Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Where Are They Going And Where Do They Belong?

CSC 1995

SUBJECT AREA Strategic Issues

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Title: Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Where are They Going and Where Do They

Belong?

Author: Major Gary A. Warner USMC

Research Question: Where, in the Marine Corps, should functional sponsorship,

operational control, and administrative control reside for Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs)?

Discussion: The Marine Corps has experimented with many UAVs but it has never

developed a robust capability. UAV programs have been plagued with training,

technical, and programmatic problems. The Pioneer UAV program has not been any

better than its predecessors, in this regard. In l987, the Secretary of the Navy pushed for an accelerated procurement of Pioneer UAV, but never ensured that the logistics required to support the program were developed. Pioneer UAV demonstrated its value in Desert Storm; but since then, the system’s mission capability has deteriorated. Programs that will replace Pioneer UAV will inherit similar problems unless corrections are made now.

In December l994, the Marine Corps Executive Steering Group (ESG) decided

to move all UAV concerns from the Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Intelligence

Group (SRIG) to the Department of Aviation. This report analyzes the alternatives that may have been available to the ESG. The alternatives were: leave UAVs under the management of the SRIG; move UAV management to Aviation with administrative and operational control in the Aviation Combat Element (ACE); and, move management to Aviation, but leave the UAVs under the operational control of the SRIG. The analysis evaluates each alternative considering the following criteria: the feasibility in disseminating information, maintenance, manning requirements, airspace management,

strategic lift and flexibility, cost, training, and the impact of doctrinal changes.

Conclusion: In terms of maintenance, flexibility and deployability, there is more benefit to placing UAV system operations under the Department of Aviation than the other alternatives. The benefit of each criteria is marginal; however, the total sum of the benefits is largely in favor of Aviation management and control.

Recommendation: That the Marine Corps place all UAV program management under

the Department of Aviation and that the ACE assume administrative and operational control of UAV companies.

Table of Contents

Section Page

Section One: Introduction to the Problem

Introduction 1

Thesis Statement 4

Methodology and Scope 4

Review of the Literature 6

Section Two: Background

UAV Basics 8

Drones, RPVs, and UAVs 8

UAV System Components 9

Misnomers 11

Constraints 11

UAV Concepts and the Intelligence Cycle 13

Disseminating Intelligence Productsl4

Early UAV History 15

Remotely Piloted Helicopters 15

Bikini 16

DASH and Project Snoopy 17

A Renewed Interest 20

Israeli Success 20

American Failure 21

Mastiff UAV Concept Developer 22

Simple, Inexpensive, and Now 22

Developing Concepts of Operations 23

Department of the Navy UAV Management 25

Pioneer UAV 25

Training and Personnel 27

Department of Defense UAV Training Center 27

Personnel and the Revolving Door 28

Summary 29

Section Three: The Analysis

Methodology 30

Assumptions 32

Alternative l 33

Alternative 2 35

Alternative 36

Criteria #l: Feasibility in Disseminating UAV Products37

Discussion 37

Comparison 41

Criteria #2: Manning Requirements 37

Discussion 40

Comparison 41

Criteria #3: Maintenance 43

Discussion 43

Comparison 45

Criteria #4: Airspace Management 46

Discussion 46

Comparison 47

Criteria #5: Strategic Lift and Deployment Flexibility48

Discussion 48

Comparison 49

Criteria #6: Cost 50

Discussion 50

Comparison 51

Criteria #7: Training 53

Discussion 53

Comparison 55

Criteria #8: Doctrine Impact 56

Discussion 56

Comparison 58

Comparing the Evaluation 58

Section Four: Conclusion 60

Section Five: Recommendations 63

Endnotes 65

Bibliography 68

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles:

Where Are They Going and Where Do They Belong?

Section One: Introduction to the Problem

Introduction

Pioneer Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) became precious assets during

Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm. They flew more than 900 hours supporting both the ground combat and the aviation combat elements. The systems partially filled the huge void in real-time and near real-time imagery and almost everyone became a UAV enthusiast. The lessons learned from the operation called for fielding more systems and providing more ways to receive Pioneer’s real-time information.1 One would think the praise and admiration of the UAV’s combat achievements would be enough to raise the interest of how well they were managed.

There are many other circumstances that should raise the Marine Corps’ interest in Pioneer UAV. Besides hand held cameras, they are the Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) Commander’s only remaining tactical aerial reconnaissance asset. The Marine Corps deactivated its only RF-4 squadron in 1990, and deactivated its last OV-10 squadron in 1994. The setbacks and cost overruns of the Advanced Tactical Aerial Reconnaissance System have placed the F/A-18D reconnaissance capability years behind schedule and lead to the cancellation of the Medium Range UAV. The Short Range
UAV, Pioneer UAV’s larger replacement, is also behind schedule and shows limited

promise of success. The Close Range UAV, whose development relies on Short Range

UAV development, will not be fielded before 1998.

