Tactical Intelligence: Reducing Reliance On The National Intelligence Agencies CSC 1993 SUBJECT AREA - Intelligence EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Title: Tactical Intelligence: Reducing Reliance on the National Intelligence Agencies Author: Mr. Jeffrey T. Dubiel, Central Intelligence Agency Thesis: Although the military services have improved their tactical intelligence capabilities, the services still rely excessively on the national agencies for tactical intelligence that the services should provide for themselves. Background: The U.S. military does not now have sufficient equipment to collect the tactical intelligence information that it needs. It also lacks the ability to adequately analyze the information it does receive, and does not always emphasize real- world intelligence in training scenarios. These problems are due to the concentration of collection assets at national level, to policies that the military itself has followed regarding personnel assignments and promotions, and to an overemphasis on operations. The national and service intelligence agencies, such as the Defense Intelligence Agency, Central Intelligence Agency, and the Army Intelligence Agency, have adequate collection assets and personnel policies that encourage the development of subject matter expertise. Therefore, military units frequently go to the national agencies to acquire tactical intelligence that they should be receiving from much lower echelons. Recommendation: The military services should acquire the intelligence collection equipment that they need. They should also develop personnel policies that encourage the development of long-term expertise and stability, and use real-world intelligence in training scenarios whenever possible. OUTLINE I. Introduction Thesis: U.S. military units at the operational, and, especially, the tactical levels of warfare lack the capability to produce timely and accurate intelligence tailored to their own needs. This weakness results from both a concentration of intelligence collection and analytical assets at national level, and from internal military policies that inhibit the development of intelligence expertise. While the U.S. military has made significant progress in correcting this problem, warfighting units still must overcome excessive reliance on the national and service intelligence agencies for tactical intelligence. A. Shortfalls under present system B. Overview of the U.S. Intelligence Community 1. National and Service Intelligence Organizations 2. Tactical and Operational Intelligence Organizations C. The Intelligence Request Process 1. Doctrinal 2. "Old Boy" Network II. Comparison of Tactical and National Agencies A. Collection Platform Distribution B. Comparison of analytical expertise 1. Organizational and grade structure 2. Time on job C. Focus of effort 1. National level: real issues, few distractions 2. Tactical level: training exercises, many distractions III. Solutions A. Command emphasis most important requirement B. Additional collection assets under tactical commander's direct control 1. Unmanned Aerial Vehicle a good example 2. Other systems already under development 3. Progress easiest to achieve here C. Only real-world information used during command post and map exercises 1. Focus on actual contingencies 2. Force operators to plan based on the intelligence D. Improved personnel management policies 1. Longer tours for intelligence personnel 2. Waive "up or out" policy for intelligence officers who have high levels of expertise, but no desire for command 3. Enhanced officer and enlisted grade structures for technical intelligence specialists a) Imagery interpreters to Lt.Col./SgtMaj (E-9), rather than Capt./SSgt typical now b) Study use of civilian analysts at lower levels 1) Long-term stability a plus 2) Civilian status a major drawback in combat 3) Worth considering E. Conclusion Operational and tactical intelligence are better than they have been, but true subject-matter expertise still resides in the national and service intelligence organizations. The warfighters must develop their own expertise to improve their abilities to react to contingencies. The Gulf War provided the U.S. military its first opportunity after Vietnam to test its intelligence capabilities under rigorous battlefield conditions. Grenada and Panama had offered some challenges, but the lack of an effective military threat in Grenada and the familiarity of U.S. soldiers with Panama's terrain and armed forces had reduced the need for basic intelligence beyond current targeting information. By contrast, the conflict with Iraq brought the U.S. military face-to-face with a large, modern, and experienced army it had not planned to fight. Consequently, the U.S. military needed all types of intelligence about its foe, from the Iraqi military's command structure to how Iraqi infantry squads dug their fighting positions. How much of this information did the U.S. military receive? According to a Defense Department after-action report, No nation or coalition of nations has ever had the ability that the Coalition possessed during the Gulf crisis to collect and disseminate intelligence. No