Airborne Assault Troops [VDV]
The Soviet Union was the first state to constitute airborne forces, the first to drop airborne forces into battle, the first to include a major airborne drop in a major field exercise, and the first to totally mechanize its airborne forces. Since 1930, the Soviet Army maintained the world's largest airborne force. Today's Russian airborne is still the world's largest.
1930 marked the beginning of a serious preoccupation with parachute troops in the USSR. In 1931 separate detachments of parachutists were made into battalions and a little later into regiments. In 1933 an osnaz brigade was formed in the Leningrad military district. It included a battalion of parachutists, a battalion of mechanised infantry, a battalion of artillery and three squadrons of aircraft. However, it turned out to be of little use to the Army, because it was not only too large and too awkward to manage, but also under the authority of the NKVD rather than the GRU. After a long dispute this brigade and several others created on the same pattern were reorganised into airborne brigades and handed over entirely to the Army.
To begin with, the airborne forces or VDV consisted of transport aircraft, airborne regiments and brigades, squadrons of heavy bombers and separate reconnaissance units. It is these reconnaissance units that are of interest to us. How many there were of them and how many men they included is not known. There is fragmentary information about their tactics and training. But it is known, for example, that one of the training schools was situated in Kiev. It was a secret school and operated under the disguise of a parachute club, while being completely under the control of the Razvedupr (GRU). It included a lot of women. In the course of the numerous maneuvers that were held, the reconnaissance units were dropped in the rear of the `enemy' and made attacks on his command points, headquarters, centers and lines of communications. It is known that terrorist techniques were already well advanced. For example, a mine had been developed for blowing up railway bridges as trains passed over them. However, bridges are always especially well guarded, so the experts of the Razvedupr and the Engineering Directorate of the Red Army produced a mine that could be laid on the tracks several kilometres away from the bridge. A passing train would pick up the mine which would detonate at the very moment when the train was on the bridge.
To give some idea of the scale of the VDV, on maneuvers in 1934 900 men were dropped simultaneously by parachute. At the famous Kiev manoeuvres in 1935 no less than 1188 airborne troops were dropped at once, followed by a normal landing of 1765 men with light tanks, armoured cars and artillery. In Belorussia in 1936 there was an air drop of 1800 troops and a landing of 5700 men with heavy weapons. In the Moscow military district in the same year the whole of the 84th rifle division was transferred from one place to another by air. Large-scale and well armed airborne attacks were always accompanied by the dropping in neighbouring districts of commando units which operated both in the interests of the security of the major force and in the interests of Razvedupr.
In 1938 the Soviet Union had six airborne brigades with a total of 18,000 men. This figure is, however, deceptive, since the strength of the`separate reconnaissance units' is not known, nor are they included in that figure. Parachutists were also not trained by the Red Army alone but by `civilian' clubs. In 1934 these clubs had 400 parachute towers from which members made up to half a million jumps, adding to their experience by jumps from planes and balloons. Many Western experts reckon that the Soviet Union entered the Second World War with a million trained parachutists, who could be used both as airborne troops and in special units -- in the language of today, in spetsnaz.
In April 1941 five airborne corps were formed. All five were in the first strategic echelon of the Red Army, three facing Germany and two facing Rumania. The latter were more dangerous for Germany than the other three, because the dropping of even one airborne corps in Rumania and the cutting off, even temporarily, of supplies of oil to Germany meant the end of the war for the Germans. Five airborne corps in 1941 was more than there were in all the other countries of the world together. But this was not enough for Stalin. There was a plan to create another five airborne corps, and the plan was carried out in August and September 1941. But in a defensive war Stalin did not, of course, need either the first five or the second five.
The airborne's political role of praetorian guards and imperial storm troopers evolved as they squashed rebellions in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, invaded and fought for ten years in Afghanistan and then returned home to counter the civil turmoil unleashed by Gorbachev's perestroika.
The Airborne Troops comprised five airborne divisions and eight air assault brigades in the mid-1990s (the USSR had seven airborne divisions). All of the airborne divisions were based in European Russia. One division ws based in the Northern Military District, two in the Moscow Military District, and one each in the Volga and North Caucasus districts. The division in the North Caucasus Military District took part in the Chechnya conflict. The eight airborne assault brigades are smaller than divisions, and they lack the armor and artillery assets that give conventional divisions ground mobility and firepower. Once the airborne brigades are on the ground, they can move no faster than walking speed. Their role is primarily focused on helicopter operations, but they also are trained for parachute assault from fixed-wing aircraft.
The Airborne Troops were designated as a separate service in 1991, at which time the air assault brigades were reassigned from ground forces units and military districts to Airborne Troop Headquarters, with direct responsibility to the Ministry of Defense. The justification for this reorganization was that airborne troops could not respond as quickly to an emergency under ground forces command as they could as a separate command. Experts believe that the decision to reorganize came mainly in response to internal politics rather than military necessity; at that time, the Russian national leadership did not want airborne troops under the control of the General Staff or the ground forces.
In 1992, when Moscow took stock of its military inheritance from the Soviet Union, the Russian state found it was left with almost no combat-ready reserves, and what still existed could only be dispatched to trouble spots with difficulty. In late 1992, by edict of the president of Russia, it was determined to create the Mobile Troops based on the Airborne Troops, corresponding in quality and quantity to the American mobile forces. The mobile forces were not created, but numerous reorganizations of the Airborne Troops, their transfer to military districts, and other changes resulting in a reduction affected their combat effectiveness.
