STATEMENT BY
MAJOR GENERAL STALDER
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
DEPUTY COMMANDING GENERAL FOR I MEF
BEFORE THE
HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, UNCONVENTIONAL
THREATS AND CAPABILITIES
ON
OCTOBER 21, 2003
CONCERNING
I MEF C4I DURING OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM
Mr.
Chairman and members of the House Armed
Services Committee, thank you for this
opportunity to appear before the committee
to discuss the First Marine Expeditionary
Force’s experiences and observations from
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF).
I.
INTRODUCTION
As
discussed in previous Marine Corps testimony
to the House Armed Services Committee, the I
Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) is
structured according to Marine Corps
doctrine as a Marine Air/Ground Task Force (MAGTF).
The MAGTF consists of four integrated
elements; a command element, a ground combat
element, an aviation combat element, and a
combat service support element. I MEF is
composed of the MEF command element, the
First Marine Division, the Third Marine Air
Wing, and the First Force Service Support
Group. This combined-arms team trains as a
MAGTF, deploys as a MAGTF, and is employed
across the spectrum of conflict as a MAGTF.
The MAGTF is an inherently flexible,
scalable force that can be sized to meet any
contingency. The MAGTF that participated in
OIF consisted of the MEF’s four organic
subordinate commands, listed above, and
expanded to include the 1st (UK)
Armored Division, Task Force Tarawa (formed
around 2nd Marine Expeditionary
Brigade, from Camp Lejeune, NC), the 15th
and 24th Marine Expeditionary
Units, the 11th Marine
Expeditionary Unit Command Element, the 1st
MEF Engineer Group, and several attached
units from the United States Army. In its
totality at the height of OIF, I MEF
consisted of over 86,000 Marines, sailors,
and soldiers. During OIF, I MEF was
directly subordinate to the Combined Forces
Land Component Command (CFLCC – 3d US
Army). Despite the size and complexity of
this force, I MEF’s success during OIF once
again reinforced the flexible, scalable
nature of the MAGTF concept.
II.
MAGTF COMMAND AND CONTROL
C4I is
first and foremost about people and
enhancing their ability to accomplish the
mission in a complex, rapidly changing, and
dangerous environment. The Marine Corps’
view of Command and Control (C2) is based on
the common understanding that all Marines
have of the nature of war and our
warfighting philosophy. It takes into
account both the timeless features of
war, as we
understand them, and the TTP’s, processes,
and hardware available to prosecute the
battle. Our doctrine provides for fast,
flexible, and decisive action in a complex
environment characterized by friction,
uncertainty, fluidity, and rapid change.
Since we recognize that equipment is but a
means to an end and not an end in itself,
our doctrine is independent of any
particular technology. In fact, the
cornerstone of MAGTF C2 is not equipment at
all, but rather the individual Marine. No
amount of technology can reduce the human
dimension of war.
Central
to this doctrine are the concepts of the
single battle, mission-type orders, and
integrated planning. The single battle
concept provides a focal point for MAGTF
planning and execution; it emphasizes that
all elements of the MAGTF engaged in either
the deep, close, or rear fight execute
according to the MAGTF Commander’s desired
endstate. Mission command and control
relies on the use of mission-type orders, by
which commanders assign missions and explain
the underlying intent (Commander’s Intent),
but leave subordinates as free as possible
to choose the manner of accomplishment.
Mission C2 leverages centralized, integrated
planning and decentralized execution at the
maneuver unit level. Integrated planning
includes subordinate command planners in the
MAGTF planning team to ensure a common
understanding of the mission requirements
and thorough coordination. It leverages
limited planning time to allow disparate
elements of the MAGTF to plan concurrently.
These central concepts empower subordinate
commanders to exercise maximum initiative,
capitalize on situational opportunity, and
maintain the tempo of MAGTF operations.
III.
C2 SYSTEM HIGHLIGHTS
Effective MAGTF C2 systems are characterized
by their flexibility, ability to support
expeditionary operations, robustness and
redundancy, interoperability, and the
ability to provide reach-back to organic,
theater, and national agencies. Development
of an effective system will result in shared
situational awareness of the mission, the
enemy situation, friendly actions and
locations and the environment. This merging
of shared information is often referred to
as a Common Operational Picture (COP). It
allows greater initiative, speed, and
freedom of action.
