A New Pair Of Dimes For The Intelligence Community CSC 1993 SUBJECT AREA - Intelligence EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Title: A New Pair of Dimes for the Intelligence Community Author: Major Richard W. Britton, United States Marine Corps Thesis: The real issue concerning the community is its failure to properly support the commander with timely and useful information by adopting the concepts of maneuver warfare. The solution, therefore, is to change the doctrine of the intelligence community to reflect the concepts of maneuver warfare thereby supporting the commander with timely and useful information. Background: In reviewing lessons learned from recent military operations, a common theme among most commanders is the lack of intelligence support. The intelligence community can change this situation by: a. Refining the intelligence doctrine to reflect the concepts of maneuver warfare. b. Adopting the principles of the logistic community which emphasize providing the commander with timely support. c. Adopting the concept of the logistical combat service support detachments which provides task organized support to a designated unit. The intelligence needed to win on today's modern battlefield is obtainable, but currently it doesn't always get to the right person, at the right place, at the right time. Recommendation: The Marine Corps should refine the doctrine for intelligence to reflect the concepts of maneuver warfare. A NEW PAIR OF DIMES FOR THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY OUTLINE Thesis: The real issue concerning the intelligence community is its failure to properly support the commander with timely and useful information by adopting the concepts of maneuver warfare. The solution, therefore, is to change the doctrine of the intelligence community to reflect the concepts of maneuver warfare thereby supporting the commander with timely and useful information. I. Correct view of the intelligence community A. Brigadier General Van Riper's statement B. Rene' Descartes' method of inquiry C. Defining intelligence community's objective II. Review of doctrinal statements in FMFM 3-21 Marine Air Ground Tactical Force Intelligence Operations A. Foundation of intelligence B. Intelligence as combat support C. Objective for intelligence D. Mission of intelligence III. Compare principles of intelligence and logistics A. Responsiveness B. Usefulness C. Simplicity D. Timeliness E. Flexibility F. magination G. Economy H. Attainability I. Sustainability J. Security K. Survivability IV. Concept of intelligence support detachments A. Logistical system of combat service support detachments B. Intelligence use of support detachments V. Refinement of doctrine for intelligence community A. Intelligence community needs to think about re-writing its doctrine B. Doctrine Center should help intelligence community re-write its doctrine A NEW PAIR OF DIMES FOR THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY After every major conflict there is always a debate over what really were the lessons learned. Operation Desert Storm is not any different in that regard from any previous conflict. One of the major debates resulting from Desert Storm concerns tactical intelligence. In 1991, Brigadier General Van Riper published an article in the Marine Corps Gazette stating, "... the weakest area that he observed (in Operation Desert Storm) was tactical intelligence."(14:30) This article has brought about a flourish of additional articles, all explaining why Brigadier General Van Riper's assessment of the situation was either slightly or totally flawed. Although all the articles had some merit and ideas that should be taken into account, they all missed the real issue concerning intelligence within the Marine Corps. The real issue concerning the intelligence community is its failure to properly support the commander with timely and useful information by adopting the concepts of maneuver warfare. The solution therefore is to change the doctrine of the intelligence community to reflect the concepts of maneuver warfare thereby supporting the commander with timely and useful information. By giving the intelligence community a new paradigm to work with, the Doctrine Center will provide the intelligence community the proper focus it needs in order to operate in future military operations. The discussion about what the intelligence community needs to change or refine in its doctrine will be in four distinct parts. The first part will be a very brief and basic discussion of the nature of war, the basic objective of the commander in combat using the concepts of maneuver warfare, and how the intelligence community can help the commander achieve his objective. The second part of the discussion will be about doctrinal statements that do not aid the intelligence community in supporting the commander in combat using the concepts of maneuver warfare. The third part of the discussion will be a comparison of intelligence and logistical principles and how adopting the principles of the logistical community might help facilitate the intelligence community in adopting the concepts of maneuver warfare to better support the commander in combat. The fourth part of the discussion is the concept of task organized intelligence support detachments that will facilitate the dissemination of timely and useful information to the unit that is the focus of the main effort during combat operations. PART ONE NATURE OF WAR The intelligence community will need to use a method of inquiry to guide it in its search for the development of certain "truths" on which to base its doctrine. One proven method of inquiry is the concept developed by Rene' Descartes, a 17th century philosopher, in his work titled Rules for the Direction of the Mind.(15:35) Several of Descartes' rules will be used in developing the following discussion of the need to change the doctrine for the intelligence community. War is very complex. To try to rewrite the entire doctrine for the intelligence community supporting the commander in war would be an undertaking beyond the scope of this discussion. The discussion will, therefore, concentrate on changing a few doctrinal statements and the current principles of the intelligence community to provide the community with a better focus in supporting the commander. As the first rule of Descartes states, "The end of study should be to direct the mind toward the enunciation of sound and correct judgments on all matters that come before it."