Army
Normally, the senior tactical headquarters of the Army in the field will be the Corps. However, under certain circumstances, a tactical headquarters may be required above the corps. Such circumstances might include the commitment of a sizable number of corps on a large land mass, wide dispersion of forces, or instances where political or geographical conditions dictate wide variation in the nature of operational functions leaving responsibility for logistics, administration, and area control in the hands of the theater Army commander.
There were eight numbered armies in FY 90, but they were reduced to seven in FY 91 with elimination of the Fourth U.S. Army at Fort Sheridan, Illinois. The seven armies were First U.S. Army, Fort Meade, Maryland; Second U.S. Army, Fort Gillem, Georgia; Third U.S. Army, Fort McPherson, Georgia; Fifth U.S. Army, Fort Sam Houston, Texas; Sixth U.S. Army, San Francisco, California; Seventh U.S. Army, Heidelberg, Germany; and Eighth U.S. Army, Seoul, South Korea. The Third Army served as a tactical field army and also as ARCENT, the U.S. Army component command of CENTCOM during the Persian Gulf war. The five continental United States armies (CONUSAs)-the First, Second, Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth armies-commanded the USAR troop units within their geographical areas. They also directed the training of ARNG units within their geographical areas in accordance with HQDA and FORSCOM guidance. FORSCOM assigned the CONUSAs operational control for mobilization and deployment at all mobilization stations in their areas. In the event of full-scale mobilization, the CONUSAs were scheduled to become Joint Regional Defense Commands.
In late 1994 Secretary of the Army Togo D. West Jr. and Army Chief of Staff Gen. Gordon R. Sullivan announced a plan to restructure the Army as directed by the October 1993 Bottom-Up Review. The First U.S. Army at Fort Meade, Md., and Sixth U.S. Army at the Presidio of San Francisco, Calif., were inactivated under the reorganization plan. Oversight for National Guard and Army Reserve training and mobilization consolidated under the two remaining CONUS-based army headquarters by the end of fiscal 1995. Second U.S. Army at Fort Gillem, Ga., controls reserve units from Minnesota to Louisiana and eastward. And Fifth U.S. Army at Fort Sam Houston, Texas, controls reserve units in the western United States.
The Commanding General, United States Army Forces Command (FORSCOM), commands the numbered CONUS Armies (FIRST, SECOND, THIRD, FOURTH, FIFTH, and SIXTH), which (with the exception of Third Army) manage Reserve Component affairs within their specific geographic areas, and the major combat, combat support, and combat service support troop units in CONUS and Puerto Rico. He has command responsibility for the units related to readiness and defense missions. FORSCOM has command readiness responsibility for the bulk of the deployable Army troop units in CONUS. He commands the Army Reserve, establishes training criteria, and supervises the training of the Army National Guard.
The Theater Army [TA] reports through the service chain of command to generate and support Army forces within the theater and responds to the combat service support needs of joint and combined forces as defined by the CINC. The TA communicates directly with DA concerning these functions, but not in a direct superior- subordinate manner. The operational chain of com-mand takes precedence if conflict between chains exists. Theater Armies are not fixed organizations; they are tailored to specific situations. This is accomplished through assignment of specialized Army units to assist and augment corps and division organizations.
As the TA, Third Army commanded all Army forces in theater, but was not in the operational chain. With execution of Desert Storm on 17 January 1991, the theater assumed a greater complexity and scope. While creation of a joint or combined headquarters to serve as an intermediate operational headquarters between corps and the theater level is one option, a Numbered Field Army was employed instead to coordinate the actions of the tactical corps conducting the theater main attack. By assigning Third Army this responsibility for operational direction of the two US maneuver corps, the CINC placed Third Army in his operational chain of command.
As an operational headquarters, Third Army was prepared to control up to five corps. Attainment of army operational objectives and the CINC's strategic goals was the focus. As such, the tactical-level warfighting was left largely to the corps. The staff sup-ported this operational perspective with extensive situation assessment, estimate formulation and contingency planning.
The numbered field army function of operational control of subordinate forces was not separate and distinct, but was integrated into the other responsibilities of Army component and TA. Third Army staff officers were hard-pressed to articulate which role they were performing at any moment during operations.
Third Army served as the Army component command, the theater army and as a numbered field army. As a deployable army headquarters, not a geographic continental army, Third Army had the versatility, flexibility and experience to accomplish these tasks.
