Intelligence

 

The Use Of Covert Paramilitary Activity As A Policy Tool: An Analysis Of Operations

Conducted By The United States Central Intelligence Agency, 1949-1951

 

SUBJECT AREA - National Security

 

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                               EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

 

Title: The Use of Covert Paramilitary Activity as a Policy Tool: An Analysis of

      Operations Conducted by the United States Central Intelligence Agency, 1949-1951

 

Author: Major D. H. Berger, USMC

 

Research Question: Was the return worth the investment for those covert paramilitary

operations conducted by the United States Central intelligence Agency at the outset of the Cold

War?

 

Discussion:

 

      This evaluation of covert paramilitary operations conducted by the CIA in the very early

years of the Cold War period is a combination of pure cost-benefit analysis and a more subjetive

evaluation of return on investment included is a collection of briefcase studies of OSS

operations during World War II, for they established the precedence for conducting similar

activity during the Cold War. There were significant differences, however, between the CIA's

"operating environment" in the late 1940's and early 1950's and the wartime situation OSS

officers operated within several years earlier. Success of post-war operations depended to a large

degree on the ability of US policy officials and CIA paramilitary specialists to recognize the

changes and adjust accordingly.

      The consensus among historians with an interest in covert operations is that paramilitary

activity conducted by the US Central intelligence Agency (CIA) during the Cold War did not

accomplish the objectives set forth for those operations; was not in line with the prevailing

national strategy or national policy; and, made no significant contributions to national security.

The fault in these generalizations is that critics too often failed to adequately consider the context

in which the activity occurred, especially during the period immediately following the end of

World War II. Americans at the outset of the Cold War believed that Stalin was preparing for a

military invasion of Western Europe. The Communists seemed intent on spreading their

ideology throughout the continent, while the "Western" European nations struggled to recover

economically from the recent war with Germany. Western Europe was vulnerable to Soviet

aggression, and the security of Western Europe was of vital interest to the United States.

      It was in this strategic environment that President Truman authorized the development of

a covert paramilitary organiztion within the newly created Central intelligence Agency. US

policy officials rccogned the drastic consequences of a war between the US and the Soviet

Union, and sought a means of countering the Russians while avoiding direct confrontation

between the two remaining global superpowers. In theory, the role of the perpetrator remains

concealed in a covert operation. Through covert paramilitary action, the US could pursue its

policy aims incognito. Covert paramilitary action also provided an opportunity for offensive

action-the chance to "roll back" the iron curtain--rather than rely exclusively on the defensive

strategy of containment. Additionally, some US policy officials saw covert paramilitary action

as a means of pursuing policy aims "on the cheap." The concept of training and supplying a

handful of guerrilla fighters to operate in Communist-controlled territory and keep the Soviets

off balance seemed a most efficient way of countering Moscow's aggression.

 

Conclusions:

 

      From a pure cost-benefit perspective, covert paramilitary action conducted by the CIA

between the end of World War II and the Korean conflict was a complete failure. CIA "project"

officers were not restricted in terms of funds available, in fact often were urged to spend more

than amounts requested. There was little in the way of accounting for expenditures within the

Agency, and the use of unvouchered funds eliminated the requirement to justify project costs to

Congress. Project officers, senior CIA officials, and policy officials in the State Department and

Department of Defense allowed numerous operations to continue beyond reasonable limits,

convinced that operatives could accomplish objectives despite overwhelming evidence to the

contrary.

      US covert paramilitary action during this period was, however, worth the effort.

Prevailing US national security strategy necessitated a reaction to counter Soviet aggression, yet

national policy stressed avoidance of direct confrontation. Administration officials faced with

this dilemma in the early Cold War years considered action--any action-better than inaction.

Cost was not a factor, and US policy officials felt that the need to maintain some form of

pressure on the Communists outweighed the risk of fallout from failed covert activity. Although

individual covert paramilitary operations failed to achieve objectives, the cumulative effect was

constant pressure on the Communist perimeter. These operations provided the CIA with a

wealth of lessons learned, which paramilitary officers applied in subsequent successfiil

paramilitary operations during the 1950's such as Guatemala and Iran.

 

Paramilitary operations are the noisiest of all covert actions. When they fail, they become

 

fiascoes and no official denials are plausible.

 

                                          Harry Rositzke, The CIA's Secret Operations

 

 

 

      Covert paramilitary operations have historically claimed more than their fair share of

 

public attention. President Thomas Jefferson in 1805 ordered a paramilitary operation to unseat

 

the ruler of the country now known as Libya; the phrase in the Marines' Hymn "to the shores of

 

Tripoli" serves as a constant reminder of that noteworthy operation. Governments, including the

 

US, have used covert operations to accomplish that which could not be attained through

 

diplomacy. Though long in lineage, covert paramilitary activity has its genesis as a policy tool

 

of the US in the latter stages of World War ll and the iminediate post-war period.

