Tactical Reconnaissance: Bringing Imagery Into Focus CSC 1993 SUBJECT AREA - Intelligence EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Title: Tactical Reconnaissance: Bringing Imagery Into Focus Author: LCDR M.A. Dombrowski, United States Navy Thesis: The Navy and Marine Corps need to improve training and procure enhanced digital technology for collection, processing and transmission of tactical reconnaissance imagery. Background: Tactical reconnaissance for littoral warfare has been left in the lurch by the Navy and Marines. Adequate sensor capability has been retired or will not be fielded for years. Decision makers do not understand the role intelligence plays in expeditionary warfare. Analysts are too few and too seldom trained. Chemical processing is cumbersome and time-consuming. Communications capabilities need to match the vast data rate requirements for both transmission and processing of digitized imagery. All this must be done within current fiscal austerity. Possible solutions include a switch to digital imagery, purchase of off-the-shelf Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV's), enhanced training for staffs and analysts, and improved communications pathways. Recommendations: Naval Services imagery intelligence should "go digital", buy UAV's, increase communications bandwidth, and redirect training to better support littoral warfare. Outline Thesis: Tactical reconnaissance for littoral warfare does not meet the operational commanders' needs. The Navy and Marine Corps need to improve training, purchase low-cost interim airplanes, and procure enhanced digital technology for collection, processing and transmission of imagery. I. Tactical Reconnaissance in Littoral Warfare A. Operational Scenario: We don't get the picture! B. Imagery Requirements for the warfighter l. Collection in all conditions 2. Fast, accurate analysis and processing 3. Quick transmission II. Problem Areas in Tactical Reconnaissance A. Sensor Systems shortfalls l. National: Too little, too unresponsive 2. Organic: Gapped capability B. Chemical Processing is wasteful C. Weak training for staffs and analysts l. "Cultural" problems 2. Numbers too low 3. Focus of training is wrong D. Imagery Transmission is slow and ineffective III. Solving Tactical Imagery deficiencies in the short term A. Digitize sensors and processors B. Buy UAV's C. Improve staff and analyst training D. Get more bandwidth l. Introduction. The tension in the War Room was palpable. The Landing Force Commander glared across the table at the Commodore. "Jack, the Navy is supposed to provide us with our intelligence until we phase ashore. We don't have any photos of the Landing Zones or the Helo Landing Zones except for some six-week old satellite 'fuzzy grams' that tell us nothing! How are we supposed to know if the gunfire you laid on did anything, or if any new defenses have been built? How can we plan? Commodore, do I have to go in blind? Don't we have any photo reconnaissance in the battle group?" The Commodore in turn glared at his Intelligence Officer and growled, "N-2, what do you mean, 'I don't have any photographs of the target area'!? What about the carrier's reconnaissance planes? What about that fancy imagery transmission whazits in the JIC? I thought it could get me pictures of anywhere in the world in a minute!" "Well, Commodore, I'm afraid the carrier was too far away, so they couldn't help. The national systems can't penetrate the high cloud cover, and even if they could, we can't get more than just a view of a single point target because there's no area coverage and, you know, each picture takes a long time to transmit, and, besides, we were the eighth priority on the list behind the enemy capital and the Army's objectives and a bunch of other guys. I guess --- heh-heh --- we'll just have to do the planning the way we did in the old days, without any imagery, using just maps and 'best guess'." "N-2," the Commodore responded, "my 'best guess' is you're fired." The above scenario dramatizes a critical deficiency faced by the Naval Services in littoral warfare: The warfighter can't bet imagery because afloat tactical reconnaissance is broken. The following reasons apply: - Imagery interpretation skills are weak. - Planners are untrained. - Sensors do not meet collection or timeliness requirements. - Processing is lagging far behind technology. - Dissemination is slow and inefficient. The Navy and Marine Corps need to improve training and procure enhanced digital technology for collection, processing and transmission of imagery to overcome the shortfalls. 