• Forum
• SITREP

• Military

• Introduction
• Systems
• Facilities
• Agencies
• Industry
• Operations
• Countries
• Hot Documents
• News
• Reports
• Policy
• Budget
• Congress
• Links

• WMD
• Intelligence
• Homeland Security
• Space
• Public Eye

Further Reading

Japan Ground Self Defence Force
Nihon Rikujyo Jieitai

The largest of the three services, the Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF), operates under the command of the chief of the ground staff, based in the city of Ichikawa, east of Tokyo.

Strategy is determined by the nation's elongated insular geography, its mountainous terrain, and the nearness of the Asian mainland. The terrain favors local defense against invasion by ground forces, but protection of the approximately 15,800-kilometer coastline of the four main islands would present unique problems in the event of a large-scale invasion. Potentially hostile aircraft and missile bases are so close that timely warning even by radar facilities might be difficult to obtain. Maneuver space is limited to such an extent that ground defenses would have to be virtually in place at the onset of hostilities. No point of the country is more than 150 kilometers from the sea. Moreover, the straits separating Honshu from the other main islands restrict the rapid movement of troops from one island to another, even though all major islands are now connected by bridges and tunnels. Within each island, mountain barriers and narrow roads restrict troop and supply movements. The key strategic region is densely populated and highly industrialized central Honshu, particularly the area from Tokyo to Kobe.

Japan has many places suited for landing operations and is geographically located close to neighboring countries on the continent. It is expected that an aggressor will attempt to assure the safety of its landing forces by concentrating its naval and air assets to secure overwhelming combat power at the time and on the point they choose. It is extremely difficult, or practically impossible, for Japan to have enough defense capability to repel all troops of an aggressor on the sea. It would incur enormous and unbearable costs to build up such defense capability. Consequently, we need to preserve an adequate ground defense capability to destroy those aggressor troops on the ground who have succeeded in their landing operation. A robust ground defense capability to repel an aggressor, which might succeed in breaking through our maritime defense, will enable us to maintain solid defense posture required for effective deterrence against an aggression.

Intended to deter attack, repulse a small invasion, or provide a holding action until reinforced by United States armed forces, the ground element is neither equipped nor staffed to offer more than a show of conventional defense by itself. Antitank artillery, ground-to-sea firepower, and mobility were improved and surface-to- ship missiles were acquired in the Mid-Term Defense Estimate completed in FY 1990. The number of uniformed personnel is insufficient to enable an immediate shift onto emergency footing. Instead, the ratio of officers to enlisted personnel is high, requiring augmentation by reserves or volunteers in times of crisis. In 1992, however, GSDF reserve personnel, numbering 46,000, had received little professional training.

The personnel strength of the Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF), which was originally 75,000, has gradually but steadily increased to 110,000 in 1952, 130,000 in 1954, and 180,000 today.7 There are five armies, 13 divisions and two combined brigades in the GSDF. Today's posture of the GSDF was basically established in 1962 when the second Defense Buildup Plan was executed.

In 1989 basic training for lower-secondary and upper-secondary school graduates began in the training brigade and lasted approximately three months. Specialized enlisted and noncommissioned officer (NCO) candidate courses were available in branch schools, and qualified NCOs could enter an eight-to-twelve- week second lieutenant candidate program. Senior NCOs and graduates of an eighty-week NCO pilot course were eligible to enter officer candidate schools, as were graduates of the National Defense Academy at Yokosuka and graduates of four-year universities. Advanced technical, flight, medical, and command staff officer courses were also run by the GSDF. Like the maritime and air forces, the GSDF ran a youth cadet program offering technical training to lower-secondary school graduates below military age in return for a promise of enlistment.

Because of population density on the Japanese islands, only limited areas were available for large-scale training, and, even in these areas, noise restrictions were a problem. The GSDF tried to adapt to these conditions by conducting command post exercises and map maneuvers and by using simulators and other training devices. In live firing during training, propellants were reduced to shorten shell ranges. Such restrictions diminished the value of combat training and troop morale.

Although allotted 180,000 slots for uniformed personnel, in 1992 the force was maintained at about 86 percent of that level (with approximately 156,000 personnel) because of funding constraints.

A division is the largest organizational unit and is considered the basic unit. Being the key unit in the army, it is responsible for defending a specific area. Meanwhile, an army is the largest organizational unit under the direct control of the Director General of the Defense Agency. It is composed of the army headquarters, two to four divisions, supporting units and is responsible for defending a certain region against the enemy's direct and/or indirect aggression.

1995 National Defense Program Outline

The National Defense Program Outline which determines Japan's defense capabilities, was reviewed and newly established in December 1995. Through a review of the troop structure, the Self-Defense Personnel of the GSDF was reduced from the current 180,000 to 160,000.

Some units may be staffed by new Self-Defense Force Reserve Personnel (Ready Reserve Personnel) capable of being quickly mobilized and to create a high-quality and effective system, will be established by 15,000 Ready Reserve Personnel, and 145,000 Regular Personnel.

A fundamental review of the troop structure, previously consisting of 13 divisions and 2 combined brigades stationed nationwide, resulted in a balanced deployment of divisions and brigades uniquely suited to the local circumstances of the area where each unit is deployed. Present 4 divisions and 2 combined brigades will be reorganized into new brigades. According to the Outline, the GSDF planned to reduce the four divisions belonging to the Northern Army (two divisions), the Northeastern Army (one division), and the Middle Army (one division) into brigade size and mobilize them, while maintaining the two divisions belonging to the Western Army as they are and turning the First Mixed Group into a brigade.

