STATEMENT OF 
W. RAY WILLIAMS
DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY
FOR COUNTERMEASURES AND INFORMATION SECURITY
BUREAU OF DIPLOMATIC SECURITY
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

BEFORE THE 
HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE 
SPECIAL OVERSIGHT PANEL ON TERRORISM

OCTOBER 10, 2002

CONCERNING THE ROLE OF MARINE SECURITY GUARDS IN SECURING U.S. EMBASSIES AND GOVERNMENT PERSONNEL 

INTRODUCTION

Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the committee, I am honored to appear before you today to speak on the issue of security at our Embassies and Consulates that form the front line in the war against terrorism.  The Department of State’s Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) considers the Marine Security Guard Program a vital asset in carrying out its mandate under the Omnibus Diplomatic Security Act of 1986 to protect our overseas missions, personnel and classified information and systems.  

BACKGROUND

The Marine Security Guard (MSG) program as we know it was established in 1948.   From a starting strength of 300 Marines, the Marine Security Guard Battalion  now has 1029 men and women assigned, providing a presence at 131 US Missions abroad, soon to be 132 with the reactivation of a Marine Security Guard Detachment in Belgrade scheduled for January 2003.  The Department of State is proud of the long-standing relationship with the Marine Corps and is very pleased with the consistently superior Marines provided to carry out this very important and necessary program.   

The history of the Marine Security Guard Battalion gives numerous examples of Marines risking life and limb to protect US lives and the integrity of our diplomatic missions abroad.  Time does not permit an extensive listing of the acts of bravery and heroism that have been carried out by Marine Security Guards around the world but let me recount a few examples.

The current Sergeant Major of Marine Security Guard Battalion, Sgt. Major Jimmie Brown, was awarded a Bronze Star and Purple Heart as a Marine Security Guard in Beirut during the bombing of the Embassy in 1982.  In the aftermath of the August 7, 1998 attacks on our Embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam the Marine Security Guards rescued trapped employees, treated the injured and secured the embassy sites.  Tragically, Sgt. Jesse Aliganga sustained fatal injuries stemming from the Nairobi blast.  More recently, in April of this year a large crowd overwhelmed host government security elements and the local guard force at our Embassy in Manama, Bahrain and entered the compound, causing extensive damage to the chancery’s exterior.  The Marine Security Guards assumed defensive positions within the facility, moved employees to designated safe-haven areas within the embassy and prevented the violent demonstrators from entering the Chancery through the deployment of tear gas.   

THE DS MISSION

The Bureau of Diplomatic Security comprises the law enforcement component of the Department of State.  Our Special Agents are sworn law enforcement officers with statutory authority to investigate passport and visa fraud, conduct counter-intelligence investigations, and protect the Secretary of State, foreign dignitaries and other designated officials.  As committee members may be aware, DS agents are sometimes called upon to provide security coverage to congressional delegations traveling into high threat overseas environments.  In addition, the Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) program run by DS provides training to selected foreign law enforcement  and security officials.  The ATA program is an important part of our homeland security effort by empowering our allies to stop terrorist and other organized criminal groups on their own soil.  Furthermore, it has not only strengthened host government capabilities to protect U.S. interests but has also greatly enhanced working relationships and the sharing of threat information by host government security officials -- a need  acknowledged as being critical by the Joint Intelligence Committee’s focus on the events of 9-11.  

Over 440 DS agents serve at embassies and consulates worldwide.  The senior agent at Post is referred to as the Regional Security Officer (RSO).  The RSO reports directly to the Ambassador, through the Deputy Chief of Mission, and is responsible for the protection of all U.S. personnel, facilities and classified information under the purview of the Chief of Mission.  

THE EMBASSY ENVIRONMENT

The security environment at each of our more than 250 overseas missions is unique, being based on such things as evolving threat information, the actual location of the mission, its physical security limitations, available host country support, and staffing levels.  Under the Chief of Mission authority, the RSO is responsible for initiating and maintaining a security program which accounts for these and other variables.  It is not measured by one enhancement or countermeasure such as setback or video surveillance cameras.  Rather it is the result of the proper integration of security programs into a protective quilt, designed to protect our employees, facilities, and information.

The events of September 11, while directed at domestic targets, served as a reminder of the depths to which our enemies will reach to defeat us.  The resulting homeland security effort makes it clear that we can no longer halt terrorism at out borders, but must simultaneously use our energies to stop it at its point of origin.  As the United States becomes more secure at the border, there is an increased significance on ensuring that our overseas sites do not then become targets of choice or opportunity.  Our RSOs and their counterparts at Post are well aware of the need to remain vigilant and innovative.

The attack on the Karachi Consulate by a suicide car-bomber earlier this year served to demonstrate the success of properly integrated security enhancements.  The efficient installation of blast-resistant doors, protective window film, internal office space redesign, coupled with additional setback and a blast resistant wall was credited with saving lives.  While the RSO is responsible for overseeing the effort, the success is the result of a partnership of multiple entities within the embassy. 

THE PARTNERSHIP

Marine Security Guards fall under the operational control of our assigned RSOs at posts overseas.  Under our unique State/Marine Corps MOA, Marine Security Guard Detachments are the only Marine Corps element under the operational control of a non-DOD element.  The RSO’s responsibilities for the Marine Security Guard Detachment include operational control in all situations, including crisis situations, promulgation of guard orders, supervision of training, and ensuring that the Marine Security Guards are provided appropriate levels of support by the Post and Department. 

Eight Regional Marine Security Guard Companies, each commanded by a Lt. Colonel, administratively monitors and inspects each Marine Security Guard detachment on a semi-annual basis.  These companies provide non-operational, administrative and fiscal guidance and oversight to the Marine Security Guards and assist the RSO in ensuring that the Marines are provided necessary and required support.  