2. Defining the Requirement. Why is imagery even an issue? Put simply, in war as in any other discipline, nothing answers a question as well as a picture. Imagery support is critical to the expeditionary commander in determining opposing force composition and location, detailing topographic and geographic features of operating areas and lines of communication, and providing an accurate record of action.1 Littoral warfare requires a high-resolution, all- weather, day/night, broad-area, near-real-time imagery capability to enable the three parts of the combat assessment (CA) process: a) Targeting; b) Weaponeering and munitions effectiveness assessment (MEA); and c) Battle-damage assessment (BDA). This capability must be responsive to short-fused tasking by tactical commanders.2 Current national, theater and tactical imagery systems cannot fulfill the Naval Services' requirements in a major regional conflict.3 The shift away from open-ocean operations and toward littoral warfare has accentuated these deficiencies in imagery support to the warfighter.4 3. Specific Problem Areas. A. Sensors. l) National: National sensors are a major source of intelligence for national and theater customers, but are of limited value to the tactical commander. These sensors provide information on denied areas (i.e. those which organic collection assets cannot access due to rules of engagement, or high personnel or political risk).5 Prior to Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM, the conventional wisdom was that national sensors could fulfill the needs of the tactical commander. Wartime experience proved their inability to provide broad-area coverage, and to meet enormous demands for collection from several customers competing for limited assets.6 Due to their high cost, funding for national systems will likely be reduced in the future, further restricting their availability to a tactical commander in a major regional conflict.7 2) Tactical-Organic: The Marine RF-4B, the USMC's only tactical reconnaissance asset, was retired on the eve of the Gulf War due to deteriorating material condition, low readiness, and high maintenance. At the time, a replacement was expected in four years. Stopgap reconnaissance pod systems for the AV-8B were approved by Navy and OSD but were not funded by Congress. Six 70mm cameras for the VMFA F/A-18's arrived in time for the war, but were not used for various reasons, and have since been discarded. The Navy has the only current high-resolution, high-volume imaging system available within the fleet today. It is the Tactical Air Reconnaissance Pod System (TARPS), mounted on three F-14 Tomcat fleet air superiority fighters per Carrier Air Wing. TARPS was designed as a stopgap "band-aid" system to provide baseline capability when the RA-5 and RF-8 were withdrawn from service in the late 1970's. Like the RF-4B, TARPS is a photographic imaging system, which requires extensive chemical and mechanical treatment; in addition, it lacks standoff high-resolution and broad-area capability. The system is a) mounted on one of the scarce fighter frames needed for CV self- and strike protection; b) the low resolution forces the aircraft to be exposed to enemy air defenses; and c) processing consumes a great deal of time and material. Carrier group commanders have until recently been reluctant to provide extensive TARPS support to expeditionary units when the CV is in a high-threat area, or when it has a competing strike mission.8 Potential successors have not yet reached the production stage. In 1985, SECNAV and SECAF agreed to pursue development of an electro-optical system to follow TARPS, the F/A-l8's ATARS. Initially scheduled for 1994, ATARS is now not due for introduction to the fleet until 1998 at the earliest. The only other "organic support" available is a hand-held video or photographic camera, which does not meet most expeditionary requirements. UAV's would be a practical and generally low-cost solution for the tactical reconnaissance problem. The two major obstacles to rapid fielding of UAV's are: - the political unviability of new system procurement under current fiscal austerity. - the congressional mandate placing all UAV development and procurement under a joint program office. After five years, the UAV Joint Program Office has yet to field a single working airframe. No new afloat system has been approved. B. Processing: Chemical-mechanical processing is necessary in any photographic system such as TARPS. It requires trained personnel and bulky, complicated and costly machinery; it poses environmental and safety hazards; and it needs lots of water to function properly. This poses major sustainment problems aboard ship and in remote locations. Storage of large amounts of film also places