combat commander has ever had as full and complete a view of his adversary as did our field commander.1 This statement fails to answer an important question, however. Where did the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) actually get its intelligence, especially its tactical and operational intelligence? Did most intelligence come from CENTCOM's own intelligence units and those of subordinate commands, or did CENTCOM have to rely on organizations it did not directly control? The answer reflects the U.S. military's failure to correctly anticipate the intelligence requirements for the modern battlefield. CURRENT SHORTCOMINGS Currently, U.S. military units at the operational, and, especially, the tactical levels of warfare lack the capability to produce timely and accurate intelligence tailored to their own needs. This weakness results from both a concentration of intelligence collection and analytical assets at national level and from internal military policies that inhibit the development of intelligence expertise. While the U.S. military has made significant progress in correcting this problem, warfighting units still must overcome excessive reliance on the national and service intelligence agencies for tactical intelligence. The Gulf War is a case in point. CENTCOM had its own Joint Intelligence Center (JIC) that was supposed to provide intelligence for the command itself and its service components. However, an Army general who was there has written: Theoretically, intelligence flows from DIA (Defense Intelligence Agency) through the Unified and Specified Command, to the Army component. That is not the way it works . . . (CENTCOM) did not have the staff capability to manage myriad sudden and urgent wartime requirements. In DESERT SHIELD, AIA (Army Intelligence Agency) stepped in to provide a single point of contact for support and coordination with DOD (Department of Defense) and national intelligence agencies. That system worked well for the Army.2 The Title V after-action report submitted to Congress corroborates the general's impressions: The entire national intelligence community mobilized to support Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. . . .Virtually every national intelligence collection system with a capability to collect on Iraqi targets or related targets worldwide was used to support Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm.3 The national intelligence agencies had to support the operations because, "The CENTCOM Directorate of Intelligence, or J-2, was not structured for a deployment or conflict on the scale of Desert Storm".4 Now, more than two years after Desert Storm, the JICs still must rely on the national and service intelligence agencies for tactical support. THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY The National and Service Agencies The U.S. Intelligence Community consists of those agencies that support the foreign policy machinery of the government. With one major exception, these agencies are components of cabinet-level departments and focus most of their efforts on providing intelligence for them. For example, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) supports the Defense Department, while the Bureau of Intelligence and Research supports the State Department. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is the exception. It provides intelligence support directly to the president and the National Security Council and is not a component of any other department. The military services also have their own department-level agencies, such as the Army's AIA. Most national intelligence agencies also support military operations, at least to an extent. Tactical and Operational Organizations The U.S. military services also have their own intelligence organizations at the tactical and operational levels. In the Army (the primary focus of this paper) and Marine Corps, these range from a battalion S-2, to a field army or Marine Expeditionary Force G-2. The Army and Marines also have intelligence units that augment the S-2 or G-2 at brigade level and higher, and provide additional collection and analytical support. The Navy and Air Force have personnel and organizations that perform similar functions. At the unified and specified commands, the JIC, headed by the command J-2, provides intelligence support to the theater commander-in-chief (CINC). Intelligence personnel from all services make up the JIC staff. In theory, the JIC combines the collection, analytical, and dissemination functions in one organization, streamlining intelligence support for both the CINC and the subordinate units. However, reality often differs from theory: Another major lesson is that to support Army requirements, Army intelligence was absolutely required. . .trends toward centralizing intelligence at joint levels are precisely opposite of what we experienced here. What commanders demanded was control over their own destinies, with tailored tactical intelligence from experienced professionals who knew Army operations, the intelligence exigencies that stem from them, and how to lead intelligence maneuver to support command intent.5 THE INTELLIGENCE REQUEST