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2003 Reports

• Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 July Through 31 December 2003. Central Intelligence Agency Released November 23, 2004 -- "As required by Section 721 of the FY 1997 Intelligence Authorization Act, the following are country summaries of acquisition activities (solicitations, negotiations, contracts, and deliveries) related to weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and advanced conventional weapons (ACW) that occurred from 1 July through 31 December 2003. We have excluded countries that already have established WMD and ACW programs, as well as countries that demonstrated little WMD acquisition activity of concern."

• Iraqi weapons of mass destruction - Intelligence and Assessments UK Intelligence and Security Committee Sep 2003 -- "The purpose of this Report is to examine whether the available intelligence, which informed the decision to invade Iraq, was adequate and properly assessed and whether it was accurately reflected in Government publications. This Report does not judge whether the decision to invade Iraq was correct." [PDF 600 Kb]

• Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 January - 30 June 2003 Central Intelligence Agency Released November 2003 -- "As required by Section 721 of the FY 1997 Intelligence Authorization Act, the following are country summaries of acquisition activities (solicitations, negotiations, contracts, and deliveries) related to weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and advanced conventional weapons (ACW) that occurred from 1 January through 30 June 2003. We have excluded countries that already have established WMD programs, as well as countries that demonstrated little WMD acquisition activity of concern." [PDF Version 151 Kb]

• A Review of the FBI's Performance in Deterring, Detecting, and Investigating the Espionage Activities of Robert Philip Hanssen U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General August 14, 2003 -- In this report, the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) of the Department of Justice (DOJ) examines the performance of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in deterring, detecting, and investigating the espionage of Robert Philip Hanssen, a former FBI Supervisory Special Agent. Hanssen's espionage began in November 1979 - three years after he joined the FBI - and continued intermittently until his arrest in February 2001, just two months before his mandatory retirement date. In addition to its management responsibility to detect espionage among its employees, the FBI is the lead agency for detecting and investigating espionage committed in the United States.

• S. REPT. NO. 107- 351 / H. REPT. NO. 107-792: Report Of The Joint Inquiry Into The Terrorist Attacks Of September 11, 2001 – By The House Permanent Select Committee On Intelligence And The Senate Select Committee On Intelligence December 2002, Released 2003

• Press Release: CODEL Goss Visit to Baghdad Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, U.S. House Of Representatives July 15, 2003 -- "Chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI), Porter Goss (R-FL), Ranking Democrat Jane Harman (D-CA), and Congressmen Jim Gibbons (R-NV) and Robert “Bud” Cramer (D-AL) conducted a 3-day oversight mission focused on Iraq. (...) On July 10th, the CODEL met Coalition officials in Baghdad to review the efforts underway to determine the status of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction program and establish security in Iraq following Operation Iraqi Freedom." [PDF]

• The Decision to go to War in Iraq, Ninth Report of Session 2002–03, Volume I United Kingdom House of Commons, Foreign Affairs Committee July 7, 2003 -- "This Report seeks to establish whether the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, within the Government as a whole, presented accurate and complete information to Parliament in the period leading up to military action in Iraq, particularly in respect of weapons of mass destruction. The focus on Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction is because their removal was the Government’s prime objective." [PDF 1.03 Mb]

• The Decision to go to War in Iraq: Oral evidence Taken before the Foreign Affairs Committee United Kingdom House of Commons, Foreign Affairs Committee 19 June 2003 -- Witnesses: SIR MICHAEL JAY KCMG, Permanent Under-Secretary of State, and MR PETER RICKETTS CMG, Director, Political, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, examined.
• The Decision to go to War in Iraq: Oral evidence Taken before the Foreign Affairs Committee United Kingdom House of Commons, Foreign Affairs Committee 27 June 2003 -- Witnesses: RT HON JACK STRAW, a Member of the House, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, MR PETER RICKETTS, CMG, Director General, Political and MR WILLIAM EHRMAN, CMG, Director General, Defence/Intelligence, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, examined.
• The Decision to go to War in Iraq: Oral evidence Taken before the Foreign Affairs Committee United Kingdom House of Commons, Foreign Affairs Committee 25 June 2003 -- Witness: MR ALASTAIR CAMPBELL, Director of Communications and Strategy, 10 Downing Street, examined.
• The Decision to go to War in Iraq: Oral evidence Taken before the Foreign Affairs Committee United Kingdom House of Commons, Foreign Affairs Committee 24 June 2003 -- Witnesses: SIR MICHAEL JAY KCMG, Permanent Under-Secretary of State, and MR PETER RICKETTS CMG, Director, Political, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, examined.
• The Decision to go to War in Iraq: Oral evidence Taken before the Foreign Affairs Committee United Kingdom House of Commons, Foreign Affairs Committee 19 June 2003 -- Witnesses: MR ANDREW GILLIGAN, BBC Defence Correspondent, and MR MARK DAMAZER, BBC Deputy Director of News, examined
• The Decision to go to War in Iraq: Oral evidence Taken before the Foreign Affairs Committee United Kingdom House of Commons, Foreign Affairs Committee 19 June 2003 -- Witness: MR ANDREW WILKIE, Former Senior Intelligence Adviser to the Australian Prime Minister, examined.
• The Decision to go to War in Iraq: Oral evidence Taken before the Foreign Affairs Committee United Kingdom House of Commons, Foreign Affairs Committee 18 June 2003 -- Witness: DR THOMAS DAVID INCH, OBE, Former Deputy Chief Scientific Officer, MoD at Porton Down and former Chief Executive of the Royal Society of Chemistry, examined.
• The Decision to go to War in Iraq: Oral evidence Taken before the Foreign Affairs Committee United Kingdom House of Commons, Foreign Affairs Committee 17 June 2003 -- Witness: MR ROBIN COOK, a Member of the House, examined.
• Intelligence and Security Committee Annual Report 2002–2003 United Kingdom Intelligence and Security Committee June 2003 -- "This Annual Report covers the period May 2002 to April 2003 and is the second Annual Report produced by the Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) under the chairmanship of the Rt. Hon. Ann Taylor MP. The Committee also produced a special Report Inquiry into Intelligence, Assessments and Advice prior to the Terrorist Bombings on Bali 12 October 2002 in December 2002." [PDF 443 Kb]

• Iraqi Mobile Biological Warfare Agent Production Plants Central intelligence Agency 28 May 2003 -- "Coalition forces have uncovered the strongest evidence to date that Iraq was hiding a biological warfare program. (...) The design, equipment, and layout of the trailer found in late April is strikingly similar to descriptions provided by a source who was a chemical engineer that managed one of the mobile plants. Secretary of State Powell's description of the mobile plants in his speech in February 2003 to the United Nations (see inset below) was based primarily on reporting from this source." [PDF Version 741 Kb]

• DCI's Worldwide Threat Briefing: The Worldwide Threat in 2003: Evolving Dangers in a Complex World 11 February 2003 -- "Mr. Chairman, last year—in the wake of the September 11 attack on our country—I focused my remarks on the clear and present danger posed by terrorists who seek to destroy who we are and what we stand for. The national security environment that exists today is significantly more complex than that of a year ago."

• Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions: 1 July Through 31 December 2002 Central Intelligence Agency Released November 2003
• Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions: 1 January Through 30 June 2002 Central Intelligence Agency Released April 2003
• Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 July Through 31 December 2001. Central Intelligence Agency - Released 07 January 2003