Intelligence

Maneuver Warfare in Cyberspace

 

CSC 1997

 

Subject Area - Warfighting

 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

 

Title:  Maneuver Warfare in Cyberspace

 

Author:  Major P.K. Singh, Australian Army

 

Thesis:  Information age technologies have created a new cyberspace environment in which to conduct warfare. Control of cyberspace will increasingly present a challenge for national security into the 21st Century.

 

Discussion:  A new environment for warfare is emerging in the information age, but generally the strategic implications have not been recognized.  Social and economic paradigms are radically changing with the consequences of more diverse patterns of conflict occurring among both state and non-state entities. New technology is heralding a Revolution in Military Affairs which has the potential to enhance strategic capabilities and create a cyberspace "arms race." The dynamism of the era raises vital issues such as the focus of national leadership and the validity of national security and military strategies. Russia's response to the information age highlights the potential for challenges to the existing military balance and global security. Paradoxically, the United States is increasingly vulnerable to information warfare as the information age progresses and cyberspace expands.  Analysis reveals an alarming reality: there is gap between the emerging information age environment and concomitant development in doctrine, capabilities and strategies for information warfare at the strategic level.

           

            Cyberspace has emerged as a dimension in which to attack an enemy and to break his "will" to resist, yet there is a doctrinal vacuum for this form of warfare.  To help redress the situation, a conceptual framework and doctrine for warfare in cyberspace is required.  Maneuver warfare theory, when combined with Warden's Five Rings model and a change to the paradigm of battlespace, is a suitable first-step way of thinking about cyber warfare.  As a corollary, a three tier strategy is required prior to initiating capability development. (1) Strategic direction and guidance is required to mobilize the efforts of all government departments and agencies. (2) National security and military strategies must outline a response to the threats and opportunities of cyber warfare. (3) Definition of Department of Defense's offensive and defensive responsibilities, parameters and capabilities for strategic information warfare needs to be clearly articulated.   

             

            Overall, the paper seeks "to anticipate the changes in the character of war" and it advocates for capability development to conduct offensive and defensive maneuver in cyberspace.

 

Recommendation: It is recommended that Department of Defense leadership promote further discussion and analytical study on the requirement to conduct strategic level offensive and defensive warfare in cyberspace.

 

 

 

 

 

 

CONTENTS

 

 

 

 

            TITLE PAGE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  i

 

            EXECUTIVE SUMMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii

 

            LIST OF FIGURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v

 

            ABBREVIATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   vi

 

            PREFACE   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .  vii

 

 

            CHAPTER                                                                                                     Page

 

            1.         THE STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS OF WARFARE IN

                        THE INFORMATION AGE  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   1

 

            2.         MANEUVER WARFARE IN CYBERSPACE  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

 

            3.         CONCLUSION: REALITY, THEORY AND NEXT STEPS . . . . . .  42

 

                       

           

            GLOSSARY - INFORMATION WARFARE & CYBERSPACE   . . . . . . .  49

 

 

            BIBLIOGRAPHY  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  51

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

LIST OF FIGURES

 

 

 

 

            Figure                                                                                                             Page

 

 

                        1.         Computer Transforming the Economic Environment  . . . . . . .  4

 

                        2.         Toffler's Waves of Warfare  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .    7

 

                        3.         Cyberspace Vulnerabilities for National Security  . . . . . . . . . . 22

 

                        4.         Warden's Five Ring Model  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  30

 

                        5.         Information Warfare Chart   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   36

 

                        6.         Dimensions for Maneuver Warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   39

 

                        7.         Cyberspace Compression of Levels of War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  40

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

ABBREVIATIONS

 

 

 

 

CONUS          Continental United States

C2W                Command and Control Warfare

DoD                 Department of Defense

EW                  Electronic Warfare

GII                   Global Information Infrastructure

GPO                Government Printing Office

INSS               Institute for National Strategic Studies

IW                   Information Warfare

JROC              Joint Requirements Oversight Council

MTR                Military-Technical Revolution

NII                   National Information Infrastructure

NMS               National Military Strategy

NSS                 National Security Strategy

OODA             Observation-Orientation-Decision-Action

OOTW                        Operations Other Than War

PDD                Presidental Decision Directive

R&D                Research and Development

RMA               Revolution in Military Affairs

 

 

 

 

PREFACE

 

Victory smiles upon those who anticipate the changes in

the character of war, not upon those who wait to adapt

themselves after the changes occur.

