Military


Project 69 Kronstadt class
Battlecruiser / Heavy Cruiser

The Kronstadt Development of the design The design of the heavy cruisers for the Soviet fleet began in the middle of the 30th years, simultaneously with the development of the designs of large (type "A") and small (type "B") battleships. In 1934-1935 the design bureaus of ship-building industry, the Research Institute of the military ship building of the administration of the sea forces ([UMS]) of RKKA (Workers' and Peasants' Red Army) and Italian firm "[Ansaldo]", which accomplished technical assistance in the creation of the light cruiser "Kirov", for the tasks [UMS] carried out several pre-sketching projects of the heavy cruisers with displacement from 15 500 to 19 500 t and with the major caliber artillery from 240 to 280 mm. In 1936-1937 domestic designers developed the preliminary designs of a battleship of the type "A" (project 23) from 406- mm by instruments, battleship of the type "B" (projects 25 and 64, with 305- mm and 356- mm by instruments respectively) and heavy cruiser (project 22) in several versions, with 254- mm and 280- mm by the instruments of main battery ([GK]). From them the direct continuation only of work on project 23, on which they finally placed four ships of the type "Soviet Union", was obtained, whereas they for a number of reasons ended rest. On November 1, 1937 industries were given out the new operational requirements (TTT) for the heavy cruiser, affirmed by the chief of the sea forces of RKKA the flag officer of the fleet of 1 ranks [M].[V].[Viktorovym]. In them the following problems were posed: in the squadron battle - fight with the cruisers of enemy (in particular heavy); the support of light forces in the distant regions; independent operations on the communications of enemy. Composition of the armament: 9 254- mm of instruments in three three-gun turrets, 8 130- mm of instruments into four twin turrets, 8 100- mm of the anti-aircraft guns into four twin tower installations, 4 of quadrupled by 37- mm zenith of automatic weapon (already after the beginning of design their quantity it was increased to six), 2 3-pipe 533- mm torpedo tubes, 80- 100 min (into the overload), 2 aircraft OF CRUSTS -2. Standard displacement - 22000-23000 T. the running speed - is not less than 34 units, cruising range by economic motion - to 8000 miles, independence on the provisions - 50 days. In TTT were indicated also the distances of battle and the caliber of the artillery of the ships of potential enemy for determining the thicknesses of vertical and horizontal armoring. The design of the heavy cruiser, to which was appropriated the index "project 69", carried out the association [TSKB]-17 {until January 1937 - [TSKBS]-1). Led work the chief engineer of bureau Of [v].[A].[Nikitin]. Already the first estimations showed that with the assigned composition of armament it is not possible to maintain limitation on the displacement. It was necessary to go to the forced measures - to decrease a quantity of ammunition of main battery to 125 shots by the stem (instead of 150), to remove torpedo armament, to establish cruising range cruising (20 knots) motion - 4500 miles (instead of 6000). The military council of the sea forces of RKKA agreed with these proposals. By June 1938 preliminary design 69 was finished. During the indicated in TTT armament the ship had a standard displacement of 24 450 t and a speed 33,3 unit. Elements of the armoring: board - main belt 140 mm, in the extremities 20 mm, beams 210 mm, the barbettes of towers 210 mm, average deck 80 mm and lower deck 20 mm. in July To [v].[A].[Nikitinu] "for the qualitative fulfillment of preliminary design" chief [Glavmorproma] of the people's commissariat of defense industry declared appreciation and entrusted reward - 1000 rubles. However, it became by this time known that in Germany concludes the building of two ships of the type "It [sharnkhorst]". On their tactical-technical elements ([TTE]) they occupied the intermediate position between the battleships and the heavy cruisers. They were higher-speed than battleships, and their main battery (280 mm) *, being inferior to [linkorovskomu], considerably exceeded the artillery "Washington" cruisers (203 mm). However, similar ships (of type "dunkirk"), but with the more powerful artillery (330 mm) were built in France. This information was discussed in the Defense Committee with SNK USSR (Council of People's Commissars USSR) at the end June 1938. Before the heavy cruisers of the sea forces of RKKA was set new task - fight with the ships of the type "It [sharnkhorst]". In accordance with the accepted by committee solution about the need for the correction of task with respect to project 69, the deputy of druggie the Navy the flag officer of 1 ranks Of [i].[S].