STATEMENT BY
GENERAL WILLIAM L. NYLAND
ASSISTANT COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON MILITARY READINESS
HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
OCTOBER 21, 2003
Introduction
Chairman Hefley, Congressman Ortiz,
distinguished members of the Committee,
thank you for this opportunity to once again
appear before the committee. It is my
privilege to report on the state of
readiness of your Marine Corps, and on
behalf of Marines everywhere, I want to
thank this Committee for its continuing
support. Your commitment to improving the
readiness of our Nation’s warfighting
response is integral to maintaining the
mission capability of the Marine Corps in
the Global War Against Terrorism. Our
successful operations in Iraq, Afghanistan,
Liberia, and ongoing presence in the Horn of
Africa attest to the state of our
readiness. Your support for the equipping,
training, and maintenance of your Marine
Corps will enable us to remain the Nation’s
“Expeditionary Force in Readiness.”
Contingency Operations
Across the spectrum of the missions assigned
by the National Military Command Authority,
the Marine Corps continues to maintain a
global, expeditionary perspective. We are a
Nation engaged in an ongoing Global War on
Terrorism; meanwhile, our forces also must
continue to serve as a strategic deterrent,
an instrument of diplomacy, a rapid reaction
force, and the Nation’s only truly
expeditionary force. Currently, all but a
remnant of our forces engaged in Operation
Iraqi Freedom (OIF) have redeployed from
Iraq. Our seasoned veterans have redeployed
to resume their forward deployed presence
missions, to reestablish routine unit
rotations, and to prepare for whatever
missions may come next. As the Marine Corps
continues to set the force, our forces will
remain scalable, sustainable and ready to
respond to the full spectrum of operations.
During Operation Iraqi Freedom, eighty
percent of the Corps infantry battalions
were deployed in combat operations, the Unit
Deployment Program, or as part of the Global
Naval Forward Presence Policy.
Approximately seventy percent of the Marine
Corps’ F/A-18 Hornet jets, attack
helicopters, and combat-service-support
capabilities were deployed. All of the
Marine Corps AV-8B Harrier squadrons, M1A1
tanks, amphibious assault vehicles, light
armored reconnaissance and combat engineer
battalions were forward deployed. The
Navy-Marine Corps team deployed two
seven-ship Amphibious Task Forces from each
coast, with a total of 11,948 Marines, 158
aircraft, 18,000 short tons of principle end
items, and their sustainment.
Our amphibious ships served as afloat
staging areas and airfields when access to
both allied and host nations sites were
denied. The attack to capture and liberate
Tikrit was the culmination of a reinforced
Marine Expeditionary Force assault that
lasted twenty-six days and spanned seven
hundred and twenty-one miles. Crossing the
initial line of departure was an all out
Navy-Marine Corps team effort.
We
off-loaded two squadrons of our Maritime
Prepostioning Force – eleven ships providing
combat equipment ready for all missions and
thirty days of sustainment. At the same
time, our global reach enabled by amphibious
platforms from our partnership with the Navy
enabled Marine Forces to operate in diverse
geographic locations from Afghanistan to
Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, the Arabian Gulf,
Southwest Asia, Jordan, the Horn of Africa,
Turkey, Georgian Republic, Iceland,
Guantanamo Bay, Colombia, the Philippines,
and North East Asia. The rapid buildup of
forces in the CENTCOM Theater of operations
validated the expeditionary posture,
strategic agility, and tactical flexibility
of the Navy-Marine Corps team. There are
profound geopolitical and doctrinal
implications for the operational reach
demonstrated by Navy-Marine Corps forces
during Operation Iraqi Freedom. As a result
of combat operations, several challenges as
well as opportunities stand before the
Marine Corps with respect to setting our
forces in the near term, as well as
constituting our forces to address future
requirements.
During OIF, the 1st Marine
Expeditionary Force fought as a joint team
composed of soldiers, sailors, airmen, and
Marines. Accordingly, the Marine Corps plans
for subsequently constituting the force
includes both comprehensive and coordinated
joint solutions. Within the Corps, our
operating forces are organized as a “Total
Force,” combining both Active and Reserve
components that train and fight together.
We plan to integrate “lessons learned” from
our joint and Total Force experience in OIF
to further improve our ability to
effectively plan, support, train and fight
in a joint warfighting environment.
Marine Corps operations throughout the past
year have again highlighted the relevance,
versatility, flexibility, interoperability,
and expeditionary nature of our forces. In
partnership with the Navy, we continue to
leverage our forward presence so that we may
engage our adversaries wherever we may find
them, and at the time of our choosing.