additional logistics demands on an already strained system. C. Training: l) Staff Training: A reconnaissance mission "will never be better than its original tasking."9 During recent operations including SHARP EDGE, DESERT STORM and RESTORE HOPE, planning staffs ashore and afloat did not understand TARPS system limitations or tactical requirements. Even Air Wing staffs are often unfamiliar with the planning requirements for reconnaissance support to the ground mission. Amphibious staffs in the Pacific Fleet seldom train with their carrier counterparts, with poor results in real-world operations.10 The "customer" whom the upgrades would most benefit is paradoxically one of the biggest obstacles. The so-called "operators" who control the purse strings have historically lent lip service to tactical reconnaissance, but have done little to support it. They argue that "intelligence is not tactical" because a collector does not physically put bombs on target. In an era of precision-guided munitions and limited funding, where every shot has to count, the precise information which only imagery can provide must be available at the tactical level. A cultural change is therefore just as necessary as a technological one.11 Wargames and exercises where these warfighting deficiencies should become evident have failed to incorporate intelligence collection and sensor capabilities into the decision process. Currently, the role played by intelligence is restricted to opposing force scenario creation and control, with little actual play for sensor systems and collection management. Commanders and their staffs therefore assume that intelligence is a side issue, which will be instantly available so they can decide their weapons-system moves. This peacetime-Navy artificiality leads to a steep learning curve on intelligence asset management for both the "operators" and intelligence officers when the commander is faced with a real-world situation on deployment. 2) Imagery Interpretation: Imagery analysis and exploitation are an integral part of the intelligence process. Analysis requires highly trained interpreters with extensive technical support. There is currently a major shortfall in adequately trained imagery analysts (IA's) in the Naval Service; for example, Marine Fleet Imagery Interpretation Units (FIIU's) are manned at 55% of end strength, and one of the three existing FIIU's will be disestablished in FY94 due to force reductions.12 The Navy is hardly in better shape; CINCPACFLEET N2 has suggested embarking USAF and USA interpreters to augment deploying units.13 Despite these shortages, the services have to provide interpreters to Theater and National-level intelligence centers to support CINCs and NCA, further straining the component's ability to support the operator. Additional interpreters are made, not born; initial training requires fifteen weeks, with frequent six-week refreshers. In addition to numbers, the problem is one of existing training and specialization, since many of the Navy's imagery interpreters were trained to read Soviet naval targets at the expense of "Rest of the World" targets which are now of primary interest. They are skilled at strategic target readout but lack adequate training in operational target analysis. In some cases, the required level of expertise may be beyond the capability of schoolhouse training: CENTCOM requires USMC IA's to deploy on carriers in their AOR because Navy IA's are reportedly unable to understand scheme of maneuver and ground targets.14 Community manpower management is also at fault: The Navy did away with the Photo Interpreter (PI) rate in 1978, and created an "Intelligence Specialist" (IS) rate. The rating is better defined as "Intelligence Generalist", since the breadth of knowledge required for advancement even within the imagery interpretation Navy Employment Code (NEC)15 forces the individual to concentrate on areas other than his nominal area of expertise. To make matters worse, photo interpretation is a highly perishable skill, and the collateral duties of a sailor on a ship make it difficult to do required training.16 Reading out photographic imagery is physically demanding, (eyestrain, exhaustion, back problems) and has changed very little at the fleet level since its inception six decades ago. The planned introduction of electro-optical (E-O) systems such as ATARS, and of digitized imagery packages from theater intelligence agencies will ease this somewhat - - - but not for the next several years. D. Connectivity: For lack of anything better, a frequently used method of imagery transfer is ship-to-ship or shore-to-ship transfer of film packages by courier or airdrop, a