Despite its importance, the Pioneer UAV’s ability to support the Marine

Air-Ground Task Force has steadily declined. The system was supposed to provide an interim capability and be replaced in the early part of this decade. Consequently, the program had neither a complete logistics support analysis nor adequate funds for full contract support. The readiness has been affected because of shortfalls in spare parts, replacement air vehicles, and training. The Marine Corps’ Pioneer UAV systems have an operational readiness that is less than one-quarter of the Chief of Naval Operations readiness goal and their mishap rates are over 100 times higher than manned aircraft.2 The correct mix of Military Occupational Specialties (MOSs) has never been resolved, and the UAV company’s table of organization is facing its third rewrite in five years. And

finally, the strategic lift requirement has increased to five C-5 aircraft for each Pioneer UAV company.

The Pioneer UAV Program was placed in a management dilemma from its

inception. The Marine Corps considered UAVs ground based and placed them in the

artillery regiment, then the division, and later in the Surveillance and Reconnaissance Group (SRIG). Although Marine Corps Systems Command (MARCORSYSCOM) normally manages ground equipment, its UAV Project Office only managed the Very Low Cost UAV Program and the Short Range UAV Program.3 Pioneer UAV Program Management Office resided in Naval Air System Command (NAVAIR). As a

result, Pioneer RPVs fell in a gap where no one in the Marine Corps was overwatching the Program’s management.

On December 21, 1994, the Marine Corps’s Executive Steering Group (ESG)

tasked the Department of Aviation (referred to as “Aviation”) with the management of UAVs. The proposal to move UAV management was quite controversial. For years, proponents who wanted to keep UAVs with the SRIG believed if UAVs were in Aviation, “real-time” intelligence would go to the Direct Air Support Center (DASC) or the Tactical Air Command Center and never be seen by the ground units.4 These proponents also raised concerns that the few Pioneer UAV systems we now have will quickly follow in the footsteps of the RF-4 and the OV-10. Those two platforms provided valuable intelligence products; however, they were deactivated because they were obsolete, expensive, and labor intensive. Aviation will realize little, if any, gain from taking over UAV management. With Pioneer UAV, Aviation will have responsibility for a program that has a very limited training pipeline, no logistics support analysis, and Congressional scrutiny over costs for improvements. With Short Range UAV, Aviation will inherit a system that has a notorious history of catastrophic failures from software, reliability problems, and a multi-million dollar funding shortage for UAV

operations and maintenance.5

UAVs are more than unmanned air vehicles, they are systems. The systems are complex, expensive, and not simple to operate. Our history is filled with failed UAV programs, each with a set of challenges that were not overcome and are being repeated in new attempts to fully field systems today. After making a simple observation of our
experiences with recent UAV programs, it is obvious that Short Range UAV management

and employment methods will follow in the footsteps of the Pioneer UAV. Therefore, the Marine Corps has an obligation to itself to remedy its UAV problems before it goes any further with them. What alternatives did the ESG really have? This paper discusses the very basics of UAVs, the Marine Corps experiences with them, and three potential alternatives to meeting the challenges of Pioneer UAV and its successors.

Thesis Statement

Where, in the Marine Corps, should functional sponsorship, operational control, and administrative control reside for UAVs?

Methodology and Scope

This paper starts with the background of the problems the Marine Corps has had with the Pioneer UAV and its predecessors. The paper then compares three alternatives to determine if aviation management or ground management best supports the operations and maintenance of UAVs. The first alternative leaves the current and future UAV systems with the SRIG and incorporates changes to optimize the company’s performance. The second alternative moves the entire UAV program to Aviation and treats UAVs as manned aircraft. The third alternative moves UAV management to Aviation but leaves the system under the operational control of the SRIG. These alternatives will be described in detail and compared against eight criteria in the analysis section of this paper. The criteria for the analysis is based on: the feasibility of disseminating UAV

products, manning requirements, maintenance, airspace management, cost, strategic lift and deployment flexibility, training, and impact on doctrine. The choice of criteria was based on interviews and extracts from recent briefs concerning UAV management. The scope of the paper focuses primarily on the Pioneer UAV, and its two follow-on systems, the Short Range UAV and the Close Range UAV. For simplicity, the paper limits the UAV mission to collecting aerial imagery.

The information for this paper comes from a variety of sources. The design of the alternatives, prediction of their impacts, and the comparison of alternatives comes from my personal experiences as the Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC) UAV Requirements Officer, the UAV Occupational Field Sponsor, a Weapons and Tactics Instructor, and an Aviation Safety Officer. As the UAV Requirements Officer, I visited operational UAV companies in the Fleet Marine Force, participated in refining UAV requirements with the Joint Staff, and witnessed the initial operational assessment of the Short Range UAV. My research started with a review of the “Marine Corps Lessons Learned System” followed by a search of all literature written under the subject of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, Drones, Remotely Piloted Vehicles, and Aerial Reconnaissance. This was followed by interviews with UAV operators, Direct Air Support Center Officers, communications officers, supply officers, program managers,

MCCDC structure and training personnel, defense analysts, and previous research writers.

