The Extinction Of Ground Reconnaissance: A Preventable Tragedy CSC 1993 SUBJECT AREA - Intelligence EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Title: The Extinction of Ground Reconnaissance: A Preventable Tragedy Author: Major William J. Corcoran, United States Marine Corps Thesis: The FSPG's recommendation for the reorganization of reconnaissance will create a lack of unity of effort in the areas of training management and will denigrate the effectiveness of our reconnaissance Marines in combat. The long range effect will be the inability of reconnaissance units to provide the division commander stealth reconnaissance for the extended close and amphibious reconnaissance mission. Presently, there are recommendations on the table that will avoid the extinction of ground reconnaissance. Background: In the fall of 1991 the Marine Corps formed a study group, the Force Structure Planning Group (FSPG), to determine how the Marine Corps could restructure to a reduced manning level of 159,100. This study included an evaluation of the requirements and capabilities of the Marine Corps in the 21st century. The FSPG concluded that reconnaissance units needed mobility to keep up with the increasingly mobile divisions. Additionally, the FSPG recommended that the present battalion reconnaissance units be reconstituted to three LAV mounted regimental reconnaissance companies and one reconnaissance battalion. This plan strips amphibious and stealth reconnaissance away from the Division Commander and effectively emasculates reconnaissance as an effective intelligence gathering force. In an attempt to rescue the Marine Corp's only HUMINT collection capability, the First and Second Marine Divisions conducted a reconnaissance planning conference where they brainstormed a solution to the problems created by the FSPG. The Reconnaissance Planning Group proposed that a division reconnaissance company (DRC) be reconstituted in lieu of light armored reconnaissance. This DRC would provide the division commander the "bare bones" minimum reconnaissance assets to meet his forward presence and contingency requirements. OUTLINE Thesis: The FSPG's recommendation for the reorganization of reconnaissance will create a lack of unity of effort in the areas of training management and will denigrate the effectiveness of our reconnaissance Marines in combat. The long range effect will be the inability of reconnaissance units to provide the division commander stealth reconnaissance for the extended close and amphibious reconnaissance mission. Presently, there are recommendations on the table that will avoid the extinction of ground reconnaissance. I. Force Structure Planning Group recommendation A. Present reconnaissance structure B. Recommended reconnaissance structure II. Secretary of the Navy's Grand Vision A. Shift in emphasis to the world's littoral regions B. Focus on regional crisis C. Maintain the U.S.'s primacy of forward presence III. Inherent problems with the FSPG s recommendation A. Fragmentation of reconnaissance assets B. Inefficient training and dichotomy of employment C. Unit commander focus D. Specialization of reconnaissance E. Overall shortage of division reconnaissance IV. Solution A. Establishment of Reconnaissance Study Group B. Establish one ground reconnaissance company per division. V. Conclusion Introduction In the fall of 1991, the Marine Corps formed a study group, Force Structure Planning Group (FSPG), to determine how the Marine Corps could restructure to a reduced manning level of 159,100 Marines. This study included an evaluation of require- ments and capabilities of the Marine Corps in the 21st century. "The base force division of the future must have more tactical mobility than its predecessors. To build that mobility, we introduce the Combined Arms Regiment (CAR).. "(2:4) Once the division's mobility problem was addressed, the FSPG turned to the issue of mobility and expanded roles for the division's recon- naissance battalion: In the area of reconnaissance, the FSPG foresaw an expanded role for the reconnaissance units on future battlefields expanding. . . These units must be able to conduct not only reconnaissance but also security and economy of force operations. Further, they rnust be able to conduct limited offensive or delaying operations, which use their firepower and mobility. (2:4) The product of the FSPG is called the "USMC 2001 Plan." The 2001 Plan recommended structure changes that will provide the Division Commander with a less than satisfactory human intelli- igence (HUMINT) gathering capability. In redefining recon's future role, the foot mobile, classic dismounted reconnaissance seems have been the biggest casualty. The FSPG's recommendation for the reorganization of reconnaissance will create a lack of unity of effort in the areas of training and management, and will denigrate the effectiveness of our reconnaissance Marine. The long range effect will be the inability of reconnaissance units to provide the division commander enough stealth reconnaissance resources for the extended close reconnaissance mission. Presently, there are recommendations on the table that will provide the division commander with a "bare bones" minimum amount of stealth and amphibious reconnaissance. FSPG Recommendation Before we study the impact of the FSPG on reconnaissance we must first look at the present structure and functions of our reconnaissance units. Under the present tables of organization 1428G and 1423J, the battalion reconnaissance units in both First and Second Marine Divisions have four companies with 12 platoons each. This gives the division commander 36 separate teams to employ throughout the division. However, in