Military


Army Prepositioned Stock (APS)
[ex-Army War Reserve (AWR)]

The traditional methods of locating sustainment stocks in Theater Reserve sites under local or theater commander control is no longer consistent with supporting the dynamics of a rapidly changing world with constrained resources - nor is it in keeping with current policy objectives. The Army has become a much smaller, predominantly Continental United States (CONUS) based force. The Army's Strategic Mobility Program, when fully implemented, will greatly expand the Army's ability to quickly move personnel and equipment to potential contingencies throughout the world. Forward presence will be achieved through minimum Outside Continental United States (OCONUS) stationing, with increased reliance on unit rotations and exercise deployments to provide stability in dynamic regions. To accomplish this objective, a balance of airlift, sealift, and sustainment (prepositioned equipment and supplies) is needed to provide the ability to project forces worldwide and sustain those forces during a contingency.

The Department of Defense (DOD) maintains stocks of supplies and equipment, called war reserves, to support military units during a war or mobilization. War reserves stored within the continental United States are distributed as needed by airlift or sealift. War reserves are also stored, or prepositioned, overseas on land or on ships near an area of potential conflict. By prepositioning war reserves overseas, US military forces have the ability to respond quickly to a contingency. For example, at the beginning of the Persian Gulf War deployment in August 1990, equipment and supplies prepositioned aboard ships arrived at the theater more quickly than if they had been sealifted from the United States. At that time, the Army's prepositioning fleet consisted of four ships used primarily for carrying ammunition and port handling equipment.

All Army war reserves (AWR) and pre-positioned stocks are managed by the Army Materiel Command (AMC), Alexandria, Virginia, with the Army Industrial Operations Command (IOC), Rock Island, Illinois, serving as AMC's management agent. Placing all five geographic sets of AWR under central management in October 1994, implemented one of the lessons learned from Operation Desert Storm. Previously, war reserve materiel was managed by theater commanders in chief. That allowed little flexibility in transferring stocks from one theater to another. In the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO's) central region "pre-positioning of materiel configured to unit sets," or POMCUS, made it easy for units from the United States to deploy to Europe and then draw their equipment. POMCUS was a key feature of the Reforger (return of forces to Germany) exercises. What was formerly war reserves and POMCUS stocks are now combined into AWR stocks. As US forces in Europe drew down, the Army reduced its stockage to four brigade sets of materiel, and reduced the number of storage locations for AWR materiel to four sites in the Netherlands -- Brunssum, Coevorden, Eygelshoven, and Vriezenveen -- and two others at Bettenbourg, Luxembourg, and Zutendaal, Belgium.

In May 1992, policy changes in the Army war reserve (AWR) program called for redistribution of materiel at Camp Doha and other AWR sites into strategic stockpiles oriented toward support of multiple commanders in chief. This shifted requirements toward developing two nearly simultaneous major regional contingencies, which would allow more flexibility in providing sustainment, instead of a global planning scenario. The Army's ability to project combat power worldwide is tied directly to the pre-positioning of combat equipment.

In May 1992, the Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) directed a reduction in Army War Reserve (AWR) and Operational Project (OP) stocks and transferred management and accountability responsibilities for this materiel to the Army Materiel Command (AMC) and Office of The Surgeon General (OTSG), for SC VIII. The USAMMA was designated by OTSG as the executive agent for SC VIII materiel and manager of the SC VIII portion of the AWR Program.

The Army Strategic Mobility Program (ASMP) supports the Army's strategy for providing a rapid deployment capability for Army contingency forces based in the Continental United States (CONUS) to meet regional commitments. The present National Military Strategy calls for forward presence, but with primary reliance on CONUS-based contingency forces. Only four of the Army's Divisions are stationed outside CONUS; the remaining Army divisional force is stationed in CONUS. The Army's global prepositioning strategy calls for 7 prepositioned brigade sets (two in Central Europe, one in Italy, one in Korea, two in SWA, and one afloat.). ASMP is key to ensuring these forces possess a credible power projection capability.

The ASMP Action Plan, published on 2 March 1993, resulted in the Army's developing the capability to provide a crisis response force of up to corps size with the following mobility standards:

  • A light or airborne brigade-size force to be inserted into a theater by C+4, with the remainder of that division to close not later than C+12. The force, including its personnel, equipment, and logistical support structure, would be transported largely by air.
  • An afloat heavy combat brigade with support to close in the theater and be ready to fight not later than C+15.
  • The Army Preposition Afloat [APA] brigade force would be a 2x2 heavy brigade: two armored and two mechanized battalions plus support. APA also provides theater-opening CS/CSS units and sustainment stocks for the first 30 days of contingency. This force would be organized into force modules tailored to meet the CINC's needs.
  • By C+30, two heavy divisions-a mix of mechanized infantry, armored, or air assault forces, depending on the theater commander's priorities, including the logistical support structure-would close in theater. The equipment for the heavy force would transit by sea.
  • The remaining force - two divisions and support - would close by C+75.
  • Air transport would be the preferred mode of travel for all contingency force personnel.