Review of the Literature

There are many articles addressing UAVs; however, there are only four articles that address how and where the systems should be maintained. Chronologically, the first was a military issues paper written in l985. The article discusses, in three short paragraphs, the potential organizational location for UAVs: the Marine Air Support Squadron of the Marine Air Wing (MAW), the Target Acquisition Battery (TAB) of the artillery regiment, and the headquarters battalion of the division. The next two articles were published by Naval Institute Proceedings in a 22 November 1991 supplement. These articles were published interviews with Major General Royal Moore and Major General J. I. Hopkins. The Generals were specifically asked, “The RPVs are, of course, division assets. Do you think that is the best place for them?” Major General Moore’s response was,

“They really became more Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) assets than

division, because we had two divisions. But they were too much oriented toward the ground. We found that we had to share the information, and depending on the flow of the battlefield, it may be 80 percent in support of the air and 20 percent in support of the ground, and then as the ground starts to go, it may be 90 percent in support of the ground...”

Major General Hopkins response to the same question was,

“No. That was a turf battle at first. They should either be owned by the division, and used by the surveillance, reconnaissance guys; and the artillery-or the assets should be pooled under the MEF. We’ve got to resolve that.”

The fourth article, published by the Marine Corps Gazette, was written by the Executive Officer and Operations Officer of 1st UAV Company. The article implies that since UAVs perform missions similar to the OV-10, the UAV companies should be considered

aviation observation squadrons. The article addresses several advantages to moving the UAVs to Aviation, but only addresses a few key points. Almost all other Marine Corps Gazette articles concern either the importance of the Marine Corps’ involvement with UAVs or the importance of maintaining a tactical aerial reconnaissance capability. Literature from almost all other sources relates to the value that UAVs add to battle management or concerns UAV programmatic information.

Section Two: Background

UAV Basics

Drones, RPVs and UAVs. This paper discusses several types of unmanned aerial vehicles: drones, remotely piloted vehicles, unmanned aerial vehicles, and remotely piloted helicopters. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Publication l-02 defines a drone as “a land, sea, or air vehicle that is remotely or utomatically controlled.” A Remotely Piloted Vehicle (RPV) is an “unmanned vehicle capable of being controlled from a distant location through a communication link.” The two terms are very similar, and for the purposes of this paper can be considered the same thing. The JCS definitions do not imply that a drone or an RPV is an airborne craft; it may be a ground or submarine vehicle. The JCS publication defines a UAV as:

…a powered, aerial vehicle that does not carry a human operator, uses

aerodynamic forces to provide vehicle lift, can fly autonomously or be piloted remotely, can be expendable or recoverable, and can carry lethal or nonlethal payloads. Ballistic or semiballistic vehicles, cruise missiles, and artillery projectiles are not considered unmanned aerial vehicles.6

UAVs are the airborne subset of RPVs. When they were in their infancy, almost all UAVs were called drones. However, UAVs have been political “hot potatoes” for decades, and no one in the Department of Defense (DoD) wants Congressional language that confuses UAV issues with other things flying through the air. Therefore, the definitions became more specific over time to avoid confusing UAVs with ballistic projectiles, cruise missiles, guided missiles, tactical air launch decoys, or other robotic systems. Technically, the Pioneer RPV program was misnamed and should have been

called a UAV. The term predominantly used throughout this paper is UAV vice RPV, to minimize confusing the reader. This paper also uses the acronym “UAV” refer to the entire system or program. The terms used to describe the actual flying machine are referred to as the drone or the air vehicle.

UAV System Components. Although each type of UAV system has variances in

design, it must have several basic subcomponents. They are: the unmanned aerial

vehicle, the payload, a ground control station (GCS), the ground data terminal (GDT) (an antenna to receive and transmit the data between the UAV and its ground station), a UAV on-board transceiver, and Ground Support Equipment (GSE). In response to the lessons learned from almost all UAV programs, a seventh element, a remote receiving station, also known as a remote video terminal (RVT), is included or planned for in most systems. Remote video terminals enable the supported unit to directly receive imagery from the air vehicle.

GSE consists of High Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs),

five-ton trucks, trailers, generators, radios, launch and recover equipment, and

maintenance equipment. Unlike manned aircraft, a failure in any one of these

subcomponents, external to the airborne platform, will either cause the UAV system to be non-mission capable or cause an in-flight emergency. When considering strategic lift, the GSE consumes the majority of the weight and cubic dimensions of the UAV company. Figure One, on the following page, depicts the Short Range UAV which is scheduled to replace Pioneer UAV.