[Isakov] on July 10 the same year affirmed "basic tactical-technical tasks ([TTZ]) for the design of the heavy cruiser of project 69". The now main battery of artillery increased to 305 mm (with the ammunition of 100 [vystr]. to a stem), a quantity 130- mm of ammunition it was reduced to 150 [vystr]. to stem (instead of 200), 37- mm of ammunition - to 800 [vystr]. to the stem (instead of 1800). Standard displacement was limited 31 to 000 T. the running speed it was established 32 units. The new version of preliminary design was presented for consideration into the people's commissariats of Naval fleet and defense industry on October 20, 1938. On the conclusion of the administration of ship building ([UK]) RKKF (Workers' and Peasants' Red Navy), it had a number of essential deficiencies. Therefore for the evaluation of the results of preliminary design and making of a decision about its further fate was created special commission under the chairmanship of the flag officer of 2 ranks, the chief of the department of the tactics of Naval academy professor [S].[P].[Stavitskiy], which examined the possible enemies of the heavy cruiser of project 69 - German "It [sharnkhorst]", French "dunkirk", English "Hood" and "[Ripals]", Turkish "[Yavuz]" (former German "[Geben]"), Italian "Cesar", the Japanese "Congo", which had speed 26-30 units. The tasks of the projected ship were substantially refined. Its basic purpose now was the stabilization to actions of light forces in all those cases, when there is no need for using battleships or when the latter do not answer task in their speed. They became particular tasks: the support of its patrol and the disturbance of the patrol of enemy; the support of the reconnaissance of light forces and the opposition to reconnaissance of enemy; the guarantee of light forces in the active barrage operations; the guarantee of output and return of its submarines; action on the communications the paralyzation of the activity of the cruisers of enemy on our communications; the neutralization of the actions of the cruisers of enemy in the squadron battle. Special tasks in the separate theaters were specially noted. On the Pacific Ocean - hit-and-run raids on the coast of Japanese islands and action on sea communications of Japan for the purpose of the suppression of its sea trade and abstraction of its forces from Okhotsk and Sea of Japan to Pacific Ocean. On north - hit-and-run raids into the northern part of the German (North) Sea and into Atlantic Ocean. On the Black Sea - creation of equilibrium in the ratio of our and Turkish forces (compensation for superiority "Of [yavuza]" in the speed over "the Commune of Paris" and in the artillery above our cruisers). With the appearance in the theater of the exceeding linear forces of enemy - hit-and-run raids for his maintenance in constant stress. For investigating the question about the tactical possibilities of the ship of project 69 were carried out 8 tactical games under varied conditions. By the enemies of our cruiser of steel "[Sharnkhorst]", "the dunkirk" and "the Congo". The sums of games showed that the ship of project 69 exceeds "It [sharnkhorst]", it has advantages over "the Congo" on the distances of battle of less than 90 [kabeltovykh] and it is inferior "to dunkirk", and it also considerably exceeds on the artillery "the Washington" of cruiser, true, being inferior to them in the speed. In the fact-finding of the commission it was indicated that the ship of project 69 answers basic tasks assigned to it, but for the successful pursuit of the light cruisers to it clearly is not sufficient speed. Main battery (305 mm) in a quantity of instruments, rate of fire and range corresponds to tasks, but it is desirable to increase ammunition, after bringing it to 120 shots to the stem. However, anti-mine artillery (130 mm) is insufficient in a quantity it is trunk for the reflection of the attacks of destroyers and it is small true to gauge for the action against cruisers. Zenith armament in a quantity 100- mm of instruments has the limited capabilities, to automatic weapons it is completely sufficient on 37- mm. The cruising range of 8000 miles (with speed 17 units) even is superfluous. Commission also noted that the actions of the heavy cruiser on the remote communications, where it cannot accompany destroyers and cover the aircraft of base aviation, will be strongly hindered. It was proposed to replace with 130- mm of instrument by the 152-mm, to strengthen armoring and anti-mine protection due to reduction in the cruising range and to leave without the change speed. Since [V].[A].[Nikitin] as the chief engineer OF [TSKB] answered for entire technical policy of design bureau and for all developed projects, in February 1939 the chief designer of project 69 appointed [F].[E].[Bespolova], to that participating in the design of destroyer escorts type "hurricane", leaders of the type "Leningrad" and "Minsk", destroyers of the type "angry", battleships of the type "B", the heavy cruiser of project 22. The deputies chief designer became young engineers [N].[K].[Gorbatenko] and [T].[L].