TESTIMONY
OF
GENERAL JAMES T. HILL
UNITED STATES ARMY
COMMANDER
UNITED STATES SOUTHERN COMMAND
BEFORE THE
HOUSE
ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
March
24, 2004
Introduction
Mr.
Chairman, Representative Skelton, Members of
the Committee, it is my privilege to present
the posture statement of the United States
Southern Command. The men and women of our
command are making enormous contributions to
the War on Terrorism and the defense of this
country on a daily basis. Your Soldiers,
Sailors, Airmen, Marines, Coast Guardsmen,
and Department of Defense civilians are
working throughout the region to promote
U.S. national security interests. Their
work has done much to preserve stability and
strengthen relationships with our allies.
Simultaneously we are building a cooperative
security community that will advance
security and stability in the generation to
come.
The
security picture in Latin America and the
Caribbean has grown more complex over the
past year. Colombia’s considerable progress
in the battle against narcoterrorism is
offset by negative developments elsewhere in
the region, particularly in Haiti, Bolivia,
and Venezuela. These developments represent
an increasing threat to U.S. interests. We
face two primary types of threats in the
region: an established set of threats
detailed in previous years and a nascent set
likely to raise serious issues during this
year. On the traditional front, we still
face threats from narcoterrorists and their
ilk, a growing threat to law and order in
partner nations from urban gangs and other
illegal armed groups, which are also
generally tied to the narcotics trade, and a
lesser but sophisticated threat from Islamic
radical groups in the region. These
traditional threats are now complemented by
an emerging threat best described as radical
populism, in which the democratic process is
undermined to decrease rather than protect
individual rights. Some leaders in the
region are tapping into deep-seated
frustrations of the failure of democratic
reforms to deliver expected goods and
services. By tapping into these
frustrations, which run concurrently with
frustrations caused by social and economic
inequality, the leaders are at the same time
able to reinforce their radical positions by
inflaming anti-U.S. sentiment.
Additionally, other actors are seeking to
undermine U.S. interests in the region by
supporting these movements.
These
traditional and emerging threats are
overlaid upon states in the region that are
generally marked by weak institutions and
struggling economies. This resulting
frailty of state control can lead to
ungoverned or ill-governed spaces and
people, corruption, and clientalism. The
militaries we work with in the area of
responsibility are feeling the brunt of both
threats and weak governments, but for the
most part have supported their respective
constitutions, remained professional, and
respected human rights. They will be under
increasing pressure from these stressors
over the next several years. Consequently,
we must maintain and broaden our consistent
military-to-military contacts as a means of
irrevocably institutionalizing the
professional nature of those militaries with
which we have worked so closely over the
past several decades.
We are
assisting our partner nations’ efforts to
address these threats and underlying
structural factors through consistent,
patient cooperation. We work closely with
the interagency to build a coherent,
long-term vision and to coordinate our
efforts, but to realize that vision will
require considerable time, energy, and
resources. As in Colombia, the work will be
hard and will require long-term dedication
and commitment. The security, economic well
being, and demographic fortune of our
country is inextricably linked with Latin
America and the Caribbean. The entire
Americas, working as one, can confront these
existing and emerging threats, and they can
do so while providing for economic growth
and opportunity. Consequently, this region
of the world, despite all the other very
real and pressing demands on our national
attention and resources, requires increased
attention in the coming year.
To
describe the current state of affairs in
U.S. Southern Command, I will outline in
detail the threats we are facing, both
traditional and emerging. I will provide a
regional assessment, with particular
emphasis on the progress we are seeing in
Colombia under the Uribe administration,
followed by an assessment of our progress in
the War on Terrorism. Finally, I will
address Southern Command’s requirements.
Threats
The
narcoterrorists in Colombia remain the
largest and most well known threat in our
region and have continued their illicit
activities, yet not without a price. All
three narcoterrorist groups are named on the
Department of State’s list of designated
foreign terrorist organizations: the
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, or
FARC; the National Liberation Army, or ELN;
and the United Self-Defense Forces, or AUC.
Most observers now understand that these
groups are narcoterrorists rather than
romantic guerillas crusading for the
downtrodden. While a few might retain some
of their founding ideology, by and large
these groups consist of terrorists and
criminals who operate outside the rule of
law in pursuit of illicit profits rather
than political revolution.