Image

Misnomers. UAV jargon often uses terms in a different context than that of

manned aviation. Operational availability is one of these terms. In manned aircraft, operational availability, also known as mission capability, means the average number of aircraft capable of flying at any given moment. Because an aircraft squadron has many aircraft, it can almost always perform its mission with an aircraft mission capability rate of 85 percent. A UAV system may have just as many air vehicles available as the manned aircraft squadron, but may not be mission capable because it does not have mission capable GSE. An operational availability of 85 percent in a UAV company would mean that the company could not perform its mission, whatsoever, 15 percent of the time.

The next misnomer is the term “real-time” information. Warfighters consider real-time information as information received in time to target moving objects. However, engineers consider all information “near real-time” because of electronic processing delays. Although delays may only be a few milliseconds, the systems are technically near real-time. The term near real-time often misleads imagery recipients because the amount of time that actually elapses during near real-time collection remains undefined and varies with different programs.

Constraints. UAVs have several major constraints that limit their operational flexibility. The two constraints that affect Marine Corps operations are the datalinks and the methods of launching and recovering the air vehicle. The datalink is the medium through which the operator controls the UAV and receives its imagery. UAVs require a

large exchange of data between the operator and the air vehicle. To perform the data exchange, in the time required, most UAV systems require the uplink and downlink to be on separate frequencies. Missions that require the datalink to be relayed require a minimum of four frequencies. Unfortunately, our tactical UAVs share the same frequencies that other Super High Frequency (SHF) systems use. The combined frequency requirements, and the amount of frequencies available, limits the number of air vehicles that can fly in a given region. Most of the Pioneer UAV crashes in Operation Desert storm were due to interference with the datalink frequency. The next datalink constraint pertains to the GDTs, which transmit and receive the data. The GDT can only control one UAV at a time; this also limits the number of air vehicles that can be airborne. And finally, datalinks require radio line of sight, and because of the curvature

of the earth and terrain features, the air vehicle must constantly increase in altitude, as it extends down range, to maintain the datalink. As the system increases in altitude, the imagery usually degrades. To overcome this, some extended range systems use relays through satellites or other UAVs. The Short Range UAV uses a second airborne air vehicle for relay, which compounds the frequency allocation problems discussed earlier.

The second operational constraint is how the UAV system is designed to launch and recover the air vehicle. The Pioneer air vehicle and almost all other UAVs currently under government contract are fixed-wing air vehicles. These air vehicles require firm runways, and they require an operator skilled in launching and landing the air vehicle. This limits the choice of operators and limits the places from which the UAV mission can originate. The air vehicle launch and recovery period presents the greatest risk

potential of non-combat loss. There are several technological remedies for improving launch and recovery operations; however, the problem will remain for the foreseeable future.

UAV Concepts and the Intelligence Cycle. The intelligence cycle is a five

phase process of: directing the collection effort, collecting the information, processing the information into intelligence, producing a tangible product for the user, and then disseminating the intelligence to the user. An expeditious link from the target locator to the weapons shooter is one of the hardest requirements to fulfill in any collection system. This is because the intelligence cycle takes time, and the target may have moved by the

time weapons are brought on to the target. Even when collection reporting is

instantaneous, processing and disseminating the information may take too much time. The concept of using UAVs offers some solutions to shortening the cycle’s time. The UAVs cut processing and production out of the cycle by collecting information and directly disseminating responsive, real time information to the user. Figure Two compares the doctrinal intelligence cycle to the same cycle with UAVs added.

Image 2

Disseminataing Intelligence Products. UAVs collect information for four basic categories: intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB), early warning and indications, targeting, and battle damage assessment. Seeing imagery of the battlespace, particularly the objective area, greatly enhances the IPB process. In many planning stages, this information’s immediacy is not critical and near real-time or delayed dissemination will suffice. In the remaining three categories, the ground commander may need immediate information about the events that are taking place. He may need to know the enemy is at a named area of interest or at a decision point. However, this type of information does not require imagery; it requires a simple voice or text message.

There is a phenomenal difference in communication requirements between

transmitting text messages and transmitting imagery. To illustrate the difference, compare one page of text and one computer monitor’s screen of imagery. One full page of text (500 words) in Ami Pro takes approximately 8 kilobytes of information. An image on a computer monitor can easily take up to 307 kilobytes. This is calculated by multiplying the 640x480 lines that make up the pixels. Regardless of the dissemination medium, we can deduce that imagery requires a 35 fold increase to transmit imagery over the same communications medium.7 Since we must work with constrained frequency allocations and limited time, dissemination requires an efficient process that identifies what needs to be sent, to whom it should be sent, and to where it should be sent.

From an analysis of the initial requirements, the Marine Corps planned to meet its dissemination challenges by procuring enough UAV systems that almost every organization above the company level would get direct UAV support. This nullified the

dissemination process, as shown earlier in Figure Two. However, this plan proved to be imprudent in procurement, manpower, and operational costs, and it had the potential to create airspace mayhem. The Marine Corps is still refining its imagery requirements in terms of what needs to be disseminated and in what quality and quantity. The Marine Corps is also refining its UAV requirements after four decades of concept development.