The previous Outline adopted the concept that Ground Self-Defense Force units to be deployed in peacetime should be deployed in conformity with Japan's geographical characteristics in a well-balanced way so that they can implement systematic defense operations from the outset of aggression in any part of Japan. Specifically, based on the concept that Japanese territory can be divided into 14 districts in light of Japan's geographical characteristics such as mountain ranges, rivers and straits, one division of the Ground Self-Defense Force was deployed in principle in each district while one combined brigade each was deployed in Shikoku and Okinawa. Accordingly, unit structure was of 12 divisions and two combined brigades.

The new Outline sets forth the deployment of eight divisions and six brigades based on the concept that divisions are deployed in districts which are of great importance from the viewpoint of defense and brigades are deployed in districts of relative importance so that divisions and brigades are deployed in an appropriate combination. This setup continues to be the previous Outline's concept that the GSDF units are deployed in conformity with Japan's geographical and other characteristics in order to be capable of implementing rapid and effective systematic defense operations from the outset of aggression, by taking into account the characteristics of each region, such as its proximity to other countries and its political and economic importance, and thereby leaving no room for regional or functional deficiencies.

Specifically, the new Outline sets forth the following deployment:

• Regions where divisions are deployed
  • Region located close to other countries and embracing important straits (Soya, Tsugaru and Tsushima straits): northern Hokkaido, northern part of the Tohoku district and northern part of Kyushu
  • Politically and economically pivotal region (Kanto and Kansai districts)
  • Region that serves as base for conducting mobile reinforcement operations for the above-mentioned regions which is important from the viewpoint of defense: southern part of the Tohoku district, the Tokai and Hokuriku district and southern part of Kyushu
• Regions where brigades are deployed
  • Regions considered of relative importance compared with above-mentioned regions from the viewpoint of defense (Eastern and central parts of Hokkaido and Okinawa)
  • Other regions (Koshinetsu and Chugoku districts, and Shikoku)

To enable regionally deployed units and other units to exercise their defense capability effectively, they should be supplemented, whenever necessary, by the mobile striking capability possessed by tank units, the airborne transport mobility possessed by helicopter units and various airborne operation capabilities. Accordingly, the GSDF, just as it did previously, must possess at least one tactical unit of each of various types of forces used mainly for mobile operation so that it will leave no room for functional deficiencies. Specifically, the GSDF must possess one tank-based armored division, one helicopter brigade equipped with a large type of transport helicopter and one airborne (parachute) brigade.

The ground-to-air missile units of the GSDF engages in air defense operations for units in aggression fronts, as well as for strategical mobile divisions. It also engages in air defense for politically and economically pivotal areas. The GSDF will continue to possess eight anti-aircraft artillery groups as the ground-to-air unit.

From the viewpoint of indicating the basic framework of ground defense capability, the new Outline gives in an annexed table the organized strength of Self-Defense Forces personnel needed to maintain the GSDF defense posture at 160,000. This organized strength is required to maintain major units including divisions, brigades and other main units, as well as supply depots and other logistic support units. Compared with the previous ceiling of 180,000, the new strength has been determined through reorganization of divisions into brigades and other means.

The GSDF units under the new structure are organized in principle by regular Self-Defense Forces personnel in order to maintain a high level of proficiency and to rapidly counter aggressions and other situations. However, from the viewpoint of maintaining personnel in an efficient manner in peacetime and ensuring the flexibility of smooth response to changes in situations, some units will be staffed mainly by high readiness Self-Defense Force Reservists (Ready Reserve Personnel). For example, three of four regiments of a division may be staffed by regular personnel which one regiment may be staffed mainly by Ready Reserve Personnel. Based on such a concept, 145,000 of the 160,000 members of the GSDF will be regular personnel and 15,000 will be Ready Reserve Personnel.

In regard to equipment of the GSDF, the new Outline, from the viewpoint of specifically showing the framework of ground-defense capability, describes in the Annexed Table the number of battle tanks and main artillery (howitzers rockets and SSM launchers), which are main equipment for the GSDF, in addition to the number of main units. Through reorganization of divisions into brigades and other measures, the quota of tanks was set at about 900, compared with 1,200 set in the previous Outline, and that of main artillery at 900, compared with 1,000 in the previous Outline.

2005 National Defense Program Outline

The National Defense Program Guidelines in and after JFY 2005 and Mid-Term Defense Program (JFY 2005-2009) were adopted by the Security Council and the Cabinet on December 10, 2004. The "Mid-Term Defense Program (FY 2005-FY 2009)" is a plan that defines Japan's policy regarding the build-up of its defense capabilities and the main projects for the five-year period to realize new defense capabilities specified in the National Defense Program Guidelines.

As regionally deployed units (basic strategic units), eight divisions and six brigades, which are responsive and highly mobile, will be formed in preparation for effective and timely response to new threats and diverse contingencies that are often difficult to predict. The eight divisions and six brigades will each be stationed in one of 14 sections demarcated with consideration given to Japan's geography, which is characterized by mountains, rivers and straits.

A departure from the conventional anti-tank warfare-oriented defense build-up concept will be pursued, and a personnel (manpower)-oriented system will be created in order to enhance the response to new threats and diverse contingencies such as attacks by guerillas and special operations forces, large-scale disasters and participation in international peace cooperation activities. To ensure effective response capability, the number of regular defense officers will be increased from 145,000, set forth in NDPG 1995 to 148,000. Meanwhile, the amount of primary equipment - tanks and artillery - will be reduced from approximately 900 vehicles to 600 vehicles for tanks, and from 900 to 600 artillery/vehicles for artillery, respectively.