However, our success in Iraq was not without
costs. During the Marine Corps’ fight from
Kuwait to Tikrit, a good deal of our
equipment, while performing admirably,
suffered some form of failure or battle
damage. In a little less than 40 days our
forces put a far greater number of miles and
flight hours on our rolling stock and
aircraft then we would have in peacetime and
training operations, and once again our
equipment proved worthy of the Marines who
operate it. That said, this would of
course require additional supplies and
maintenance - funding for which is included
in our FY'04 Supplemental Request.
Marine Corps’ weapons systems proved
effective under the harshest of conditions
and a great deal of ordnance was expended.
Many of our preferred munitions are already
being manufactured at maximum production
rates to meet inventory replacement
requirements, so restoring our inventory
levels will require time. We will continue
to prosecute the Global War on Terrorism
wherever that path might lead. Meanwhile
the Marine Corps will set the force as
swiftly as possible in order to achieve the
highest level of readiness expected by our
nation.
Setting the Force
When we refer to “setting”
the force, we are addressing our efforts to
ensure our readiness. When the call came,
our Marines and equipment were “set,” poised
and ready for success. Their performance on
the battlefield was superb. Our Marines
endured the hardship of battle and
separation from loved ones and emerged with
their spirit intact. Our equipment
performed under the rigors of combat without
the benefit of routine maintenance cycles.
Today we are dealing with the effects of our
recent successes. Some of the effects are
immediately obvious while some will be
apparent only over time. By rotating and
repairing our units and equipment, we ensure
the highest possible state of readiness. In
this sense, we will be continuously
“setting” the force for some time. In
the near-term FY 2003-2004 period, we will
re-deploy forces from OIF and engage in
maintenance and training activities to
meet our planned presence and
operational planning requirements. The near
term force setting challenges that lie
before us continue to be assessed and will
not be fully realized until all of our
forces have returned home, resumed routine
deployments and our Maritime Prepositioning
Force is fully constituted.
The Marine Corps objective in
setting and constituting the force is to
maintain a high state of preparedness as a
ready force while preparing for the future
as a joint partner in answering challenges
to national security. As with any objective
there is a cost, and I come prepared to
discuss those costs with you today.
Supplemental Funding
The Marine Corps received sufficient funding
through the FY 2003 Supplemental to cover
all of its Military Personnel and Operations
and Maintenance requirements. Likewise, the
FY 2004 Contingency Operations Supplemental
request also addresses all of our essential
and anticipated Military Personnel and
Operations and Maintenance requirements. To
that end our supplemental funding request
contains operational support costs of $1.045
billion to cover the incremental operational
costs, OPTEMPO, training, material and
services, facilities/base support costs,
constitution, and depot maintenance.
The FY 2004 Supplemental also includes $830
million in the Marine Corps Military
Personnel accounts to cover the costs of
Mobilized Marine Reservists, active duty end
strength carryover, and the costs associated
with contingency plans to deploy a MAGTF in
support of OIF as early as Spring 2004 for a
period of up to one year. A longer
deployment or a larger force would result in
a requirement for additional funding.
Additionally, $351.3 million is included in
the FY 04 Supplemental request for Personnel
Support costs in support of ongoing Marine
Corps support of Operations Noble Eagle,
Enduring Freedom, and Iraqi Freedom. These
costs cover our Active and Reserve component
activation/deactivation costs, temporary
additional duty, Class II supply for,
clothing, tools, and administrative
supplies, and Class VIII personal demand
items including medical supplies, and
Reserve. This $351.3 million portion of the
request also includes $18 million in DHP for
health care for activated reserve forces and
their families.
Equipment Replacement
The Marine Corps objective in setting and
constituting the force is to maintain a high
state of preparedness as a ready force.
This will obviously take both time and
money. Two of our four divisions are
currently reporting significant degradations
in readiness because of equipment loss or
damage.
During OIF, the Marine Corps offloaded two
Maritime Prepostitioning Squadrons.