costly and time-consuming alternative. It is also not feasible in rough seas or when the ATF and CVBG are widely separated. Imagery transmission via radio circuits requires enormous bandwidth17, and a high-quality printer at the receiving end. The transmission process is slow (5-30 minutes/image) and there is no dedicated circuit, so only a few images can be received during the broadcast window.18 To transmit TARPS imagery to an amphibious flagship (LHD, LHA, LPD or LPH classes), a carrier must first develop the film, then digitize the images for transmission via the Fleet Imagery Support Terminal (FIST). Once the "amphib" receives the image, the IA can manipulate and print it. Each step degrades resolution by about ten per cent for a total of about forty per cent loss. The result is often a "fuzzygram" that is useless for planning, and time-late. 4. Solutions. Answering operator requirements for imagery intelligence will take creativity and careful judgment because of constrained funding. Most of the following proposed solutions would require some initial cash outlay, but would eventually prove cheaper, and provide better results. A. Incorporation of Digital Technology. l) Collection Systems: Airborne reconnaissance systems must "go digital" now to save time, money, and image quality.20 This will require procurement of a new ship-launched and retrieved low-cost system which does not compete directly with ATARS development. Only a UAV tailor-made for naval use would meet all these requirements. The congressional mandate forcing all programs to undergo joint development must be rescinded to allow greater flexibility by the service in the selection and development process. Off-the-shelf systems such as Teledyne- Ryan's ARGUS which satisfy most requirements can be purchased today at relatively low cost and made operationally capable within eighteen months. UAV's present a compelling case. They do not have the same political or human risk as manned platforms. They are organic to the amphib user, rather than tied to a carrier, making them much more responsive. Recent advances in airframes and materials have given them significantly increased range and endurance. Miniaturized electronic components allow increased capability with a small payload. Opinion in OSD and Congress is quickly moving in their favor. The question about UAV's is no longer "Why buy them?", but rather "Why haven't you bought them already?" 2) Hand-held Systems: In the hand-held arena, digital systems can meet tactical requirements more effectively than film-based systems, which they can replace promptly and at low cost. Both still and video digital cameras, with greatly improved resolution over earlier models, are now available on the market. Each theater should purchase enough of these relatively low-cost systems to ensure that deploying units are properly equipped. The Office of Naval Intelligence recently purchased one video and three still cameras for deployment to Somalia for less than $100,000.21 The equipment was compatible with CJTF Somalia's intelligence computers, so the commander can display and enhance his images instantly, transmit them via encrypted channels to other units without quality degradation, and make hardcopy quickly and cheaply on the system's printer. Savings? USS Tripoli, while processing the film for CJTF Somalia, required $18,000 a month in supplies (not counting postage), uses large amounts of scarce fresh water, produces copious chemical waste, and takes 48 hours to process film due to personnel shortages and exhaustion. The product must be digitized before transmission, with attendant degradation. A photo lab ashore would have the same requirements. The digital system eliminates the recurring expense, the water and chemical problem, the time delay and the personnel requirement. The type of sensors and processors available also impacts analysis personnel; digital processors remove much of the guesswork from measurement and reduce operator exhaustion. They also allow great improvements in image manipulation and enhancement. Because digital sensors allow a transition to digital processing without degradation, they would accelerate and qualitatively improve analysis. Advances in artificial intelligence, such as pattern analysis programs, could revolutionize the entire field and reduce manpower needs. B. Improved Training. 