                                                                        - Air Marshal Giulio Douhet

 

 

            "Government and commercial computer systems are so poorly protected today that they can essentially be considered defenseless - an electronic Pearl Harbor waiting to happen."[1]  With this characteristic flourish, Winn Schwartau sounded an ominous warning to a Congressional Committee hearing in 1991.  This threat arose because of the emergence of the information age - a new age which will radically change the character of warfare.  The impact of this age is comparable to the effect the industrial age had on war throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.  This paper contends that embedding information age technologies in the national and global information infrastructure created a new environment in which to conduct maneuver warfare.  The new environment is called cyberspace, and it increasingly presents a challenge for national security into the 21st Century.

            This paper is in three parts and written from a United States perspective.  The first chapter analyzes the strategic environment for warfare in cyberspace and focuses on four key aspects which include: the new social and economic environment emerging from the information age; the contribution of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) to enhance strategic capabilities and potentially start a cyberspace "arms race", which in turn raises questions on the validity of current national security and military strategies; Russia's response to the information age and the potential for challenges to the existing military balance and global security; and finally, the United States' increasingly vulnerable position as the information age gathers momentum and cyberspace expands. 

            The second chapter explains how maneuver warfare theory might be adapted to the cyberspace environment with devastating effect.  The aim is to provide a "way of thinking" about cyber warfare in a similar manner that Douhet, writing in the 1920s, envisaged the strategic implications of airpower.  In short, cyberspace is a dimension to attack an enemy and to break his "will" to resist.  There is a link between the first and second chapters.  In essence, chapter 1 analyzes the current "reality" and exposes the gap between the emerging information age environment and concomitant development in doctrine, capabilities and strategies at the strategic level.  Chapter 2 theorizes how the information age environment can be exploited as a dimension to defeat an adversary, particularly at the strategic level.   The paper's conclusion brings together the reality and theory discussion from the first two chapters and suggests avenues for further investigation and analysis.  Overall, the aim of the paper is to anticipate the changes in the character of war and advocate for capability development to conduct offensive and defensive maneuver in cyberspace.

 

 

CHAPTER 1

 

THE STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS OF WARFARE

IN THE INFORMATION AGE  

 

 

When farming was the essence of national economies, taking land was the essence of war.  As agriculture yielded to industry, war too was industrialized; nations defeated foes by destroying their productive capacity.  If this pattern holds for the information age, might war follow commerce into cyberspace, pitting foes for control of this undefinable but critical ground.[2]

 

           

            The information age is having a profound effect on the world.  While the future is not entirely clear, Peter Ducker says "the one thing we can be sure of is that the world that will emerge from the present rearrangement of values, beliefs, social and economic structures, of political concepts and systems, indeed, of world views, will be different from anything anyone today imagines."[3]   Conceptually, the impact of the new environment has not been missed by defense planners.  In an Army think-piece entitled "War in the Information Age", Army Chief of Staff General Gordon Sullivan and Colonel James Dubik reflect that the information age "will affect every aspect of human life ...

and the Army is changing to accommodate this new epoch ... and positioning America's

Army today so that it will succeed in the information age is a historic task."[4]    These comments are indicative of the forward-looking approach being taken by all Services.  In fact Joint Vision 2010, which provides the strategic template for the evolution of the US Armed Forces, speaks of "information-age technological advances" as one of the four principle concepts for core strength in the future.[5]  Overall, military analysts thoroughly embrace this futuristic assessment of information age technological advances.[6]   