 

      This inquiry is an attempt to analyze the post-World War II evolution of US covert

 

paramilitary operations from two different perspectives. First is a pure cost-benefit analysis of

 

the major operations conducted by the CIA between the end of World War II and the Korean

 

conflict. Was the return worth the investment? What were the objectives of each operation, and

 

were they achieved? By objectively examining various US covert paramilitary operations and

 

drawing conclusions from the cumulative results of those operations I intend to answer these two

 

key questions.

 

      The second perspective is a subjective analysis, more qualitative in nature and requiring a

 

broader scope of reasoning than the cost-benefit analysis. For this portion of the examination I

 

have attempted to look beyond the immediate, short-term objectives and weigh the merits of

 

individual operations based upon their contribution to national security and conformance to the

 

prevailing national strategy. Context is germane to this portion of the analysis, in that we cannot

 

condenm an activity without considering the options available at the time (inactivity, for

 

example).

 

      From a pure cost-benefit analysis point of view, covert paramilitary operations conducted

 

by the US between the end of World War II and the Korean conflict were a dismal failure.

 

Manpower and money were allocated in tremendous amounts to the various operations, yet in

 

every case the objectives of creating and expanding a viable anti-Communist resistance effort

 

were not met. Soviet counterintelligence agents penetrated virtally at will the CIA-sponsored

 

resistance organizations and emigre' groups. Competing faction leaders used CIA-provided

 

equipment and training to further their own cause and consolidate their own political power

 

base, rather than direct their efforts against the Communists. The CIA allowed most covert

 

paramilitary operations to continue far beyond reason, unwilling to admit the futility of a

 

"project"' despite overwhelming evidence that stated objectives were no longer achievable.

 

      US covert paramilitary operations in the early Cold War period were not, however, a

 

"total" failure in the sense that there was no return on our investment.  The US was doing

 

something, which in the early years of the Cold War was better than the alternative. By

 

experimenting, the US learned the limits of the utility of covert action. Used alone, covert

 

paramilitary action rarely accomplished significant objectives; when conducted simultaneously

 

and in close coordination with various other covert activities and diplomatic action, chances of

 

success increased dramatically. Operatives learned their trade, honing skills and refining

 

techniques that would prove more effective later in the 1950's in countries such as Guatemala

 

and Iran. Although not intended, the visibility of the various programs demonstrated US resolve

 

to Moscow, indicating that the West would not stand idly by while Stalin sought to expand his

 

empire.

 

      This paper consists of two distinct sets of case studies, separated by a discussion of the

 

legislative and national command authority action that directly impacted US capability and

 

authority to conduct covert paramilitary activity. The first portion of this inquiry contains an

 

analysis of several of the more significant covert paramilitary operations conducted by the US

 

during World War II. These abbreviated case studies provide a basis for comparison when

 

examining the post-war US covert paramilitary action case studies contained in the latter portion

 

of this paper. The reader should recognize the significant changes in the stategic geography and

 

operating environment following the end of World War II, and the impact of those changes on

 

US covert paramilitary operations. The fact that these changes were either not recognized or

 

simply ignored by US intelligence and foreign policy officials in the immediate post-war period

 

perhaps had more effect on operational results than any other single contributing factor.  Between

 

the two sets of case studies is a discussion of several key presidential and National Security

 

Council (NSC) directives passed during the immediate post-war period relevant to the re-creation

 

within the CIA of a covert paramilitary capability.

 

      This inquiry required a combination of primary and secondary source documents,

 

although countless documents relative the topic and periods remain classified. Several former

 

OSS and CIA officers directly responsible for the planning and execution of the paramilitary

 

operations examined were generous in allowing personal interviews for this project.  Their keen

 

insights and first-hand knowledge of operational details were invaluable in my efforts to "see the

 

whole picture."

 

      In retrospect, the record of CIA's post-war covert paramilitary operations is considered by

 

most historians to be "one of almost uniform failure."2 Historians so quick to categorize US

 

post-war covert paramilitary operations as failures too often have failed to adequately consider

 

the critical importance of context in their analyses. The threat of Soviet military forces driving

 

west across Europe was real to US officials and the public at large-by the late 1940's. Embassy

 

reports, reports from military officials in Europe, and CIA threat assessments verified Stalin's

 

capability to launch such an offensive. The iron curtain had proven virtually impenetrable,

 

preventing Western intelligence agencies from collecting within the Soviet block to assess

 

Stalin's intent. The prevailing attitude among American officials by the late 1940's that doing

 

something is better than doing nothing is somewhat more understandable when we consider the

 

circumstances--or "zeitgeist"-- of the time.

 

      Left unchecked, there seemed no limits to the expansion of Communism across Europe.

