that remnant Taliban, al-Qaida, and other forces have increased their attacks on soft targets in order to weaken international resolve and undermine Pashtun support for the Afghan government, we are also in the process of implementing what is known as the South and Southeast Strategy.  This strategy combines military, political, and economic instruments of policy.  Combat operations (like Operation Mountain Storm) are followed up by intensified, focused reconstruction and humanitarian assistance. Already the strategy is paying dividends:

• We are collecting better and more intelligence on Taliban, al-Qaida, and other enemy forces, important contributions to the war against terrorism.

• Reconstruction aid is being directed to where it is most needed.

• Three new Provincial Reconstruction Teams will be established in the South and Southeast by June 2004.

• The US military has undertaken establishment of a Regional Development Zone pilot project in Kandahar to focus humanitarian, reconstruction, and security efforts in the south.

Challenges that Remain

We understand that these gains are at risk.  Taliban and al-Qaida remnants and other outlaw elements want to derail this progress.  Another major challenge, however, is the recent surge in poppy cultivation and distribution in Afghanistan.  We know that some regional warlords are complicit in this trade and that this trade helps finance their war against Afghanistan’s future.

The British government has the lead role in the counter-narcotics effort, and within the U.S. Government the Department of State has the lead.  But the Department of Defense has a key role and we are expanding our effort.  The US counter-narcotics strategy for Afghanistan supports the stability of the central government and the development of the lawful economy.  It calls for alternative development, security sector reform, and eradication.

DoD’s roles include the following:

• The FY2004 Emergency Supplemental included $73 million for DoD counter-narcotics programs for Afghanistan.  Those resources are being spent on equipping and providing infrastructure for Afghan law enforcement: better equipping police, constructing new border entry points, new intelligence fusion and sharing capabilities, a public affairs training program for the Afghan Ministry of the Interior, and to upgrading helicopters for the British-trained Afghan counter-narcotics interdiction forces.

• USCENTCOM has also provided more detailed guidance to U.S. forces to ensure that they destroy drugs and drug equipment when resources are available or when they encounter them during the course of military operations.

Another key challenge that remains is building the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police to ensure that they are up to the task of providing security in the new Afghanistan.

In September 2003, the Afghan government appointed the leadership of and activated the ANA’s Central Corps in Kabul. Fifteen ANA battalions have now graduated from the Kabul Military Training Center, and a sixteenth is in training.  In January of this year, as part of President Bush’s “Accelerating Success” strategy, we accelerated the rate of training from 6,000 a year to 10,800.

ANA battalions have ably conducted presence patrols and combat operations. As of this writing, approximately 2,500 ANA troops are deployed throughout Afghanistan:

• Elements of two ANA battalions are currently deployed with Coalition forces along the Afghanistan-border in Operation Mountain Storm.

• In late March, approximately 1,000 ANA troops were deployed to Herat after factional fighting broke out.  The troops have played a crucial role in the maintenance of stability in the area.

• In early April, another 600 ANA troops and 300 ANP were deployed to quell factional violence in Meymaneh, Faryab province.

• Elements of one battalion are in Mazar-e Sharif providing important support for the UN-led heavy weapons cantonment program and

• One ANA company currently is in Qa’leh-ye Now, Badghis province, conducting presence patrols.

According to many reports, the reaction of the Afghan public to the ANA has been positive. As one local leader said, “Wherever the ANA goes, stability breaks out.”

A specific challenge is to ensure that security in rural areas improves significantly to enable national elections to be held.

In late March, the Afghan government decided to postpone by three months the national elections originally set for June under the terms of the Bonn Agreement.  As President Karzai noted at that time, the postponement was to ensure that the voter registration process and logistical preparations are completed before elections are held. 

The United Nations, the Afghan Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Defense, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), and Coalition forces are preparing a security plan to support the national elections. As mentioned above, the Afghan government has unveiled an ambitious plan to disarm 40 percent of all militias and canton 100 percent of heavy weapons by June 2004. Concurrently, Afghan security forces are being trained and deployed.

Security in Afghanistan will never be 100 percent. But the Afghan people --and the country’s political leaders -- are not likely to be easily intimidated.  Threats and sporadic attacks by al-Qaida, Taliban and other outlaw elements should not be allowed to deter the Afghans from reaching this crucial political milestone.  The Afghan government, with the help of the international community, is redoubling its efforts to strengthen security around the country.

Finally, some ask: Do we have enough troops in Afghanistan? The answer is: Our commanders have the troops they need.

Numbers are misleading.  The Soviets invaded Afghanistan, eventually had an occupying force of several hundred thousand troops, but failed to rule large areas of the country.  Of course, we are not the Soviets.  We are fighting a different kind of war, as a partner of the Afghanistan government and people against a die-hard minority.

The Coalition is, as I noted earlier, on offense, not defense -- keeping up the offensive in the porous border areas.  Effective cooperation with Pakistan is improving.  Approximately 17,000 U.S. forces are currently in Afghanistan, successfully conducting counter-terrorist missions in key areas, primarily in the South and East.  Eighteen other nations have forces on the ground, in the Coalition or in ISAF.  Over 6,000 ISAF troops support Afghan police and security forces in Kabul. NATO/ISAF has expanded to Kunduz, and will expand further in the coming months.

Conclusion

Let me conclude, Mr. Chairman, by acknowledging the seriousness of the challenges that we and the Afghans face in rebuilding a country devastated by a generation of war and tyranny.  But we are pursuing the strategy I have outlined, and we have accelerated our efforts.  Congress’s solid support has made possible the gains we can point to.  There is no doubt that the Administration and the Congress have much to do together to complete what we have begun.

Thank you.