              This chapter analyzes four significant aspects of the information age pertaining to national security: the information age environment for warfare; the direction of the RMA, and the validity of current leadership's national security and military strategies; Russia's response to the information age and the potential impact on global security; and finally the United States' vulnerability from weaker countries or non-state groups who could use abundant cyberspace technologies for offensive action.  A central theme is that while RMA proponents concentrate on comprehensive enhancements to operational and tactical capabilities with information age technology, they generally do not analyze the broader strategic implications and possibilities.  A notable feature is the mismatch between the national security and military strategies and the emerging vulnerabilities of the United States in the information age.   

THE EMERGING SOCIAL, POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC

ENVIRONMENT FOR WARFARE

           

            The Army defines the term "information age" in Pamphlet 525-5 Force XXI Operations as "a future time when social, cultural and economic patterns will reflect the decentralized non-hierarchical flow of information."[7]    Images of the future generally draw upon the work of Alvin Toffler who, in 1980, described the current technological changes as the Third Wave of the three great transforming ages in history.[8]  In The Third Wave, Toffler forecasts that the information age will bring wholesale change to society, the economy and politics, and also transform the traditional nation state system. These comprehensive changes are due to the astounding degree to which power and wealth have come to depend on knowledge.  What is occurring is a deep-level change in the very nature of power.  The result is that an advanced economy, with its complexities of production, financial markets, and integration of diverse systems could "not run for thirty seconds" without microprocessors and computer networks.[9] 

            The Economist magazine recently provided evidence supporting Toffler's futuristic assessment when it surveyed the extent that the information technological revolution will be accompanied by an economic revolution.[10]  Over the past two decades, the investment in computers in America has risen 20-30% in real terms per year.  Figure 1 shows the share of firms' total investment in information technology equipment has increased from 7% in 1970 to over 40% in 1996, and  "... about half of all American workers now use some form of computer."[11]  The Economist notes, however, that the real productivity gains based on this investment is yet to be realized as there is historically a lag between acquiring new technology and shifts in the economy.[12]            

 

Figure 1:  Computers Transforming the Economic Environment

           

            In 1992, the United States invested over $210 billion in information technology, about half the global investment, and the amount has continued to grow at about 18 percent since.[13] Nearly all economic commentators agree that the impact of information technology (semiconductors, computers, software and telecommunications) will increasingly transform the global economic environment.  The Economist summized that there is widely divided opinion as to whether the consequences will be largely positive or negative.  On the positive side, many analysts argue that the technological revolution is "an engine for growth and prosperity".  Other forecasters, however, conclude that "... rapid technological change and increased international competition are fraying the job markets of the major industrialized countries.  The global economy is leaving millions of disaffected workers in its train.  Inequality, unemployment, and endemic poverty have become its handmaidens."[14]  As the information age unbalances the economic status quo and states are challenged by social and political upheaval, governments will increasingly be engaged in some form of inter-state or intra-state conflict.  The type of conflict wrought by information age upheaval may well be different from anything encountered in the industrial age.

            Regardless of whether the outcomes of the technological revolution are positive or


negative, the overriding message is that the changing world economy calls for nothing less than a new economic paradigm.  A new economic environment may have significant consequences in terms of global military power.  In The Rise and Fall of Great Powers, Paul Kennedy's analysis of the past five centuries concludes that "the relative position of each of the states has been affected by economic and technological change, and the constant interaction between strategy and economics."[15]  While cogent counter arguments to Kennedy's thesis have credibility,[16] three distinct economic indicators should be acknowledged by military strategists.  First, there is a convergence in levels of income, growth, and productivity among North American, European, and Asian countries.  Second, there is an evolution of global industrial networks with highly integrated and stable nodes, reinforcing the global economy.[17]  Third, there is strong empirical evidence to support Toffler's argument that computerized information systems will be the foundation of economic wealth and social order. Finally, if the global economy, networks, and information systems represent strengths in the information age, then to the military mind they should also represent critical vulnerabilities -- something to be attacked or protected. 


