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Further Reading

Troops of National Air Defense (PVO)

The Troops of National Air Defense (PVO) became a separate armed service in 1948 and were given the mission of defending the Soviet industrial, military, and administrative centers and the armed forces against strategic bombing. Air Defense Forces were known as Voyska PVO Strany [National Air Defense Forces - Voiska Protivovozdushnoi Oborony Strany] from 1941 to 1982.

The Air Defence Air Force (PVO Strany) became an independent branch in the area of air defence and antiaircraft systems in 1948. United under its command were interceptor aviation; antiaircraft artillery (AAA); and the Ground Observation Service, which included radar units, ground observers, searchlight units, barrage balloon units, and other specialized forces. The entire country was divided into border and interior regions. In this period, the conduct of air defense actions in particular regions came under the direction of the commanders of the various military districts.

The air defense forces, charged with defense against enemy air attack, include missile, air force, and radio-technical units. The strategic air defense operation focuses on defending friendly forces and contributing to air superiority.

Defensive tasks, in order of priority, include--

• Protecting administrative-political, military-industrial, and communications centers;
• Providing cover for air bases, missile troops, and major headquarters;
• Defending concentrations and deployments of major ground forces groupings, especially on main axes, and then of second echelons or reserves.

The Troops of National Air Defense (PVO) combined ground-based air defense assets with fixed-wing aircraft forces to provide an integrated air defense umbrella. Conflicting pressures for centralization and decentralization affected air defense control relationships. Factors favoring centralized control include the greater efficiency and effectiveness of centralized target detection systems and the increased ranges of modern SAMs. Decentralized control provides flexibility and shorter response times for supporting fast-paced operations by ground maneuver units.

The Soviet Air Force of the Anti-Aircraft Defence of the Homeland (Protivo-Vozduschniya Obarona-Strany or PVO Strany) ranked third in order of precedence in the Soviet armed forces after the Strategic Rocket Forces and the Ground Forces and became an independent arm in 1954. After Air Defense of Ground Forces was formed in 1958, the National Air Defense Forces focused on strategic aerospace and theater air defense.

The Commander-in-Chief of the PVO Strany, who operated directly under the Ministry of Defence in Moscow, had four main elements under his command. These comprised:

• Anti-Aircraft Artillery Troops (Zenit-naya Artilleriya)
• Anti-Aircraft Missile Troops (Zenitno-Raketmye Voiska)
• Fighter Aviation of the Air Force (Istrebitel'naya Aviatsiya)
• Radar Troops (Radioteknicheskie Voiska)

A major reorganization of Soviet Air and Air Defence Forces took place between 1978 and 1980, including Frontal Aviation, Long-Range Aviation, interceptor aircraft of the National Air Defence (IA-PVO) and Ground Force Troops of the Anti-Aircraft Defence (PVO Voysk). Since 1978 PVO [or P-VO] (Protivo-Vozdushnoi Oborony = National [Homeland] Air-Defense Forces) combined PVO-Strany (Strategic ADF) and PVO-Voysk (Ground Forces ADF). At the beginning of 1981 the name of the air defense force component was changed from "Troops of National Air Defense" (Voyska PVO strany) to simply "Troops of Air Defense" (Voyska PVO), but it maintained its status as an independent branch, and the main body of army air defence troops, including the military schools, were annexed to it. Voyska PVO gained responsibility for theater anti-aircraft systems of the Air Defense of Ground Forces. The Voyska PVO lost its separate command and control system in the reorganization and about half of the fighters and the majority of the flying training system was transferred to the Air Force.

In 1989 the Air Defense Forces had more than 500,000 personnel and operated the world's most extensive strategic air defense network. By the mid-1990s the air defense forces had a total of about 200,000 troops, of whom 60,000 were conscripts, with about 850 combat aircraft, including 100 MiG-23, 425 MiG-31, and 325 Su-27 aircraft.

As a part of the organizational reform aimed at increasing efficiency and cutting military personnel, the Air Defense Force was merged with the Air Force in 1998. On 11 August 2000 the Air Force commander-in-chief, Army Gen Anatoliy Kornukov, announced that Russian air defence missile units would soon stop being on a permanent combat duty for financial reasons. The units will be kept at a lower level of readiness, with primary air defense responsibilities being placed on fighter aviation.

As of mid-2003 Anatoly Kvashnin was said to be slated to be removed from position of Chief of the General Staff. To all appearances, everybody was tired of his inconsistent moves related to army reformation. By his proposal the combat arms of RVSN, the Space Forces and the Missile-Space Defense Forces were merged into the new force - the RVSN. By 2003 this phase of a military reform had been admitted fallacious and the Space Forces and the Space Defense Forces had again become independent forces. The RVSN had also lost its status of a force (it became an independent combat arm). The Ground Forces Main Command was disbanded in 1998. It was restored in 2001 and the status of the Main Ground Forces Commander was brought to the level of deputy defense minister. Kvashnin was the Chief of the Russian General Staff until 2004, when he was dismissed by President Vladimir Putin after seven years on the job.