The FARC
still comprises the largest threat, with an
estimated 13,000-15,000 members. The FARC
has continued to conduct terrorist
activities in Colombia and still holds three
Americans hostage. Despite their numbers,
they have suffered many setbacks this past
year, with the capture or elimination of a
number of valuable leaders and front
commanders. Most notably a high-level
financier, Simon Trinidad, was captured by
the Ecuadorians and turned over to Colombian
custody. Over 2,000 FARC members have
demobilized since August 2002. The ELN, a
smaller organization with an estimated 3,500
to 4,000 members, is declining in
importance. There has been some progress in
encouraging the ELN to demobilize via peace
talks, although those who refuse may merge
with the FARC. Much of the AUC, while still
a threat and still heavily involved in
narcotics trafficking, is in peace
negotiations with the Government of
Colombia. 10,000 to 12,000 members of the
illegal self-defense groups are estimated to
be involved in the peace process, though
another 2,000 to 4,000 remain outside the
process.
The
narcoterrorist influence is bleeding over
into what we see as a second and increasing
threat to the region: growingly
sophisticated criminal gangs. While not all
gangs are fueled by illicit narcotics, most
bolster their criminality by drawing
substantial support from the drug business.
The World Health Organization has described
Latin America as the world’s most violent
region based on the numbers of homicides per
capita, surpassing even war-torn Africa.
Homicides and violent crime take a direct
toll daily on Latin Americans. There is
another insidious second order effect. The
Inter-American Development Bank has
estimated that per capita GDP in Latin
America would be nearly 25 percent higher if
Latin American crime rates resembled those
of the rest of the world. Violent crime
causes capital flight from within the
country and stifles investment from outside
the country. It literally takes money out
of the pockets of those who need it most and
most hurts those who have the least. This
second threat faced by many Latin American
countries is difficult and complex because
it falls precisely on a seam between law
enforcement and military operations. Latin
American leaders need to resolve this
jurisdictional responsibility issue to
promote cooperation among their police and
military forces while simultaneously
restructuring their states’ security forces.
Beyond
narcoterrorist and gang violence, branches
of Middle Eastern terrorist organizations
conduct support activities in the Southern
Command area of responsibility. Islamic
radical group supporters, extending from the
Caribbean basin to the tri-border area of
Paraguay, Argentina and Brazil, conduct fund
raising activities. Terrorists who have
planned or participated in attacks in the
Middle East and the United States, such as
captured high profile al Qaida terrorist
Khalid Shaihk Mohammed, have spent time in
the region. Supporters generate illicit
funds through money laundering, drug
trafficking, arms deals, human smuggling,
piracy, and document forgery. They funnel
tens of millions of dollars every year back
to their parent organizations in the Middle
East, thus extending the global support
structure of international terrorism to this
hemisphere. Not surprisingly, Islamic
radical groups, narcoterrorists in Colombia,
and urban gangs across Latin America all
practice many of the same illicit business
methods.
Radical populism is another emerging concern
in the region. Populism in and of itself is
not a threat. Rather, the threat emerges
when it becomes radicalized by a leader who
increasingly uses his position and support
from a segment of the population to infringe
gradually upon the rights of all citizens.
This trend degrades democracy and promises
to concentrate power in the hands of a few
rather than guaranteeing the individual
rights of the many. Anti-American sentiment
has also been used to reinforce the
positions of radical leaders who seek to
distract the populace from their own
shortcomings. Anti-American sentiment also
troubles our partner nations as well, as
elected leaders must take into account the
sometime very vocal views of their
constituents. The threats and trends in the
region paint a negative picture in many
regards and certainly bear close scrutiny in
the coming year. We will maintain
vigilance. We will also continue our work
with partner nations and the interagency to
shore up stability and promote increasing
security cooperation.
Regional Assessments
Andean Ridge
Colombia is where the most is at stake. The
United States made an enormous investment in
the Government of Colombia three and a half
years ago with our support to Plan
Colombia. That investment is beginning to
pay dividends. Under President Uribe, the
Government of Colombia, with robust popular
support, is making impressive progress in
defeating the narcoterrorists and rejoining
the ranks of peaceful, safe and secure
states. I have been to Colombia 23 times
since I took command, and I have seen
progress on every visit.
President Uribe is a unique leader who has
galvanized the will of the people and
motivated his armed forces. He has
personally demonstrated that one individual
can change the course of events. Without
his personal leadership, energy, and
dedication, I don’t think the Colombians
would have achieved the remarkable progress
we have seen. Yet his personal charisma and
drive only go so far, and he well knows it.
That is why he is building the structures to
sustain momentum and institutionalize
success beyond that of his term and beyond
that of Plan Colombia.