Initially it was reported that the Mobile Forces might be composed of an Instant Deployment Force (capable of deploying in 3-5 days) and a Rapid Deployment Force (capable of deploying in 30 days, each having a strength of 100,000 to 150,000 men). In December 1993 Grachev referred to a force on permanent stand-by and able to mobilise in 4-10 hours (an `Immediate Reaction Force'), while the Rapid Deployment Force (as in the NATO concept) should be ready to move within three days.
In 1994 a plan which contains a concept for Russia's participation in peacekeeping activity was developed and adopted in the [Russian] Security Council. At the same time, two ground-forces motorized rifle divisions were given a new organizational structure which met the requirements for military contingents participating in peacekeeping operations. The necessary training materials and gear were created and, beginning in 1995, these missions were removed from the responsibilities of the air-assault troops.
Russia has made marked progress on shaping its peacekeeping forces, on both the military and legal levels. In addition to the CIS "collective peacekeeping forces", comprising the 201st Russian motorized rifle division stationed in Tajikistan, the "Russian peacekeeping forces" were being formed, with the 27th and 45th motorized rifle divisions and an independent parachute battalion assigned. More than 16,000 Russian army servicemen were performing peacekeeping tasks in the "near abroad" in the beginning of 1994.
Russia initially designated a special division in the Volga Military District for peacekeeping (the 27th MRD redeployed in 1992 from east Germany) and a second division, the 45th MRD (from the Leningrad Military District), was also assigned to peacekeeping missions. Planned light Mobile Forces of about five division equivalents could in principle be centerd on units from the 76th Pskov and 106th Tula Airborne Divisions (ABDs) plus a number of special units. The Volga and Urals Military Districts emerged as the central base for the Mobile Forces, which need to be located in the centre of Russia and capable of being airlifted anywhere there is a threat (though the 76th and 106th ABDs are not centrally located).
By 1996 plans were developed under which the Mobile Forces would total some 100,000 men and be based largely (60%) on airborne troops, but they will include some motor rifle formations, equipped with light weapons, which can be airlifted, naval infantry, military transport aircraft and logistic units.
In early 1996, four of the eight independent airborne brigades and two of the five airborne divisions were placed under the command of their respective district commanders, and the remaining three divisions became part of the strategic reserve. The command adjustments constituted a return to the pre-1991 arrangement. The reason given for the transfer of authority was that the military districts already controlled the helicopter, fixed-wing, and other resources needed to support the air assault brigades, and that historically air assault brigades were created to operate in an operational-tactical role attached to a high-level headquarters. They were never intended to be a strategic asset. In the case of the Novorossiysk Division engaged in Chechnya, a chain of command running back to Moscow allegedly proved unworkable. However, the reassignment of the airborne units brought interservice charges that the move was an attempt to rein in a service branch perceived as having a dangerous combination of independence and mobility. The chief of the General Staff, General Mikhail Kolesnikov, characterized the decision as purely operational.
In late 1996 Defense Minister Igor Rodionov order the disbanding of two of Russia's remaining five airborne divisions (the USSR had seven airborne divisions) by the middle of December 1996. Rodionov's order stemmed from an earlier one issued by then Defense Minister Pavel Grachev in December 1995 that turned over two paratrooper divisions and four independent airborne brigades to the control of the military district commanders where they were based. These two measures would bring the strength of the airborne forces down from 64,300 to 48,500. The lower figure is probably an accurate reflection of the size of the force at the time. The the 237th Air Assault regiment, attached to the 76th Airborne Division based in Pskov, apparently was also slated for elimination.
In May 1995 paratroopers from the 106th Guards Airborne Division, who had recently returned to their Tula garrison from Chechnya, were arrested when they attempted to sell plastic explosives, grenade launchers, and ammunition to Chechen fighters. The famous 331st Guards Regiment of the 98th Guards Airborne Division took part in combat operations in Chechnya between 17 September 1999 and 20 March 2000. In June 1999, the regiment also formed and sent to Kosovo the 2nd Airborne Battalion to be included into the multinational peacekeeping forces.
According to Russia's military reform plans as of 2007, the Airborne Troops will be fully manned with professional soldiers by 2011. "Priority tasks for the development of the Russian Airborne Troops include the improvement of their combat potential, upgrading of the current arsenal to advanced weaponry, and the introduction of automated battlefield command-and-control systems," defense ministerAnatoly Serdyukov said at a meeting with senior Airborne Troops staff on 22 March 2007.
AIRBORNE COMBAT FORMATIONS
- Air Assault Brigade: (1 recon BMD, 1 recon BRDM-2, 1 SO-120 SP Mortar); 2 Air Assault Battalions; 2 Light Parachute Battalions; Airborne Light AT Battery
- Airborne Regiment: (1 SO-120 SP Mortar); 3 Airborne Battalions; Airborne AT Battery;
AIRBORNE SUPPORT UNITS
AIRBORNE COMBAT UNIT TO&E
1
There is one Airborne Artillery Battery in an Air Assault Brigade. This is the only organic artillery unit apart from the 120mm SP Mortar.2
There is one Airborne AA Battery per Air Assault Brigade, one per Airborne Rgt, and 3 in the Airborne Div AA Btn. Towed ZU-23 AAA may be upgraded to ZSU-23-4 in 1990s.3
Mounted in BMDs if attached to an Air Assault Brigade, foot mobile if part of a para deployed force4
Airborne Division asset: 1 Battalion per division.
Boyevaya Mashina Desanta ("Combat Vehicle of the Airborne")
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