Missile and Space Defense

In 1963-1964 the Soviet Troops of Defense (PVO) established two new commands: PRO and PKO (Protivo Kosmicheskoi Oborony). PRO, meaning anti-missile defense [Protivo Raketniya Oborony], was charged with detecting, intercepting, and destroying enemy ballistic rockets, while the PKO, meaning anti-space defense, was responsible for "destroying the enemy's cosmic means of fighting". On Oct. 1, 1992, the PRO and PKO Directorate was restructured into the Command of the Rocket and Space Defense (RKO). Colonel General Smirnov became officially the commander of the RKO forces. In 1997, the RKO forces, along with the Space Forces became the part of the Strategic Missile Forces (RVSN).

Missile and space defenses have been effective arms of the Air Defense Forces since the mid-1960s. In 1989 the Soviet Union had the world's only operational antiballistic missile (ABM) and antisatellite (ASAT) systems.

The Soviet Union deployed its first ABM defense system around Moscow in 1964. It consisted of surface-to-air missiles that could be launched to destroy incoming ballistic missiles. The Soviet leaders have continually upgraded and developed the capabilities of this initial system. A major modernization of interceptor missiles began in the late 1970s, and by 1989 the Soviet Union had up to thirty-two improved SH-04 (Galosh) launchers in operation and a fundamentally new SH-08 (Gazelle) interceptor missile under development.

In 1989 the Radiotechnical Troops operated eleven ground-based radars and numerous satellites to provide strategic early warning of enemy missile launches. They also manned six large phased-array radars for ballistic missile detection. These radars could also serve as target acquisition and tracking radars to guide ABM launchers as part of a nationwide defense against ballistic missiles. In 1989 the Soviet Union was building three additional sites for phased-array radars.

The Soviet Union had an operational ASAT interceptor system that in wartime it would launch a satellite into the same orbit as an opponent's satellite. The ASAT satellite would then maneuver nearby and detonate a conventional fragmentation or a nuclear warhead to destroy its target. Thus, the interceptor system posed a threat to an adversary's command, control, and communications, navigation, reconnaissance, and intelligence gathering satellites in low-earth orbits, a capability that would be critical in wartime.

National Air Defense - 1945-1955

From the Soviet perspective, The development of antiaircraft defense after the Second World War may be divided into two periods: the first, from 1946-53, and the second, from 1954 to the present. The break between the two periods is delimited by the formation of PVO (Strany) as a co-equal with other services of the Soviet armed forces in May of 1954. Coincidently, the 1953 date conforms to more general Soviet military histories, which acknowledge 1953 as the year of Stalin's death and the year in which the Soviet Union demonstrated its first thermonuclear weapon. Within these divisions, Soviet writers usually characterize the first period as one in which Soviet air forces were equipped with modern jet aircraft. The second period is generally characterized by the deployment of missiles for both ground and aviation air defense components.

The Soviets responded to the US atomic threat by reorganizing their air defenses. During the Great Patriotic War, Soviet air defense forces had been organized into four fronts (the Western, Southwestern, Central,, and Transcaucasian) and six armies, In 1946 these were reorganized into air defense districts. At the same time, a commander of Soviet National Air Defense Forces (PVO Strany) was appointed. He was immediately subordinated to the commander of artillery of the armed forces of the Soviet Union. This relationship reflected the fact that tubed artillery still represented the dominant weapon of air defense.

During the first decade after World War II, the contrasts between the two air defense systems of the world's greatest continental powers were striking. In the U.S.S.R., the defense clearly dominated Soviet development and deployment of an obsolescent but nationally integrated early warning system, supported by a diversity of improved antiaircraft artillery, high-speed (limited range) jet interceptors and surface-toair missiles (to ring Moscow), all under a single national air defense agency aiming at the military integration of all national air defense resources, including civil defense.

Deeply influenced by traditional non-military considerations, the approach to air defense by each country's leaders was inevitably driven by a distinctive military heritage. For American leaders, the war confirmed the importance of keeping and fighting enemies at a distance, preferably thousands of miles across two oceans. In contrast, the war confirmed Soviet military planners' historic concern with surprise attack, probably from Europe, directed at the heart of the homeland. Unlike the Americans, who had the tradition and the capability of mobilizing and projecting offensive air and naval power over vast distances, the Soviets needed reliable defensive military power, principally ground forces supported by airpower, immediately available since time-distance factors precluded a lengthy mobilization process. In the context of their distinctive military heritage, 1945 found the Soviets sensitized to the urgency of defense against a probable threat from Europe, where American and British airpower would be the most likely immediate threat. Air defense was, therefore, a matter of priority for the U.S.S.R. Given the available technology (British and German, bought or captured) in the U.S.S.R., the Soviet focus on the application of that technology to improved antiaircraft artillery and the jet interceptor reflected the urgency and single-minded Stalinist decision- style of the period.