PROCESS Military units usually attempt to satisfy their intelligence requirements through their own intelligence staff sections first. A battalion S-2 section, consisting of at most a captain or lieutenant, a senior sergeant, and a junior enlisted driver, has little capability to acquire or analyze information beyond the immediate combat information that the battalion's own organic assets can obtain. When ground combat battalions need more extensive intelligence, the S-2 submits a request to the intelligence staff section at the next higher echelon to provide it. Problems in satisfying intelligence requirements generally begin here. The higher echelon section may determine that the lower unit does not actually need the information and deny the request outright. This does not happen often, and usually results from incompetence or inexperience at either level, or personal animosity. Generally, the senior section attempts in good faith to get the information the junior section says it needs. When the senior section cannot satisfy the request itself and believes that the subordinate still needs the information, it relays the request to the next higher echelon. This passing of a request to the next higher echelon may continue all the way up to the national agencies. Even with modern communications, a response to an immediate tactical requirement may arrive too late to be of use. In addition to this formal chain, intelligence officers may use the informal "old boy" network, which thrives in intelligence organizations. An officer assigned to a tactical unit and impatient for a response to an intelligence requirement may have a friend at DIA or CIA who has just the expertise he needs. After a call or two on the secure telephone, the officer has his answer. When the officer circumvents the chain this way, his higher-echelon intelligence section does not learn that he has obtained his answer and the section may continue to waste effort to satisfy his request. The section also cannot disseminate this intelligence to other units that need it. NATIONAL AND TACTICAL AGENCIES: A STUDY IN CONTRASTS The long request chain and the "old boy" network are two problems in how the military obtains intelligence support, with the request chain being the more serious of the two. At least the "old boy" network results in someone receiving useful intelligence. Both have their origins in the military's lack of a sufficient organic collection and analysis capability. In the interest of saving money, the Marine Corps retired the RF-4B reconnaissance aircraft, leaving the Marines without a means of deep tactical aerial reconnaissance. The Army has had no means of deep aerial reconnaissance for years and has relied on the Air Force to perform the mission. Signals intelligence (SIGINT) has received more emphasis and better funding from the services than imagery intelligence, but the National Security Agency (NSA) still retains direct tasking authority over all U.S. SIGINT assets. This arrangement may result in tasking conflicts between NSA and the theater CINC. The U.S. military has also pursued personnel management policies that have degraded the capabilities of intelligence units to perform effective analysis. Typically, the job of "intelligence analyst" is only one of several that an intelligence officer may hold during his career. He may also wind up as a battalion S-2, collection and jamming platoon leader, or headquarters company commander. Enlisted personnel usually have assignments more directly related to their intelligence specialties, but often find themselves doing routine intelligence-related "housekeeping" tasks, such as map posting, that require little skill. In neither case do the officers or the enlisted personnel build up the necessary expertise to become truly effective analysts. The situation in both hardware availability and personnel policies at the national agencies differs greatly from that of the military . The national agencies either control directly or may easily task the collection platforms. While the national agencies do not always successfully anticipate future hardware requirements, with the retirement of the SR-71 months before the Gulf Crisis the most egregious example, they generally have enough assets to fulfill their needs. The personnel situation at the national agencies also lends itself to more effective development of analytical expertise. An analyst generally remains an analyst for his entire career, often on the same "account", or topic, enabling him to develop considerable insight into his analytical field. For example, during the Gulf Crisis, the 11 analysts in one national agency office assigned to analyze the Iraqi military had a combined total of 82 years of experience in the analysis of Middle Eastern military forces, including over 15 years on Iraq itself. Active- duty intelligence units, which change analysts almost constantly, do not have the opportunity to build up this type of expertise. Despite the military's use of clever analytical matrices, templates, and checklists to ensure complete analysis, nothing can replace time on an account for developing expertise.6 Another difference between the