1) Staff Education: Pre-deployment staff training at the Fleet Tactical Training Groups must bring together intelligence representatives from all the deploying staffs. Intelligence officers must educate their commanders and "operator" colleagues about the combat-multiplier effect of intelligence, and the role of intelligence in the planning process and operational execution.22 Joint and service military modeling and simulation need to put intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination into the wargaming and exercise process. Some new automated systems already include collection management and intelligence reporting. Organizations that do not operate automated conflict-resolution systems need to incorporate intelligence play into the process of manual games as though it were another operational capability, not a "given". Improved staff training and utilization methods can enhance existing systems. TARPS operations during PROVIDE COMFORT were made more effective by planning teams which prepared entire missions in advance for the aircrews, increased familiarity with system parameters and reporting formats, and placing more analysts at each workstation. (Whitworth: 36-37) 2) Imagery Analysis: The still-extant Cold War Navy imagery interpretation training doctrine, centered on Soviet naval and strategic targets, rather than on littoral targets, must be changed. Interpreters must be trained to recognize what they are most likely to see --- Italian, French, British, and, yes, U.S. ground, air and naval equipment --- in addition to Soviet-style gear. The Navy and Marine Intelligence Training Center (NMITC) is making significant strides in this direction, but additional improvement is required. To maintain the interpreters' level of expertise, the Intelligence Specialist (IS) rating must be divided into at least two rates: Imagery Interpreter and Intelligence Generalist. A less radical solution is to subdivide the IS rate along the same lines as the Communications Technician (CT) rate, with sharply defined technical specialization, rather than as it is now into the more general Naval Employment Codes (NEC'S). This would preclude the current situation, where a highly trained specialist performs unrelated administrative or technical tasks as his principal assignments. A comprehensive afloat training package to keep these perishable skills current will also improve efficiency. A project is under development by NMITC to compile a training target-set using digital technology, allowing multiple views of a single platform to be stored on a laser disc. The trainee can study ways to enhance an image, as well as process and report it, while keeping up with recognition skills. This system must be embedded in the Naval Tactical Command System - Afloat (NTCS-A), the backbone of naval shipboard automated systems, to ensure fleet-wide dissemination, product support, and standardization. C. Processing. Efficient digitization of TARPS film (to enable image transmission) requires a $100,000 machine whose purchase is currently under review.19 Such a digital-TARPS based solution must be viewed strictly as a temporary "band-aid"; otherwise, it could doom the troubled ATARS program and leave the services with a stop-gap, second-rate imager based on an airframe which will be obsolete by 1997. The Joint Services Imagery Processing System (JSIPS) and NTCS-A Imagery Exploitation Work Station (NIEWS) are approved for purchase and will be operational soon. Together, they will satisfy digital processing requirements afloat. The Navy and Marines must ensure that a digital imagery data base is created from the current film-based systems by the imagery processing centers at the Joint Intelligence Centers so that these machines can be fully employed. D. Dissemination. The Navy must drastically increase available bandwidth for deployed units, by launching satellites and providing communications antennas. The intelligence and C4 communities must work together to ensure future systems can process high data rates. Due to determined Marine Corps C4I and CNO N6/N2 prompting, a higher-bandwidth capable system (JDISS) and supporting communications (4800 bps) are being installed on deploying amphib flagships.23 The system is working far below its capacity even with the higher transmission rate. A high-capacity satellite antenna has been programmed for CV's and LHD's, but this alone will not solve the problem. The price of commercial satellite time ($80,000 plus a month per 9600bps channel), coupled with the increasing demand for high- data-rate transmission, makes it imperative for the services to deploy their own communications satellites soon. Ideal transmission capability would be a T1 line, which carries one Megabit (a million bps) and could be shared by a multitude of users. Higher-bandwidth satellites would therefore support not just imagery transmission, but also dozens of data-intensive functions resident in NTCS-A and dedicated systems. All future