 

The efficiency of Soviet subjugation of indigents in the Baltics, the Balkans, and the Ukraine lent

 

credence to the arguinent that the remaining free populace of Europe was in jeopardy of suffering

 

a similar fate, powerless to offer any significant resistance to Stalin's apparent appetite for an

 

enlarged Soviet state. In retrospect, we can legitimately fault US policy makers for not

 

adequately considering the ramifications and long-term impact of covert paramilitary operations.

 

We must acknowledge, however, that these activities gave the US an opportunity and an

 

"acceptable" means to act at a time when action was deemed necessary. The void of intelligence

 

on the enemy made it impossible for US policy officials to accurately predict results, so why not

 

try covert paramilitary action? The dilemma in judging the merits of US covert paramilitary

 

action in the early Cold War period is deciding whether to accept these arguments as justification

 

for such activity, or dismiss them as mere rationalization.

 

      As early as 1946 President Truman, US military strategists, and most intelligence

 

analysts "had reluctantly concluded that recent actions of the Soviet Union endangered the

 

security of the United States."3 Planners recognized early on the need to avoid direct military

 

confrontation between the US and the USSR. Open conflict between the two remaining global

 

superpowers, in the absence of (external) constraint, would logically expand to nothing less than

 

total war. Confirmation by the US in 1949 that the Soviets had developed a nuclear capability

 

transformed overnight the consequences of unlimited war between the US and the USSR.

 

      During this post-war period, while the Soviets were building their conventional military

 

capability and developing a nuclear capability, US national focus had shifted to economic

 

stabilization and growth. This reprioritization had led to dramatic reductions in US conventional

 

military forces--maintaining a large standing army in times of peace has always been difficult to

 

justify. This left national security strategists with the dilemma of finding the proper means to

 

counter a growing strategic threat, without having the deterrent leverage of a credible

 

conventional military response capability. Faced with this dilemma, policy-makers in

 

Washington frantically searched for low-cost, low-risk options to deal with the evolving

 

Communist threat.

 

      The Central intelligence Agency (CIA) attempted to recreate in the post-war period a

 

capability that seemed to satisfy this requirement Covert paramilitary operations, in fact,

 

seemed ideally suited to the situation. Compared to maintaining a large standing military force,

 

the cost of conducting paramilitary operations would be negligible. Properly conducted, covert

 

operations would conceal the role of the US government, minimizing the possibility of direct

 

confrontation with the Communists. Within the framework of the defensive doctrine of

 

containment, covert paramilitary activity offered an offensive potential to "roll back," rather than

 

simply prevent the spread of Communism. Covert paramilitary operations, a capability which

 

the OSS during World War II had proven could produce significant results for a relatively small

 

investment, thus got a new lease on life.

 

      In the transition from World War II to the Cold War, however, the "operating

 

environment" had changed. The target was no longer simply a military force, as it had been

 

during the war. The new target was an ideology, based on the fundamental concept of political

 

indoctrination of the populace. In wartime, the assurance of pending Allied conventional

 

military operations to expel Axis occupation armies provided the necessary degree of motivation

 

for the various resistance groups. By the late 1940's the Communists were firmly entrenched in

 

Soviet-controlled territories; it was clear to those in the CIA with experience in partisan

 

operations that unseating the Communists in those areas would not be a simple affair. This

 

meant that resistance efforts in the Cold War period would be long-term operations, making it

 

difficult to sustain morale among resistance members.

 

      Most of the CIA, State, and Defense Department analysts recognized the changed

 

environment. Few, however, made the necessary adjustments in planning considerations and

 

operating procedures to account for the changes. According to former DCI William Colby, no

 

one in the CIA in the late 1940's considered that the "model we were using off the European

 

resistance against the Nazis might not be adequate in the face of a totalitarian threat that sought

 

to enlist and not merely subjugate the peoples it overran."4 Within the CIA, the tendency among

 

operators was to rely on those techniques that had worked so well for the OSS just a few years

 

earlier. State and Defense Department officials urged the Agency to take action--any

 

action--without realizing the political and diplomatic implications of the covert paramilitary

 

operations proposed. Given that the modus operandi of CIA's paramilitary operatives were not

 

well suited to the post-war situation, and that military and diplomatic officials enthusiastically

 

promoted means and ways without considering ends, the results are not altogether surprising. To

 

understand where and why the system broke down we must trace the roots of post-war CIA

 

paramilitary techniques and procedures to their source--the Office of Strategic Services.