reality, first Reconnaissance Battalion restructured and redesignated to become First Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion. The Second Recon- naissance Battalion is actually staffed at two companies vice the four companies as authorized on their table of organization. The Third Marine Division has a total of three companies with one company permanently based in Hawaii. In addition to the battalion reconnaissance units, each Marine Expeditionary Force has a force reconnaissance company with six platoons containing three-four man reconnaissance teams. Under this present table of organization there are enough recon- naissance assets to support the division commanders, and the deploying MEUs. This T/O made allowances for maintenance stand downs and various training evolutions. Additionally, it provided for. limited quality of life. FSPG Recommendation The FSPG recommended that the current organization of three reconnaissance battalions, one in each division, be reconstituted by fiscal year 93. Under the new structure, the reconnaissance units are reconstituted as four separate reconnaissance entities: one light armored reconnaissance company within the combined arms regiment, two reconnaissance companies to support the two infan- try regiments, and one separate reconnaissance battalion-light armored (LA) in support of the division as a whole. Each of the regimental reconnaissance companies will have three platoons. Finally, the force reconnaissance company will remain with the Surveillance Reconnaissance Intelligence Group (SRIG) in the MEF command element. The former T/O was focused on stealth, foot mobile, human intelligence gathering operations. The latter T/O is obviously focused on speed, firepower, mobility, and a limited capability to fight. "In reality, USNC 2001 defines the reconnaissance battalion as a light cavalry organization with an emphasis on light armored reconnaissance."(2:5) In addition to their traditional intelligence gathering activities, the newly formed Light Armored Reconnaissance Company (LAR) is assigned such missions as economy of force, deception, screening, scouting and other functions as shaping the battlefield. Secretary of The Navy Grand Vision This restructure seems to counter the Department of the Navy's new shift in their roles and missions. In a Navy and Marine Corps White Paper, the Secretary of the Navy spelled out his grand vision of the Naval Service's role in the next century. Central to that theme is the Naval Service's shift in emphasis to the littoral regions of the world. This new shift will require increased emphasis and training in amphibious reconnais- sance. The Secretary of the Navy's White Paper provides reasons for possessing the amphibious reconnaissance capability: . . . examples of how naval forces will implement the concept of joint operations include focusing on the littoral area. By maintaining this focus the Navy and Marine Corps can seize and defend an adversary's port, naval base, or coastal air base to allow the entry of heavy Army or Air Force forces. The success of modern U.S. military strategy depends on forces organized, trained, and equipped for that division of labor.(6:2) In the same White Paper the Secretary of the Navy stressed that naval forces operating forward will demonstrate U.S. commitment overseas. "Naval Forces also contain crisis through forward operations and rapid response with flexible and sustainable sea- based forces."(6.) Over the past few years, forward operations and rapid response have become increasingly important. It is universally understood that although our main adversary, the Soviet Union is no longer a threat, the world today is much more dangerous and volatile. Regional conflicts have increased as a result of religious, ethnic, and racial tensions. There are literally dozens of potential flash-points throughout the world that are nearly impossible to predict and that will require an immediate contingency response. At this critical time when the Marine Corps' roles and missions have become more acutely focused towards the world's littorals, we are faced with an increased need for amphibious reconnaissance. The authors of ". . From the Sea" under score the importance of focusing on littoral warfare: For the Naval Service, then, dominating the battle space means ensuring effective transition from open ocean to littoral areas, and from sea to land and back, to accomplish the full range of missions. This is the essence of naval adaptability and flexibility, which are keys to contingency response. (6.) Under the Marine Corps 2001 plan, the emphasis on our ground and amphibious reconnaissance capability is going in the opposite direction from where it should be headed. Under the USMC 2001 Plan, the light-armored reconnaissance battalions/companies are more focused on mechanized operations with the light-armored vehicle as the primary insertion/extraction platform. This is a much different maneuver than the traditional scuba, parachute, or helicopter form of insertion, not to mention it is devoid of any stealth or secret means of employment. The deployment of our reconnaissance units in LAVs not only decreases their amphibious reconnaissance capability, but is sure to degrade their stealth collection ability. Problems With The FSPG Recommendation Fragmentation of Division Reconnaissance One of the many flaws with the FSPG's recommendation is the fragmentation of the division's reconnaissance assets. As previously discussed, under the structure prior to USMC 2001, all the division's reconnaissance assets were located under one battalion commander. The benefits of this monolithic organi- zation were its inherent unity of effort, standardized