Initially constrained by their indigenous technology, the Soviets after 1950 urged advanced interceptor and SAM development while making-do with an improved version of the MiG-15 and passive nationally integrated civil defense system. By 1955, the increasing speed of high-altitude, American jet bombers and a coming generation of nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles had seriously eroded the defense utility of the East European buffer and underscored the need for a shift in Soviet emphasis from area and even point defense (whether with AAA, interceptors, or SAMs) to a deterrent offensive capability.

The contrast between the Soviet and U.S. air defense and civil defense programs of the early 1950's appears sharp. American programs slighted air defense in favor of offensive forces; Soviet planners obviously emphasized and sought, as soon as possible, an integrated, national air defense program and supported civil defense. Despite the handicaps of a war-damaged economy; long-standing, unfulfilled promises to the Soviet people of "the fruits of revolution"; and acute technological gaps, the Soviets made substantial progress in the decade after the war to protect the homeland.

By 1953, initial post war early warning had been strengthened by wide-scale deployment of the Token radar, a Soviet V-beam equipment inspired by the U.S. AN/CPS-6 V-beam set. This directly complemented the growth of jet fighters as the dominant and most significant part of the Soviet air defense forces. Soviet radars provided warning and made the fighter more effective by facilitating intercept. Later in the decade, a large-scale deployment of surface-to-air missiles would make ground systems the backbone of the PVO.

In 1953, their development programs were already actively under way. Initial systems tests of the SA-1 took place in late 1952 and construction began in the Moscow area for the operational deployment of this system to begin by 1954. The SA-2 system began development in 1951. At the same time, the Soviets had developed, produced, and deployed in the post war period two new AAA gun systems and new fire control systems including associated radars. Another, heavy gun system was being developed at the time and would be deployed by 1955. Development, production, and deployment of various jet aircraft, bombers, and fighters had already impressed the West and, while the post-Stalin policy review was going on a medium jet bomber, the TU-16 Badger became operational and the MiG-19, an initial, somewhat limited all-weather interceptor, was deployed with Soviet air defense units.

By the mid-1950's, the sizeable Soviet air defense forces; deployed radar warning and surveillance systems; very large numbers of antiaircraft guns and clear-weather fighters; great effort and high priority for developing defensive missile technologies manifested deliberate effort. By the end of the first post war decade, surface-to-air missiles were part of the active defense of Moscow. Civil defense received a big boost during this period when, in October 1952, the 19th Party Congress decided to develop an all-out defense of the Soviet Union.

Soviet national air defense forces grew after Korea and, together with preparations for the incorporation of the SA-1 system, growth helped to promote improved command and control of the growing force. In addition to the reorganization of Soviet armed forces in 1950, the establishment of PVO Strany as an operating organizational structure in 1954 and the employment of fighter aircraft with airborne radar from mid-1954 brought out other requirements for modifications in command and control procedures. Use of airborne radar improved the all-weather capabilities of the system and that fact, building on the operational experience derived from the Korean War, must have influenced control procedures.

U.S. aircraft in Korea found that coordinated employment by the Communists of searchlights and fighters required significant use of electronic countermeasures, both jamming and chaff, in order to defeat those tactics. Communist AAA in Korea-weak by World War II standards-lacked radar. U.S. employment of ECM against communist air defense systems in Korea as late as 1953 is assumed to have induced some C2 changes in PVO Strany. A basic concept appeared to have been to have fighter aircraft operate beyond the range of AAA. Soviet actions adhered to the basic operational principle of centralized control of all resources used in air defense. Recognizing such problem areas, Soviet air defense planners sought solutions, and anticipated the introduction of new, improved weapons and the growing needs for the coordination and mutual support of air defense forces deployed as part of PVO Strany.