The
Colombian military has become much better
and more aggressive in their operations
against the FARC, the ELN and the AUC. They
have nearly doubled the number of
narcoterrorists captured while also seizing
the initiative on the battlefield. They
have had increasing success against the
enemy’s leadership. Demobilizations are up,
with some 3,500 members of illegal armed
groups having voluntarily given up arms
since President Uribe took office. There
have been fewer terrorist attacks on the
electrical grid, the oil pipeline,
communications towers, roads, bridges, and
towns. Cocaine eradication is up along with
interdiction and seizures. Colombia has
resumed a thoroughly vetted and robustly
staffed Air Bridge Denial Program. Across
the entire country, homicides, kidnappings,
robberies and thefts are down. Colombia’s
economy is growing as measured in its GDP,
stock market, foreign investment, exports,
and banking revenues. I am heartened by the
progress the Colombians are making, of their
own volition, and with our aid. We need to
stay the course in our support of their
efforts to ensure that the Plan Colombia
dividend is paid in full.
The
Colombians are abiding by the norms of
International Humanitarian Law in their
struggle. The State Department has
certified this performance. Under President
Uribe’s “Democratic Security Policy,”
extrajudicial executions in 2003 were down
48 percent, assassinations were down 41
percent, homicides of trade unionists were
down 68 percent and forced displacements
were down 68 percent. None of the units
U.S. forces have vetted and trained have
been found to have committed human rights
abuses. Alleged human rights abuses by
Colombian security forces are now less than
two percent of those reported and the
institutionalization continues with the
opening of Colombia’s Armed Forces School of
International Humanitarian Law, Human
Rights, and Military Justice that teaches
human rights and international humanitarian
law to attorneys, commanders, officers, and
sergeants. I am confident that President
Uribe and the Colombian military have taken
respect for human rights to heart, unlike
their adversaries, who commit the vast
majority of human rights abuses. In 2003,
as members of the illegal armed groups
demobilized, over 77 percent of those who
did so turned themselves into government
forces. If those demobilizing suspected
they would be subject to torture and abuse,
they would turn themselves into
non-governmental organizations and the
Church as they did in years past, before
human rights became an integral part of the
Colombian military’s ethos. That
professional ethos is also reflected in
public opinion that now lists the Colombian
military as the second most respected
institution in the country just behind the
Church. The Colombian military is at war,
which it will win while fighting justly.
Venezuela remains an oil rich nation that
provides some 13 percent of oil imported
into the United States. The domestic
political situation continues to be
exceedingly complex, and the prospects of
the presidential recall referendum are still
in considerable doubt. Venezuelan society
is deeply polarized and will continue to be
so as long as the Government of Venezuela
continues along an authoritarian path.
Well-organized street protests numbering in
the hundreds of thousands occurred on a
frequent basis over the past year.
Bolivia
faced significant turmoil over the past
year. Bolivia has a very deep geographic
divide between two parts of the country, the
La Paz region and the lowlands around Santa
Cruz, which is mirrored by deep ethnic and
social divisions. There are legitimate and
historic grievances, manifested partially in
tension over indigenous traditions that
revolve around growing coca in limited
amounts as a part of their native culture.
Yet the limited amounts never seem to stay
limited, and the cocaleros who seek
expanded rights to grow coca certainly
envision the profits from illicit narcotics
rather than the practice of ancient
traditions. These cocaleros have
found leaders who have tapped into
indigenous and other social tensions.
Indigenous groups, working with labor unions
and others, mounted violent protests last
October that led to the eventual resignation
of then President Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada.
If radicals continue to hijack the
indigenous movement, we could find ourselves
faced with a narco-state that supports the
uncontrolled cultivation of coca. Since his
elevation to the presidency in October,
however, President Mesa has been able to
stabilize the country. Still, Bolivia bears
very close scrutiny in the upcoming year.
Ecuador has demonstrated over the past year
that it has the political will to secure its
border with Colombia and to fight drug
traffickers. Despite limited resources and
a vast expanse of thickly vegetated country
that needs to be covered, the Ecuadorian
military has placed many of its best troops
on its northern frontier and has established
cross-border communications with the
Colombian military. Ecuador continues to
host one of the Southern Command’s
Cooperative Security Locations (CSL) in
Manta, which has been especially critical in
providing coverage on the eastern Pacific
vector of drug smuggling.
In
Peru, President Toledo suffers from very low
popularity ratings despite a good economy.
Peru’s large indigenous population remains
relatively politically inactive and has not
been mobilized to the extent seen in
Bolivia. Sendero Luminoso (SL) remains an
ongoing problem. The Peruvian military has
aggressively pursued them, and they do not
possess the strength or capabilities they
once displayed. Ominously, SL has now
adopted the FARC model of protecting
narcotics traffickers in exchange for
funding. In a reassuring example of
regional cooperation, the defense ministers
from Peru, Colombia, and Brazil signed a
three-way agreement to combat illegal drug
trafficking in the Amazonian region on
February 10th, 2004.
