Aerial Reconnaissance: A Dedicated Squadron CSC 1993 SUBJECT AREA - Intelligence EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Title: Aerial Reconnaissance: A Dedicated Squadron Author: Major Wayne E. Breakfield, United States Marine Corps Thesis: Although the OV-10 Bronco must be replaced, the Marine Observation Squadrons must be retained for the support and expertise they provide. Background: With the probability of confIict shifting towards the low intensity end of the spectrum the requirement for a dedicated observation squadron still exists. The deactivation of Marine Observation Squadrons creates a gap in aviation support to the MAGTF that attack helicopter and fighter/attack squadrons can not fill. Attack aircraft crews lack the expertise to accomplish the mission and are already overtasked. Additionally, flight characteristics of attack helicopters and fighter attack jets make them unsuitable for the observation mission. Recommendation: To ensure continued tactical aerial reconnaissance and supporting arms coordination support, Marine Observation Squadrons must not only be retained but also equipped with modern aircrait designed to accomplish the observation mission. OUTLINE Thesis: Although the OV-10 Bronco must be replaced, the Marine Observation Squadrons must be retained for the support and expertise they provide. I. Marine Observation Squadrons support to the MAGTF A. Tasks B. Unique crew composition II. lnability of attack helicopter and fighter/attack squadrons to adequately perform observation mission A. Insufficient ground combat arms experience B. Lower priority of observation mission C. Fight characteristics of helicopters and jets D. Improper avionics Ill. Requirement for an observation squadron A. Dedicated to the mission B. Higher probability of low-to-mid intensity conflict IV. V-10 replacement A. Flight characteristics B. Avionics AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE: A DEDICATED SQUADRON The United States entered the age of aerial reconnaissance during the Civil War. Both the Union and Confederate armies used hydrogen balloons to provide tactical reconnaissance to their commanders. By carrying a telegraph line aloft, an observer could adjust artillery or provide intelligence about troop movements. (8:12) After the invention of airplanes. aerial reconnaissance became more flexible during World War One. Observers, free to move over the battlefield, provided information about enemy units, defensive trenches, and massing of enemy forces for an attack. The Marine Corps deployed Marine Observation Squadron One to Nicaragua in 1927 to support 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines. In addition to providing aerial reconnaissance, VMO-1 flew close air support. medevac, and resupply missions.(5:101) Since their establishment, Marine Observation Squadrons have reduced the commander' s uncertainty by providing tactical, aerial furnishing detailed information of critical times and places. Marine Observation (VMO) Squadrons provide valuable support to the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAG TF). Support provided includes day and night aerial reconnaissance, Forward air control airborne (FACA) Tactical air coordinator airborne (TACA), artillery and naval gunfire air spot, radio relay, light attack, and other utility missions. Although the OV-10 bronco must be replaced the Marine Observation Squadrons must be retained for the support and expertise they provide. Deactivating Observation squadrons will create serious deficiencies in support provided by the wing to the MAGTF. The deactivation of the Marine Observation squadrons creates a gap in aviation support. Attack helicopter and all weather fighter attack squadrons can not provide adequate support because of lack of crew expertise, other priority missions and aircraft unsuitability. Even a cursory examination of existing missions and training syllabi exposes the flawed concept of tasking these overly committed airframes with more missions. Air frame limitations of both strike aircraft and helicopters also make them unsuitable as an OV-10 replacement. One of the first points to consider is the VMO squadron' s unique crew composition of a naval aviator and a Supporting Arms Coordinator (SAC) or an Aerial Observer (AO) . The crew furnishes expertise essential to accomplishing the observation mission. Each SAC or AO begins aviation training only after completing a ground combat arms tour. His ground background combined with the pilot's aviation expertise forms a team unparalleled in the Marine Aircraft Wing. This crew, the smallest of MAGTFs, often functions as a critical link between ground units and aviation assets. The observation crew, drawing on their combined expertise, matches the proper aviation support to the situation. Attack helicopters and strike aircraft crews do not bring this same level of expertise to the observation mission. Two pilots man the attack helicopter the AH-1W Cobra. A naval aviator and a naval flight officer flew the fighter/attack jet the F/A-18D Hornet. These Marines take their responsibilities seriously and train diligently toward their missions. However, no requirement exists for these marines to serve a tour as a ground combat arms officer prior to flight training. The training received at The Basic School also does not develop the expertise in ground operations acquired by an officer serving a tour in the fleet Marine forces. Aviators without significant experience in ground operations simply cannot provide the detailed support available from an observation squadron. Another factor to consider is primary tasking for mission accomplishment. Observation squadrons fulfill their mission by accomplishing two primary tasks: tactical aerial reconnaissance and supporting arms coordination.