Intelligence In Coalition Operations

CSC 1995

SUBJECT AREA - Intelligence

INTELLIGENCE IN COALITION OPERATIONS

Roger R. Royston., 514-60-5003

Major, USMC

Research Paper submitted to the Faculty

of the Marine Corps Command and Staff College

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and

do not reflect the official policy or position of the

Department of Defense or the U.S. Government

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Title: Intelligence in Coalition Operations

Author: Major Roger R. Royston, United States Marine Corps

Thesis: The Marine Corps is not adequately considering the impact of coalition

warfare on tactical intelligence requirements and can not accomplish coordination

tasks without an increased risk of unauthorized disclosure.

Background: The intelligence community often makes changes to its structure

and or policies due to deficiencies or failures that come to light during a conflict.

The Gulf War highlighted shortfalls in the intelligence community's ability to

quickly establish cooperative intelligence arrangements between the foreign forces

that make up a multinational coalition. In 1993, the Department of Defense

published Joint Doctrine that established an intelligence architecture which fulfills

requirements for the coordination and sharing of intelligence between

multinational forces. The Department of Defense is also creating Joint Doctrine

that establishes guidelines and delineates authority for the sanitization of

intelligence for release to foreign forces. The current and developing doctrine

only address functional requirements down to the CINC level. The tactical

commander will also have to interact with and fulfill coordination requirements

with foreign forces. By exclusion, the current doctrine places limitations and

restriction on the tactical commander in the functional area of intelligence

operations. The Marine Corps has not created any doctrine which recognizes

these restrictions and fully considers the implications of operational employment

with foreign forces. By not considering the likelihood of coalition operations, the

Marine Corps may discover tactical intelligence shortfalls through failure rather

than by foresight.

Recommendations: The Marine Corps should write service doctrine that will

address the requirements and restrictions attendant to intelligence operations in a

coalition environment. Additionally, when the Marine Corps conducts the

semi-annual Mission Area Analysis (MAA) on intelligence functions, subject

matter experts should consider coalition impacts when formulating potential

requirements for doctrinal, organization, training, equipment, and support

corrections and opportunities.

Intelligence in Coalition Operations

After World War II, the United States began developing an intelligence

community to address and overcome shortfalls highlighted by the surprise

bombing of Pearl Harbor. The National Security Act of 1947 began the formal

establishment of a cohesive intelligence community that has continually matured

through expansion of organizations, creation of agencies, adjustments in

responsibilities, and the refinement of procedures. As with the creation of the

community, many of the substantial changes that have occurred were driven by

changes in technology and often determined through failures rather than

forethought and analysis.1 The intelligence community is currently pursuing

correctional changes in the area of sharing intelligence between U.S. and foreign

military forces that are part of an ad hoc coalition.

The basic requirement for sharing intelligence with foreign forces is not a new

concept and was a highlighted attribute to U.S. and British efforts during WW II.2

The community and services still routinely share intelligence with foreign services

but within the confines of well established alliances. The most notable exchanges

occur within alliances that represent national commitment and include the forward

deployment of U.S. forces, such as in the bi-lateral relationship with Korea. The

principles and procedures for sharing intelligence in alliances typically have a

regional focus and did not require or create institutional procedures within service

or joint doctrine. More relative, the intelligence community did not use the

experience gained in alliances as a foundation for considering requirements in

ad-hoc coalition operations.3 As a result of this oversight, the coalition force

created for the conduct of the Gulf War did not have an established pre-planned

system or mechanism to release essential intelligence information to coalition

partners accept for traditional allies.4 Despite ultimate success, once again the

intelligence community needed to make changes and adjustments because of

failing to anticipate a likely event; ad hoc coalition warfare. To avoid potential

failures within tactical intelligence, the Marine Corps must consider implications

of a coalition environment. Marine Corps consideration necessitates a participant

understanding in emerging doctrinal fixes contained in existing and developing

Joint Doctrine.

Ad Hoc Coalition.

Department of Defense efforts embrace the assumption that future conflicts, in

which the United States will become involved, will most likely be bilateral or

multinational rather than unilateral. This assumption is echoed in Joint Pub I

which states;

There is a good probability that any military operations undertaken

by the United States of America will have multinational aspects, so

extensive is the network of alliances, friendships, and mutual

interests established by our nation around the world.5

Since the Revolutionary War, the assumption of coalition involvement holds true

as the major conflicts the Unites States participated did not take the form of

unilateral actions.6 The end of the cold war further reduces the probability that the

United States will enter a significant unilateral conflict. With the demise of the

Soviet Union and the United States remaining as the sole military superpower it is

not likely that we will conduct a unilateral use of military forces due to political

sensitivities. It is a fair assumption that any significant military operations

involving the United States will most likely be with allies as part of a combined or

coalition force.7 Although the services have maintained experience through

participation in alliances, the characteristics of an ad hoc coalition require

additional considerations.