Caribbean
Following the resignation and departure of
former President Aristide, there was a
constitutional transfer of power to the
interim government in Haiti, and with it, an
opportunity to move forward. With United
Nations support and in conjunction with our
partners, we have established the
Multinational Interim Force, consisting of
forces from the United States, France,
Chile, and Canada. We are working to
reestablish security and stability for the
Haitian people until such time that Haitian
institutions have been sufficiently
bolstered to resume that task. This
operation has had the effect of saving the
lives of innocent Haitians, preventing a
mass migration during a time of rough seas,
protecting U.S. interests in the Caribbean,
and fostering regional and international
cooperation to assist a nation in need.
Much work remains to be done, and we will
continue providing our assistance to the
Multinational Interim Force’s efforts and to
developing plans for a potential follow-on
U.N. Multinational Stabilization Force.
Beyond
Haiti, the primary challenges in the
Caribbean come from narcotrafficking,
terrorism, document fraud, and corruption.
Democratic institutions remain relatively
immature, rendering many countries unable to
police fully their sovereign territory,
resulting in porous borders and coastlines
and ungoverned spaces. Migration remains a
concern should Caribbean governments be
unable to meet the needs of their people.
Additionally, violent crime has grown over
the past decade, much of it related to
narcotrafficking, arms trafficking, and
money laundering. To meet these challenges
regional governments are attempting to focus
on cooperative efforts such as the Regional
Security System (RSS), the Caribbean
Disaster Emergency Response Agency (CDERA),
the Caribbean Information Sharing Network (CISN),
and the U.S. Coast Guard’s Caribbean Support
Tender (CST). A key element of Southern
Command’s efforts in the Caribbean is the
uniquely focused Tradewinds exercise.
Conducted annually, Tradewinds exercise
objectives focus on combating transnational
threats, counter drug operations, and
disaster preparedness.
Aruba
and the Netherlands Antilles continue active
support of Southern Command counterdrug
efforts with their respective Cooperative
Security Locations. Of all our allies in
the Caribbean, the Dominican Republic has
the strongest military and has often been
the most supportive. Their military
capability and political leadership allowed
them to support multinational forces in Iraq
with a battalion sized task force. The
Dominicans will be key partners in expanding
the Third Border Initiative to build a
Caribbean zone of confidence. The Enduring
Friendship initiative will help synchronize
all maritime activities in the Caribbean,
deny terrorist access, protect legal trade,
and suppress illicit trafficking.
Central America
Democratic governance continues to be the
accepted model throughout Central America
and the region is generally pro-United
States. Central American leaders have shown
a commitment to free trade and open
economies and have also begun laying the
groundwork for greater regional
integration. They are overcoming historical
border differences and tensions in order to
pursue regional economic and military
integration. Honduras, El Salvador, and
Nicaragua sent forces to support Operation
Iraqi Freedom. Current relations with
Nicaragua are a testament to how much
improvement has been made in just two
decades with patient, cooperative efforts.
Additionally, El Salvador provides Southern
Command the use of Comalapa Airport as a
Cooperative Security Location for
counter-trafficking coverage throughout
Central America, the eastern Pacific, and
the western Caribbean. Joint Task Force
Bravo in Honduras continues to provide a
logistical support base to the critical
humanitarian missions of the region, as well
as to counter illicit trafficking
operations.
Despite progress, Central American countries
lack resources and remain susceptible to the
ills of narcotics and arms trafficking.
This region is also a primary avenue for
illegal migrants and drugs entering the
United States. Especially troublesome is
the growth in gangs and drug related crime
we are seeing across Central America.
Unemployment and poverty, together with a
demographic surge in the younger population
and thousands of leftover weapons from the
wars of the 1980s, make Central America a
fruitful recruiting ground for organized
criminals. Violence is a major problem in
this area with local vigilantism taking the
place of judicial systems that do not work.
There are estimated to be at least 25,000
gang members in Honduras, El Salvador and
Guatemala, the three countries where the
problem is worst. There is also some
evidence that many of those gang members
have close connections with gangs in the
United States, either from drug distribution
networks or from immigration and
re-migration to their home countries.