national agencies and the tactical and operational intelligence units is that the national agencies spend most of their time and effort on real-world intelligence problems. The national agency analysts have to produce timely, accurate reports on these problems and have no time to be distracted by fictional military training scenarios. By contrast, military training exercises often have scenarios that bear little relation to reality. Even if the scenario reflects an actual situation, the intelligence officers also may not be given the latitude to add all relevant enemy information.7 If the intelligence officers try to add enemy forces that they know could hinder friendly operations, the commanders or operations officers may veto the attempt. The operators say that they're only interested in how well their own units can execute the plan, never mind the potential opposition. Although not as prevalent an attitude as before, this short- sighted view of intelligence still has the potential to leave U.S. soldiers unprepared to face an enemy that intends to kill them. SOLUTIONS Tactical intelligence improvements will require investments in new equipment, modifications in training practices, and changes in personnel policies. Above all, improvements will require commanders to emphasize real-world scenarios that fully exercise intelligence officers' capabilities. Sophisticated equipment, challenging training, and personnel improvements will go to waste unless commanders demand that intelligence officers provide them with timely, accurate and relevant information. The current lack of sufficient collection and analytical equipment is perhaps the easiest problem to fix. The Army and Marines have already made considerable progress in providing intelligence hardware to tactical users. Collection platforms such as the unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) mounting a television camera have already been used successfully, and follow-on UAVs are under development.8 Computer workstations designed for tactical use have also made their debut, potentially increasing the analytical capabilities of intelligence officers, as well as easing their routine housekeeping chores. The use of intelligence in training has also improved in recent years, but could be far better. For example, a U.S. V Corps exercise conducted in March 1993 used fictional countries such as "Graylandia", while a lucrative intelligence crop went unharvested in nearby Bosnia-Herzegovina.9 The Gulf crisis gave intelligence officers and commanders six months to refine the intelligence picture of Iraq and integrate it into operational plans, and the intelligence system still had numerous problems. Few crises will allow U.S. forces sufficient time to develop the intelligence picture after they are committed to a theater. When they have the opportunity, U.S. forces must incorporate and train with actual intelligence before they go in harm's way. Personnel improvements offer the military the most reliable route to upgrading the quality of intelligence support. Modern collection equipment and realistic training scenarios have little use when intelligence personnel do not understand their potential enemies or their areas of operation. The present policy of transferring officers and enlisted soldiers after three or four years contributes to a lack of both expertise and institutional memory in a field that requires these qualities. Time on the job on a specific intelligence account directly affects the level of expertise. Typically, an intelligence analyst can contribute little during his first year on any given account. Despite this, he probably will not have the luxury of learning his account without being free of production pressure. This leads to shallow, if not erroneous, analysis. By the time he becomes reasonably comfortable with his account, he then has to prepare for his next assignment. The unit then loses his expertise, and has to train a new analyst on the account. To break this cycle of constant personnel turnover, the military should introduce longer tours of perhaps six to eight years for some commissioned and enlisted intelligence personnel. Tours of this length would give them the necessary time to develop their expertise. Long tours would also reduce the anxiety that soldiers and their families experience when they move every few years, and would save the military money. Two related courses of action should go along with longer tours. First, the military should waive its "up or out" policy for intelligence experts who have no desire for command or high- level staff assignments. Superb analysts or collection specialists sometimes make mediocre commanders or first sergeants. These experts would become similar to the Limited Duty Officers currently in the naval services, and the program would be restricted to first-rate performers of proven benefit to their service. Second, the military should enhance the grade structures for intelligence specialties as an incentive to develop expertise. For example, most Army imagery analysts are captains, lieutenants, warrant officers, and noncommissioned officers of pay grade E-6 and below. Majors and senior sergeants