[Dzhelomanov]. With the preparation of the [korrektirovannogo] preliminary design 130- mm of instrument they replaced by the 152-mm, they strengthened the armoring of conning tower, towers of main and anti-mine calibers, grew the power of the generators of power stations. Insignificantly increased length, width and height of board and, as a result, displacement. Simultaneously [TSKB]-17 gave out orders to subcontracting enterprises for the development of engineering designs of the towers of main, anti-mine and zenith calibers, control instruments of shooting, equipment of the magazines, feed units of ammunition and other systems and mechanisms. The [korrektirovannyy] preliminary design was examined by the state committee of defense and affirmed by its decision dated July 13, 1939. However, in the decision simultaneously was contained requirement about strengthening of the zenith armament of cruiser due to an increase in the number 37- mm installations to seven. Laying Thus far designers [napryazhenno] worked at documentation, at the construction plants by the accelerated rates was developed the preparation for the laying of ships. To build heavy cruisers charged to the plants of ? of 194 names To [a].[Marti] in Leningrad (until November 1922 - "admiralty plant", now state unitary enteprise "admiralty shipyards") and ? of 200 names of 61 communards (until February 1930 - "[Russud]") in Nikolayev. The building of heavy ships after twenty-year interruption was connected with many problems. At the plant of ? 194 specially was overhauled the largest southern stock, while at the plant of ? 200 specially for the heavy cruisers it was necessary to build new (stock of ? 3). In Leningrad, where head ship was created, the full-scale mock-ups of basic battle posts, turbine and boiler room, prepared, experimental boiler was perfected on the stand. Details to two heavy cruisers according to the drawings of project 69 were given out to plants in March 1939, and on November 30 at the plant of ? 194 took place the official laying of head cruiser "Kronstadt", that received factory serial number "550". Building headed [S].[M]. Of [turunov]. Somewhat earlier, on November 5, at the plant of ? 200 they placed "Sevastopol" (plant of ? 1089, main builder [G].[V].[Babenko]). They established the period of the delivery of ships in 1943. The operation followed personally [I].[V]. Stalin how is explained this hurry with their laying, important it was to report about this to Secretary General. Finale After the beginning of World War II by the decision of the state committee of defense dated July 10, 1941 the building of the heavy cruisers was stopped with their technical readiness of about 12%. All forces of plants were cast for building of light ships, submarines and launches. In summer and in autumn the first year of war the armor constructions of cruiser "Kronstadt" were used for the building of reinforced-concrete pillboxes. The housing "of Sevastopol", seized by the Fascist-German troops in August 1941 on the stock, was during the occupation partially dismantled, and metal and armor were exported to Germany. The completion of the cruisers of project 69 so was not renewed after the end of war. There are no towers of main battery and main engines. Yes even the experience of the past war showed that to finish building heavy cruisers with the obsolete armament does not have a sense. Moreover full speed, as before under the fixed observation of Stalin himself, occurred the design of his new favorites - the heavy cruisers of project 82, which had to be more advanced in comparison with project 69. Were introduced different proposals on the completion of ships both as the heavy aircraft carriers to 76 aircraft and as the bases of whaling expeditions, but they all for the different reasons were deflected. The decision of the Council of Ministers of USSR about the dismantling of the ships of project 69 to the metal in March 1947 left. Experience, accumulated with design and building of these heavy cruisers, was used with the creation of new, more contemporary ships. General estimation of the project During many decades in our Naval and technical literature heavy cruisers of the type "Kronstadt" (as battleships of the type "Soviet Union") were represented not otherwise as "strongest in the world". This did not completely correspond to reality. On the power of major caliber artillery, the armoring and the anti-mine protection the ships of projects 69 and 69[I] actually exceeded the analogous ships of foreign fleets. However, they had essential deficiencies. "Kronstadt", exceeding its potential enemy "Of [sharnkhorsta]" along main battery, was inferior to it in a quantity it was trunk anti-mine and antiaircraft artillery (8 152-mm and 8 100- mm against 12 150- mm and 14 105- mm). Yes even presence itself aboard our large ships, placed at the end the 30th years, two "medium" calibers - 152-mm anti-mine and 100- mm of zenith can be considered the most serious deficiency. Without having adequate experience, Soviet designers turned themselves for help to the foreign firms. Italians rendered greatest assistance to us. "Italian school" was reflected with the selection of the composition of armament. Our heavy ships - as Italian and German - bore anti-mine artillery and zenith of long-range. The Americans and 133- mm the English and American battleships, which were being built from the second-half of the 30th had on 16-20 universal instruments (127- mm years, in Englishmen) in the coupled installations. French "dunkirk", which was considered