            Turning to warfare in the information age, Toffler envisions an information age where knowledge has gone from being an adjunct to money and muscle, to being the most important ingredient of force and wealth.[18]   Although the United States and other countries are riding the information age wave, other wave forms continue to exist.  Two important features will emerge.  First, cultural variants will arise as other countries enter the information age and adds to the complexity of the global environment.[19]  Toffler believes that this phenomena of unequal growth and cultural variation will  "represent the 21st century world conflict pattern."[20]  Second, warfare will become an admixture, to varying degrees, of agrarian, industrial, informational age technologies and war forms.  These two factors create an environment which will be characterized by complexity, unique forms of conflict, and increased global disparity between rich and poor.[21]  Such an environment can be explained by Toffler's "waves of warfare" concept.

            According to Toffler, a characteristic of the three great ages is the unmistakable parallel between the features of an economy and the features of warfare.  The way we make war reflects the way we make wealth.[22]  Each age has its own unique form of war and a true military revolution only occurs when the form of war is completely altered as a result of a civilization entering a new age.  This is the essence of a military revolution.  In their book War and Anti-War, Alvin and Heidi Toffler describe how each wave runs concurrently and sequentially (schematically shown at Figure 2).  The United States armed forces may find themselves facing opponents fighting  within any one of the three waves, or within a combination of waves.  The Tofflers claim that Operations Just Cause and Desert Storm represent the first wars of the third wave.

           

 Figure 2:  Toffler's Waves of Warfare

           

            In his book the First Information War, Alan Campen contends that in the Gulf War "knowledge came to rival weapons and tactics in importance, giving credence to the notion that an enemy might be brought to its knees principally through destruction and disruption of the means for command and control."[23]  Empirical evidence supports this assertion.  In Operation Desert Storm the electronic warfare (EW) phase lasted for 38 days, more than nine times as long as the ground operations phase.  In abundance was the


latest electronic warfare equipment, airborne early-warning and control aircraft, and radar systems for reconnaissance and precision strike.  Important targets were continuously and precisely attacked by EW and precision missiles throughout the entire battlespace, disrupting the command and communications system at all echelons.  Control of air operations, with up to 2,000 to 3,000 sorties per day, was unprecedented.  As a result, Iraqi combat effectiveness and will to fight was all but been destroyed before the beginning of the ground offensive.  Linking the operational and strategic level, there were more than 3,000 computers in the war zone linked to computers in the United States, which is indicative of the increasing interface between strategic, operational and tactical levels in the information age. 

            Given such evidence, many analysts[24] support Toffler's claim that:  "Knowledge, in short, is now the central resource of destructivity, just as it is the central source of productivity" and in the information age "a revolution is occurring that places knowledge, in various forms, at  the core of military power."[25]  In making this statement Toffler does


not deny that knowledge has always been important in war, but the 1990-91 Gulf War evinced new trends for warfare.  Continuing the trend in computer reliance, the US Air Force contracted for the purchase of  300,000 computers in 1993.

 

THE RMA, NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGIES AND

LEADERSHIP IN THE INFORMATION AGE

           

            Widespread debate in the defense community exists on the subject of the RMA.[26]  Publications, papers, and conferences abound with the concept of "third wave" warfare.  Military analysts are grappling with how Toffler's concept of the impending information age might translate to change for the military.  Carl Builder, a senior analyst at RAND Corporation, at a Revolution in Military Affairs Conference conducted by the Australian Defence Studies Centre over 27-28 February, 1996, identified technology as the catalyst for changing societal order with seldom foreseeable consequences at the time.  "In the information age", Builder explained, "the societal implications were firstly, a diffusion of power downwards and secondly, a by passing of traditional hierarchies."[27]  A recurring theme of the conference indicated:

... an RMA is likely to be part of a much broader social revolution brought about by new information technology.  Thus, continuing challenge to existing defence paradigms, the future would seem to require a more inclusive approach, involving civil and business leaders as well as the military.[28]

 

To help meet these challenges under the RMA genre, William Lind promoted the notion of a fourth generation of warfare propelled by new technology of the information age.[29]  Notably, fourth generation warfare carries over a few key elements from the third generation such as mission orders, maneuver emphasis, and targeting the enemy's societal morale.