Southern Cone
The
Argentine economic crisis has caused many to
question the validity of neo-liberal
reforms, manifested in the Buenos Aires
Consensus signed last October by Presidents
Kirchner and Lula and stressing “respect for
poor countries.” Southern Cone countries,
traditionally strong supporters of
multilateralism and the United Nations, were
also the most vociferous in opposition to
Operation Iraqi Freedom. Limitations
related to the American Servicemember
Protection Act (ASPA) have added yet one
more complaint. Brazil continues along a
moderate path but is suffering from
narcotics fueled urban gang violence. The
Brazilian minister of justice stated that
violence in Brazil’s three biggest cities
costs $4.5 billion dollars a year.
Nevertheless, progress and stability in
Brazil is not in question.
We are
maintaining strong military-to-military
relations with the countries of the Southern
Cone. Southern Command has developed
relationships with the new Argentinean
military leadership and expects sustained
cooperation in the future. Cooperation with
the Brazilian administration and the
Brazilian military continues routinely. We
have received good cooperation from
Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay in
disrupting terrorist activities in the
Tri-Border Area (TBA). A Chilean platoon
and a Paraguayan platoon are serving under
Argentine command in the United Nations
Peacekeeping Operation in Cyprus, with
additional military personnel from Bolivia,
Brazil, Peru and Uruguay also serving with
the Argentine-led force. Chile, the fourth
largest user of the Panama Canal behind the
United States, Japan, and China, took an
active leadership role in the Southern
Command sponsored PANAMAX exercise designed
to guarantee the security of the Panama
Canal. The Chileans rapidly deployed a
force to Haiti during the recent crisis. We
look forward to a growing and cooperative
relationship with Chile and its armed
forces.
War on Terrorism
Terrorists throughout the Southern Command
area of responsibility bomb, murder, kidnap,
traffic drugs, transfer arms, launder money,
and smuggle humans. Southern Command gains
actionable intelligence on these and other
terrorist activities that is then used by
U.S. law enforcement agencies and our
partner nations to disrupt terrorist
operations and means of support. To further
these efforts, we train, equip, build and
exercise partner nation capabilities to
control borders, eliminate safe havens, and
project government presence. Our primary
efforts are in the areas of improving
Colombian military capabilities, conducting
detention operations, improving interagency
cooperation, resetting our strategic
architecture, promoting security
cooperation, and institutionalizing partner
nation professionalism and human rights
adherence.
Colombia’s Military Capabilities
Southern Command assistance
programs are helping Colombia develop the
capabilities to achieve security and
stability. Military training of Colombian
units that are vetted for human rights
abuses is a key enabler in their fight. In
addition to working closely with the
Colombian Ministry of Defense, Army, Navy
and Air Force, we developed over the past
year a close working relationship with the
Colombian Special Operations Command, the 1st
Commando Battalion, the Lancero Battalion,
and their urban counter-terrorist unit. We
assist in providing operational support and
developing thorough logistics systems, with
a particular emphasis on casualty
evacuation. We continue training the
Counter Narcotics Brigade and its aviation
units. The Plan Colombia helicopters have
proven to be a major asset in the fight
against narcoterrorism, and the procedures
for coordinating their use have been
optimized and institutionalized. As we look
to the future, careful consideration should
be given to the eventual nationalization of
these assets, while maintaining and
respecting Congressional intent in their
provision. We work on riverine techniques
with the Colombian Marines and assisted in
the establishment of operationally focused
Riverine Combat Elements (RCE). We assisted
in infrastructure security planning, and
ensured that all systems were in place to
resume the State Department-managed Air
Bridge Denial (ABD) program. We are working
closely with Colombian Military Intelligence
to assist them in developing intelligence
driven operations. We sent Planning
Assistance Teams to support Colombian units
in numerous locations throughout Colombia.
We helped develop Civil Affairs capabilities
that have been well used as the government
reestablished its official presence in all
municipalities. With funds made available
from the original FY 2000 Plan Colombia
emergency supplemental, we have helped the
Colombian Ministry of Defense institute
legal reforms through the creation of a
Military Penal Justice Corps (MPJC), similar
to our Judge Advocate General’s Corps. To
provide for the long-term institutional
health of the Colombian Army, we assisted
them in establishing a Command Sergeants
Major Academy to develop a robust
non-commissioned officer corps. Finally,
drawing on lessons learned in our own
operations, we are assisting in Colombian
efforts to strengthen interagency
cooperation.
Detention Operations
In
addition to its work in Latin America and
the Caribbean, Southern Command has directly
and actively supported the War on Terrorism
since January 2002 by operating a terrorist
detention and intelligence operations
facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
Intelligence operations at Guantanamo have
provided critical information regarding
terrorist organizations’ leadership,
organization, finances, planned attacks,
potential attacks, and other specific
information that has thwarted terrorist
activities. As Guantanamo operations
continue, we will improve intelligence
exploitation, detainee review and
repatriation procedures, and quality of life
for service members. We are prepared for
our role as host of military commissions.