(l5:35) It is the hope of the author that the recommended changes to the doctrine of the intelligence community direct it to sound and correct judgements. In order for the intelligence community to properly understand the role it plays in supporting the commander, it must first understand the basic nature of war and what the commander is trying to accomplish in war. As Descartes once wrote, We ought to turn the whole force of our minds to the smallest and simplest things, and to stop there for a long time, until we become accustomed clearly and distinctly to intuit the truth. (10:40) By understanding the basic concepts of war the intelligence community can "clearly and distinctly" define the role it plays in supporting the commander on the battlefield. By understanding the "smallest and simplest" concepts of war, the intelligence community will be able to correctly change its doctrine to properly support the commander using the concepts of maneuver warfare. In trying to understand the smallest and simplest concepts of war, the place to start the inquiry is to define war. The intelligence community can use the definition of war as stated in FMFM-1 Warfighting. War is defined, in Warfighting, as, ... a state of hostilities that exists between or among nations, characterized by the use of military force. The essence of war is a violent clash between two hostile, independent, and irreconcilable wills, each trying to impose itself on the other.(4:3) This definition is certainly adequate for the intelligence community to use as a starting point in its inquiry to understand the nature of war in order to properly develop its doctrine. Following Descartes' method of inquiry the next step is, To distinguish the simplest things from those which are complex, and to follow them out in order, it is necessary, in every sequence of things in which we have directly deduced certain truths from others, to observe what constituent has the greatest simplicity, and in what way all the others are more or less or equally removed from it.(10:26) Equipped with a definition of war, the next step in, the "... sequence of things in which we directly deduce certain truths ..," is to determine what the commander is trying to accomplish in war. Clausewitz defined the commander's objective in war as the act of force to compel our enemy to do our will.(3:75) The commander's focus of effort throughout the continuum of the operation or campaign is thus to compel the enemy to do his will. By understanding this basic concept, the intelligence community can start to determine what information is useful to the commander when he is determining actions required to compel the enemy to do his will. The next concept the intelligence community needs to understand in, "... the sequence of things...," is the manner in which the commander is going to compel the enemy to do his will. The Marine Corps, according to FMFM-1 Warfighting, plans on using the concepts of maneuver warfare to compel the enemy to do its will.(4:58) Maneuver warfare is defined as, "the generation of a faster operational tempo than the enemy to gain a temporal advantage."(4:58) It is through maneuver in both dimensions (time and space) that an inferior force can achieve decisive superiority at the necessary time and place. The essence then of maneuver warfare is to defeat the enemy by forcing him to react to our actions in a manner most advantageous to us. Sun Tzu best described this concept as, "... those skilled in war bring the enemy to the field of battle and are not brought there by him. "(13:96) The next concept in, "... the sequence of things ...", the intelligence community needs to understand is exactly how the commander executes the concept of maneuver in time and space to, ". . bring the enemy to the field of battle." The commander maneuvers through time and space in order to defeat the enemy by outthinking his opponent and then taking advantage of situations as they are presented. If warfare could be simplified to one simple concept, it would be that war is a contest of the intellect. FMFM-1 Warfighting best states this concept as, The essence of the problem (for the commander in war) is to select a promising course of action (based on timely and useful information provided by intelligence) with an acceptable degree of risk, and to do it more quickly than our foe.(4:70) The objective, therefore, for the intelligence community is to provide the commander with timely and useful information in order for him to outthink his opponent in both dimensions of time and space or as FMFM-1 Warfighting best states this as, "fighting smart."(4:77) The concept of fighting smart is the essence of what the doctrine of the intelligence community needs to reflect. The objective of the intelligence community is to aid the commander to fight smart. A quick review of lessons learned from recent military operations reveal that most commanders perceive the intelligence community as not adequately supporting them in their objective of fighting smart. (8:103) One of the contributory causes to this situation is the doctrine of the intelligence community. The doctrine does not properly focus on supporting the commander with timely and useful information in order for him to outthink his opponent in both dimensions of time and space. Thus the current doctrine of the intelligence community directly leads to the situation of the intelligence community not providing adequate support to the commander. PART TWO INTELLIGENCE DOCTRINE FMFM 3-21, Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) Intelligence Operations, contains a discussion of the doctrine for intelligence. The doctrine for intelligence does not reflect the concepts of maneuver warfare that the rest of the Marine Corps has adopted. The following will be a brief discussion of a few doctrinal statements that should be refined to facilitate the operation of the intelligence community in supporting the commander, who is using the concepts of maneuver warfare, during combat operations. On page 1-1 of FMFM 3-21, MAGTF Intelligence Operations, paragraph 1001, states, "Intelligence is the foundation on which the operational effort is built." This statement seems to be in direct conflict with Clausewitz who proposes the operational effort is built on the political effort.(3:90) FMFM-1 Warfighting states, "The policy aim is the motive for war must also be the foremost determinant for the conduct of war."