Our equipment came off Maritime
Prepositioning Ships Squadrons 1 and 2 with
equipment readiness ratings of 98% and 99%
respectively. After combat operations much
equipment is worn and broken, and assessment
of the material condition of that equipment
is ongoing. We have approximately 2,000
Marines in Kuwait working to both assess and
where feasible bring that equipment up to a
usable condition. In the interim, the
equipment we back load will be usable, able
to shoot, move, and communicate. The
equipment going to reconstitute the Maritime
Prepositioning Force losses is being pulled
from assets left behind by deploying units,
and global war reserve stocks. It will take
time to return the Maritime Prepositioning
Force program to pre-employment
capability. We are taking advantage of
the constitution process to transform our
MPS through the implementation of the
Maritime Prepositioning Ship Realignment
Plan. This plan shifts several ships among
the Maritime Prepositioning Squadrons in
order to achieve enhanced capability and
interoperability in support of deliberate
and contingency plans. We have used many
assets from the Norway Air-Landed Marine
Expeditionary Brigade (NALMEB)
Prepositioning Program in the constitution
of our Maritime Prepositioning Squadrons,
and expect to tap further into the assets
stored there as we progress in the overall
Maritime Prepositioning Force
constitution.
Depot Maintenance
Returning our operating and Maritime
Prepositioning Force equipment to full
mission capabilities is one of our highest
priorities, and that priority is reflected
in both the FY 2003 and FY 2004 Supplemental
requests for depot maintenance funding.
However, we have constrained our request for
equipment throughput at our two Marine Corps
depots in order to preclude a significant
investment in new facilities or production
line tooling. We will continue to evaluate
options to accelerate our depot maintenance
throughput in order to return mission
essential equipment to the Fleet Marine
Forces as expeditiously as possible.
Aircraft Replacement
The Marine Corps intent for replacing combat
losses is to continue our transformation and
modernization initiatives to the extent that
we can, and to recapitalize only when
necessary. We have put forth a plan for
replacing all our aircraft that were lost
during OIF. We lost seven aircraft during
OIF, not all of which will be replaced in
the near term with like model replacements.
For example, AV-8B Harrier aircraft are no
longer in production, so the AV-8B lost
during OIF will be replaced by the next
generation Joint Strike Fighter, which
begins production in FY 2006. This will
ultimately allow us to constitute our force
with a more capable platform and accelerate
our transformation efforts. Similarly, two
CH-46E Sea Knights helicopters are projected
to be replaced by two MV-22 Ospreys in FY
2004. A CH-53E Super Stallion helicopter
will be replaced by a CH-53E from the
boneyard after modernization at a cost of
$1.5 million. Two UH-1N Huey, and two AH-1W
Super Cobra helicopters that were lost, will
be replaced by 4 H-1Y/Z aircraft in FY
2004.
Other Investment Items
The FY 2004 Supplemental includes a Marine
Corps request of $123.4 million to replace
combat losses and facilitate implementation
of OIF lessons learned. The $123.4 million
portion of the FY 2004 Supplemental request
includes $23.2 million for eleven Light
Armored Vehicles (LAV), $13.1 million for 77
MK48 Logistics Vehicle System modifications,
$8.3 million for three M88A2 Recovery
vehicles, and $78.8 million for 105
Amphibious Assault Vehicle replacement and
upgrade vehicles.
Any inventory shortfalls due to delays in
equipment or munitions replacement are
manageable in the near term, and we continue
to explore options to accelerate the
procurement of next generation replacement
items with enhanced capabilities as part of
our force constitution efforts. The impact
of the delay in funding all of our
identified requirements on combat readiness
is modest and must be weighed against the
opportunities available to provide the force
with truly transformational capabilities.
Our Marines have done an
exceptional job. They have embraced every
mission with enthusiasm. The number of
first term reenlistments to appropriate
skills is at an all time high at a time when
the average number of unit-deployed days is
approaching 300 out of the last 730 days.
We are actively monitoring our OPTEMPO. As
our forces return there are Marines who will
be leaving active Service, and there will be
young Marines that are finishing boot camp
and entering the
operating forces. These young Marines must
be properly trained before deploying in
support of the Global War on Terrorism. For
the Marines that remain in our ranks, we
will refocus our enlisted professional
military education (PME) to ensure that it
addresses the joint aspect of warfighting.
Marines returning from combat
operations and lengthy deployments will be
supported by unit Commanders at every level
who will monitor, train, and offer treatment
to Marines experiencing adverse
post-deployment effects. To that end, a new
program called Warrior’s Return will provide
Marines that experience difficulty in
adjusting with medical and counseling
assistance.
Conclusion
In conclusion, I would like
to again thank the members of the Committee
for their outstanding, continuing support
for the Marine Corps, and the opportunity to
address our readiness issues. Our
expeditionary force in readiness did an
exceptional job during Operation Iraqi
Freedom. Their accomplishments were a
direct reflection of your continued support
and commitment to maintaining our nation’s
expeditionary warfighting capability. Your
Marine Corps appreciates this opportunity to
restate our requirements as reflected in the
FY 2004 Supplemental and thanks you for your
assistance.