Inter Agency
Cooperation
JIATF-South
continues to serve as a model joint,
interagency, and multinational organization
as it coordinates source and transit zone
activities from Key West, Florida. With the
proven nexus between terrorists, drugs, and
arms trafficking, counter illicit
trafficking is becoming an increasingly
important expansion of counterdrug efforts.
JIATF-South and the Joint Southern
Surveillance Reconnaissance Operations
Center (JSSROC) successfully merged last
July, with a gain in efficiency by
concentrating the trackers and planners in
one headquarters. In January JIATF-South
hosted a successful interagency counter
narcotics trafficking conference that
included high-level Colombian participation
and set the course for future operations.
Responding to Secretary Rumsfeld’s guidance
to establish a Joint Interagency
Coordination Group, Southern Command meets
monthly to focus on the War on Terrorism
with representatives from the Department of
Treasury, Drug Enforcement Agency,
Department of State, Department of Homeland
Security, the intelligence agencies, and
Department of Defense. The Joint
Interagency Coordination Group is also a
venue for sharing intelligence and
effectively coordinating our regional
counter-terrorism efforts. Within the
interagency terrorist financial designation
process, Southern Command is partnering with
the Department of Treasury’s Office of
Foreign Assets Control to assist in
interdicting the flow of capital acquired
through illicit activities.
Strategic
Architecture
Southern Command serves as a model unified
command with modest forward presence and
ability to respond regionally. Over the
past year we have relocated some of our
components and will continue throughout this
year. U.S. Army South (USARSO) relocated
from Fort Buchanan, Puerto Rico, to Fort Sam
Houston in San Antonio, Texas. Special
Operations Command South (SOCSO) is in the
process of relocating from Roosevelt Roads,
Puerto Rico, to Homestead, Florida. This
move is in conjunction with the U.S. Navy’s
decision to leave Roosevelt Roads, which
also involves Naval Forces South (NAVSO)
moving from that location to Naval Station
Mayport, Florida. Southern Command,
Northern Command, and Pacific Command
successfully agreed to establish a Joint
Operating Area (JOA) that gave JIATF-South
the area responsibility in the eastern
Pacific all the way to the California
border. This JOA is just one example of
combatant commands cooperating to resolve
seam issues. Additionally, Southern Command
has established a J-7 directorate for
transformation and is establishing a
Standing Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ) in
cooperation with Joint Forces Command. This
prototype SJFHQs deployed from the
headquarters for the first time to Soto Cano
Air Force Base, Honduras, in January and
conducted a two week long exercise with full
connectivity to Southern Command in Miami.
Overall, these changes in Southern Command’s
strategic architecture will allow us to
prosecute the War on Terrorism in a more
effective manner.
Security Cooperation
Southern Command’s security cooperation
activities expand U.S. influence, assure
friends, and dissuade potential
adversaries. The overarching goal is to
promote regional security and stability
through training, equipping, and developing
allied security force capabilities that
improve competence and professionalism while
underscoring respect for human rights.
Command programs are also intended to
strengthen respect for the rule of law,
civilian control of the military, and
support for democratic ideals. We do this
not only because it is in tune with the
highest values of the American people, but
also because it is a strategic, operational,
and tactical necessity. Security forces
must earn the trust and confidence of their
people before they can be effective. Only
by respecting the law and the dignity of all
the citizens they are sworn to defend can
security forces hope to gain the respect of
those they protect.
We
annually coordinate and direct more than 30
legal engagement activities among military
counterparts, regional governments, and
non-government organizations. Throughout the
Southern Command area of operations we have
advocated reform of military justice codes
and procedures, education on human rights
and law of war, and the inclusion of
military lawyers in the planning and
execution of military operations.
Complementing this training are disaster
relief programs to teach militaries how to
respond to their civilian authorities when
disasters occur. Fuerzas Aliadas
Humanitarias is the cornerstone of this
program and will be hosted by Panama this
year. More than 20 nations will
participate, including our regional
partners.
Beyond
disaster relief, New Horizons exercises
provide unique and rigorous training
opportunities to engineer, medical, and
civil affairs units. These activities hone
U.S. forces’ engineering and medical skills
in challenging environments under conditions
nearly impossible to replicate in the United
States. Last year the New Horizon exercises
completed 31 engineer projects consisting of
schools, medical clinics, wells, and
rudimentary road construction and repair.