training, and more effective use of reconnaissance as an intelligence collector. With all the reconnaissance assets in one battalion, the commander can orchestrate the battalion's efforts in one direction at the same time. Deploying infantry units would use the time tested procedure of task organizing for operations by requesting support through higher headquarters. Under USMC 2001, the units are spread over four different commands within the division, each unit operating autonomously on its own. Although each regiment has its own reconnaissance assets, when reconnaissance is needed at the division level the division commander will have to request support from the subordinate (regiment) headquarters. Inefficient Training and Dichotomy of Employment Because of USMC 2001, training in amphibious and stealth reconnaissance will be greatly affected. It is wise to assume that each of the reconnaissance units will be required to meet a standard set of performance objectives. The problem is the disparate quality of training in each of the units, and subse- quently, their varying levels of proficiency. Weaker units will tend to stay weak while the units with effective trainers will get stronger. This new organization also portends duplication of effort, which equates to wasted time and effort by conducting the same training in the separate reconnaissance units. With the down-sizing of the Marine Corps, equipment and personnel will be in shorter supply. In the spirit of "Total Quality Management" we should be managing our time and resources more efficiently. The difficult task of getting helicopter support for rapelling, spie rigging, helicasting, fast-roping, etc. , will become even more difficult. If the reconnaissance companies train in these skills at all, the chances are great that they will be requesting multi- ple frags from scarce assets. This duplication of effort will exhaust a capability that is already stretched too thin. The same situation will be true for fixed wing support for parachute operations. The other problem with training is the fact that the employ- ment of light armored reconnaissance (LAR) is directly opposite from the employment of stealth, foot-mobile reconnaissance. Both concepts of employment contradict one another. We cannot hide the fact that in reality, LAR is cavalry employed to exploit its speed, mobility, and firepower. Ground reconnaissance, although less mobile, exploits stealth and secrecy through the doctrinal manner in which it is employed. LAR engages the enemy and ground reconnaissance does not. When employing LAR and stealth recon- naissance together, important decisions must be made. In his proposal to modify the FSPG, LtCol Kiser raises several conflict- ing decisions: Combining reconnaissance and LAR into one unit forces such dilemmas as choosing between sending foot patrols out or maintaining vehicle security, conducting only short term surveillance on key points of interests because the vehicles need to be moved for security, utilization of the vehicles in restricted/close terrain where the enemy might be at risk of endangering the vehicles, and how to apportion LAR missions between information collection for the Commander and exploitation of the LAV-25' s, mobility and firepower as a component of the scheme of maneuver.(3:1-2) What the FSPG failed to realize is that fighting recon and stealth recon are two totally different missions. Employing recon in LAVs inherently- implies "fighting reconnaissance," which means aggressively looking for enemy gaps, salients, and other opportunities and exploiting them immediately. "Fighting recon requires quick reaction and exploitation. This mission is normally controlled by the G-3. "(4:41) On the other hand, stealth reconnaissance, requires a static or slowly developing situation (low intensity conflict) to allow for detailed planning and close surveillance. Stealth reconnaissance is more of an intelligence gathering asset and as such is conducted by the G-2. (4: 41) Maintenance and training, two areas which are time dependent, will be competing for the reconnaissance Marine's attention. The LAV is a complex, maintenance intense vehicle. Routine preventive maintenance must be performed throughout the LAV: vehicle hull, communications gear, intercom system, secure voice equipment, optical system, grenade launcher, and fire control system. This routine preventive maintenance is performed by the crewmen while in garrison, on ship during deployments, as well as in the field during in-place halts, when the vehicle is parked for the night, and at other miscellaneous times. Who is going to perform the daily preventive maintenance on the vehi- cles? Valuable MOS training time will be spent in the critical tasks of performing preventive maintenance on the vehicles. The reconnaissance MOS has 86 individual training standards (ITS) that must be mastered. The light armored infantryman has 97 ITSs he must maintain proficiency in. Most of these ITSs are incompatible for concurrent training. "When the 183 ITSs are combined with the extraordinary maintenance requirements of the LAV and its armament it is unrealistic to expect a platoon com- mander to develop an effective training plan "(3:1-2) even if the platoon commander is able to develop a training plan, will his Marines ever be able to master all the skills, and maintain proficiency in them? Unit Commander Focus Problems with roles and missions of reconnaissance will occur because of the focus (or lack) of the unit ,commander. Many commanders harbor resentment of the reconnaissance community because of their "elitist" reputation. Also, there are many commanders who don't understand or don't appreciate the benefits of effectively employed reconnaissance. Although the idea of a commander's negative attitude towards recon may sound parochial, it is a very real concern that must be dealt with. Reconnais- sance skills are specialized and highly perishable requiring continual practice. Only a unit commander who appreciates the skills and employment of reconnaissance will ensure that those skills are maintained. One reconnaissance battalion commander summarized a primary reason for the lack of understanding of reconnaissance: The Marine Corps does not train it's future GCE commanders, S3s, or S2s, on proper reconnaissance employment. Amphibious Warfare School allocates only one three hour block of instruction. As a result, most GCE staffs do not appreciate the reconnaissance unit's abilities and restrictions.