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Further Reading

Defense Spending

Since the end of military rule in 1985, the armed services have steadfastly supported Brazil's civilian leadership and adapted to their new apolitical status. Brazil's military has subordinated itself to civilian rule, under a civilian Ministry of Defense. The officer corps is professional and dedicated to defending Brazil's constitution. In public opinion surveys the military tops all institutions in the level of public trust, even surpassing the Catholic Church.

Public esteem does not translate, however, into funds. Military budgets decreased steadily for 15 years, with the severest cuts introduced over the four years 2000-2004. This has naturally had a negative impact on the readiness of the armed forces. As President Lula stressed social priorities while working within tight fiscal constraints, the prognosis for the military's budget was for more of the same. The military grumbled that it is entitled to pay raises. The lack of money dampened the force projection capability. Procurement programs for new weapons systems to replace outmoded equipment are also starved for funds, while programs such as the development of a Brazilian nuclear-powered submarine and maintenance of antiquated vessels drain resources that could be better directed elsewhere.

In 2007, Brazil’s military budget was around $3.5 billion. According to official figures made public on 04 November 2007, Brazil requested $5 billion for its 2008 defense budget, with the possibility of raising it to $5.64 billion. President Lula’s administration had larger plans than just equipment recapitalization, saying that “we must overcome the lack of strategic planning and the technological dismantling of the last two decades.”

In recent years, the navy procured 23 A-4 Skyhawk attack aircraft from Kuwait and bought the former French aircraft carrier Foch, renamed the Sao Paulo. Several pilots have already become carrier qualified in the US. The Navy is sending on average two officers a year for flight training. In March 2004, the navy signed an LOA for the FMS LINK 11 case to upgrade their secure communications. In a program plagued by technological and design flaws, the navy,s nuclear submarine program has swallowed about $1 billion in R&D costs. The navy claims it is still 20 years, and $500 million, away from final development and delivery of a nuclear sub. Meanwhile, the navy is in dire need of escort vessels, and is hard pressed to maintain its aging fleet. Navy command is interested in submarine rescue, diesel submarine, and UNITAS training and exercises.

The air force desperately wants to replace its aging Mirages. Upon taking office in January 2003, President Lula postponed a decision on a new generation fighter (F-X), an understandable decision given the cost involved, approximately $700 million. New Lockheed F-16 Block 50 aircraft were previously offered in the competition. However, recognizing that other competitors might be preferred by FAB, Lockheed-Martin also decided to offer used F-16s in a deal that would provide the air force with capable aircraft at a fraction of the cost of new planes. Recent soundings from the GOB suggest that in order to avoid the significant budgetary outlay, consideration is also being given to upgrade of the current Mirage fleet. However, FAB continues to focus on the procurement of new, not used, aircraft. Regardless of the decision, GOB funding of the F-X will be difficult. FAB is also looking to replace its aging UH-1 helicopter fleet. In February 2004, the FAB sent a delegation to Alabama to discuss possible modifications needed on the 6-10 Black Hawks they are interested in purchasing.

Data on Brazil's military expenditures need to be approached with caution. Their accuracy is complicated by high rates of inflation since the late 1950s, by secrecy surrounding the funding of various military-related projects, by personnel costs that are sometimes hidden in other budgets, and by the common practice of mixing the accounts of the national treasury, the Central Bank, and the Bank of Brazil (Banco do Brasil--BB). However, even if the figures generally attributed to Brazilian defense expenditures understate their true value, there is consensus that Brazil is among the countries with the lowest levels of military expenditures, and that those levels have declined in the last three decades. For example, the rate of military expenditures in relation to GDP has dropped steadily: in the 1960s, it averaged 2 percent; in the 1970s, 1.5 percent; in the 1980s, 1 percent; and in the early 1990s, less than 0.5 percent. In 1993 that rate reached a mere 0.3 percent. Brazil in 1993 ranked 133d out of 166 countries in military expenditures as a share of government expenditures. Within South America, only Guyana and Suriname ranked lower.

Political scientist Paulo S. Wrobel notes that these data point to a correlation between the type of government (military or civilian) and military expenditures. That correlation is made even clearer if one examines military expenditures as a share of the federal budget: in 1970 that figure was 20 percent; in 1993 it was only 1.3 percent. The 1993 figure was the lowest since independence in 1822. The highest figure was in 1864 and 1865, at the early stages of the Paraguayan War, when defense expenditures accounted for 49.6 percent of all government expenditures.

Brazil's low level of military expenditures can be attributed to the perception that the country has few external threats and to Brazil's large size in relation to its neighbors. In terms of threats, the deepening integration process with Argentina since the early 1980s virtually has removed the only potential external threat to Brazil.

Despite its low rate of military expenditures, in absolute terms Brazil is by far the largest military power in Latin America. In 1993 it ranked nineteenth among 166 countries in total military expenditures; the next highest in Latin America was Argentina, which ranked twenty-fourth. From 1988 through 1993, Brazil's military expenditures totaled US$43.12 billion (in constant 1993 dollars; an average of US$7.19 billion per year). They totaled US$10.6 billion in 1996. The defense budget in 1997 totaled US$12 billion.

The armed forces have had some minor triumphs on budget issues. In early 1994, the Franco administration announced that it would cut US$22 billion in the federal budget, dividing the cuts equally across ministries. The military ministers reacted quickly, going directly to the president to criticize the proposed reductions. They succeeded in lowering the proposed military cuts by at least US$300 million.

In late 1993 and early 1994, the armed forces were more vocal in their criticism of the low levels of military expenditures. They pointed out, for example, that the air force work week began on Monday afternoon, after lunch, and ended at Friday noon, before lunch, in order to save on the cost of feeding the officers and troops.

Military salaries were raised substantially in mid-1991 and in April 1992. According to one report, before the second raise, a four-star general with forty years in the service was earning about US$1,700 a month, and many soldiers earned only a few hundred dollars a month. In contrast, a congressional deputy earned more than US$6,000 a month.

The armed forces had been trying to protect their priority projects: the army--Calha Norte and the "defense" of the Amazon; the navy--its nuclear-powered submarine; the air force--its AMX subsonic fighter. Each project has had special funding from the federal government, aside from the general military budget. Additional funding has sometimes been available through various government agencies.

In essence, the armed forces were being squeezed in an unintended fashion by a neoliberal economic model that stressed cuts in government expenditures and privatizations. Not only has their budget been cut, but they no longer have the ready-made sinecure of state enterprises in which to work at the time of retirement. Indeed, under the military regime, state enterprises became bloated with retired military officers. A 1983 study by political scientist Walder de Góes identified more than 8,000 retired officers who were in positions within the state enterprises and federal bureaucracy.

What the defense spending levels suggest is that the military is having to compete with virtually every civilian ministry and, in many cases, is coming up short. Moreover, even though the military is still the most influential player on some issues, the number of civilian actors involved in the decision-making process has increased. In many cases, the military has been displaced by civilians. The Ministry of Finance has become the dominant actor on budget issues. Although the armed forces can try to appeal directly to the president, such an approach is not guaranteed to succeed. Also, the armed forces must deal directly with a Congress responsible for approving the budget.