as one of the potential enemies "of Kronstadt"; it was also armed with 16 130- mm by universal guns. On the installation of universal artillery aboard the American and English ships knew our designers and seamen. Moreover, in 1937-1939 American firm "[Gibs] and coke" to order Soviet side carried out several studies of battleships. They were distinguished by displacement, measurements, caliber of main battery, but everyone had 127- mm universal twin installations. Debated a question about the equipment of heavy ships with universal artillery, also, in the Naval academy. As we see, the supporters of the Italian and German way of the development of naval artillery conquered in these disputes. This conducted to an increase in the nomenclature of the fire control directors and battle posts. In Russia on the eve of the First World War in arsenal of fleet was accepted excellent rapid-firing 130- mm the gun with a length of stem of 55 calibers of the system Of the [obukhovskogo] plant. According to its ballistic and mass-and-size characteristics it was considered the optimum combat means with the torpedo boats and as the light cruisers of that time and it adapted on the Black Sea battleships of the type "empress Maria", the linear cruisers of the type "Izmail" and the light cruisers of the type "Svetlana". Unfortunately, the sea forces of RKKA and on their order industry continued to improve the instruments of this caliber in the 30th years only for the shooting at the sea and coast purposes. Only at the end the 30th began the works on the universal twin installation B-2- U, but at the beginning war was not prepared even prototype. Actually universal 130- mm installations for the first time appeared on the destroyers "undaunted" (project 41} and "calm" (project 56) at the beginning of the 50th years, after being late as the minimum to 10 years. Hence followed another most important deficiency in the heavy cruisers - weak zenith armament. The newest ship, if it entered the system in 1944, would have as much 100- mm of guns, as light cruisers of the type "Chapaev" and even the obsolete "red Caucasus". As a result with the reflection of air attacks on heading angle of 90° in our cruisers would shoot 4 100- mm of gun, and in Americans 8-10 127- mm. But as showed the experience of war, one anti-aircraft gun, which shoots by projectiles with the time fuse, it is more effective than the battery of the small-caliber automatic weapons, which had only projectiles with the contact fuses. To leave into the ocean with this zenith armament without the reliable air cover (on the aircraft carriers only just they began design studies) would be the adventure, which borders on the suicide. On this it was indicated in the findings of the commission Of [s].[P].[Stavitskogo] on the preliminary design in 1938. Was inferior "Kronstadt" to its potential enemies, also, in the armoring. Armor belt in "[Sharnkhorsta]" had a thickness of 350 mm, and in "dunkirk" - 241 mm (with the angle of the slope of 12°). And this with the fact that the displacement German m of the French of ships was less. The effectiveness of armor protection and [PMZ] of the cruisers of project 69 can be judged only from the theoretical calculations. The effectiveness of the protection "Of [sharnkhorsta]" was checked in combat with the superior forces of English fleet on December 26, 1943. It did not lose combat efficiency after entry of approximately 30 152 - 356- mm of projectiles and 4 Torr. And only after shooting from the distance of 9500 m by the 14- one-inch planks of battleship "Duke [of] York" and entry about 10 more Torr German ship sank. The presence of one conning tower and the limited survey from the pilot bridge was serious deficiency. Desiring to obtain the greatest target sectors of instruments, designers strongly narrowed superstructure in the nose section. Commander, being located on the bridge, could not observe not only the stern of his ship, but also wide sector in the rear portion, which hampered control of ship in the narrowness and in the harbor. However, a similar problem the seamen encountered with the entrance into the system of battleships of the type "Sevastopol" in 1914. Then it was necessary to urgently attach wings to the pilot bridge. And finally speed. As a result overload (especially in the project of 69[I]) it was reduced to 31 units, and possibly, and it is below. On [TTZ] the ship had to overtake "It [sharnkhorst]" and depart from the battleships. If "Kronstadt" entered the system, it could not overtake "It [sharnkhorst]", to say nothing of already heavy cruisers, but new American battleships generally developed 33 units. Should be mentioned about the serious factor, long years influenced the development of our ship building. These are "leading and guiding role" of TsK the AUCP(B), and then CPSU (Communist Party of the Soviet Union). [I].[V].