            While most analysts agree that a RMA will be a bi-product of the information age, few acknowledge that the RMA "race" will in itself shape the information age.  For instance, in 1906, Britain's development of the Dreadnought class of battleship rendered obsolete all previously constructed battleships and consequently the great powers, including Britain, were forced into an arms race. Around the world navies were revolutionized, and as such became a driving force of the industrial age.  The negative consequence for Britain was that previously she was unrivaled as a sea power, but after 1906 she had a lead of just one battleship - HMS Dreadnought. Irrelevant naval powers such as Germany now sought to challenge British naval supremacy.[30]  The RMA and the development of information age military capabilities is likely to fuel a similar "arms" race with the same potential (Dreadnought) negative consequences for the United States.  In this way the RMA could precipitate a change in the balance of power.

            The National Defense University's, Martin Libicki wrote in 1995 that information warfare and the RMA "... has assumed almost totemic importance in the conceptual superstructure of national defense."[31]  RMA concepts are providing an impetus for capability development and the allocation of defense resources.  Therefore the nature of the RMA, and how it is controlled by defense policy and strategy, will be a central feature of the information age environment. National strategy should be cognizant of the RMA's potential to affect the balance of power.  Andrew Marshall, a Director at the Pentagon's Office of Net Assessment, has made insightful contributions to understanding how the RMA might evolve.[32]  Marshall theorized that the RMA will evolve in two stages: first, in a drive to limit casualties, stand-off platforms, stealth, precision weapons, information dominance and missile defense will emerge as the priority; while the second stage emphasizes robotics, non-lethality, psychotechnology and elaborate cyber defense.[33]

            Despite the broad debate on the RMA, no consensus on information warfare's strategic or operational implications emerges.[34]  Most analysts view information warfare


as an adjunct to conventional strikes - a force multiplier - rather than a stand alone method of warfare.[35] Discussion of the strategic implications of information warfare among the military and the defense community has been limited to a few writers, but none propose a comprehensive framework for the strategic use of such warfare.[36]  At issue is the extent to which a revolution can be initiated or shaped by deliberate policy decisions.[37]  Certainly making an RMA happen and controlling its development are themes that Admiral William Owens stressed when vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.  Through the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC), Admiral Owens declared that: "If we decide to accelerate the process by emphasizing those systems and weapons that drive the revolution in military art, we can reach ours years - perhaps decades - before any other nation."[38] 

            Similarly, Marshall advises that the United States should accelerate the RMA pace in order to deter a peer competitor from making similar investments -- essentially to price the competitor out of the market by creating an insurmountable technology gap.  To achieve this end, Steven Metz and James Kevit assert in "Strategy and the Revolution in


Military Affairs: From Theory to Policy," that "in order to master the RMA rather than be dragged along by it, Americans must debate its theoretical underpinning, strategic implications, core assumptions and normative choices."[39]  Unfortunately to date there has been little debate on these national level strategic issues in the United States.[40]

            There is, however, concern that the United States will not only need to be prepared to fight an information age war, but also first (agrarian) and second (industrial) wave adversaries.  This concern is sometimes called the "bandwidth problem".  In Technology and War, Martin van Creveld describes a future predominantly influenced by terrorism and insurgency and warns that a technology dependent military force might be unbalanced because "... technology and war operate on a logic which is not only different but actually opposed; the very concept of 'technological superiority' is somewhat misleading when applied to the context of war."[41]  For instance, the technical sophistication of the United States in the Vietnam War could not overcome the agrarian age North Vietnamese and Viet Cong.