Indicative of Soviet sensitivity and capability, incidents of reaction to U.S. flight activity in peripheral areas included shooting down a U.S. B-29 in October 1952 over the Kuriles, and another, two years later, over Hokkaido. As further evidence of the violence of Soviet reactions, a Navy P2V aircraft was shot down in September 1954 over the Sea of Japan and, earlier that year in Europe, two Navy aircraft were attacked by Soviet aircraft near the German border with Czechoslovakia. Soviet strategy and action for air defense of the U.S.S.R. in the first decade following World War II demonstrate greater emphasis, more extensive commitment and higher national priority than the American effort for continental air defense. Rapid, continuing growth within a phased, orderly development marked the Soviet pattern following a relatively slow start. Technological limitations underlay Soviet moves to provide an effective, integrated national air defense. Qualitative deficiencies and gaps were recognized at the start and intensive effort made thereafter to offset such limitations through relatively large scale, quantitative commitment of resources and systematic wide-scale exploitation of foreign technology. While these conditions induced "crash" actions, progress to achieve an effective national air defense system was steady, consistent, and continuing.

The goal of an integrated national system was established and adhered to. During this decade weapon systems for Soviet air defense were in a substantial transition: jet fighters entered the operational inventory quickly and quantity production backed the growing requirements of this component as the primary arm of PVO Strany. The systematic but accelerated development and deployment of a national radar warning and surveillance network was being advanced by a sustained effort and, while AAA guns continued as primary ground-based weapon systems, surface-to-air missile development progressed to the point of beginning an operational deployment. Command and control needed to provide an effective, flexible, coordinated yet centralized direction and employment of the various components developed concurrently with the growth of the overall system.

Soviet emphasis on quantitative solutions to air defense problems and technological limitations probably represented a combination of predisposition and experience. Traditional predilection for defense, World War II experience, and a doctrinal, strategic preference to have a reliable, self-contained capacity for security were in keeping with the work of an effective strategy: concentration. Genuine fear and a sense of inferiority gave impetus to the program, at least under the circumstances of the U.S. nuclear monopoly.

Soviet decisions probably built on a worst-case basis yet obviously were influenced by assessments of conditions of a future war. There is, however, little evidence to reflect Soviet air defense developments during the decade being directly responsive to decisions concerning strategic weapon systems. The clear and overriding purpose of Soviet air defense during the decade was to "protect the homeland." Along with the growth of a substantial force for the purpose, Soviet air defense at the end of the period had solid acceptability and, in PVO Strany, an able, central institutional advocate for agreed programs to improve the defense of the homeland. In marked contrast to the Americans, the Soviets rarely criticized decisions; open criticism was lacking. The extensive Soviet efforts for air defense became part of the integrated national air defense program and tended to complement other commitments for "protection of the homeland."

Early Soviet commitment to national air defense represented a basic long-term strategic choice. Military requirements had to be supported because, despite the severe economic strain they entailed, the U.S.S.R. was strategically very vulnerable. The U.S. nuclear monopoly was a central fact influencing the Soviet overall strategy; national air defense complemented their forced-draft nuclear developments and concepts for defense against a threat from Europe.

In the Soviet Union particular importance was attached to the construction of air defense. It created as a sort of two "fences" of the complexes of anti-aircraft missiles. One tried to build on the borders of the USSR, and the second - around vital installations of industrial areas. And in the zone between them were to operate fighter-interceptors. That such a doctrine defense was supposed to be able to protect our country from enemy air attack. Of course, means even such a power as the USSR, was not sufficient to create a "fence" around the perimeter of the entire border. But around the big cities and critical industrial parts, such as Central, which included Moscow, it was created and covered up their anti-aircraft missiles. Moscow region has been protected even two rings of defense. And on the perimeter of the Soviet Union means SAM is only closed the border cities such as Leningrad, Lvov, Baku and other, mostly in the northwest, west and south-west, where may have been air strikes as the main opponent of the NATO countries were considered. All the "assumption", including Eastern Europe, which included the Warsaw Pact countries, oceanic zone of the North and the Far East, it was assumed to be the cover of fighter-interceptors, as well as all the sky of the USSR. That's why we built the interceptors, as the main type of fighter. This line began Su-9, then continued the Su-11, Su-15 Sukhoi and MiG-25, high-altitude interceptor KB Mikoyan. The last plane, which carried the idea of front-line fighter, able to support the air operations of ground troops, and technically not part of the air defense system, was the MiG-21. It stood light weapons, in particular, the missile R-13. This aircraft is very widely sold. MiG-21 "bis" was born in 1972-1973 during the Egyptian-Israeli war. It was modified by creating gargrota on "back" of the fuselage, which housed the extra fuel, which increased its range and it was upgraded weapons. The first MiG-21 were strictly "cannon", then the gun was removed and placed missiles in air - the air "working on the beam - K-5 and C-5M. But his appearance with K-13 missiles, backed up the line "Sayduindera", gave birth to the MiG-21 MF, which formed the basis of MiG-21 "bis". More front-line fighter at the time we did not build, because the position of Khrushchev, and thus the country was the fact that front-line aircraft build pointless, since the USSR has a powerful nuclear weapons and missiles.