The 70 humanitarian medical deployments
treated more than 300,000 patients. During
these deployments, our veterinary teams
treated approximately 57,000 animals in
varying livestock categories, which
contributed significantly to sustaining
local economic health. Panama, Belize,
Dominican Republic, Grenada, and St. Kitts
will host New Horizons exercises this year.
The
annual naval exercise, UNITAS, is conducted
throughout the region with significant
participation by several countries. This
year, Peru will host the UNITAS Pacific
Phase and the UNITAS Amphibious Phase, while
Uruguay is scheduled to host the UNITAS
Atlantic Phase in November. Central
American nations will host several exercises
this year to include Peacekeeping Operations
(PKO) NORTH that will focus on strengthening
the peacekeeping skills and capabilities of
the 25 participating nations. All the
Central American countries and the majority
of Caribbean nations will participate. We
will also conduct PKO SOUTH and Cabañas to
strengthen the peacekeeping skills,
cooperation, and capabilities of the rest of
the region’s military forces.
Professionalism and Human Rights
A number
of countries in Latin America and the
Caribbean have a history of military
dictatorships, authoritarian governments,
violent internal conflicts and rampant human
rights abuses dating back to the 1950s and
into the early 1990s. Many countries in the
Southern Command area of responsibility are
dealing with the legacy of human rights
abuses committed during military
dictatorships by strengthening judiciary and
democratic institutions and by cementing
civilian control of the security forces.
Since 1996, USSOUTHCOM has conducted the
Human Rights Initiative (HRI), "Measuring
Progress in Respect for Human Rights,”
focusing on developing regional standards
for human rights programs in the military
and security forces. The HRI is a major
strategic enabler tool for USSOUTHCOM and is
a key component of the Command’s Theater
Security Cooperation Plan. We also ensure
that all units that receive U.S. security
assistance are vetted for human rights
violations in accordance with the Leahy
Amendment.
Requirements
As the
War on Terrorism progresses we will
increasingly pursue operations of mutual
interest with goals that increase
interoperability with our allies. We will
pool our resources to the extent possible,
but we foresee additional threats to U.S.
security interests that may require
additional resources or the reprioritization
of programmed funds. To reinforce success
in Colombia we will address the current
personnel cap. We also expect an increase
in requirements for persistent Intelligence,
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) and
additional stress on our theater
communications architecture, as well as a
requirement for the renewal of Expanded
Authorities legislation.
Colombia Personnel Cap
The
current personnel cap limits the U.S.
presence in Colombia to 400 military
personnel and 400 contractors. We manage
the cap on a daily basis, rigorously remain
under the ceilings, and frequently must
cancel or postpone planned personnel travel
to Colombia, request aircraft to reduce crew
size, create complicated work-around
schedules for aircraft flights, or simply
cut back on training. Part of the
difficulty lies in the types of personnel
that we have counted against the cap, which
include, for example, the permanent party
military group itself, those in aircraft
flying over but not stationed in the
country, and personnel who have completed
their assignments but have not yet left the
country. A review of whether such personnel
should be counted would be warranted.
The
decision for the Departments of Defense and
State to seek an increase in the personnel
ceilings is a change from our previous
belief that we could continue our programs
efficiently under the previous ceilings.
The progress made by President Uribe and
Colombia have led us to conclude that there
is a real opportunity, with only a small
increase in U.S. personnel, if we are to
achieve our policy goals in Colombia. I
would emphasize that we do not seek to
change the prohibition on U.S. involvement
in combat.
To
date the impact of the personnel cap has
been small. In the coming year, however, as
the Colombian Military conducts full-scale
operations across the depth of the country,
the personnel cap will begin to have a
deleterious effect on the mission. While
U.S. personnel will not be directly on the
front lines with the Colombian troops, more
training and planning assistance at a
variety of headquarters is required since a
greater portion of the Colombian Military
will be directly engaged on a broader front
in operations to defeat the narcoterrorists.
We should reinforce success this year rather
than constraining ourselves with a cap
number that made sense at the beginning of
Plan Colombia but has not been adjusted for
the current and future situation on the
ground. Consequently, the Administration
has requested an increase of the personnel
cap to 800 military personnel and 600
civilian contractors in Colombia in support
of Plan Colombia.
Persistent Intelligence, Surveillance, and
Reconnaissance
We
conduct varied detection and monitoring
(D&M) operations that require a high state
of readiness and a joint effort to link
multi-intelligence collectors targeted
against strategic, operational, and tactical
requirements. This melding of organic and
national collection resources will improve
operations and fulfill the Quarterly Defense
Review Transformation requirement for
continuous and persistent intelligence,
surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR).