Early UAV History

Remotely Piloted Helicopters. As the Marine Corps became aware of the utility of the helicopter, it was concerned about the missions, work load and manpower required to equip the Fleet Marine Force with enough helicopters to meet all of its requirements. A concept paper was published in April 1954 “A Study of Marine Corps Requirements for the Remotely Controlled Rotary Wing Aircraft.” The report discussed several concepts using Remotely Piloted Helicopters (RPHs) instead of manned helicopters. It suggested that RPHs had three advantages: they would reduce the tasking of helicopter crews; the crews would be kept out of harm’s way; and the drones were more cost effective.9 One year later, prototypes from the Kaman Corporation were evaluated by Experimental Helicopter Squadron One and the Landing Force Development Center. Anticipating success, the Marine Corps’ Aviation Plan programmed three RPH squadrons to activate starting in fiscal year 1959.10 The plan was based on an understanding that RPHs would not count against the Marine Corps operating aircraft inventory. The squadrons never materialized because the evaluation demonstrated no

advantage over a manned helicopter. The demonstration showed that RPH systems were more expensive, less reliable, and more difficult to operate than initially anticipated.11

Bikini. Experience with the second drone was under the code name Bikini.

While the RPH concept was predominately evaluated for the feasibility of a utility vehicle, the Bikini concept was evaluated for the feasibility of providing organic near real-time reconnaissance to the battalion commander. The Bikini program started in 1959 and, after seven years of research and development, appeared to have great potential. The system would require a team of two Marines, one operator and one technician. The drone teams would be attached to the infantry battalions and perform reconnaissance missions.12

The entire drone system would be carried in one jeep and one trailer, with the trailer doubling as a launcher and cargo carrier. The pneumatic launcher would be recharged by the battalion’s flame thrower compressor. The air vehicle would be recovered by the operator flying the drone overhead, cutting the engine, and activating the parachute release. The program planned for the air vehicle to carry a 70mm camera whose film was to be developed by either the division reconnaissance battalion or by the team using a newly developed waterless film processor.13 The basic Bikini drone concept is extremely similar to the standing Marine Corps Concept of Employment for the Close Range UAV published by MCCDC, 26 years later.

The Marine Corps obtained twenty drones, and had Headquarters and Service

Company of Second Reconnaissance Battalion, Camp Lejeune participate in the test. Within the year, and over 300 flights later, only 6 of the 20 air vehicles remained. Eleven

of the l4 losses were due to operator error, and a majority of controlling errors were on landing and takeoff. By the end of the developmental test, Bikini demonstrated the potential of UAVs, but the system was not considered suitable.14

DASH and Project Snoopy. Between 1969 and 1972, the Defense Advanced

Research Project Agency developed some advanced applications of an RPH called the QH-50, Drone, Anti-Submarine Helicopter (DASH.) The DASH, which could carry up to 1000 pounds of payload, was bought with the primary purpose of extending the range of the Navy’s anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capability a safe distance from the ship. However, after some practical experience with the DASH, new concepts were developed. The first advanced application was Project Snoopy, which equipped the drone with television cameras for beach reconnaissance and naval gunfire spotting along the coast of Vietnam. Project enhancements eventually included payload packages with low light level television, lasers for range finding, and armaments of either .50 caliber guns, Gatling guns, or hypervelocity guns. From my research, it appears the Marines became

involved in a DASH adventure called Operation Nite Panther. During this operation, Marines who were ashore were equipped with a jeep configured as a GCS. They would take control of a ship-launched drone and execute clandestine reconnaissance and targeting missions. Upon completing the mission, they would hand control of the drone back to the shipboard operators for recovery. The missions in Southeast Asia attributed to 58 DASH losses, but it could not be determined whether the losses were due to enemy action or malfunction/pilot error. Figure Three shows a variant of the QH-50.

IMAGE #3

Although the DASH program was predominantly a Navy program, there were lessons

about the program that should be mentioned. Of the 750 drones built, 411 crashed within a ten year period. drone’s attrition rate perturbed defense officials which lead to the program’s cancellation. Then Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara, in his budget presentation to Congress said, “The DASH ASW Drone helicopter was encountering higher than expected peacetime attrition and lower than expected performance.”16 In a similar vein, the GAO stated that the drone had problems because it went into production before the system was adequately developed and tested. DASH attrition was attributed to poor management. The system was exposed to corrosion problems, high crew turnover, improper maintenance procedures, and the crew lacked flight proficiency because of long

periods without training. The Japanese, flying identical systems, achieved l440 flight hours with only 4 losses which was four times better than the American average. The Japanese maintained a daily training program, teamed crews together for several years, and followed the prescribed maintenance procedures. Although McNamara cut the DASH program out of the budget because of cost and attrition, the Navy claimed it replaced the DASH with the SH-2D helicopter because it felt the evolving missions were too critical to rely on a drone.17 Had more emphasis been placed on the DASH, throughout the program’s development, it may have overcome its design defects and management problems. However, the program was built under a false sense of urgency, and no one realized how much money and effort would be required to make the system work well.