The relationship between the Marine Corps and the Department of State has been formalized through a series of Memoranda of Agreement (MOA) since 1967 which have been renewed every two years, most recently on January 9, 2001.  As stated in the MOA, the Marine Security Guard Battalion’s primary mission is to “provide internal security services to prevent the compromise of classified material and equipment.”  The orders, procedures, and equipment, used by the Marine Security Guard detachments are established primarily to protect those assets.  Marines assigned to our overseas missions provide vital security support in other areas as well, including anti-terrorism defense and protection against civil disorder.  The Marine Security Guards, in tandem with DS Agents, are on the front lines in America’s war against terrorism in defending our embassies and consulates around the world.  This was most recently evidenced in the car bomb attack against our consulate in Karachi, Pakistan and a specific threat requiring the temporary closure of many of our posts in South Asia.

In the next five years we plan to add another 19 MSG Detachments to the 131 currently deployed worldwide.  In the long term, the MSG Battalion has been authorized to increase in size to 1352 Marine Security Guards and 159 Detachments.  An end strength of 1434 enlisted Marines has been authorized for Marine Security Guard Battalion, with the remaining 82 positions providing  administrative support at the company and battalion level.

The Marine Security Guard Detachment in league with local guards, host country security elements and surveillance detection teams together give the RSO four layers of security resources.  Host country security elements remain critical in helping determine the threat environment as well as providing a response capability.  Surveillance Detection (SD), developed pursuant to specific recommendations made by the Crowe Report, is charged with preventing terrorist attacks by recognizing pre-operational surveillance directed against U.S. personnel and facilities.  SD teams are designed to work unobtrusively, in plainclothes, beyond the walls of the Embassy and Consulate.  Conversely, their local guard counterparts provide a uniformed presence at entry points to official facilities.  Their primary function is to perform access control through the screening of visitors and vehicles entering the compound or facility.  The local guard force receives support from host government security services as an on-scene law enforcement entity responsible for securing the perimeter of the facility or compound and are capable of intervening in incidents that, while outside the embassy, may impact its security.  Marine security guards form the innermost security ring with responsibility for controlling access to sensitive areas of the Mission, safeguarding of classified information, providing internal security defense and performing specific escort duties within controlled areas of the facility. 

MSG Post 1 routinely serves as a 24-hour point of contact within the embassy and the coordination point for RSO security asset control.  In most cases, there is also a 24-hour local guard control center/dispatcher.  MSGs and local guard force supervisors communicate via radio, cell phone, landline and in person.  The MSGs and local guard supervisors exchange information with the RSOs during normal working hours and as necessary after hours.  While the local guards may facilitate the operation of perimeter access control doors and vehicle gates, many posts have override capability of technical security systems that allow the MSG at Post 1 to prevent unauthorized access or to “lock down” the compound in an emergency.  Incidents initially involving the local guard force are communicated along post-specific standard operating procedures and local guard orders, with the MSGs and Post 1 as a first point of contact.  Examples of instances that involve coordination between the MSGs and local guards include an intruder on the embassy compound, demonstration activities, verification of employee and visitor access, discovery of a weapon during perimeter screening, bomb threats and other such incidents that require RSO notification and response.

LESSONS LEARNED

With the August 1998 attacks on our embassies in Dar Es Salaam and Nairobi the Department’s security posture and concerns have changed drastically.  In the world of today there is no such thing as a “low threat post.”  The transnational nature of the lethal terrorist threat we now face has taken us from a relatively stable matrix reflecting regional or more often country specific indigenous terrorism and political violence with its predictable patterns and activities, to a matrix based in asset vulnerability.  Significant threats against our missions abroad now surpass 4,000 each year, ranging from anonymous bomb threats to threats of assassinations, kidnappings and a repeat of the East Africa disasters.  There is every expectation that targeting of U.S. interests will continue into the foreseeable future. 

We cannot take for granted that a particular Post is not a target.  The American flag will continue to serve as a focus for those dedicated to destroying us.  The increased access to technology and weapons of mass destruction by those same adversaries must continue to send a strong signal that we must leverage all our resources to combating terrorism.  As Ambassador Francis X. Taylor from the Department’s Office of Counterterrorism recently testified, “…our enemies’ ideologies, strategies, and tactics are wide-ranging”.  They can exploit a single void, while we must be accountable for ensuring all countermeasures are in place.

To meet today’s threat the Department’s security programs are becoming more broad and complex .  Most importantly, the Department, through its Diplomatic Security and Overseas Buildings Operations Bureaus, has embarked on an aggressive long-range capital program designed to provide a secure environment for the conduct of foreign policy.  That program includes the construction of MSG facilities and living quarters in all New Embassy Compounds (NECs) being built by the Department. 

As a direct result of the 1998 bombings, we have initiated a worldwide surveillance detection program; implemented more than $225 million in physical security improvements to existing facilities; initiated a technical security upgrade program to replace aging cameras systems and retrofit MSG posts around the world; expanded RSO presence to 250 posts; incorporated DS Agents into 19 Joint Terrorism Task Force offices; and expanded our Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) training programs as well as our interaction with American business interests abroad.  While a number of vulnerable posts remain, the large car bomb attack of June 2002 directed against our Consulate in Karachi reflected that upgrades to existing facilities coupled with a willingness on the part of the host government to meet its international obligations can be effective in deterring terrorist acts.

CONCLUSION

In closing, Mr. Chairman, let me say that the Department of State and the US Marine Corps have a partnership based on trust and mission goals.  Be assured, the demands on both organizations brought on by the war on terrorism have only strengthened our resolve.  I appreciate the opportunity to address the committee.  I would welcome any questions that you or the other members may have.