                Admiral Owens' paper entitled "JROC: Harnessing the Revolution in Military Affairs" in Joint Forces Quarterly,[42] almost exclusively focuses on capability development at the operational level.  Such focus is typical across DoD and negatively impacts on national security and military strategies.  For instance, A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement (NSS), February 1996, states: "The new era presents a different set of threats to our security," and goes on to list proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, narcotics trafficking, organized crime, environmental and natural resource issues as new challenges to US security strategy.[43]  The glaring omission in the NSS is the threat to the national information systems.Also, the section in the NSS outlining the requirement for a strong defense capability does not include the concept of protecting national information systems as a task for the military or any other agency.[44]

            The  National Military Strategy (NMS) is derived form the NSS and consequently fails acknowledge the strategic implications of the information age.  The NMS also omits recognition of any threat to national information systems from a military aggressor.  The limitations are readily apparent when the NMS states:

The strategic landscape is characterized by four principle dangers which our military must address: regional instability; the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; transnational dangers such as drug trafficking and terrorism; and the dangers to democracy and reform in the former Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and elsewhere.[45]

 

To "Win the Information War" the NMS remains steadfastly focused on the operational and tactical levels and the scope for information warfare is limited to Desert Storm type scenarios.[46]  The evidence indicates that the NSS and NMS missed the strategic implications of the emerging information age.

            Unfortunately, Joint Vision 2010 also does not address what the NSS and NMS missed on the question of information warfare at the strategic level. Although Joint Vision 2010  describes the information era "of accelerating technological change" as one to be harnessed for "dominant battlespace awareness," dominant maneuver, precision engagement, full-dimensional protection, and focused logistics.  For the military, the parameters for information warfare are confined to a regional conflict scenario and the spectrum of operational and tactical capabilities.  Only in passing does Joint Vision 2010 reflect that: "In addition, increased strategic level programs will be required in this critical area (of defensive information warfare)."[47] 

            Enthusiasm for embracing the information age at the operational level contrasts inertia at the strategic level.  From a national perspective only a few initiatives are underway.  Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 29 of 1994, created a Security Policy Board to address a variety of security issues to include information systems security and risk management.  However, a July 1995 report commissioned for the Joint Staff entitled "Information Warfare" indicated that "there is no national policy on information warfare ... (which) is a source of concern for many, particularly in the DoD."[48]  Below the executive advisory level, there is no overarching authority to take the lead for information warfare policy, strategy, or defense. 

            The absence of a leading authority in Government is surprising given President Clinton's and Vice President Gore's awareness of the economic and social implications of the information age is evinced by their firm platform to "use information technology to improve American's quality of life and reinvigorate the economy;"[49] and their vision for expanding the Global Information Infrastructure (GII) to build an inter-connected and interdependent global community.[50]  Presidential leadership, however, views threats to the National Information Infrastructure (NII) and GII only in the context of criminal behavior, a matter for security managers.  The issue of the NII and GII becoming a military target, a matter for the National Command Authority and Defense, has not been formally acknowledged.  Vice President Al Gore's document, entitled Global Information Infrastructure: Agenda for Cooperation provides evidence of a misguided assumption of a GII and NII free from military manipulation.  The following extract reveals how Gore merely equates "security challenges" solely within the context of criminal behavior:

A network as vast and complex as the GII will pose difficult security challenges for all nations.  The same modern technology that makes communication faster and easier also makes communication  systems vulnerable to ever greater security risks.  These risks are not new - most are well-known to security managers.[51]

 

When it comes to addressing information age issues, leadership should accept its  responsibility for creative innovation and protection of national information interests.