[Stalin] considered itself expert in many questions, including in the building of fleet. Often it is individual, in spite of the opinion of seamen, it determined, what ships and in what quantity to build. Moreover its word was final and was not subject to criticism. Therefore pre-war and the first postwar programs of military shipbuilding were unbalanced, the role of aircraft carriers and aviation in the naval action was underestimated. On the whim "of the father of the peoples" of the USSR it was the only in the world country, which continued also after the end of the Second World War of work on the creation of battleships and heavy cruisers. Stalin considered Italian ships worthy of imitation, and Italian firms rendered us technical assistance in the design of the destroyers, whose housings under the conditions of northern fleet broke, and the cruisers, which, possessing the high running speed, they had weak zenith armament. Frequently the leader individual made decisions even by the separate elements of ships. Specifically, he solved, which for the heavy ships is completely sufficient 100- mm of anti-aircraft cannon (seamen they proposed 130- mm). [N].[G].[Kuznetsov] it recalled, as to strengthen PVO (Air Defense) of ships Stalin stated on the request that "war we will be not on America coasts". Sometimes it required of the designers and the seamen of impracticable, for example, 35- main speed for the cruisers of project 82. That objected or argued could pay by head, the examples to that set. It is under such conditions difficult to charge designers and seamen with the fact that our ships had serious deficiencies. The heavy cruiser of the project of 69[I] In order to have complete idea about the ship, I advise to read a little the history of cruiser "Kronstadt". This ship actually is simply rearmed by new instruments and had some differences in the construction. While the forming of the housings of cruisers on the stocks occurred by high rates, development and production of armament and mechanisms considerably lagged behind the planned periods. Was not begun the production of installations MK-17 and [MZ]-16. Although [LMZ], without waiting until the end of the release of working drawings, and approached the production of experimental installation MK-15, instruments B -50 for it still were located in the stage of design. Priority in the delivery of turbines and other equipment returned to the constructed battleships. Delays with the production of armament and need for the execution of the established periods of building ships forced command the Navy and management of ship-building industry to examine the proposal of German firm "Krupp" about the delivery for them of the towers of main battery per 380- mm by instruments. The matter and that the firm "Krupp" had large reserve on 380- mm to tower installations for the battleships of the type "Bismarck". On that affirmed and February 1939 to ship-building program (plan "2") Germany had to have by 1944 6 battleships. But command "[krigsmarine]" limited to building only two ships of this class and made a rate to the submarines. In order not incurred losses from the unrealized installations, firm "Krupp" she proposed to place them in the USSR. During the current soon negotiations with the Soviet "economic commission" headed by the druggie of ship-building industry [I].[F].[Tevosyanom] German side it expressed the readiness to place six complete sets twin 380- mm of towers (aboard two ships of project 69) and control instruments of shooting ([PUS]) for them. This proposal interested Stalin. On its indication for evaluating the combat capabilities of the heavy cruisers with established on them 380- mm by the towers of main battery and Naval academy in May 1940 conducted additionally two tactical games, where as the enemies of the ship of project 69 were considered the same small battleships "It [sharnkhorst]" and "dunkirk". The results of games showed that the replacement of 305- mm of instruments on 380- mm even with their smaller quantity qualitatively changes the power of its artillery armament. Armor of the ships of enemy in this case is penetrated by larger projectiles and are excluded unfavorable before for the project of 69 distances of battle (110-170 [kbt]). The smaller number of entries 380- mm of projectiles is compensated by an increase in the lethal area after the armor. This predetermined making a decision about the development of the design of the rearmament "of Kronstadt". The political solution about the acquisition in Germany 380- mm of towers and [PUS] as the unfinished cruiser "Of [lyuttsov]", started without taking into account opinion the Navy. "This was not the first case, when naval questions were solved through the head of people's commissariat", wrote subsequently in his book "the day before" the druggie the Navy Of [n].[G].