For this program to be successful, three key mobility initiatives are critical: the acquisition of fast sealift shipping, the creation of an APA capability, and the infrastructure and procedures necessary to rapidly and efficiently deploy forces from their locations through CONUS ports.

A key aspect of ASMP is continued support of airlift and sealift acquisition programs. For airlift, this means support for building the Air Force's C-17 fleet to 120 aircraft as validated by the Mobility Requirements Study (MRS). For sealift, this means support for the acquisition of the nineteen large, medium-speed roll-on/roll-off (LMSR) ships and expansion of the Ready Reserve Force (RRF) roll-on/roll-off [RORO] fleet to 36 ships as recommended by the MRS. As of 1995 twenty-nine ROROs were in RRF status, and two more were purchased and were modified to RRF standards with FY96 funding. The last 5 ROROs were unfunded as of August 1995.

In June 1997, Headquarters, Department of the Army, announced the decision to change the term "Army war reserves" to "Army pre-positioned stocks" to more appropriately identify these stocks as the Army's first-to-fight equipment capability. In 1998, the AWR Program was redesignated as the Army Prepositioned Stock (APS) Program.

HQDA, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations (DCSOPs) has determined the need to preposition seven APS Brigade Sets, one exercise Brigade Set for Desert Spring (previously known as Intrinsic Action) unit rotations and nine Unit Sets (hospitals) worth of materiel at strategic locations. This will enable units to deploy from home station with minimal equipment.

Brigade/Unit Sets are documented as unmanned Table of Organization and Equipment (TO&E) units. They have a Unit Identification Code (UIC) and AMC does the Unit Status Report (USR) on these sets since the majority of the materiel within the Brigade is under AMC management.

The objective of the CSA APS management policy is to change the use and ownership of APS materiel from specific Commanders-in-Chief (CINCs) and theaters to a common user stockpile of equipment and supplies that can support the worldwide requirements of any warfighting CINC. These stocks now fall under the broad heading of APS materiel and are grouped into five regions. APS-1 consists of CONUS based stocks, APS-2 stocks are stored in Europe, APS-3 stocks are prepositioned aboard ships, APS-4 stocks are located in the Pacific, and APS-5 covers Southwest Asia. The APS program encompasses prepositioned Brigade/Unit Sets, OP, and sustainment stocks.


FY03

  • APS-3 BDE1, APS-3 CSS Units, APS-5 QA, AND APS-5 KU Remain in Kuwait.
  • APS-3 BDE2 partially loads in Charleston Jun 03, remainder loaded in Europe Aug 03, stationed in Guam.

FY04

  • APS-2 1x1 loads in Europe Dec 03, dual alignment to EUCOM and NEA, station in Diego Garcia.
  • APS-3 BDE2 Remains in Guam.
  • APS-3 CSS (CS1) loads in SWA, MAR 04, moves to Guam.
  • APS-3 AMMO (1) ship loads from MOTSU, Aug 04, move to Guam (Actual load date TBD).
  • APS-3 Sustainment (1) ship loads Aug 04 Charleston then SWA, moves to Guam.
  • APS-3 HA/DR 1 (CSS) Load Aug 04 from SWA.
  • APS-3 BDE1, Most APS-3 CSS units, APS-5 Qatar and Kuwait undergoing repairs mainly in SWA.

FY05

  • APS-2 1x1 Remains in Diego, move to Italy Mar 05. Work equip, reconfig to 1 X 1 HVY TF and a BSB & CSSC
  • APS-3 BDE2 Remains in Guam.
  • APS-3 CSS (CS1) Remains in Guam.
  • APS-3 CSS (CS2) Loads Nov 04 in SWA, moves to Diego Garcia.
  • APS-3 AMMO (1) Remains in Guam.
  • APS-3 AMMO (2) Load Dec 04 in MOTSU
  • APS-3 Sustainment (1) Remains in Guam.
  • APS-3 Sustainment (2) Loads Dec 04 Charleston then SWA, moves to Diego Garcia.
  • APS-3 BDE1 Load 1x1 with Div Slice OR a SBCT round out units and BSB/CSSC, FEB 05. Move to Diego Garcia.
  • APS-5 Qatar and Kuwait undergoing repairs mainly in SWA.