(5:1) Regimental intelligence officers do not know how to plan for stealth or reconnaissance operations. They do not know how to employ reconnaissance teams and consequently, the S-3's often take over and misemploy reconnaissance. Specialization of Reconnaissance It should be clear that a great deal of time and effort goes into train our reconnaissance Marines. These Marines receive intense training in SCUBA diving, spie rigging, rapelling, fast roping, helicasting, communications, small unit patrolling, inflatable boat operations, not to mention lesser, known skills such as morse code, vehicle recognition, sketching, and photo- graphy. If these skills are not used they are quickly denigrat- ed. FMFM 2-2, the amphibious reconnaissance doctrinal training publication, states that "the reconnaissance training cycle should be a minimum of one year in order to properly train personnel in the required skill and techniques."(1:41) It is recognized that amphibious reconnaissance is a highly specialized brand of warfare. That is why after completion of their train- ing, reconnaissance Marines are assigned the MOS of 0321. This specialization calls for unique requirements to be met if the reconnaissance units are going to operate effectively. Additional pitfalls of merging specialized reconnaissance units with LAVs were identified most recently in a staff study submitted by the battalion commander of First Reconnaissance Battalion: Because they are specialized, they require specialized equipment (budgeting), training, manning, and staff support. The regimental reconnaissance companies are unlikely to get the required level of attention in an organization surrounded by people who are under the gun to answer key issues surrounding the training, equipping, and manning of our fighting infantry. (2:4) Shortage of Reconnaissance Training, maintenance and specialization aside, the biggest deficiency with USMC 2001 is the disregard for critically needed stealth and amphibious reconnaissance at the division level. ". . . a problem brought on by the USMC 2001 is that the reconnais- sance battalion (LA) can no longer provide the division commander an amphibious reconnaissance capability. "(2:6) In June 1992, the Commanding General of the First Marine Division implemented the USMC 2001 PLAN as it pertains to reconnaissance. Keeping within the constraints of USMC 2001, the First Marine Division has con- ducted four command post exercises under different plans and found that they routinely run out of reconnaissance assets within the first 48 hours of operations. The resultant effect is for the division to dip into the CAR and regimental reconnaissance units to support the division's recon needs. The unnatural act of higher headquarters asking a subordinate headquarters for support not only doesn't make sense, but it is sure to leave the regimental commander with out any recon assets, and could create disharmony between the two commanders. The FSPG plan becomes self defeating if every time the division commander has a need for more reconnaissance he takes it from the regimental commander. Solution Under the 2001 Plan the MEU commanders are sure to get short changed. The decreased number of reconnaissance platoons will not be enough to support the myriad of real world contingencies: ACF or MPF commitments, annual cold weather commitments, an extra periodic MAGTF commitrnent, CAX and mountain warfare training and other major exercises. In response to the FSPG's recommendations, Headquarters Marine Corps and the First and Second Marine Divisions sent representatives to Camp Pendleton on 17 November 1992, in order to brainstorm how the divisions will deal with the recommendations of the FSPG. The division representatives felt that while the USMC 2001 plan supports reconnaissance in a fast paced, shoot and move environment, it does nothing to support a slower paced, restricted terrain environment where light infantry troops in a third world country are involved. The 2001 plan simply does not support combat in a low intensity conflict. LtCol McKenzie, a former reconnaissance battalion commander, provIdes a cogent argument for maintaining stealth reconnais- sance: At the low intensity end, stealth recon is vital to finding the enemy as he makes maximum use of cover and concealment, operates in very small units and masses only for short periods to obtain surprise in order to achieve a limited objective.