 

 

 

 

 

                             THE OSS PRECEDENT

 

 

 

      A role for paramilitary operations in World War II

 

      President Franklin D. Roosevelt created the Office of Coordiator of Information, the

 

United States' first independent intelligence organization, by his presidential order of 11 July

 

1941. General William J. Donovan, appointed Coordinator Of Information (COI) by Roosevelt,

 

had considered the subject of special operations as early as 10 October 1941.5 Donovan sent one

 

officer to England in November 1941 to study the organization, training, and operational

 

methods of the British intelligence organization SOE. Donovan established a special operations

 

branch--SA/G--to organize and execute morale and physical subversion, including sabotage and

 

guerrilla warfare. The primary function of SA/G was unorthodox warfare in support of military

 

operations. In a 22 December memo to the President, Donovan identified the two types of

 

guerrilla warfare missions SA/G would pursue: (1) establishment and support of small bands of

 

local origin under definite leaders, and (2) the formation in the United States of guerrilla forces

 

military in nature.6 All paramilitary activities pursued by the United States Government over the

 

following 50 years fall into one of these two basic categories identified by Donovan in 1941.

 

      The administration and organization of SA/G was along military lines and its first

 

personnel were drawn from the armed services, principally from the Army. Paramilitary training

 

for SA/G recruits focused on infiltration techniques such as parachuting and maritime (surface

 

craft and submarine) insertion and the skills necessary to organize and influence locally-recruited

 

dissidents. Demolitions, weapons, close combat, silent killing, and industrial sabotage training,

 

as well as instruction on coordinating supply efforts to local resistance groups rounded out the

 

training syllabus.

 

      The Deprtment of Interior secured the use of four training areas near Quantico, Virginia

 

and Catoctin, Maryland for the duration of the war for Donovan's use. These traning areas were

 

of sufficient size (nearly 20,000 total acres) to permit for their envisioned use in training larger

 

militarized guerrilla units in the United States which could then be inserted to operate behind

 

enemy lines. Lieutenant Colonel Garland Williams, a former director of the New York Bureau

 

of Narcotics, transferred from the War Department to COI in late fall 1941 to assumed command

 

of the new traing unit.  During the preparation of training areas and facilities, Williams and his

 

trainers attended the British SOE school in Canada.  The SA/G paramilitary training school at

 

Quantico opened in April 1942.7 On 13 June 1942 the COI was redesignated the Office of

 

Strategic Services (OSS); the SA/G branch was subsequently renamed the Special Operations

 

(SO) branch. The infantile SO Branch was less than a year old when General Donovan saw an

 

opportunity to employ the paramilitary tool against the Japanese occupation force in Burma.

 

 

 

      "Det 101"

 

      The legendary "Detachment 101" was the first OSS special operations effort of World

 

War II. The Kachins8 in Burma had been waging a determined struggle against occupying

 

Japanese military forces since early in World War II. Support of the Kachins began with an

 

airdrop of twenty-five British-trained operatives in mid-1942. The original members of

 

Detachment 101 were recruited, trained and dispatched to Burma in May of 1942. The first

 

leader of Det 101, Major Carl Eiffler, had been a Treasury agent operating on the Mexican border

 

before he was commissioned in the Army and subsequently assigned to OSS's predecessor COI

 

as the Far Eastern representative.9 Eiffler and his men trained the Kachins to conduct large-scale

 

ambush patrols and sabotage operations against Japanese occupation forces.

 

      Eiffler faced two principal challenges in Burma.  In 1942 there was no projected date for

 

conventional Allied military operations against the Japanese in Burma. With Europe being the

 

dominant theater, the US was a long way from taking the offensive in the Pacific region. This

 

meant that Eiffler's paramilitary efforts had little chance of achieving decisive results by

 

themselves; the Kachins and the OSS were therefore in for a protracted guerrilla war. The

 

second challenge was answering to two headquarters: British and American. Continual

 

second-guessing by OSS and British SOE superiors far removed from the scene frustrated

 

Eiffler's attempts to secure the logistics support needed to generate the level of resistance

 

necessary to theaten the Japanese hold on Burma. The OSS eventually pulled Eiffler out of

 

Burma, then shuttled him around Washington and Europe to pass on lessons learned to

 

paramilitary officers throughout the OSS. The OSS was busy developing a large-scale

 

paramilitary program to support Eisenhower's military plan in the European theater, and those

 

operatives preparing to enter France would soon benefit from Eiffler's tactics, techniques, and

 

procedures for guerrilla and paramilitary warfare.

 

 

 

      OSS spccial operations in France

 

      OSS paramilitary operations in France were a supporting effort for planned Allied

 

conventional military operations. OSS activities were part of a joint British-American effort,

 

with the British SOE initially in charge. Two types of paramilitary elements operated in France:

 

three "Jedburgh" teams and larger units of thirty to forty men organized into "Operational

 

Groups." The OSS recruited its paramilitary agents from the Army and Navy, with the majority

 

coming from the Army. The Jedburghs parachuted into France from June through September of

 

1944, and much like the OG's conducted sabotage operations to impede the movement of

 

German military units within France.