(3:46) The training and readiness (T&R) syllabus reflects the squadrons priority by dedicating 56 percent of their training toward these two tasks.(4:1122) Expertise in performing this mission comes only long hours of dedicated training conducted by a squadron focused on accomplishing this mission. The VMO squadron trains for and performs other assigned tasks, but its priority remains aerial reconnaissance and supporting arms coordination. FMFM 5-1, Organization and Functions of Marine Aviation, tasks attack helicopter squadrons with performing aerial reconnaissance and supporting arms coordination. however, their primary mission is to provide anti-armor support and close in fire suppression to the MAGTF.(3:4-17) The squadron' s T&R syllabus reflects its priority by allocating only six percent of the syllabus for observation mission training. With so little training allocated to performing aerial reconnaissance and supporting arms coordination, the support provided by an attack helicopter squadron will not compare favorably to similar support furnished by a dedicated VMO squadron. Like the attack helicopter squadron. the all weather fiqhter/attack squadron's priorities are not aerial reconnaissance and supporting arms coordination. FMFM 5-1 tasks them with providing day and night under the weather offensive air support. Training for their primary mission occupies 33% of the T&R syllabus. However only 7.2% of the syllabus is devoted to the mission of supporting arms coordination and visual reconnaissance. (4:121-122) By the time aircrews finish air-to-air intercepts, low altitude training, and carrier qualifications, little time remains for developing expertise in supporting arms coordination and reconnaissance. Limited numbers of fighter/attack squadrons, performing critical and highly visible close air support missions, will find it difficult to make time to train for and accomplish the deactivated VMO squadron's mission. Further, the observation mission requires an airframe that can cruise at medium altitudes and medium airspeeds for extended periods of time. The AH-1W and F/A-18Ds limitations in speed, altitude, time-on-station, and avionics make both aircraft poor replacements for the OV-10. For example, the AH-1W is designed to fly low and relatively slow. The AH-1W's maximum speea of 190 knots makes it too slow to accomplish the observation mission and survive. The AH-1W lacks sufficient speed to allow its crew to dash into and safely out of areas requiring aerial surveillance. The AH-1W flies too slowly to rapidly relocate from one area on the battlefield to another. Also as the AH-1W climbs, its maneuverability decreases making it more susceptible to anti-aircraft weapons. Like otner fighters, the F/A-18D is designed to fly at super-sonIc speeds. In order to accomplish the observation mission the F/A-18D would have to fly at an uncomfortably slow speed limiting its maneuverability and increasing its susceptibility to anti-aircraft weapons. Furthermore, flying at medium altitudes will decrease the F/A-18D's time-on-station through increased fuel consumption. Due to decreased maneuverability and increased susceptibility, neither of these aircraft would survive on the modern battlefield attempting to perform the missions of the VMO squadron. Time on station is critical for accomplishing the observation mission. Observation squadrons developed a relationship with ground units by staying on station for four or more hours. Neither the AH-1W nor the F/A-18D remain airborne long enough to build the situational awareness required to support ground units. The AH-1W carrying a typical ordnance load can remain aloft for two hours: the F/A-18D stays airborne one hour and 45 minutes.(2:360:439, 6, 7) The F/A-18D can extend its time on station by aerial refueling, but the crew still loses situational awareness when leaving to refuel. Trying to replace the OV-10 with tne AH-1W or the F/A-18D will not work because neither aircraft has sufficient on station time. The avionics in the OV-10D provide capabilities not available with the AH-1W and F/A-18D. The OV-10 has four radios: the AH-1W and F/A-18D each have only two radios and neither is a high frequency radio necessary for communicating on some supporting arms nets. Unlike the OV-10, neither the AH-1W nor the F/A-18D is equipped with a LASER designator for target marking. Further, the AH-1W and F/A-:18D lack an integral Forward Looking Infrared (FLlR) system and rely on the less capable night vision goggles for night reconnaissance. The F/A-18D carries a FLIR pod, but the squadrons have insufficient FLIR pods to equip all aircraft (2:36O:439) Does the Marine Corps need an observation squadron? Why can not it accomplish the mission with the observation support provided by the fighter/attack and attack helicopter squadrons? Although all combat forces need sound tactical intelligence, forces fighting low to mid-intensity conflicts or executing peace-making or peace-keeping missions are even more dependent on current, tactical information for mission accomplishment. Observation squadron crews are dedicated to providing the combat information commanders require for making expeditious but sound decisions. Attack squadrons provide observation support as a secondary or tertiary mission: their primary mission, steel on target, takes priority. The finely honed skills of observation crews will save Marine s lives by providing timely combat intelligence or supporting arms coordination. Political unrest, illegal drug production and smuggling, and ethnic wars indicate that no shortage of potential conflicts. Disaster relief also provides opportunities for Marines to be deployed to crisis areas. Recent Marine deployments to Somalia, Bangledesh, Panama, Greneda, and Iraq demonstrate America's resolve to continue her role as a world leader. The United States, as a world leader, must maintain the ability to respond with an