imagery processing and dissemination systems used by the different services must be interoperable to allow free communication between them. In the past, interoperability standards have been repeatedly waived. This solution will be difficult and costly to implement at first, but it must be rigidly adhered to. The alternative is the same chaos that occurred during DESERT STORM, when no less than eight different systems were deployed. In conclusion, the solutions postulated here for the tactical imagery problem range from the simple and relatively inexpensive (hand-held digital cameras and improved training) to the complex and costly (satellite launches). The common thread running through them is that they all cry out for immediate implementation to remedy critical support deficiencies to the littoral warfighter. FOOTNOTES 1. FMFM 3-21, MAGTF Intelligence Operations. Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Command Development Center, 91. Chapters 9 and 10 state intelligence requirements to build an accurate intelligence estimate and carry out "intelligence preparation of the battlefield." Without organic imagery support, it would be extremely difficult to perform either of these functions. 2. Jenkins, MajGen Harry W., Jr. "Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities: Report From the Director of Intelligence." Marine Corps Gazette September 92: 17. 3. Starr, Barbara. "TARPS Was Weak Link in BDA." Jane's Defence Weekly 3 August 91: 190. The article quotes then Director of Naval Intelligence RADM T.A. Brooks as saying that TARPS was "totally inadequate", and cites the Pentagon's interim report to Congress as "highlighting the problems in gathering reconnaissance data". 4. "De-Briefing on Naval Air Power in Gulf Shows Weapons Worked, Recon Didn't." Article. Inside the Navy 25 March 91: 2. 5. Chandler, David L. "Satellites, Planes, Play Big Targeting Role." Boston Globe 14 February 91: 15. The article quotes renegade author Jeffrey Richelson extensively, as he details capability estimates for highly classified U.S. reconnaissance systems. 6. Clayton, CWO2 Steven B. "Marine Corps Imagery Support." Marine Corps Gazette September 91: 26. The actual quote reads, "For too many years our... officers have gone to such schools as Command and Staff College and have been deceived... as to how much a national system can support the ground commander." 7. "Spooked Over Intelligence Cuts." Editorial. New York Times 18 March 93: 22. 8. RADM Hancock, Commander Cruiser Destroyer Group ONE, briefed "RANGER'S Last Ride," the first "expeditionary deployment of the '...From the Sea' era" in the Pentagon on 5 March 1993. He detailed the major role played by TARPS throughout the deployment, especially in support of expeditionary forces in Operation RESTORE HOPE in Somalia. RANGER also provided significant imagery processing and distribution services for the landing forces ashore. At the time, RESTORE HOPE was the carrier's top operational priority, and the CV operated in a low-threat environment; its relief on-station, USS KITTY HAWK, departed the area shortly after arrival due to commitments in the Persian Gulf, leaving the Landing Force with greatly reduced capabilities. 9. Whitworth, LTJG F.D. "Improving Tactical Photo Reconnaissance... Today." Naval Intelligence Quarterly Summer 92: 35. 10. RADM Hancock stated in his 5 March 93 debrief that the PHIBRON staff and the CJTF staff ashore "had no idea" how to plan the numerous TARPS missions the Air Wing flew in support of RESTORE HOPE, in large part because of lack of advance training. The carrier staff had to "be imaginative" in its tasking and try to figure out on its own the collection requirements of the amphibious staff. 11. McTernan, LtCol Walter F. III. "Intelligence: You Get What You Pay For." Marine Corps Gazette March 92: 23. 12. COL Mammarella of MCCDC presented these figures at a Community Management Briefing during the USMC C4I Conference, held at the Sheraton National Hotel, Arlington, VA 23-25 February 1993. 13. CAPT Nelson Litsinger, CPF N2, in 4 March 1993 Pentagon discussion with CDR Jim McKee of CNO N20 (Intelligence Plans, Policy, Programs and Requirements). 14. Whitworth: 36, states assigning "a Marine or Army photo interpreter...to the CVIC should be a prerequisite." LT Maria Lyles, CENTCOM (Rear) J20, in phone conversation, 5 February 1993, stated that assignment of Marine IA's to CVIC's is now official CENTCOM policy. 15. The USN equivalent of the USMC's Military Occupational Specialty or MOS 16. CDR Pete Hull, former CCDG N2A for RESTORE HOPE and CVW Intelligence Officer for DESERT STORM, commented 18 March 1993 that collateral duties "like buffing decks often seemed to be the main job of the sailors and the main priority of the CVIC officer." 