Command
and Control systems effectively employed
during OIF were able to convey Commander’s
Intent, disseminate orders, reports,
overlays, and intelligence, and support
constant communications among and between
the MEF Commander, his subordinate
commanders, and higher and adjacent units.
Detailed planning between elements of the
MEF staff and the subordinate commands
enabled stable and redundant communications
throughout the conduct of OIF, despite
unprecedented network complexity and
operational distances. Specifically, the
MEF C2 architecture easily incorporated Task
Force Tarawa, and the 15th and 24th
MEU’s into a cohesive whole. Combining the
well-planned and scalable architecture with
proven tactics, techniques, and procedures,
I MEF C2 supported the successful
accomplishment of the Marine Corps’ mission
during OIF.
In order
to support these C2 systems, the MEF and its
major subordinate commands incorporated
several recently fielded communication
technologies. Among these were the Secure
Mobile Anti-Jam Reliable Tactical-Terminal
(SMART-T), the Tactical Data Network (TDN)
gateway, the Digital Technical Control (DTC)
facility, and the Deployable KU Earth
Terminal (DKET). Overall, these new
technologies were a great success story and
contributed significantly to the MEF and
Major Subordinate Command (MSC) Commander’s
ability to command and control forces in
combat.
The
SMART-T, a HMMWV-mounted mobile satellite
terminal, designed and fielded to provide a
satellite communication path to the
regimental level, exceeded all
expectations. With this expeditious
satellite terminal, regimental commanders
were able to stop, set up, and establish
secure tactical phone connectivity with the
Division Commander, often within 10 to 15
minutes.
The
employment of the TDN/DTC combination and
its inherent multiplexing capability enabled
the MEF to establish the most complex and
extensive communication architecture the
Marine Corps has ever employed in combat.
From the start of combat operations on 20
March 2003 to the cessation of major combat
operations on 1 May 2003, this system
completed 2.5 million tactical telephone
calls, over 240 video and audio
teleconferences, over 700 video TS/SCI video
teleconferences over the Joint Military
Intelligence Communications System, and
innumerable secure and unsecure e-mail
transmissions. Leveraging these new
communications technologies, the MEF
Commander was able to conduct twice-daily
teleconferences with his subordinate
Commanders, and the MEF Staff was able to
conduct numerous daily video teleconferences
with CFLCC (our higher headquarters), and
with the MEF Home Base Staff at Camp
Pendleton.
The TDN/DTC combination also
facilitated the Secure Internet Protocol
Router Network (SIPRNET), which supported
the MEF’s primary Command and Control
Applications, including the Global Command
and Control System (GCCS), the
Intelligence-Operations Systems (IOS), and
Command and Control PC software (C2PC). One
great leap in capability the MEF gained
since the days of Desert Storm was the
addition of Blue Force Position-Location
Information (PLI). Unit PLI, when
aggregated across the force, showed the
location of selected units in real time,
permitting commanders at all levels the
ability to watch the battle unfold. GCCS,
IOS, and C2PC received and processed data
from Blue Force Tracking (BFT) devices such
as the Marine Corps’ Mounted Digital
Automated Communications Terminal (MDACT)
and a system called MTS-2011,
both of which produced unit blue force PLI.
This data, when added to the enemy
position-location information delivered by
the intelligence community, was the basis
for the COP for the MEF.
Additional intelligence dissemination was
accomplished through the use of the Trojan
Spirit II (TS), which was fielded down to
the regimental level. TS enabled the
regiments to carry with them a rapidly
deployable Secure, Compartmented
Intelligence communications system with
which they could pull theater and national
data and analysis products that would have
otherwise been unavailable.
Complimentary to the Trojan
Spirit was the Global Broadcast System (GBS).
This system relieved the burden on our
transmission and data networks by providing
additional bandwidth, thereby enabling the
MEF to receive various intelligence products
such as real time video and imagery
products.
