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Further Reading

Foreign Relations - United States

With Brazil emerging rapidly from the global economic downturn, President Lula's high popularity ratings, the country's new stature in the G20, international trade and financial architecture discussions, a tenth term on the UN Security Council set to begin in January, and Rio de Janeiro's successful bid to host the 2016 Olympics on the heels of the 2014 Soccer World Cup, Brazil was rapidly gaining international confidence and clout. The attainment of a permanent seat on the UN Security Council (UNSC) was a central goal of Brazil's foreign policy under President Lula's government, and Brazil was elected to a tenth UNSC term, a record matched only by Japan. Brazil has also taken a more visible role on major international negotiations, including the Doha trade round, G20 discussions on the global economic crisis, and post-Kyoto climate change talks, taken the lead on peacekeeping in Haiti, and is seeking a role in the Middle East peace process.

Brazil has traditionally been a leader in the inter-American community and played an important role in collective security efforts, as well as in economic cooperation in the Western Hemisphere. Brazil supported the Allies in both World Wars. During World War II, its expeditionary force in Italy played a key role in the Allied victory at Monte Castello. It is a member of the Organization of American States (OAS) and a party to the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty). Recently, Brazil has given high priority to expanding relations with its South American neighbors and is a founding member of the Latin American Integration Association (ALADI), the Union of South American Nations (UNASUL) created in June 2004, and Mercosul, a customs union between Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay, and Brazil, with Chile, Bolivia, Peru, Colombia, and Ecuador as associate members; Venezuela's full membership is pending.

The general policy approach of Lula and his foreign policy team in seeking to maintain stability in the region did not differ enormously from that of his predecessors; historically, Brazilian governments have avoided taking sides in Latin America and followed a policy of trying to maintain good relations with all of their neighbors. Uncertainty about Venezuela added a new element, however, leading to a more concerted effort to contain Chavez. Brazil was the leading advocate of Venezuelan admission to Mercosul, a move that, if approved by the Brazilian and Paraguayan congresses, would further complicate both the stated economic integration and political objectives of the organization. From Lula's point of view, bringing Chavez into a political organization in which Brazil has strong influence makes sense.

Brazil is a charter member of the United Nations and participates in its specialized agencies. It has contributed troops to UN peacekeeping efforts in the Middle East, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Cyprus, Mozambique, Angola, East Timor, and most recently Haiti. Brazil is currently leading the UN peacekeeping force in Haiti. In 2010-2011, Brazil is serving as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council. Prior to this, it had been a member of the UN Security Council nine times. Brazil is seeking a permanent position on the Council.

As Brazil's domestic economy has grown and diversified, the country has become increasingly involved in international economic and trade policy discussions. For example, Brazil was a leader of the G-20 group of nations and in 2009 became a creditor country to the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The U.S., Western Europe, and Japan are primary markets for Brazilian exports and sources of foreign lending and investment. China is a growing market for Brazilian exports. Brazil also bolstered its commitment to nonproliferation through ratification of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), signing a full-scale nuclear safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), acceding to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, and joining the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and the Nuclear Suppliers Group.

If Brazil's rapid emergence on the global stage is unquestionable, it is also true that it is very much still emerging. Brazil's clear sense of purpose in South America, where the overriding importance of maintaining stability on its poorly protected borders has led to an emphasis on dialogue and integration with its ten neighbors, is not in evidence on most extra-regional issues. Brazil's objective in achieving a seat at the table on many global issues seems to stop at the seat itself. In part, this stems from a general Brazilian disposition to prefer dialogue with other countries to confrontation or isolation. It was also driven by Lula's determination to develop and maintain friendly relations with all global players as Brazil seeks a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. The end result is that Brazil often remains reticent to take firm positions on key global issues and generally seeks ways to avoid them. More often than not, the GOB eschews positions of leadership that might require overtly choosing sides.

Under Lula, Brazil was increasingly insistent that international efforts to promote security must go hand in hand with commitments to economic and social development. Brazil maintains a double-standard on democracy and human rights. Although a founding member of the Community of Democracies and Partnership for Democratic Governance, Brazil rarely stands firm on these issues. In the wake of what it considered a near-disastrous brush with election observation in Zimbabwe in 2008, the GOB opted to focus on technical cooperation related to running elections, in lieu of observing them. In the UN, Brazil generally chooses to abstain even on resolutions regarding the most egregious human rights abuses-such as those in Iran, North Korea, and Sudan - unless it considers evidence of non-cooperation with international human rights bodies to be clear-cut (as in Burma, for example).

Where Brazil's policy is not hesitant, it is often ill-informed or straight-jacketed by the policies of the past. As it steps out on Middle East issues, the GOB does so with a lack of expertise on the region. Inclined to take assertions from the Syrians, Iranians, and Hizbullah at face value, it insists that peace can be achieved only if all players are at the table, and seeks to position itself as a neutral party, "the country who can talk to everyone," over against what it perceives as the biased U.S. and European efforts. This penchant for dialogue stands together with respect for sovereignty and non-intervention in internal affairs as the hallmarks of Brazilian foreign policy. But as Brazil plays in a growing number of international arenas, it is finding it more difficult to remain true to these principles, and more difficult to hide its inconsistencies.

Brazil is careful to avoid any suggestion that it is toeing a U.S. line, is intent on avoiding situations in which it might be perceived as a junior partner, and tends to see an "independent" position-i.e., independent of the United States in the first instance, and wealthy countries more generally-as the preferred default. Nor does Brazil want to be lumped in with the mass of developing countries. In multilateral settings, Brazil prefers to position itself as a "bridge" between the wealthy and developing nations.