Coordination.

A coalition is a term that is often applied to relationships formed expressly for

prosecution of a war or conflict that has already begun. More precisely, coalitions

are wartime associations. Desert Shield demonstrates this trait as the political and

military relationships that defined the coalition were not established until after Iraq

attacked Kuwait. Coalitions are generally characterized as an ad hoc relationship

since they are reactive in nature and created to fight a particular war or counter a

specific threat. Although the relationship is temporary, an effective coalition still

requires cooperative arrangements, to include sharing of intelligence. To establish

cooperative arrangements, coalitions often attempt to apply the basic principals

used in effective alliances. By definition, a coalition has a narrow focus of effort

that is attendant to the specific purpose and limited time. Given this narrow focus

of effort, nations that are part of the coalition may have opposing interests in many

areas on the peripheral of the main effort.8 This is an important aspect of

coalitions, particularly in considering sharing of intelligence, since ad hoc

alliances do not necessarily generate from nor translate into friendships.

Security.

As a basic premise of the definition of an alliance or coalition, military forces

of nations are still ultimately responsible and accountable to their parent states.

Along with the benefit of an alliance comes substantial drawbacks, the biggest of

which is a loss of complete sovereignty over a nations actions.9 By sharing

intelligence with other nations a state concedes information and potentially

capabilities that would not normally or otherwise be provided. As such, coalitions

often carry a requirement for compromise in the area of the security of a nation's

secrets. Not all nations will bring the same level of robust and technically

sophisticated intelligence capabilities to a cooperative effort. While a coalition

aggregates the capabilities of military forces, the operational cohesion requires

mutually supporting the intelligence capabilities and products provided by

participating nations.10 The nation with the most capable intelligence structure and

resources can expect to compromise more since they will provide more than they

receive in return. This can be especially true when a coalition includes third world

countries that can neither sustain nor support development of expensive and

sophisticated collection and processing systems. Despite variances in capabilities

and structure, a coalition should exploit any unique contribution of supporting

nations, often human intelligence, for the common goal of the union of national

efforts.11 A nation will maintain its' sovereignty and security by only providing

intelligence deemed necessary for the conduct of the coalition and by protecting

the sources and methods of intelligence that is shared.

DIA and Security.

When considering intelligence security, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)

is one of two key players in coalition operations. When Secretary of Defense

McNamara created the DIA in 1961, to overcome parochial intelligence estimates

from the services, he established a centralized position within the intelligence

community to satisfy DoD interests.12 Similar to the WW II Office of Strategic

Services (OSS), DIA provides a focal point for national and DoD efforts in the

process of collection, production, and dissemination of defense related

intelligence.13 DIA's central position also fulfills DoD's requirements, through

coordination with the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), to establish

guidelines and oversight measures to protect intelligence sources and methods

from unauthorized disclosure.

CINC Coordination.

The CINC is the other key player in establishing effective intelligence

operations within an ad hoc coalition. By establishing the CINC as regionally

responsible for projecting national power, the Goldwater-Nichols Department of

Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 facilitates orienting the intelligence

community from a global to a regional focus. The CINC fulfills a critical role by

establishing a structure which translates a regional intelligence focus into a

cooperative effort. The CINC established structure and attendant architecture

must also provide a conduit for the flow of intelligence products to coalition

members. It is the combination of recognizing the CINC as a focus of national

effort and the DIA's central position within the intelligence community that allows

bringing to bear the full capabilities of national and theater assets to a regional

coalition conflict.

Joint Doctrine for Dissemination.

As stated earlier, after the conclusion of the Gulf War, the U.S. intelligence

community did not return to its' historical practice of returning to an inward focus

but began to apply the lessons learned from coalition operations. The Department

of Defense first applied lessons learned by adjusting joint doctrine on intelligence

support to operations, Joint Pub 2-0 published in October 1993. The doctrine

depicts two key elements required for effective coordination; a multinational

intelligence architecture and attendant communications structure.15

The development of the multinational intelligence architecture uses the

Coalition Coordination and Communication Integration Center (C3IC), developed

by CINCCENT, as a backdrop for lessons learned. The tether between the joint

doctrine and the C3IC is most readily apparent in reviewing the principles cited for

consideration when dealing with multinational forces as part of coalition

operations.

Adjust National Differences Among Nations

Unity of Effort Against Common Threat

Determining and Planning Intelligence Special Arrangements

Full Exchange of Intelligence Sharing

Complementary Intelligence Operations

Combined Intelligence Center

Liaison Exchange16

Besides reaffirming responsibilities of various intelligence agencies, the joint

doctrine specifically addresses the functional linkage between DIA, supported

CINC, and military forces of coalition members. Of service concern, the joint

doctrine does not address the functional role and linkage of the tactical

commanders subordinate to the CINC.

Use of non-service systems.