[Kuznetsov]. Nevertheless on July 10, 1940 he affirmed "[TTZ] to the rearmament of the ship of project 69 by German 380- mm by the towers of instead of 305- mm of towers MK-15 and [PUS] of main battery". Only three months were necessary by the association [TSKB]-17 for the development of the preliminary design of 69[I] (the heavy cruiser with the imported guns and mountings). On October 16 the same year project was presented for consideration into the people's commissariats the Navies and to ship-building industry. Project showed that the arrangement of new guns and mountings will require significant changes of the general layout in the regions 62 - 175 [shp]. and 351 - 431 [shp]. (of about 40% of length of ship) from the internal bottom to the upper deck, and also of superstructures. [PMZ] was lengthened on 9 m. for positioning the new control instruments of shooting it was necessary to increase the overall sizes of conning tower, to change the upper tiers of [bashennopodobnoy] foremast, superstructure under stern KDP. Simultaneously at the proposal the Navy the arrangement of aircraft changed, instead of the arrow the cranes were established aircraft -[barkaznye] (according to the type of those accepted by the cruiser "Petropavlovsk"). Into the complete set [PUS] of the delivery of firm "Siemens" entered two KDP with one 10- meter range-finder in each {they were established on the places KDP -8), and also night view-finders, three-meter range-finders and 150- cm combat searchlights. Their arrangement required the expansion of those existing and creation of new bridges and areas. In connection with an increase in [elektronagruzki] and combat mode it was necessary to increase the single power of turbogenerators to 1300 kW. All these changes led to the fact that the standard displacement of ship grew to 36240 t, after exceeding the limitation, established by the Washington agreement of 1922 for ~ the battleships (35 000 t). Average sagging with the full load displacement increased to 9,7 m. it decreased to 2,58 m (in comparison with 2,8 m in project 69) metacentric altitude and, as a result, it deteriorated stability. Was reduced reserve of bouyancy (to 75% - general and to 33% - combat), decreased speed. So that the speed of the ship of the project of 69[I] would be not lower than in project 69, it was intended to increase its propulsive coefficient due to the development of new screws. At the same time German 380- mm instrument with a length of the stem of 52 calibers, exceeding our 305- mm of gun by the weight of projectile (800 against 470 kgf), was inferior to them in the range of fire - 87 [kbt] (34,3 km) instead of 260 [kbt] (47,6 km), the rate of fire (2,3 [vystr]./[min] instead of 3,24) and the total mass of projectiles with the simultaneous shooting of all instruments of main battery per minute (11 000 instead of 13700 kgf). Ammunition was reduced by more than third (570 380- mm of projectiles instead of 900 305- mm). At the beginning October 1940 [N].[G].[Kuznetsov] with the consideration of the draft of the plan of shipbuilding at the session of government it in 1941 proposed to forego completely the building of the heavy cruisers, to dismantle those already placed and to build instead of them the new destroyers of project 30, which it would be possible to introduce into the system considerably more rapid. However, Stalin insisted on their building. In that left on October 19, 1940 the decision SNK by TsK the AUCP(B) "about the plan of military shipbuilding in 1941" it was recorded: ". The new layings of battleships and heavy cruisers not to produce, to bind [NKSP] to concentrate forces on the building of the heavy cruisers "Kronstadt" and "Sevastopol", to set a period of their descent to the water in THE III quarter 1942 g., a question about the caliber of main battery for them to solve not later than the middle of November. To stop the building of battleship "Soviet Belorussia" and instead of it to place at the plant of ? 402 in [Molotovske] four destroyers of project 30". The delivery of cruisers was planned in 1944. For adopting the measures for the fulfillment of this decision the management [TSKB]-17 at the end October 1940 reported into the people's commissariat of ship-building industry, that obtaining imported materials was tightened. Construction plants concluded works on the housings in the regions, not touched upon by changes. It was necessary to boost the development of drawings for the variable regions. It was necessary to urgently obtain drawings from the Germans, otherwise the work of designers, and then plants it could be paralyzed. In November 1940 agreement to the delivery 380- mm of towers and [PUS] they signed, however, in spite of timely obtaining of payments with it (50 million stamps), German side did not hurry with the fulfillment of its obligations. Although the guns and towers were practically finished, them so they did not send in the USSR. At the conference at the beginning April 1941 Stalin listened report about the state of the matters for deliveries for the completion of cruisers "Petropavlovsk" (been "Of [lyuttsov]"}, "Kronstadt" and "Sevastopol", but he decided not to tear up the prisoners of agreements, avoiding the complication of interrelations with Germany. On April 10 the same year the Defense Committee made the final decision to establish to constructed the heavy cruisers of project 69 on three twin 380- mm of the tower of main battery, it affirmed changes in the basic tactical-technical elements connected with this and bound the people's commissariat of ship-building industry ([NKSP]) to correct engineering design and to affirm it in the final form by October 15, 1941.



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