FY 06

  • APS-3/5 Load a 1 X 1 HVY TF and SBCT BSB/CSSC (loose stow), OCT 05. Move to Mediterranean.
  • APS-3 BDE2 Download in Italy, transfer to APS2, upload the 1 X 1 HVY TFand BSB/CSSC (immediately), Nov 05.

Pre-positioning equipment and materiel has been a key element of the Army’s Strategic Mobility Triad for many years. It has been a necessary component of the ability to meet the demands of the National Military Strategy. There has been and continues to be constraints to the strategic mobility of the Army. This is represented in terms of weight/cube and time/distance. The weight/cube of Army forces exceed the capability of available strategic airlift to meet deployment goals. The time required to move Army forces vast distances by sea from CONUS exceeds the acceptable force closure times for early deploying forces. The Army Pre-positioned Stocks (APS) program has served a useful purpose in mitigating this mobility dilemma. As the Army progresses, however, with the Transformation process, the nature of this mobility dilemma is changing significantly. As a result, the Army must adapt its pre-positioning strategy to effectively deal with these changes. This need for a change in strategy was identified as an insight in the Army Transformation Wargame 02 (ATWG 02), and was included in the set of recommendations from the Logistics Transformation Task Force (LTTF). In recognition of this fact, the Army G3 and the Power Projection (P2) Council of Colonels (CoC) have chartered an Integrated Concept Team (ICT) to develop strategy alternatives. The first meeting of the ICT was on 9 August 2002.

The current status of APS assets is exemplified by shortages in equipment fill, no planned modernization of equipment, and increasingly more expensive maintenance requirements. While some elements of the program have received increased funding (War Reserve Secondary Items for instance), the overall program has not been funded at levels to keep pace with the ongoing modernization, digitization, and transformation of Army forces. This situation is indicative of the Army’s decision to take risk in legacy forces in order to invest in Objective Force capabilities. The ongoing transformation process will further exacerbate these conditions. Additionally, as the composition of the Army’s combat formations includes more Stryker Brigade Combat Teams (SBCT) and Objective Force Units of Action/Employment, the relative value of AOE Heavy equipment in APS will consistently diminish. Within the construct of the current Army Transformation Campaign Plan, it is certain that there will be a point when the Heavy forces are no longer supportable. The Army’s pre-positioning strategy must address this to avoid unacceptable strategic risk.

The most compelling need for change in pre-positioning strategy is the requirement to adequately support emerging joint operational concepts (e.g. Rapid Decisive Operations) with Army objective force capabilities. Keeping mind that Objective Force capabilities will include legacy CS/CSS equipment for quite some time. This compelling need is clearly illustrated within the broader context of Army Power Projection in the DRAFT White Paper on Power Projection of the Transforming Army.

Based on ATWG 02 insights, LTTF recommendations, The Power Projection White Paper, and the ongoing analysis of the APS Transformation ICT, a prevailing underpinning for the strategy has emerged. That is, the composition of pre-positioned assets should include more CS/CSS equipment and sustainment materiel (including Configured Loads). In fact, the P2 White Paper poses the question: “Should pre-positioning consist solely of CS/CSS stocks and other non-combat force structure?” While eliminating heavy combat equipment does not seem like a viable alternative for the near term, there is clearly merit in pre-positioning more CS/CSS equipment. A simple comparison between the expected life cycle and utility of combat equipment versus CS/CSS equipment over the next 15 to 20 years highlights the fact that fielding status of combat systems (AOE, FXXI, Stryker, and FCS) will experience significant turbulence, while CS/CSS equipment will remain relatively stable and constant.

Pre-positioning CS/CSS assets would significantly mitigate the risk of an operational pause between prompt response and sustained operations. Improved strategic mobility of future combat systems is a required performance parameter, thus negating the need to pre-position. The resulting effect of reducing the CS/CSS claims on Strategic Lift, thereby increasing the lift availability for combat systems and forces. The increased utility of common CS/CSS equipment for operations across the spectrum of operations (e.g. Humanitarian Ops, SSC, MCO). The equipment value and maintenance requirements are less costly for CS/CSS equipment than for combat systems. CS/CSS equipment is less subject to the rapid pace of technological change, thus requiring less modernization over time.