Other
warfighting information was disseminated
between the MEF, higher headquarters, and
other commands via web-based technologies.
This information, including operational
orders and overlays, daily intelligence
data, and reports, provided the common
information framework for the MEF. This
critical technology lowered internal
friction by reducing required reports and
allowing warfighters to focus on leading
Marines instead of answering requests for
information from higher headquarters.
I also
want to highlight one of our big successes,
which was the creation of a deployable MEF
Combat Operations Center. This center
provided operational flexibility to the MEF
commander and fulfilled our C2 requirement
for a mobile, expeditionary, survivable, and
effective command post. We are working with
our Systems Command who helped us construct
this command post to incorporate lessons
learned into our program of record, the Unit
Operation Center (UOC).
Marine
Command and Control must be expeditionary in
order to succeed. Traditionally coming from
the sea, the Marine Corps has never
conducted sustained combat operations so far
inland. Our Command and Control facilities
and equipment required tactical and
operational mobility greater than that
previously envisioned or expected and
performed remarkably well under the
extremely harsh environmental conditions of
Kuwait and Iraq. Particularly noteworthy
were the sustained performance of our
satellite and terrestrial transmission
systems.
Interoperability of our C2 systems was
critical due to the joint nature of this
operation and the introduction of UK
forces. One application that greatly aided
interoperability across the joint force was
the use of C2PC software. This software,
which displays and manages the COP, creates
and disseminates operational overlays and
other graphics, and provides a common
baseline for warfighters, was deployed at
every echelon of command from CENTCOM down
to the individual Battalion to include UK
forces.
The
robustness of our network allowed us to
establish reach-back. Reach-back is the
ability to use the communication network to
draw critical information from sources far
from the forward edge of the battlespace.
Reach-back, to both airfields and command
posts in Kuwait and national assets in CONUS,
was a requirement for the MEF command
element. It was planned for and
incorporated into the overall MEF C2
architecture. This robust communications
architecture engineering, and availability
of SATCOM (i.e. commercial and military)
greatly increased our reach-back
capability. This gave us the edge by
enabling support from our home base at Camp
Pendleton, CA and national agencies in CONUS.
Future operations will require a greater
need for satellite communications and
expanded use of both military and commercial
satellite systems. Our recent fielding of
the Lightweight Multi-band Satellite
Terminal (LMST) provides us with the
capability to leverage both commercial and
military satellite systems with a single
terminal.
IV. C2
SYSTEMS IN EXECUTION
I MEF
validated its C2 philosophy and systems
architecture prior to combat operations
through the conduct of three Command Post
Exercises (CPXs). Exercises Lucky Warrior 1
and 2, and Internal Look thoroughly tested
our C2 architecture and systems in simulated
combat conditions in the CENTCOM AOR. More
importantly, they helped I MEF develop the
close working relationship required for
combat with our higher, adjacent, and
attached units.
Although
we planned, established and refined the most
complex and advanced C4I system the Marine
Corps has ever used, it remains clear that
our best “C2 System” was our Marines. Upon
reaching our staging areas, I MEF sent
liaison cells (including operations, fire
support, and intelligence Marines) with
communications and C2 equipment to our
attached UK forces, our adjacent Army units,
and our Higher Headquarters. These trusted
liaison officers fulfilled the critical role
of communicating the MEF Commander’s intent
at all echelons. In particular, the
liaisons to the attached First UK Division
brought robust C2 systems and communications
support that provided the primary method to
communicate situational awareness data, such
as the Common Operational Picture (COP),
cleared intelligence products, and all the
other benefits that a complete connection to
the SIPRNET brings. These liaisons also
provided real-time friendly force
Position-Location Information (PLI) to the
UK Forces. This data, overlaid on the UK’s
own paper-map based processes, provided the
common Situational Awareness required across
the force. Finally, these liaisons provided
a crucial targeting intelligence function
both to and from the UK. It is clear that
no C2 system can take the place of a Marine
who won’t take no for an answer.
