1st Brigade - 4th Infantry Division (Mech)
"Raider"
As of Jan. 2006, the 1st Brigade Combat Team was operating in Camp Taji, an Army base approximately 10 miles northwest of Baghdad, fulfilling their second rotation in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. They replaced the 3rd Brigade, 1st Armored Division and will be there until Dec. 15th, 2006. In Mar. 2003, 1st Brigade 4th Infantry Division deployed to Iraq in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. 1st Brigade, 4th Inf. Div. Soldiers conducted numerous raids and patrols seeking the remainder of Saddam Hussein loyalists and terrorist operatives in the area. On Dec. 13, 2003, 600 1st Brigade troops, along with special operations forces, launched operation Red Dawn which resulted in identifying the location and capturing Saddam Hussein, the former Iraqi president.
History
The 1st Brigade was originally stood up on 19 November, 1917, in the Regular Army as Headquarters Troop, 4th Division. 1st Brigade 4th Division was organized at Fort Ethan Allen on the 16 December of the same year. The unit actively participated in WWI and was involved in numerous campaigns including the Aisne-Marne; St. Mihiel; Meuse-Argonne; Champagne and Lorraine campaigns.
On the 1 March, 1921, the 1st Brigade, 4th Division was reorganized and redesignated as Headquarters and Military Police Company, 4th Division. It was inactivated on 21 September, 1921, in Camp Lewis, Wa, and then activated for eventual service in Europe on 1 June, 1940, at Fort Benning, Ga. The unit was reorganized and redesignated three times prior to its service in WWII. On 6 July, 1942, it was reorganized and redesignated as 1st Brigade, Headquarters Company, 4th Division; on 1 August, 1942, it was reorganized and redisignated to Headquarters Company, 4th Motorized Division; and on 4 August, 1943, it was reorganized and redesignated again to Headquarters Company, 4th Infantry Division.
The 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division served in the Normandy (with Arrowhead), Northern France, Rhineland, Ardennes-Alsace, and Central Europe campaigns. The unit specifically distinguished itself fighting in Belgium and was cited twice in the Order of the Day of the Belgian Army and received the Belgian Fourragere in 1940.
On 12 March, 1946, at Camp Butner, NC the unit was inactivated only to be reactivated a little over a year later on 15 July, 1947, at Fort Ord, Ca. It was disbanded in June of 1960 at Fort Lewis, Wa, and reconstituted in the Regular Army as Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division on 21 August, 1963.
The 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division served gallantly during the Vietnam War and received participation credit for its roles in Counteroffensive, Phase II; Counteroffensive, phase III; Tet Counteroffensive; Counteroffensive, Phase IV; Counteroffensive, Tet 69/Counteroffensive; Summer-Fall 1969; Winter-Spring 1970; Sanctuary Counteroffensive; and Counteroffensive, Phase VII. The Brigade received two Presidential Unit Citations for its actions in Vietnam; one for operations in Pleiku Province and the other for Dak To District. It was awarded the Republic of Vietnam Cross of Gallantry with Palm twice for actions thru 1966-1969 and 1969-1970. It was also presented with the Republic of Vietnam Civil Action Honor Medal, First Class for its service from 1966-1969.
The 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division was inactivated on 15 October, 1995, at Fort Carson, Co, and activated at Fort Hood, Tx on 16 January, 1996.
Force XXI
The 4th ID became the Army's Experimental Force in 1995. Its 1st Brigade become Task Force XXI and was outfitted with digital communications systems, new equipment and new weapons systems.
In March 1997, after training on the new equipment and new tactics, techniques and procedures, the 1st Brigade was tested in an advanced warfighting experiment at the National Training Center (NTC), Fort Irwin, CA. The Army conducted an advanced warfighting experiment (AWE) at the NTC featuring a brigade task force reconfigured and equipped with Force XXI's futuristic technologies. That rotation demonstrated the capabilities of many new warfighting systems and the tremendous potential offered by using advanced technologies to support battlefield tactical operations. But while the rotation showed a great deal of promise for the military as a whole, the performance of the CSS units was rather bland and inconclusive.
The 1st Brigade was the Army's Force XXI Experimental Force designed to help build Army XXI. Its state-of-the art digital communications equipment, night fighting gear and doctrine were realistically evaluated in an Advanced Warfighting Experiment against the NTC's vaunted Opposition Force. The AWE began March 15. TRADOC's Joint Venture and Force XXI were the processes the Army used to create Army XXI, the force capable of victory in the next century.
The 1st Brigade Combat Team (1BCT) deployed with nearly 1000 vehicles. There were 73 separate technology initiatives consisting of more than 5000 new items: Appliqué, Precision Lightweight Global Positioning System, Enhanced Position Location Reporting System, Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System, Battle Command Information System, and 1386 others. At the time of the AWE, the 1BCT was indisputably the most digitized ground combat force in the United States. Soldiers from 1st Battalion, 5th Infantry Regiment, Fort Lewis, Wash., were also outfitted with night vision equipment Javelin anti-tank weapons to provide the light infantry component to the AWE.