in the imagery field perform supervisory tasks and rarely look at film, even though they usually have the most analytical experience. If officers could make lieutenant colonel and sergeants could make E-9 and remain working analysts, the military would receive the benefits of their expertise while being able to adequately compensate them for their service. Another suggestion to improve expertise and stability involves the limited use of civilian analysts and specialists in tactical military units, down to division or possibly brigade level. If promotable to a sufficiently high pay grade, such as GS-13 or 14, civilian intelligence personnel could remain in one unit indefinitely and would serve as both subject matter experts and repositories of institutional memory. Civilians would also be immune to the typical distractions that plague military members, such as physical training, work details, staff duty officer tours, and mandatory formations. They would not be exempt from field exercises, however. Rather, they would be fully integrated into whatever intelligence center the unit operates in order to take full advantage of their expertise. Their civilian status could be a major drawback during combat, but the CENTCOM's experience during the Gulf War with both national agency civilians and contractor personnel should provide a baseline from which to build. CONCLUSION Operational and tactical intelligence are better than they have been in recent memory, but true subject matter expertise generally resides in the national and service intelligence organizations. The warfighters must develop their own expertise to improve their abilities to react to the many potential hotspots in the world. The military must improve its tactical and operational intelligence collection and analysis equipment; it must restructure its personnel policies to allow experienced intelligence specialists to remain on the job and still be adequately compensated; it should also experiment with having civilian intelligence specialists at tactical levels in order to provide even greater continuity. These measures would significantly improve the tactical and operational intelligence capabilities that all the services have said they want. Let the services now show how serious they are. ENDNOTES 1. U.S. Department of Defense, Conduct of the Persian Gulf Conflict, An Interim Report to Congress Pursuant to Title V Persian Gulf Supplemental Authorization and Personnel Benefits Act of 1991 (Public Law 102-25),1991, p. 4-1. 2. Stewart John F. Jr., Brigadier General, U.S. Army, "DESERT STORM-A 3rd U.S. Army Perspective", Military Intelligence, October-December 1991, Ft. Huachuca, AZ, p. 27. 3. Department of Defense, op. cit., p. 14-1. 4. Ibid., p. 14-1. 5. Stewart, op. cit., p. 31. 6. Department of the Army, FM 34-3, Intelligence Analysis, Washington, DC, March 1990, Chapters 3 and 4. 7. Stewart, op. cit., p. 23. 8. Department of Defense, op. cit., p. 4-2. 9. Bradley, Richard J., Major, U.S. Army Reserve, Personal Interview, 23 March 1993. BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. Baker, Daniel F., Major, U.S. Army, "Deep Attack: A Military Intelligence Task Force in DESERT STORM", Military Intelligence, October-December 1991, Ft. Huachuca, AZ, pp. 36-38. 2. Black, John H., Colonel, U.S. Army, "The IEW Synchronization Matrix", Military Intelligence, October-December 1991, Ft. Huachuca, AZ, p. 32. 3. Bradley, Richard J., Major, U.S. Army Reserve, Personal Interview, 23 March 1993. 4. Department of the Army, FM 34-3, Intelligence Analysis, Washington, DC, March 1990, Chapters 3 and 4. 5. Department of the Army, FM 34-130, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield, Washington, DC, May 1989, Chapters 2-6. 6. Department of the Army, FM 100-5, Operations, Washington, DC, May 1986, p. 46. 7. Department of Defense, Conduct of the Persian Gulf Conflict, An Interim Report to Congress Pursuant to Title V Persian Gulf Conflict Supplemental Authorization and Personnel Benefits Act of 1991 (Public Law 102-25), pp. 14-1 to 14-3. 8. Echevarria, Antunio J., and Shaw, John M., Captains, U.S. Army, "The New Military Revolution: Post-Industrial Change", Parameters, Winter 1992-93, Carlisle, PA, pp. 70-79. 9. Eichelberger, Charles B., Lieutenant General (Retired), U.S. Army, "The MI Corps: A Vision of the Future", Military Intelligence, October-December 1991, Ft. Huachuca, AZ, pp. 6-13. 10. Jackson, John D., Captain, U.S. Army, "Battle Damage Assessment", Military Intelligence, October-December 1991, Ft. Huachuca, AZ, p. 19. 11. Krueger, John L., Major, U.S. Army, "Pitfalls in Combat Simulations", Military Review, June 1992, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, pp. 20-25. 12. Macedonia, Michael R., Major, U.S. Army, "Information Technology in DESERT STORM", Military Review, October 1992, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, pp. 34-41. 13. Stewart, John F., Jr., Brigadier General, U.S. Army, "DESERT STORM: A 3rd U.S. Army Perspective", Military Intelligence, October-December 1991, Ft. Huachuca, AZ, pp. 22-31. 14. U.S. Marine Corps, OH 6-1, Ground Combat Operations, Quantico, VA, January 1988, Chapter 4, Section II.