From the perspective of the Joint Force Combatant Commander, eliminating heavy combat equipment sets from APS would not be prudent until the Army has achieved the demonstrated capability to rapidly deploy combat power from strategic distances. Certainly in the near term, pre-positioned combat equipment represents a formidable deterrent. It remains clear that there will be a point in time when the AOE Heavy Brigade sets will lose their relevance.

The ICT is also considering other potential aspects of the pre-positioning strategy. They include pre-positioning non-Stryker equipment and sustainment in Configured Loads for the SBCT, or restructuring APS afloat into employable unit configurations with sustainment on a single vessel, rather than equipment sets on one vessel and sustainment on another Restructuring APS afloat into employable unit configurations divided into separate “fleets” perhaps collocated with USMC MPS.

If the Army adopts the emerging strategy recommendation of pre-positioning more CS/CSS, attention must be given to the courses of action to fulfill that strategy. Affordability of the strategy must be a paramount consideration. The source of the equipment assets will have to be determined. Does the Army buy new or identify currently on hand assets to pre-position? Given the significant resource requirements for the Objective Force (i.e. FCS) and the current shortages of required equipment, it is not likely that the Army will invest the resources to purchase additional CS/CSS equipment to pre-position. Thus the only viable course of action to fulfill the strategy is to source the equipment from on-hand assets. The preponderance of CS/CSS equipment assets in the Army is found in the Reserve Component. Similarly, the preponderance of the CS/CSS force structure that would fall in on the equipment is found in the Reserve Component. The presumption here is that RC CS/CSS capabilities will be required for prompt response and sustained operations. Under these conditions, the integration of RC capabilities and on hand assets into the pre-positioning strategy is a very plausible course of action.

The Army’s strategic mobility dilemma extends into the Army Reserve, where the challenge is even more pronounced. With equipment scattered in cities and towns across the country and supporting installations sometimes several hours away, deploying that equipment is intensely difficult. Deploying that equipment from central CONUS in the time-frames to meet the demands of prompt and sustained operations is all but impossible. To address this challenge the Army Reserve has developed a program called Army Reserve Logistics XXI (ARLOG XXI). This program involves a sophisticated methodology to identify minimum equipment assets required to support unit training readiness and the equipment required for war. This process has shown that about 37%(approximately $2.5 Billion total) in Army Reserve equipment assets can be positioned in strategic locations (including OCONUS) and made available for deploying units in a contingency. The Chief, Army Reserve approved the ARLOG XXI program in SEP 2000 based on the availability of resources. As a result, the Army Reserve is constructing a strategic storage facility in Gulfport, MS and has studied the feasibility of pre-positioning assets in Europe with promising results. It seems to be smart to make an arrangement between COMPO 1 and COMPO 3 to integrate the strategic storage element of ARLOG XXI into the emerging pre-positioning strategy involving more CS/CSS assets. This alternative has the potential to achieve real gains in the transformation of APS in the near term. It also increases the accessibility of critical Army CS/CSS capabilities in the Reserve Component by reducing some of the major obstacles in deploying equipment. And most importantly, it provides an affordable option to execute the APS Transformation strategy.

There is some recognition within the APS Transformation ICT that there will likely be opportunities to make adjustments to APS through the course of current operations. The pre-positioning strategy should incorporate the near-term reconfiguration opportunities presented by deploying equipment, the download of APS afloat, and the restructuring of APS-2.

There are other ongoing studies and initiatives that support the analysis in this memorandum. The ongoing DPG directed study on world-wide pre-positioning (Sub-study of Operational Availability) has taken an interest in both the pre-positioning of more CS/CSS equipment and the integration of the RC into the strategy. Similarly, RAND has concluded that within the current and near term capabilities in the Army, pre-positioning CS/CSS (e.g. Tactical Wheeled Vehicles) is an essential element in achieving deployment goals. The Center for Army Analysis (CAA) conducted an analysis on the effectiveness of configuring APS in terms of Common User Items rather than unit equipment sets.

It is clear that a fundamental change is required in the Army’s pre-positioning strategy. This is brought about by a changed strategic environment and by the Transformation of military capabilities. Based on sound analysis, the prevailing position is to increase the pre-positioning of CS/CSS assets and sustainment materiel. There is real potential to achieve this strategy through innovative combinations of programs (AC and RC). Certain actions in current operations may be used to aid in the implementation of some elements of the strategy. The ability of the Army to meet the sustainment demands of the Interim and Objective Force with legacy CS/CSS equipment can be significantly enhanced by APS. The value of APS will prove to be essential to mitigating the increased strategic risks associated with transforming the Army while at war.