            Absence of progress on the issue of strategic information warfare is alarming in the light of some warnings.  In 1991, Winn Schwartau submitted testimony to a Congressional Committee that "inadequate security planning on the part of both the government and the private sector"[52] could result in an electronic Pearl Harbor.  A range of government sponsored reports support Schwartau's assessment.  The National Research Council reported in Growing Vulnerability of the Public Switched Networks: Implications for National Security, that "because of powerful trends in the evolution of the nation's telecommunications and information networks, they are becoming more vulnerable to serious interruptions of service."[53]  Other examples of the growing


vulnerability of information systems abound in Government reports and papers.[54]  Overall, Metz and Kevit believe that a strategic vacuum exists and the vulnerabilities to the NII continue to become more pronounced. At the end of their article, both analysts postulate: "If the United States is to lead and master the revolution rather than be its eventual victim, this (strategic) vacuum must be filled."[55] 

 

THE CHANGING GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT:

RUSSIA'S RESPONSE TO THE INFORMATION AGE

 

            Russia's perspective on the impact of the information age will be a major factor in shaping the global strategic information warfare environment.  There is the potential for Russia to bypass the United States' expensive R&D investment and develop its so-called "sixth generation" of cyberspace warfare technology.  Despite Russia's struggling economy, there is the long-term potential for reasserting military power through cyberspace.  Russia could make advances in cyberspace in a similar manner that the  Soviet Union harnessed nuclear technology for war despite its struggling post-war economy.

            Mary FitzGerald, an adjunct professor at the United States' Air Command and Staff College and research fellow with the Hudson Institute's National Security Studies Group, recently analyzed Russia's perspective on the impact of information technology.  FitzGerald states that the Russians believe that a military-technical revolution (MTR) is emerging where "... precision-guided, non-nuclear, deep-strike weapons, and the systems used to integrate them, are revolutionizing all aspects of military art and force structure - and elevating combat capabilities by a million-fold."[56]  The strategic impact is equally dramatic as Admiral V.S. Pirumov says in Two Aspects of Parity and Defense Sufficiency, "... that a war's main objective is shifting away from seizure of the opponent's territory and moving towards neutralizing his political or military-economic potential - eliminating a competitor - and ensuring the victor's supremacy in the political arena or in raw materials and sales markets."[57]  Clearly the Russians envision a radical change to their concept of warfare.           

            In Military Review, Lieutenant Commander Randall Bowdish describes how the Russians foresee impending sixth generation of information warfare technology as a potential for cyber warfare to inflict decisive military and political defeat on an enemy at


low cost and without occupying enemy territory.[58]  FitzGerald also states that Russia's sixth generation warfare is intended to change the laws of combat and the principles of military science.  In past wars the emphasis was on the battle on the earth's surface, with the vertical coordinate (primarily air) playing a supporting role.  In future wars the "... main vector of combat will be the vertical or aerospace coordinate, with operations on the ground playing a supporting role."[59]  The changing emphasis in "vectors" has not been acknowledged in the United States in key publications such as Joint Vision 2010.

            Russian analysts realize the potential to use sixth generation cyberspace weapons at the outset of war with devastating effect.  The impact on national strategy and campaign planning is apparent, as Defense Minister P. Grachev described in 1993:  "If war begins, it will be with an air-space offensive operation by both sides.  Strikes on main facilities and troops will be made from space and from the air."[60]  Electronic-fires makes these strategies possible.  Timothy Thomas, in a Parameters article "Deterring Information Warfare: A New Strategic Challenge", argues that Russia is cognizant of this first-strike potential and is at the forefront of theoretical attempts to prepare against the possibly of strategic information assault. In speech given at the Russian-US conference on "Evolving Post-Cold war National Security Issues", V.I. Tsymbaluch indicates the strategic implication of a first strike cyberspace maneuver:

From a military point of view, the use of information warfare means against Russia or its armed forces will categorically not be considered a non-military phase of conflict, whether there are casualties or not ... considering the possible catastrophic consequences of the use of strategic information warfare means by an enemy, whether on economic or state command and control systems, or on the combat potential of the armed forces, ... Russia retains the right to use nuclear weapons first against the means and forces of information warfare, and then against the aggressor state itself.[61]

 

            Accordingly, Russia is determined not to lag behind other nations in ushering in the "sixth generation" of warfare.  Russia's doctrine demands the fielding of world-class advanced capabilities for both local and large-scale wars.  On 2 November, 1993, President Yeltsin and the Security Council approved Russia's first official military doctrine: "Basic Provisions of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation." The new doctrine emphasized a priority for "appropriations for the most promising scientific and technological defense developments ... (including) highly efficient C3I, strategic warning, EW, and precision non-nuclear weapons systems, as well as systems for their information support."[62]  The Russian military elite argue that advanced C3I and EW systems must


govern allocation of scarce defense resources.  The new strategy is contrary to Gorbachev's 1987 (Soviet ) "defensive doctrine".  Henceforth, the new doctrine asserts that Russia's armed forces will prepare for "... both defensive and offensive operations with a massive use of existing and future weapons irrespective of how war starts and is conducted."[63]  Russian analysts Yevgeniy Korotchenko and Nikolay Plotnikov conclude:

We are now seeing a tendency toward a shift in the center of gravity away from traditional methods of force and the means of combat toward non-traditional methods, including information.  Their impact is imperceptible and appears gradually. ... Thus today information and information technologies are becoming a real weapon.  A weapon not just in a metaphoric sense but in a direct sense as well.[64]

 

            Some commentators believe that Russia's economic climate precludes the acquisition of  high-technology capabilities.  However, Sergei Modestov argues in "The Possibilities for Mutual Deterrence: A Russian View," that information warfare technologies represent a relatively inexpensive strategic capability.  Russia's could redress its inferiority in conventional and nuclear weapons, with information warfare weapons.  Therefore capabilities for command and control, communications, intelligence and warning, electronic warfare, and special mathematical programming actions (computer viruses) is crucial to Russia's acquisition program.  In short, information warfare capabilities represent a viable means to restore  Russia's strategic reach and lethality and


thereby provide a mechanism for deterrence.[65] Is it possible that despite a struggling economy, Russian determination and forethought could produce a first-rate strategic information warfare capability?   If so, the impact on the current superpower imbalance could be profound.

A DIGITAL PEARL HARBOR:

THE CYBERSPACE VULNERABILITY OF THE UNITED STATES

                       

            Russia has clearly signalled an intention to develop both offensive and defensive information warfare capabilities.  Russia's information warfare strategy should cause the United States to examine the extent that it is vulnerable to attacks through cyberspace.  The United States with its high technology and economic capability has a rich array of information targets for an adversary can exploit.  An adversary's targets include: telecommunications, space based sensors, communications and relay systems; automated aids to financial, banking and commercial transactions; supporting power productions and distribution systems; cultural systems of all kinds; and the whole gamut of media  hardware and software that shapes public perceptions.  In "A Theory of Information Warfare: Preparing for 2020", Richard Szafranski contends that "strategic information systems in states with high technomic capability oftentimes are mirrored by operational-level ones of equal complexity.  All are vulnerable to attack."[66]

            A recent RAND report for the Pentagon entitled Strategic Information Warfare: A New Face of War,[67] describes seven defining features of strategic information warfare for the United States.  Features include low entry cost, blurred "traditional" boundaries, expanded role for perception management, a new strategic intelligence challenge, formidable tactical warning and attack assessment problems, difficulty of building and sustaining coalitions and vulnerability of the US homeland.  A brief outline of this environment is shown at Figure 3.  Clearly, the United States in the leading the information age has exposed numerous opportunities for a potential aggressor.

Features

Warfare Issues

Low entry cost.

Unlike traditional weapons and technologies, development of information-based techniques does not require sizable financial resour