Renewed Interest In UAVs

By the mid 1970s and early 1980s, the Services were revitalizing their interest in UAVs. The Marine Corps outlined UAV requirements in the l975 Mid-range Plan, and the Army flew its first Aquila UAV prototype in 1976.18 However, Congress believed that the Services were not making headway fast enough. The 1978 House Armed Services Committee reported that:

“The committee has strongly supported the development of remotely piloted

vehicles. However, the significant investment in development and the lack of success in deploying new vehicles have highlighted the Department of Defense’s inefficient management in this area.”19

At about the same time, the GAO was pressuring the military to invest in UAVs because they believed UAVs could be more cost effective than manned aircraft. In 1981, the GAO submitted a report to Congress titled “DoD’s Use Of Remotely Piloted Vehicle Technology Offers Opportunities For Saving Lives And Dollars.” The report claims that the Services were reluctant to field UAVs because pilots feared a lack of job security. The report goes on to explain that pilots felt that if drones replaced many of them, a pilot’s chances for promotion would be less. The report concluded with the GAO recommending:

“the Congress should scrutinize proposed manned aircraft developments to assure that DoD gives adequate consideration to the use of remotely piloted vehicle technology for some missions.”20

Israeli Success. Before anyone in the United States fielded a tactical UAV

system, the Israelis had great success with them during Operation Peace for Galilee. The

Israeli Defense Force used the Mastiff UAV and the Israeli Air Force used both the Scout UAV and high speed drone decoys.21 Israelis’ overall success caught the attention of the Secretary of the Navy, John Lehman. In his behalf, an envoy was sent to Israel to examine the Israeli’s tactics and weapons. Among the many findings, the Americans discovered that the Israelis had used UAVs for decoying, jamming, and targeting.22

American Failure. The catalyst for getting the Navy and Marine Corps actively involved with UAVs was the peace keeping operation in Beirut, Lebanon. In support of the operation, Sixth Fleet regularly sent F-l4s into the Shouf Mountains for routine photo reconnaissance missions. Each mission required many aircraft for the supporting missions of: aerial refueling, airborne radar control, combat air patrol, and search and rescue.23 The reconnaissance planes routinely took anti-aircraft gunfire, but the Navy never executed retaliatory strikes. Then, on 3 December 1983, a shoulder launched missile was fired at one of the F-l4s. The following morning the USS Independence and the USS Kennedy launched sequential strikes on targets in the Shouf Mountains. The mission planning and execution were less than noteworthy, and the results made

international news. The USS Independence lost one A-7 and another was damaged, but recovered. The USS Kennedy lost an A-6B, its pilot, and had its bombardier navigator taken prisoner.24 After the calamity, Lehman visited the fleet for his own inquiry. Lehman believed the fleet was performing missions to provide information that could be obtained by other means.25

The Mastiff UAV Concept Developer

Simple, Inexpensive, and Now. Working to resolve the Sixth Fleet

Commander’s reconnaissance problems, Lehman became the principal driver behind the acquisition of the initial Israeli UAV.26 claimed the Israeli system would not only fulfill an urgent need, it would help refine the UAV concepts and requirements of the Navy and Marine Corps. He believed the Israeli concept was simple and affordable and had less “gold plating” than other programs. Lehman decided the UAV program would be executed as a rapid development capability and Air Program Code 202 (later to become PMA-263) was established. Although his actions were controversial, they were consistent with his philosophy that the Washington bureaucracy was too slow to answer any immediate needs.

Lehman helped establish a bilateral agreement with the Israeli government

concerning UAVs. For the price of approximately $7.5 million,27 Israelis would teach the Marines how to operate and maintain a Mastiff UAV system, and when the training was completed, the Marines would take one system back to Camp Lejeune, North Carolina. The reason the Marine Corps’ 2d Division was selected is subject to opinion. Some believe it was based solely on a personal relationship between Lehman and the Division Commander, Major General Alfred Gray.28 Others believe the main reason was that certain staff officers in the Department of Aviation declined any interest in the program. Regardless, it went to the 2d Division and the 10th Marine Artillery Regiment had the vehicles, radios, and time to support UAV operations.

Developing Concepts of Operations. Developing the concept of operations for Marine Corps UAVs kept the participants busy. On 27 January l984, the l0th Marines Artillery Regiment, Target Acquisition Battery, Detachment A deployed for “Operation Thumbs Up.” The mission was classified because the Israelis were using the system primarily for real-time targeting, and the United States was sensitive to the international politics that immediately followed Operation Peace for Galilee. Detachment A returned to Camp Lejeune and actively exercised their new Mastiff UAV. On 22 August, the Mastiff UAV detachment was transferred to Headquarters Battalion, Second Marine Division and was designated 1st RPV Platoon. The system was under the operational control of Commander and Chief Atlantic Fleet and participated in several fleet exercises, a Weapons and Tactics Instructor Course at Yuma, Arizona, a combined arms exercise at

Twenty-nine Palms, experimental payload flights from Vieques Island, Puerto Rico, and flew to and from an LPH Class ship.