During major combat
operations, the MEF Command Post maintained
operational tempo by displacing three times,
moving a total distance of 700 kilometers,
while never losing positive Command and
Control of assigned forces. In fact, our C2
systems were so robust that we easily passed
command and control functions from Jalibah,
Iraq to Commando Camp, Kuwait during the
worst Iraqi sandstorm in 20 years. As
further evidence of our flexible C2, the
First Marine Division Command Post moved
nineteen times during combat operations.
Meanwhile the Third Marine Air Wing
established twenty-two Forward Arming and
Refueling Points and supported six airfields
in both Iraq and Kuwait simultaneously. The
Force Service Support Group conducted six
Command Post Displacements. Finally, Task
Force Tarawa and both 15th and 24th
MEUs were well integrated into the force and
conducted similarly effective operations
throughout their battlespace.
Logistics convoys traveled over
unprecedented distances in this theater,
stretching our C4I architecture to its
physical limits. As an example, reaction
forces were in some circumstances limited by
the range of line-of-sight communications.
Logistics operations were supported by a
combination of Iridium satellite phones,
Blue Force Tracker Systems, and an extensive
terrestrial communications infrastructure
built as the MEF moved toward Baghdad.
V. OBSERVATIONS
The
Marine Corps installed, operated and
maintained the largest and most complex C4
architecture in the history of the Marine
Corps, which required 80% of the Marine
Corps’ communication assets and augmentation
of commercial satellite resources. These
assets supported both Marine Corps and
British coalition forces. The scheme of
maneuver, distances covered and speed of
advance imposed significant demands on all
echelons of the MAGTF and required a
reliable and flexible command and control
architecture.
The overall consensus from
commanders at every level was that
communications worked very well. Most
noteworthy was the sustained performance and
reliability of many of the newly fielded
communication systems despite an extremely
challenging environment. Critical data
services were provided using the newly
fielded Tactical Data Network (TDN) and both
voice and data circuits were routed using
the Digital Tech Control (DTC) facility.
With the increased demand on beyond line of
sight communications systems such as Iridium
Satellite phones and the TRC-170 radio
systems, the newly fielded SMART-T provided
critical bandwidth within the MAGTF. The
SMART-T in particular was essential in
providing voice and data services between
the Division Headquarters and subordinate
units. Most of these systems remained on
line for the entire duration of the
operation from the initial deployment of
forces through combat operations and
retrograde.
The
systems providing the COP were critical in
unifying situational awareness information
across the MEF. However, these systems
began to reach their limit.
Specifically, as the number of tracks
increased to beyond several thousand, our
systems began to get saturated. The Global
Command and Control System (GCCS) must be
upgraded to accommodate the increased number
of tracks.
Combat
Identification (CID) remains problematic,
but it continues to be our top concern. The
MEF continues to have an enduring
requirement for an active Combat
Identification (CID) system that enables our
Marines to identify friendly forces from
foes or non-combatants at the point of
decision. CID components are distinguished
from those systems that provide Battlefield
Situational Awareness in that CID must be
applied to each Marine and vehicle and work
from the shooter to the potential target.
CID must have both an air-to-ground and
ground-to-ground component. We must
continue to press for an end-to-end joint
solution.
Another
system employed was the MTS-2011, Blue Force
Tracking device, which allowed adjacent
Marine, Army and UK units to see the current
position of adjacent units. While the MTS
system was a success because of its
satellite-based communications pathway, it
uses commercial satellite and encryption
capabilities that are pending National
Security Agency (NSA) certification. As a
result, it could not be seamlessly
integrated into our COP. Therefore, MTS-equipped
units could only see other MTS unclassified
feeds, eliminating their ability to see
classified track data.
The M-DACT,
our program of record for blue force
situational awareness/blue force tracking,
provided a secret high capability and
visibility of the entire COP. However it was
dependent on the Enhanced Position-Location
Reporting System (EPLRS), which is
a line of sight
data radio. Due to the size and scope of
the MEF operational area and the rapid
advance of our maneuver units we exceeded
the line of sight capabilities of the EPLRS
network. Because of the vital role EPLRS
plays in our tactical data network, we are
developing a beyond line of sight EPLRS
bridge called the Ship-To-Objective-Maneuver
(STOM) Bridge. This bridge will extend the
reach of this vital tactical data network.