Several key differences mark the EXFOR's rotation to NTC from a normal training event. It was six weeks long from the time the soldiers leave Fort Hood until they return, instead of the regular four-week rotation. They deployed from Fort Hood with all their equipment -- M-1A2 tanks, Bradleys, howitzers and other materiel -- at the end of February 1997. A unit on a normal rotation uses equipment stored at NTC, much as prepositioned equipment in a combat theater. Then they spend a week training on the equipment before they deploy against the OPFOR.
The EXFOR arrived at NTC about March 1. First ensured their equipment survived shipment with no major damage. They then transfered the MILES (Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System) and location devices from the NTC stock to its own vehicles. Leaders and soldiers were given about two weeks of rugged training to ensure the MILES and location gear interfaces with their own equipment.
When they deployed against the OPFOR, the soldiers were engaged for 14 days. The scenario they were given was also a measuring tool. It was the same series of situations faced by brigades on five other rotations within the past year. In those rotations the OPFOR has attacked at the same time in the rotation, in the same location, the same approach. Umpires were able to compare and contrast how the EXFOR does to what other brigades have done with different sets of equipment, different sets of capabilities.
After that scenario was completed, which took about nine days, the rest of the AWE was "free play." It is at this point in a standard rotation that a unit engages in live-fire training on a range with thousands of pop-up targets. The brigade and the OPFOR had to find each other. They had to figure out the best way to attack or defend or defeat their opponent. The only boundaries were the fence around NTC.
Training for the EXFOR began during the summer of 1996 at Fort Hood. Commanders and soldiers learned how to use new equipment to its full potential. Going up against the OPFOR was a solid test for them. The OPFOR is a regular part of the Army's combat force. It stays ready to deploy overseas and fight. But it also trains in equipment from the former Soviet army -- armored personnel carriers and T-72 tanks. That equipment is what it uses against units at the NTC.
Contrast a rotation to NTC against what the Army experienced in Operation Desert Shield. Army units deployed to Saudi Arabia had about six months in which to train before engaging in combat -- Operation Desert Storm. A unit deploying to NTC essentially goes right into combat. The NTC environment in that regard is very realistic.
Air Force and Marine units also participated in some portions of the AWE. One of the hard parts was the synchronizing of all the systems, not just Army systems. There were two JSTARS (Joint Surveillance Tactical Acquisition Radar System) flights, several unmanned aerial vehicle missions and some special reconnaissance action to support the EXFOR. They were part of the experiment with transmitting information across the battlefield.
There were 71 prototypes of new equipment tested in the AWE. They ranged from the Apache Longbow down to simple small laser signaling devices. About 85 percent of the prototypes performed to requirements. Of the rest, 10 percent need improvements to be useful and five percent were "ideas whose times have not yet come." Among "the great winners" were JSTARS, the UAV and the Javelin.
The JSTARS was really important to get the big picture, and the UAV validated the details. The two systems were "indivisible" partners. During the AWE, the tandem forced the OPFOR to change its operational patterns. They had to reorganize for force protection. They were 50 percent more defensive than they had ever been before according to the commander. The UAV used at the AWE was the Hunter, which will not become part of the inventory. The Hunter requires too much manpower and a large operating field. The Outrider, a tactical UAV now in development, will be more proficient and require less support resources. However, the Hunter helped prove the value of UAVs to ground combat units.
The Javelin was a winner to the point that light infrantrymen were being flown around in helicopters in Javelin packages to attack tanks. Only two of the advanced the AH-64 Apache Longbow elicopters were operational, but the ability to shoot from concealed, stand-off positions made it a deadly weapon. The OPFOR commander "lost" over 20 vehicles in the space of about 20 minutes and never saw what they were losing them to. Other systems that performed well were the mortar fire control system, which makes mortar fire more accurate; armored and scout Humvees; and night vision equipment for individual soldiers.
In most units, only lieutenants, E-6s, and below operated the systems. Captains and higher ranking individuals were reluctant to run the systems. One (very) senior officer stated, "We need to fire all officers above O-2 because they refused to learn the technology." When battle staff officers did not believe what their digital "common relevant picture" was telling them, they bypassed and ignored it. One senior observer stated that at every after action review, when the observer/controllers compared the pictures of reality from their instrumentation to the Appliqué-Maneuver Control System-ASAS picture, there was virtually no difference.
Although the new systems had a 98 percent operational ready rate throughout the AWE, civilian contractors were present to quickly put them back on line when they failed. The kind of people who came out to service the prototypes had 25-30 years of experience, may have had Ph.D.s, certainly were highly skilled technicians.
The new organization of the task force proved efficient. The concept of "2X9 plus 5" was also effective. That means two nine-man squads plus a five-man machine crew to each mechanized platoon. They added considerable firepower. The machine gun team gave flexibility that the Army hadn't had before.
Its success against NTC's world-class Opposing Force was largely attributed to increased situational awareness made possible by digital communications. The 4th will continue to be the developmental organization for the Army to test new concepts and technologies. The division will take advantage of the infrastructure in existence at Fort Hood.