Southern Command’s role in
Operation ENDURING FREEDOM includes the
employment of national, airborne, ground,
and maritime ISR assets that are targeted
against regional terrorist groups and
transnational support cells. Their combined
products create a common operating picture
of regional activity that can be shared with
our allies as appropriate. Still,
the majority of assets available to us are
focused on the tactical fight in Colombia
and thus unavailable for other missions.
A capability to support
Colombia and our other areas of concern in
the War on Terrorism is essential to gain
the situational awareness requirement to
disrupt terrorist activity. When
sufficiently funded, D&M programs provide a
formidable capability to detect and monitor
illicit trafficking of arms, drugs and other
illegal activities that fuel terrorist
groups. Overall, this capability further
provides critical information used by the
U.S. and host nations to effectively counter
the expansion of narcoterrorism and
international terrorism.
Command, Control, Communications and
Computers (C4)
Improving C4 architecture for fixed and
mobile operations throughout the region has
been a consistent priority, as outlined in
previous testimonies. The current C4
infrastructure lacks the flexibility to
execute the assigned mission due to
over-reliance on inadequate commercial
communications systems, limited
communications bandwidth, and fragmented
operations and maintenance support.
Consequently, Southern Command is unable to
effectively and efficiently support a
counterdrug mission simultaneously with
another contingency operation such as
anti-terrorism, noncombatant evacuation,
migrant operations, disaster relief, or
defense of the Panama Canal.
Since
existing military systems alone are
insufficient, it is my intention to
transform, expand, and maintain a
cost-effective, efficient, centrally
managed, and robust infrastructure that
supports the Theater Security Cooperation
Strategy. This strategy includes
counter-terrorism operations, regional
engagement, crisis response, and counterdrug
missions. We are partnering with the
Defense Information Systems Agency and the
Department of State’s Diplomatic
Telecommunications Service Program Office to
explore commercial alternatives such as
fiber optic communication links. This
effort shows promise for improving C4
effectiveness throughout the region.
Expanded Authority
In
2003 and 2004, Congress gave us Expanded
Authority to use counter-drug funds for
counter-terrorism missions in Colombia
because it concluded that there is no useful
distinction between a narcotrafficker and
his terrorist activity, hence the term
narcoterrorist. This link between narcotics
trafficking and terrorism in Colombia was
also recognized in the National Security
Presidential Directive 18 (NSPD-18)
concerning support to Colombia. Operations
today are more efficient and effective
because our expanded authorities allow the
same assets to be used to confront the
common enemy found at the nexus between
drugs and terror. Expanded Authority
permits greater intelligence sharing and
allows Colombia to use U.S. counterdrug
funded equipment for counter-terrorism
missions. Expanded Authority from Congress
is essential to this command’s ability to
deal with narcoterrorists. We are
requesting that Congress again pass Expanded
Authority for Fiscal Years 2005 and 2006.
Reprogramming of $50 Million
We
request congressional support of Department
of Defense reprogramming of $50 million to
support Colombia’s campaign plan. Along
with Expanded Authority and the increased
troop cap, this reallocation of funds will
synchronize U.S. Government efforts in
assisting Colombia at this critical juncture
in their fight against narcoterrorism.
Conclusion
I’m
proud of the effort the men and women of
Southern Command have made over the past
year. They have been able to protect our
interests in the area of responsibility
while the nation’s attention was focused
elsewhere, and their dedication and focus
has paid off, especially in Colombia where
the Colombian government is making real
progress against narcoterrorists and
criminal groups. These successes, however,
may not be enough to stem the growth of
radical populism and popular dissatisfaction
in some countries where reforms have failed
to solve underlying social and economic
woes. We continue to work to improve both
the capabilities and professionalism of our
partner nations’ militaries, so they can
maintain their own security and can assist
in combating common transnational threats.
Our partner nation military forces are
currently under tremendous stress while
simultaneously institutionalizing their
roles in democratically elected
governments. These forces, if properly
trained and equipped, can ameliorate aspects
of the struggles many countries face. We
will continue to encourage
professionalization through what we are
doing in Colombia, and through what we are
doing throughout the AOR with security
assistance, theater security cooperation,
and exercises. We will continue working
diligently with the interagency to build the
coherent long-term policy that will improve
the security, and resulting economic and
social health, of the entire Americas.
I
would like to thank the Chairman and the
Members of the Committee for this
opportunity and for the tremendous support
you have provided this command. Southern
Command is a good investment of both your
dollars and your trust. I can assure you
that the men and women of the United States
Southern Command are working to their utmost
to accomplish their missions for our great
country.