In addition to this effort the Joint
Requirements Oversight Council has directed
the Army to lead a joint effort to identify
the most effective and efficient means to
achieve Joint Blue Force Situational
Awareness (JBFSA). The Marine Corps is
actively involved with this effort and heads
the programmatic development efforts to
support this initiative.
As
operational planning commenced it became
evident that the network being developed
would require the latest in computing
technologies. We had new systems (e.g. TDN)
being fielded with commercial components
that required upgrading to satisfy our
expanded requirement from the original
specifications. Too often, the length of
time to field a new piece of hardware is
excessive. We must continue to refine our
acquisition process to increase its
flexibility to accommodate new technology
enhancements and changing requirements.
Like all
US Forces undergoing transformation, the MEF
is getting more digital with every passing
day. This transformation requires us to
also transform how we train our Marines to
keep pace with these advancing
technologies. Training our Marines must
continue to be the priority as we move
forward into this dynamic net-centric
environment. Our Training and Education
Command recently established a C4 Center of
Excellence to provide a training continuum
for our Marines to keep pace with the
advancing technologies.
Digital
communications on
the move
is another area that captured our attention.
Specifically,
mobile units require Situational
Awareness and threat intelligence data.
Equally stressing is
the digital divide, the line between
those larger units that have large bandwidth
satellite connectivity and those
disadvantaged smaller units that have
only line of sight communications. The
Future fielding of SATCOM systems like the
Mobile User Objective System (MUOS),
Transformational Communications, and Joint
Tactical Radio System (JTRS) will help
reduce the Digital divide between those
forces at the MEF and Major Subordinate
Commands, while providing much better data
to those maneuver elements that need it most
at the fighting edge.
Significant progress has been made and
continues in the joint requirements arena to
develop joint concepts of operations and
architectures – that’s the good news.
However, a number of difficult legacy
interoperability challenges still remain to
be overcome. Here are a few examples we
faced, but successfully conquered through
some hard work and compromise. The Theater
Battle Management Core System (TBMCS)
allowed the MEF and 3rd Marine
Air Wing to process the Air Tasking Order (ATO)
in real time. Having visibility on
individual missions permitted a greater
control of the effects of airpower,
delivering better results more quickly.
While this system provided a dramatic
improvement from Desert Storm in the ability
to disseminate, view and manipulate the ATO,
TBMCS was not completely integrated with
other fire support systems. Specifically,
ATO information was inconsistent between air
and ground systems. Additionally, TBMCS was
difficult to set up and use. Also, the
Army’s All-Source Analysis System (ASAS) did
not share intelligence information with the
Joint-standard USMC’s IOSv2. As a result,
the USMC had to field an ASAS terminal into
our intelligence section in order to
effectively share and exchange information.
Further, the CFACC used a third system, the
Intelligence Targeting System that was not
fully compatible with either the Army or
Marine Systems. Similarly, AFATDS, a system
designed for fire support at the Division
level and below, was pressed into service as
the primary fire support system at the CFLCC
level. At Corps and above level, AFATDS
functionality is limited by system design.
Instead the MEF used ADOCS to get the
functionality the MEF required.
Operating with our coalition partners
offered unique challenges as well.
Although the
current coalition information sharing
system of choice
(i.e.
CENTRIXS)
allowed us to exchange information,
technical and procedural obstacles
impaired our operational effectiveness. We
must
continue to pursue multi-level secure
solutions that allow
us to seamlessly operate with our coalition
partners in the future
without requiring multiple networks.
The alternative is to provide them access to
our classified networks.
VI.
SUMMARY
The
application of C4I contributed to the
success of I MEF during OIF. More than any
other contributing factor, this success was
due to the efforts of individual Marines and
the proven tactics, techniques and
procedures developed over time. Once again,
our best C2 system was our
Marines. The combination of our
systems and people allowed for better
Command and Control, shared Situational
Awareness, a faster operational tempo,
effective destruction of known enemy
elements, and rapid victory. As we continue
to find ways to improve systems
interoperability and reduce acquisition
times, we will further
enhance our effectiveness
in joint and combined operations.