17. A minimum of 2400 bits per second (BPS), preferably via a low-interference band such as UHF SATCOM. HF-band use in the late 1970's and early 1980's was highly unsatisfactory. A major problem for afloat units is that most of their data circuits are 75bps, with only two or four 4800 or 2400 bps circuits aboard a major vessel. 18. Imagery transmission to afloat units is usually on the Commander's Privacy Net, leading to constant frequency-share allocation turf battles. 19. The Prototype Imagery Exploitation System (PIES) would be deployed on all carriers. 20. Putting digital backs on TARPS cameras, an idea advanced in an earlier solution paper, is not feasible because there is no aircraft-capable digital tape recorder on the market with the required data rate (120-240 Megabits per second). 21. CAPT David Bishop, of JDISS Program Office at Naval Maritime Intelligence Center, phone call January 1993. 22. Recent assessment wargames have gone some way to correct this deficiency; tactical reconnaissance assets were three of the top ten priorities for combat capability upgrades in the CNO- level Joint Littoral Warfare Assessment and the Surveillance Joint Mission Assessment for the Navy, and figured prominently at the CNO/CMC/SECNAV "Force 2001" Assessment in March 1993. 23. JDISS is the Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System, whose afloat version currently uses 4800 or 9600 bps of a 32K bps SHF circuit. Programmed afloat versions will require up to a T1 line. BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. "De-Briefing on Naval Air Power in Gulf Shows Weapons Worked, Recon Didn't." Article. Inside the Navy 25 March 91: 2. 2. "Possible Enhancements to USMC Tactical Reconnaissance Capabilities". Information Memorandum. CMC/C4I. November 92. 3. "Questions From The Assistant Chief of Staff C412 on Tactical Reconnaissance." Information Paper. CMC/APW-61 10 April 91. 4. "Spooked Over Intelligence Cuts." Editorial. New York Times 18 March 93: 22. 5. Chandler, David L. "Satellites, Planes, Play Targeting Role." Boston Globe 14 February 91: 16. 6. Clayton, CWO2 Steven B. "Marine Corps Imagery Support." Marine Corps Gazette September 91: 26. 7. CNO/N889 (Tactical Reconnaissance) Program Office. "ATARS Programmatic Options." Flag Officer Review Brief. March 93. 8. FMFM 3-21, MAGTF Intelligence Operations. Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Combat Development Command, 91. Chapters 9 and 10. 9. Fulghum, David A. "Desert Storm Highlights Need for Rapid Tactical Intelligence." Jane's Defence Weekly 11 February 91: 18-19 10. Gutmann, Major Christopher P. "The Lessons Learned of Tactical Reconnaissance." Marine Corps Gazzette September 91: 33-34. 11. Hancock, RADM T. "Ranger's Last Ride." Post-deployment Debrief to CNO. 5 March 93. 12. Holycross, COL Thomas. "Joint Systems Imagery Processing System." Information briefing. Boston, MA: JSIPS PMO, 92. 13. Intelligence Systems Handbook. Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Combat Development Command, March 93. 14. Jenkins, MajGen Harry W., Jr. "Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities: Report From the Director of Intelligence", Marine Corps Gazette September 92: 17. 15. Jenquin, Mike. "Comparison of Film-based and Electro-optical System Resolution." Monograph. Pensacola, FL: Naval Air Training Center, 14 February 92. 16. Keller, Major Russell A. "Intelligence Is a Team Sport." Marine Corps Gazette March 92: 16. 17. McTernan, LtCol Walter F. III. "Intelligence: You Get What You Pay For." Marine Corps Gazette March 92: 23. 18. Maynard, Lt Col Robert. "Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System: The Standard for Interoperability." Information Brief. Suitland, MD: JDISS Program Office, NAVMIC 10 February 93. 19. Perkins, RADM J. "MPF Operations in RESTORE HOPE." Post-deployment Debrief to CNO. 1 February 93. 20. Starr, Barabara. "TARPS Was Weak Link in BDA." Jane's Defence Weekly 3 August 91: 190-91. 21. Wanstall, Brian. "Realtime Images for Post-Gulf TacR." International Defense Review August 91: 833-839. 22. Whitworth, LTJG F.D. "Improving Tactical Photo Reconnaissance... Today." Naval Intelligence Bulletin, Summer 1992: 35. Following personnel were interviewed or provided assistance for background material on this paper: CNO/N2O (Intelligence Plans, Policy, Programs and Requirements): CDR James H. McKee (N20X1 Data & Surveillance Systems) LCDR Santiago R. Neville (N20X6, Expeditionary Warfare) CNO/N889 (Tactical Reconnaissance): CAPT Larry Long, USMC ONI/JDISS PMO: CAPT Dave Bishop, USMC (ONI 7113) -END-