appropriate force across the spectrum of conflict. The world is more unstable now than it was four years ago. However, future conflicts will probably occur at the low-to-medium level of the spectrum. The Vietnam War, another low intensity conflict, validated the need for a dedicated observation squadron and platform. Super-power influence that prevented wars between satellite states, like the war for control of Bosnia-Herzegovina, no longer exists. An observation squadron enhances effective and efficient employment of all MAGTF assets in low intensity conflicts. The deactivation of the Marine Observation squadron creates a gap in support for the MAGTF. Relegating the functions of the VMO squadron as secondary tasks to heavily tasked squadrons, like the all weather fighter/attack squadrons and attack helicopter squadrons, ensures less than optimum performance of the observation mission. Only a squadron dedicated to the mission of tactical reconnaissance and supporting arms coordination ensures proficient crews dedicated to the accomplishment of the mission. Just as the OV-10 was built with off-the-shelf technology, its replacement, using current technology- could be built and fielded at relatively low cost. Mission parameters will dictate the aircraft's physical capabilities and avionics. Mission accomplishment and survivability require an aircraft with a cruise speed of 275 knots, a loiter speed of 200 knots, a dash speed of 400 knots, on station time 3.5 hours, and an aerial refueling capability for self deployment. Like other Marine tactical aircraft, this replacement must be ship-board compatible. While mission parameters drive a modern aircraft's performance characteristics, anti-aircraft weapons influence an aircraft's design from a survivabilty perspective. To perform the observation mission, an aircraft must fly in harms way. Modern technology for reducing susceptability, such as chaff/flare buckets, signature reduction, and maneuverability must be designed in not added on. Also, to reduce vulnerability, component placing and redundancy along with shielding techniques, must be designed into modern aircraft. Combat survivability must be built into any aircraft expected to operate on the modern battlefield; the OV-10s replacement can be no exception.(1:3-4) The OV-10's replacement must also provide light attack support and therefore must be capable of carrying a variety of general purpose ordnance. Additionally, the airframe must be capable of carrying laser-guided Hellfire or Maverick Missiles. These weapons not only destroy enemy equipment but can also be used as precision marks for strike aircraft. The plane should also mount a 20mm cannon in place of the OV-10's four 7.62mm machine guns. Additionally, situational awareness is critical to mission accomplishment. Modern avionics can provide the communications capability, day and night optics, and position information necessary for crews to maintain situational awareness. Using off-the-shelf avionics systems, a properly equipped aircraft will effectively accomplish the observation mission well into the next century. The three AN/ARC-182 multi-band radios with appropriate encryption devices and one enciphered high frequency radio provide sufficient communications to accomplish the observation mission. Integrated through a cockpit management system, the aircrew can maintain a high degree of situational awareness while coordinating supporting arms with distant fire support coordination agencies. The system would also support cross band and inband automatic radio relay for ground or airborne units. Modern electro-optics provide day and night, long range target acquisition and identification. Combining a laser designator for target marking with a FLIR/electro-optic camera, allows the crew to provide enhanced support for day and night visual reconnaissance and coordination of close air support missions. A simple ground mapping radar would enhance target location and all weather operations. Avionics and human engineering combined into a modern cockpit allow aircrews to effectively manage vast amounts of information and provide effective support without becoming bogged down in information overload. With the probability of conflict shifting towards the low intensity end of the spectrum, the requirement for a dedicated observation squadron still exists. The deactivation of Marine Observation squadrons creates a gap in aviation support to the MAGTF that attack hel icopter and fighter/attack squadrons can not fill. Attack aircraft crews lack the expertise to accomplish the mission and are already overtasked. Additionally, flight characteristics of attack helicopters and fighter attack jets make them unsuitable for the observation mission. To ensure continued tactical aerial reconnaissance and supporting arms coordination support, Marine Observation Squadrons must be equipped with modern aircraft design to accomplish the observation mission Bibliography 1. Ball, Robert E. The Fundamentals of Aircraft Combat Survivability Analysis and Design. New York, New York: American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, INC, 1985 2. Jane's All the World's Aircraft Coulsdon, Surrey, United Kingdom: Jane's Information Group, 1991. 3. FMFM 5-1 Organization and Function of Marine Aviation. Quantico, Virginia Marine Corps Combat Development Command, 1991. 4. Marine Corps Order P35O0.15c Training and Readiness Manual Volume 3. Washington, DC: Headquarters Marine Corps, 1991 5. Simmons, BGen Edwin H. The United States Marine Corps 1775-1975. New York, New York: The Viking Press, Inc, 1976. 6. Speer, Maj Jeffery L. Interview, Command and Staff College, March 1993. 7. Stockwell, Maj Harmon A. Interview, Command and Staff College, February and March 1993. 8. Timpe, Lt Col Earl W. "Tactical Aerial Reconnaissance in Decline," Marine Corps Gazette Dec 92: 12-14.
