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Further Reading

People's Liberation Army - Ground Forces / PLA Army

The Army is responsible primarily for military operations on land. At present, the Army has no independent leading organ, and the functions of the leading organ are exercised by the four general headquarters/departments.

The seven military area commands, namely, those of Shenyang, Beijing, Lanzhou, Jinan, Nanjing, Guangzhou and Chengdu, exercise direct leadership over the Army units under their command.

The Army has as arms infantry, armor, artillery, air defense, Army aviation, engineering, chemical defense and communications, as well as other specialized units such as those of electronic counter-measure (ECM), reconnaissance and mapping.

The infantry, maneuvering and operating on foot or on armored personnel carriers or infantry fighting vehicles, is composed of mountain infantry, motorized infantry and mechanized infantry (armored infantry).

The armored corps (tank corps), equipped basically with tanks and other armored vehicles and support vehicles, carries out ground assaults.

The artillery corps, equipped basically with artillery for suppression and anti-tank purposes, and missiles for antitank and other operational-tactical purposes, carries out ground fire strikes.

The air defense corps, equipped basically with anti-aircraft artillery and ground-to-air missile systems, carries out ground-to-air operations.

The Army aviation corps, equipped with attack, transport, and other specialized helicopters and light fixed-wing aircraft, carries out air maneuvers and provides support for ground operations.

The engineering corps, responsible for engineering support, is composed of engineering and other specialized units of pontoons, construction, camouflage, field water supply, and engineering maintenance.

The chemical defense corps, responsible for chemical defense operations, is composed of chemical defense, flame-throwing and smoke-generating units.

The communications corps, responsible for military communications, is composed of specialized units engaged in communications, communications engineering, communications technical support, aviation navigation and military postal service.

The Army, in accordance with its different duties and responsibilities, is also divided into field mobile, sea border defense, frontier defense, and garrison troops. The organizational order of the field mobile troops is normally combined corps, division (brigade), regiment, battalion, company, platoon and squad. The organizational systems of the sea border defense, frontier defense and garrison troops are decided in accordance with their operational tasks and geographical conditions.

Chinese military strategy underwent a fundamental reformulation in 1985, based on the assessment that the improving relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union had greatly reduced the probability of a new world war, and consequently increased the salience of regional conflicts. This new strategy, initially articulated in "Strategic Changes to the Guiding Thoughts on National Defense Construction and Army Building," is termed "active" defense (also known as "strategic," "frontier" or "peripheral" defense). The new "limited war under high tech conditions" strategy focused on a major conflict or limited war along China's borders. In contrast to the previous People's War of trading space for time, the new concept called for a forward strategy that would take the fight to the enemy's territory. A new "fist force" for rapid response to regional conflict was intended to include a few units of well-equipped, high-tech ground, naval and air forces. This new force projection emphasis was reinforced by the lessons of Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm.

Particularly since the 1991 Persian Gulf conflict, the PLA has devoted considerable resources to the development of special operation forces (SOFs). These units likely have been assigned specific missions and tasks in a variety of Taiwan contingencies, to include locating or destroying C4I assets, transportation nodes, and logistics depots; capturing or destroying airfields; destroying air defense assets; and, conducting reconnaissance operations.

Traditionally, China's ground forces have been highly cohesive, patriotic, physically fit, and well trained in basic skills. In addition, they are generally strong in operational and communications security, as well as in the use of camouflage, concealment, and deception. Major weaknesses are lack of transport and logistic support. Ground force leadership, training in combined operations, and morale are poor. Most soldiers who enter the army are peasants with a poor education, and one-third of China's ground forces leave active duty each year. Consequently, the PLA lacks a large body of experienced professional soldiers who are trained to operate sophisticated equipment.

The PLA is still a party army with nepotism and political/family connections continuing to predominate in officer appointment and advancement. The soldiers, for the most part, are semi-literate rural peasants; there is no professional NCO corps, per se. Military service, with its low remuneration and family disruption, is increasingly seen as a poor alternative to work in the private sector. China's leadership is aware of these weaknesses and is trying to address them in its overall modernization program. Thus, increasingly in the future, officers likely will be promoted on merit as opposed to connections, and the ratio of higher educated volunteer servicemen to conscripts likely will increase.

Force reductions and selective new equipment acquisitions are creating a more mobile, combat-ready core within the larger ground force. Since the mid-1990s, the army has shrunk from about 100 divisions to approximately 50, with many of the units downsizing to brigades. The PLA also has three Airborne divisions and two Marine brigades. However, the army's ability to project force much beyond China's land borders remains limited due to a shortage of amphibious ships, heavy cargo carrying aircraft, long-range transports, and other logistical shortcomings. Although the PLA has improved its amphibious attack capabilities in recent years, there are no signs that Beijing is serious about increasing its heavy lift capacity or conducting sustained ground operations.

In September 2003 China announced more cuts to its military, currently the largest standing armed force in the world. Former President Jiang Zemin, who heads China's Central Military Commission, announced the government plans to cut 200,000 troops from its force by the end the year 2005. The newest cuts would bring the size of the People's Liberation Army to 2.3 million. Most of the cuts are expected to occur in the largest force, the People's Liberation Army (PLA). Part of that, in terms of the force reduction that has been under way for several years, involves removing from the PLA's role or mission a number of activities that are not really the focus of a military force - things like border guard duties, or internal security activities.

The size of the PLA ground forces suggests that continued modernization will remain slow, deliberate, and limited through at least 2010. By 2020, infantry, airborne, armor and army aviation units will comprise a much larger percentage of the force. The army is supported by a large reserve-militia force numbering more than 1.5 million personnel and a one million man armed police force.