The Mastiff UAV system held up well considering the circumstances. The

Mastiff Platoon had a combination of helicopter mechanics, artillerymen, and officers that made the system work. One of the maintenance officers had an electrical engineering degree and could trouble shoot avionics. The artillerymen surveyed the site for geo-location accuracy, and the DASC Officer acting as the Assistant Operations Officer would coordinate airspace. The external pilot, the operator who launches and recovers the UAV, was a renown remote control model airplane enthusiast. The few manuals the Marines did receive were in Hebrew, and the manuals they could decipher were often found to be technically incorrect. A shortcoming in the table of equipment forced the

platoon to borrow trucks and radios since they were now removed from the target

acquisition battery.

With some experience, refining the concept development and requirements was well under way. The Marine Corps approved a “backfilled” the “Requirement of

Capabilities Document for the Ground Launched Short Range Remotely Piloted Vehicle” in November 1984, and Headquarters staffed a concept of operations draft by the following summer. Since the Mastiff UAV was almost instantly fielded, the concepts for the system were based on the operators’ aspect vice one of sustainment. The concept of logistics was heavily based on contractor support. Since it was a concept developer, there was no reason to think about the system’s long term support.

The initial concepts for employment were very simple, and they are virtually the same concepts for the Pioneer UAV and the Short Range UAV. For operations, the system had two controllers: an external pilot and an internal pilot. The external pilot used a portable control station to preflight, launch and recover the air vehicle at an airstrip. The internal pilot, so named because he flew the air vehicle from inside the GCS, would take over control once it was safely airborne. The GCS was located close to DASC and was in direct contact with the fire support coordination center. The internal pilot conducted preplanned missions and reconnoitered targets of opportunity. Alongside

the internal pilot, a photo interpreter would manipulate the payload (a video camera) to determine whether targets were viable or not. Upon mission completion, the internal pilot would electronically “hand-off’ the UAV back to the external pilot using the portable control station at the airstrip.29 All maintenance, with the exception of the GCS,

would be performed at the airstrip. The only flaw in the plan was that it lacked an alternative when the portable control station did not work.

Department of the Navy UAV Management

To support the program, the Navy and Marine Corps developed a Memorandum

of Agreement (MOA) concerning the development and procurement of Unmanned Air

Vehicles. The MOA, signed in l 98S, is still in effect and outlines the management, test, operations and fiscal aspects of UAVs. The MOA states that the Navy would manage the Navy/Marine Corps UAV Program at Headquarters Naval Air Systems Command. The MOA specifically states:

… for the Miniature Remotely Controlled Vehicle funds would be furnished to the Navy/Marine Corps UAV Program Office as the Marine Corps share of the system’s development and testing costs. Training, procurement, and operating costs will be programmed for by the Executive Service.30

The Navy is considered the Executive Service in the MOA. The agreement further states that follow-on systems would fall under the fiscal guidance of the Marine Corps.

Pioneer UAV

The Mastiff UAV acquitted itself well enough to pursue more UAVs. Lehman

wanted to quickly field a UAV system and avoid the errors of the Army’s Aquila UAV. Aquila had been under development for ten years, had a $2.4 billion cost, and was under great scrutiny by the GAO. Skyeye UAV, also under development by the Army, was being used in Central America, but it was large and designed for heavier payloads. Navy

and Marine Corps sentiments about Army UAV development were so negative that in

April 1985, the Commandant directed that the Marine Corps would not make any move toward an Army system without consulting him first.31 So Lehman had the Navy pursue an “off-the-shelf’ UAV system with a contract specification extremely close to the capabilities to of the Pioneer UAV system, which was Mastiff UAV derivative. To expedite the program, the Navy’s contract proposal required a competitive “fly off’ for the best system 75 days after it released the invitation for bids.

Only two companies put bids in for the Navy contract: Pacific Aerosystems,

which made the Heron 26; and Mazlat, which made the Pioneer UAV. Like the Mastiff, there was no stated requirement for a nighttime imaging payload. This overqualified and overpriced Developmental Sciences Corporation’s Skyeye R4E-40 and Lockheed’s Aquila UAV Programs. When Pacific Aerosystems was not ready on the fly-day, Mazlat won the competition by default. The Navy awarded a contract for three systems in 1986, two in l987, and four in l988. Each system would have eight UAVs, two portable ground control stations, two remote receiving stations, and system specific support equipment.32 Lehman did not want to have the UAV system’s procurement held back with “typical Washington bureaucracy,” so he also called the Pioneer UAV the “Interim” Short Range UAV to get around the acquisition regulations.

In September l986, the 2d Marine Division received its Pioneer UAV system.