(4:30) Instead of adding reconnaissance companies to the regiments, the planners at the reconnaissance conference recommended that a division reconnaissance company (DRC) replace the existing recon- naissance battalion and supersede the proposed light armored reconnaissance battalion. This plan will provide DRCs wIth 12 officers and 227 enlisted men for the 1st and 2nd Divisions and a company of 6 officers and 88 men for the 3rd Division. (The 3rd division gets a smaller company because of reduced contingency requirements). This proposed plan will provide the Marine Corps with twenty one traditional foot-mobile, stealth and amphibious reconnaissance platoons who provide the capability to support the division's current and foreseeable forward presence and rapid response requirements. The concept of employment calls for teams of five to six men to operate in the division and regimental zones conducting the various types of traditional missions assigned to reconnaissance units. They will report to the tactical commanders whose zones they are operating in. Platoon and company command elements will deploy with the units they will be supporting in order to advise on employment and to assist in the intelligence section. There are a few drawbacks to this plan. Obviously the plan removes the regimental (scout) capability. However, the capa- bility to support the regiments exists at the division level. The ground reconnaissance conference showed that In order for the division to meet its forward presence and contingency operations, a minimum of 21 platoons are required Corps-wide. This plan does not consider the impact that staffing goals, fleet assistance programs, or any other sources of personnel turbulence will have on the reconnaissance units. The plan does not provide any depth to these units. The many strengths to this proposal oat weigh by far the weaknesses. Of primary importance, Division Commander's operational requirements. It reflects the Secretary of the Navy's primacy of forward presence which he articulated in his White Letter. It recognizes the Navy Marine Corps relationship which was also discussed in the Secretary of the Navy's White Letter. The proposal also incorporates the current and emerging doctrines of the 1990s. Additionally, the proposal centralizes reconnaissance assets and their efforts under the Division Com- manding General. This maximizes the division's tactical flexibility and standardizes training. Finally, the ground reconnaissance assets can be tailored to meet each division's forward presence and contingency requirements without exceeding the FSPG's limitations on staffing. Conclusion In light of the unholy marriage between reconnaissance and LAVs, the importance of the foot mobile, stealthy, intelligence gatherers cannot be understated. Their capabilities of conduct- ing distant and deep reconnaissance are invaluable assets for the division commander. HUMINT intelligence gathering skills are not easy to come by. These skilIs in stealth operations, insertion and extraction, and working in their small units must be con- tinually honed in order to maintain their proficiency. Merging ground reconnaissance with light armored vehicles will emasculate the reconnaissance community by shifting the focus of employment away from stealth recon to fighting recon. It is inconceivable that our Commandant who co-authored the White Letter ". . From the Sea," which emphasized the importance of forward presence, contingency operations, and a focus on the world's littorals, would allow the Marine Corps to degrade our critically needed amphibious and stealth reconnaissance capability. Adding the light armored vehicle to the reconnaissance mission increases recon's training and maintenance time, which stretches an already busy training regimen. We should not make the mistake of confusing fighting reconnaissance with stealth reconnaissance which are two different missions on opposite ends of the spectrum. The issues of commander's focus, expertise of the trainers, and unity of effort will all have a negative impact in the area of training and employment. To get at the heart of the problem we must ask ourselves; what are we gaining and what are we giving up? I question the wisdom of giving up our amphibious/extended reconnaissance capability in order to gain another maneuver element. Since June 1992, the First Marine Division has operated within the "constraints" of USMC 2001 and has categorically refuted its utility. The Commanding Generals of the two CONUS divisions recognize the impact that LAR will have on their amphibious and extended reconnaissance capability. They both agree that what they need more than an additional "ride-along- infantry" unit in LAVs, is their old battle tested amphibious/ extended reconnaissance capability. The division's proposed plan is within the staffing constraints of the FSPG and will provide the Marine Corps a bear minimum of reconnaissance assets to support the myriad of contingency and presence missions. Additionally, it is in keeping with the spirit of the Secretary of the Navy's ". . .From the Sea" White Paper. Consideration of the reconnaissance conference's proposal will provide the divisions what they need in HUMINT and prevent the tragedy of the possible extinction of stealth/amphibious reconnaissance. BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. FMFM 2-2 Amphibious Reconnaissance. Quantico, Virginia, 19 March 1976. 2. Kelly, LtCol John. "Restructuring Recon in the Marine Corps." Staff Study, 1st Reconnaissance Battalion, October 92. 3. Kiser, LtCol J.B. "Proposed Modifications to USMC 2001 Plan; Division Reconnaissance Companies." 2nd Reconnaissance Battalion, Draft Copy, 1900/ADJ(S). 4. McKenzie, S.W. "The Case For Division Reconnaissance." Command and Staff College Archives, November 1992. 5. McKenzie, S.W. "Reconnaissance Issues Within the Marine Corps." 2nd Reconnaissance Battalion, Ltr to 2nd CG MarDiv, 3000/ADJ, 20 June 1991. 6. Okeefe, Sean C. Secretary of the Navy, "From the Sea: A New Direction for the Naval Services." Sept 1992. 7. "Recon Issues Conference Daily Summary." After Action Report. HQTRS Marine Corps, POR-25, 23 November 1992.