Supporting the architecture, the doctrine also depicts the communications paths

and methods attendant to the functional responsibilities. Again the document is

tied to and clearly reflects the lessons learned by operations of the C3IC. By

specifying methods of communications the doctrine incorporates the

communication systems and work stations developed to overcome shortfalls noted,

particularly in the dissemination of imagery.17 The document also assists in

organizational planning by citing areas that will likely require courier or liaison

services. As a carryover from the Gulf Conflict, the joint doctrine additionally

focuses on satisfying the CINC's intelligence and processing requirements. The

architecture reflects the Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System (JDISS), a

non-service system, as a key element in the dissemination of intelligence which

reinforces a CINC focus.18 While the document does address the potential for the

establishment of a Joint Force Commander, the lowest authoritative level remains

with the CINC. As with the structural architecture, Joint Pub 2-0 does not address

subordinate commands and linkage requirements to service communications

systems.

Joint Doctrine for Sanitization and Security.

A concurrent and ongoing effort is the development of proposed doctrine, Joint

Pub 2-0 1, that addresses the sanitization requirements posed by working as part of

a multinational force. The central theme that runs throughout the document is

providing timely and responsive, yet controlled, intelligence to other members of a

multinational force. The dilemma that the document addresses is being able to

quickly transition from peacetime and working with security manuals to a wartime

position.19 During the Gulf War, DIA developed the DIA Handbook for Analysts

to facilitate sanitization and dissemination of intelligence to the multinational

forces. The handbook also provides the basic format and principles used in the

proposed doctrine. As practiced during Desert Storm, the doctrine separates

responsibility of sanitization and dissemination into two broad areas, based around

national and theater assets.

DIA as focal point.

Within the doctrine, DIA is clearly the designated focal point for sanitization

authority and efforts. DIA's role as a focal point is reinforced by providing the

CINCs with a DIA Guide to Foreign Disclosure and by performing an interaction

function with other intelligence agencies. In seeking to assist the combatant

commander, DIA will work with national level agencies to seek exemptions to

national security policy if required by operational necessity.20 It is likely DIA will

sanitize the collection from national assets and provide appropriately marked

intelligence products tailored to CINC requirements that are releasable to a

multinational force. The basic direction of DIA guidance and efforts is clearly to

remove as much sanitization burden as possible from the CINC.

CINC Authority.

While DIA is the focal point for overall sanitization efforts the CINC is clearly

the responsible agent within a theater. Specifically, the doctrine recognizes the

challenges faced by the CINC's intelligence officer, the J-2, in carrying out

sanitization and dissemination responsibilities. As a guide for the J-2, the doctrine

underscores the fact that a multinational organization can and will create unique

releasability problems. The documents also recognize that J-2s are typically not

knowledgeable and practiced. in the sanitization and release procedures, due to a

lack of practice and peacetime requirements. As a subset, the document points out

that the sharing of US intelligence, while also protecting sources and methods, can

be a key to sustaining a multinational force (MNF).21 The specific considerations

listed for the J2 are: "(1) eligibility of recipient countries; (2) need to know; (3)

gain outweigh risks; (4) level of control necessary; and (5) organization receiving

afford some protection."22 The driving point behind these considerations is that

the combatant commander is ultimately responsible and accountable for the release

of intelligence to foreign forces. While the document provides various

considerations, the DIA Guide to Foreign Disclosure, provided to each combatant

commander, gives specific guidance to the CINC's J-2.23 The CINC's intelligence

staff will use the guide in executing sanitization and dissemination authority to

protect the sources and methods of intelligence gathered primarily from theater

resources. Probably the majority of the sanitization efforts of the combatant

commander will be executed under the auspices of the DIA representative on the

CINC's staff.

Tactical coordination with foreign forces.

Current and developing doctrine is oriented around the in theater

responsibilities of the CINC to provide a centralized effort of a multinational force

which appropriately includes a responsive level of intelligence support. The

documents do not address the need for the cooperative and coordination

requirements that will exist below the combatant commander. Tactical

commanders below the CINC can and should anticipate they will either have

forces from different nations attached or adjacent to their command. In either case

the tactical commander should plan for coordination requirements that include

sharing of intelligence.

Liaison and communication.

Per doctrinal considerations, the combatant commander will provide liaison

teams to multinational commands below the staff levels that are directly linked

within a CINC level architecture, as practiced in Desert Storm.24 These teams

consist of S2 through S4 staff elements and supported by a robust signal element.

Although they possess a signal element, the teams will not focus solely on

providing intelligence support redundant to higher levels of coordination. As these

liaison teams will address a CINC's efforts, the tactical commander will need to

provide complementary assets at almost every level of command. Additionally,

cooperative integration of the CINC's and tactical commander's liaison teams is

necessary to attain unity and preclude the potential for contradictory efforts.25

Beside providing support in flank coordination and experience in operations above

brigade level, the teams will naturally function as a conduit for critical intelligence