The UAV Platoon was renamed Second UAV Company, and it warehoused the Mastiff

UAV that November. In January and June l987, 1st and 3d UAV Companies,

respectively, were activated at Twenty-nine Palms, California. The Pioneer system was

so new that the Israelis taught the course concurrently to the American instructors and the Marines.33 April l987, the Marine Corps Development and Education Command published the Operational Handbook (OH 2-2) for Remotely Piloted Vehicles which was derived from the “Concept of Operations for Remotely Piloted Vehicles.”

The Pioneer UAV program had a rough start and never got much better. One

opinion speculated that some in NAVAIR resented the UAV system being pushed on

them. A successful program without a logistics support analysis (LSA) had the potential to disrupt the entire acquisition process.34 Other reasons for Pioneer’s problems can be attributed to Lehman planning on having the Pioneer for three or four years at the most. In that case, a full LSA would not have been warranted and full contractor support would have been more cost effective. Consequently, the Pioneer UAV program never had its logistics support analysis (LSA) completed, its spares were not fully funded, and the system’s availability suffered. However, the Marine Corps’ problems were not all related

to the equipment.

Training and Personnel

Department of Defense UAV Training Center. The DoD UAV Training

Center, known as DUTC, is located at Fort Huachuca, Arizona. DUTC teaches Army,

Navy and Marine students five scheduled courses: external pilot, internal pilot, electronic technician, air vehicle mechanics, and payload operators. The school does not have a simulator and uses one UAV system for all hands-on training.35 In the morning, the internal pilots, external pilots, and payload operators train with an air vehicle flying. In

the afternoon, the mechanics and technicians tear the system down and reassemble it. The school seats in highest demand are the external pilot course, recently shortened to 19 weeks, and the internal pilot course, which lasts eight weeks. The equipment limits students to two per course and throughput is relatively inflexible. The external pilot course requires prior remote control model airplane experience. Units recruit through “All Marine Message” traffic and Base newspapers. Since there are no MOSs for remote control model airplane flying, it was impossible to select the correct primary MOS for assignments. Prerequisites for the other courses are related to a variety of MOSs and are not hard to structure.

Personnel and the Revolving Door. There were several circumstances that

affected Pioneer training readiness. In many situations, Marines that went to the UAV companies already had two years at their duty station and were subject to rotating to a new duty station at anytime. Since there was neither a school code, nor an MOS for UAV trained personnel, HQMC Manpower had no method of tracking or locating experienced candidates. Because of the limited time left on station, Marines often got trained and then left the company within the year.36 These inefficiencies wasted travel dollars and often cut the other Services, and sometimes other Marine UAV company’s students, out of the available school seats. To be fair to all the Services, the Pioneer Program Manager established a student priority. First priority went to students with permanent change of

station orders to an UAV unit, second went to students with less than one year on station, and last went to students with more than one year on station.

No one besides the Program Manager and the Company Commanders realized the

training inefficiencies until l992. That September, MARCORSYSCOM “zeroed”

Pioneer UAV training funds after they determined the system should no longer be

considered new equipment.37 Concurrently MCCDC Training and Education did not

recognize DUTC as formal training and would not fund training either. Although these errors are being corrected, it will take time to achieve a fully trained UAV company.

Summary

When comparing the challenges of each UAV system, there were several

similarities. Each program fell short of what was originally anticipated. The RPH was expensive and difficult to operate, the Bikini drone required aviation-like skills, the DASH continually crashed into the sea. Each UAV system had major performance tradeoffs. The RPH was agile but unreliable; the Bikini was simple but the imagery was not real-time; and the Pioneer UAV required a runway. Other systems, such as the Army Skyeye, had long endurance, but were expensive and too large for easy deployability. Almost all the systems required people with greater skill and mechanical aptitude than were available. All of the UAV programs had some degree of technical difficulty that could not be overcome before they were canceled. When costs for replacing crashed air vehicles were included, the systems were much more expensive than anticipated. And finally, all of the UAV systems required more command attention and effort than anyone

thought were necessary.

Section 3: The Analysis

The analysis proposes three alternatives to determine the optimal location

for UAV management. The three proposed alternative solutions are:

• Alternative l: Improve Current UAV Management and Leave Operational

Control in the Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and

Intelligence Group.

• Alternative 2: Move UAV Management and Operational Control to

Aviation.

• Alternative 3: Move Management to Aviation but Leave UAVs Under

Operational Control of the Command Element.

The criteria for the analysis was developed from interviews with subject matter

experts, from briefing excerpts, and from a wargaming session conducted in the

Spring l994. The criteria are:

• Feasibility of Disseminating the Collected Information

• Manning Requirements

• Maintenance

• Airspace Management

• Strategic Lift and Deployment Flexibility

• Cost

• Training

• Doctrine Impact

To facilitate comparing the three alternatives using the eight criteria, I used a method similar to the Multi-factor Evaluation Process (MFEP). This is an established quantitative management process that assists the decision maker when there are many factors to be considered. Using this approach, I subjectively and intuitively assigned