(4:19) Intelligence should support the commander in his pursuit of the conduct of war and is not the foundation on which the operational effort is built. The statement, "Intelligence is the foundation on which the operational effort is built," should be eliminated because it does not directly reflect the concepts of maneuver warfare. The second sentence of the previously mentioned paragraph states, "Intelligence is not a combat support function." This sentence obviously contributes to the perceptions most commanders have of the intelligence community, especially if the community strongly expounds this concept that it is not a support function. The intelligence community needs to drop this line of thinking and adopt one more like the philosophy of the logistical community. FMFM 4-1, Combat Support Operations states, Logistics is the science of planning and effecting the development, deployment, and sustainability of national and/or multinational military resources in support of national policy, strategy and objectives. (7:2) For the intelligence community a comparable statement could be, intelligence is the science of collecting, analyzing and disseminating useful information affecting the development, deployment and employment of national and/or multinational military forces in support of national policy, strategy and objectives. In adopting a statement like this in its doctrine, the intelligence community would be able to start changing the perceptions held by most commanders concerning the intelligence community. Most commanders in the Marine Corps do not doubt the intent of the logistical community to provide support and one of the reasons is the logistical community does not have a statement in its doctrine stating it is not a combat support function. The intelligence community needs to drop the attitude that it is not a combat support function and adopt a philosophy more in line with the logistical community. On page 1-1 of FMFM 3-21, MAGTF Intelligence Operations, paragraph 1003 states, The first intelligence objective is to keep the MAGTF commander and senior, adjacent, and subordinate commanders informed on the characteristics of the enemy, weather, and terrain within the area of operations (AO). This statement does not properly focus the intelligence community on its real objective; to support the commander with timely and useful information with which to select a promising course of action with an acceptable degree of risk and to do it more quickly than his opponent. This statement leads to the tendency of the intelligence community to provide the commander with every data point known to mankind about the AO. This approach, providing volumes of information to the commander, usually just overloads him with information that does not directly contribute to helping the commander select a course of action. Because the intelligence community just overloads the commander with trivial information, the intelligence community does not directly aid the commander. This situation leads to the image that the intelligence community is the weakest actical area in the Marine Corps. If the intelligence community wants to change its perceived image it needs to change its doctrine to reflect concepts that are more in harmony with those of the commander; maneuver warfare. The objective is the most crucial aspect of war. Everything that is done in war must be done to support the objective. Admiral C. R. Brown best states this concept as, ... the objective is unquestionably the most important of all principles of war. It is the connecting link which, alone, can impart coherence to war... Without the objective, all other principles are pointless. (8:218) The objective of the current doctrine for the intelligence community needs to be changed in order to adequately reflect the type of support the commander wants. The support the commander wants is not just information alone on the characteristics of the enemy, weather and terrain within his AO. What the commander wants is information on the characteristics of the enemy, weather and terrain within his AO that aids him in outthinking his opponent in both dimensions of time and space. The commander does not want a description of the enemy's command and control system and hourly updates on which transmitters are active. An example of the type of information a commander is looking for is the location of critical command and control nodes that if destroyed or disrupted would create the greatest amount of disruption in the enemy's command and control system. FMFM-1 Warfighting states this concept as, "a philosophy for generating the greatest decisive effect against the enemy at the least possible cost to ourselves - a philosophy of fighting smart."(4:77) The objective of the intelligence community should reflect the concept that the commander wants timely and useful information on the characteristics of the enemy, the terrain, and the weather to aid the commander in "fighting smart." On page 1-1, paragraph 1005, of FMFM 3-21, MAGTF Intelligence Operations states, "Intelligence support is based on the mission." This statement is misleading because intelligence support should be based on the objective. The commander is going to outthink his opponent in the dimensions of time and space to achieve his objective. The mission is the "vehicle" the commander will use to obtain his objective. The mission and the objective are many times considered as to be one and the same; they are not. The objective is the "what" and the mission is part of "how" the commander plans to accomplish it. f the intelligence community would adopt the concepts of maneuver warfare it would view the battlefield in the same manner as the commander. As stated in FMFM-1 Warfighting, "...doctrine provides she basis for harmonious actions and mutual understanding. "(4:43) Currently, the intelligence community does not understand what the commander is trying to accomplish, therefore providing the commander with information that he finds useless. Thus the situation that most commanders believe the intelligence community is tactically the weakest area. The dichotomy in viewing the battlefield by the commander and the intelligence community starts with not having a common doctrine. The intelligence community should change its doctrine to read, "Intelligence support is based on the objective as defined by the commander." This revised doctrine will lead the intelligence community and the commander to harmonious actions and mutual understandings. PART THREE INTELLIGENCE AND LOGISTICAL PRINCIPLES Most commanders do not doubt the intentions of the logistical community of providing him with support. The intelligence community, unfortunately, does not enjoy this same high regard concerning its support. In reviewing the principles of both the intelligence and logistical communities, a difference in attitude toward providing support to the commander is detected. The following discussion will be a comparison between the principles of intelligence and logistical communities and a recommendation of which principles the intelligence community should adopt to facilitate the application of the concepts of maneuver warfare (See Fig 1). Responsiveness: The intelligence community should drop the principle of interdependence and adopt the logistical principle of responsiveness. Responsiveness as stated in Figure 1 is, "... the provision of the right support, at the right time, and in the right place." The intelligence community could eliminate a lot of perceptions concerning the intelligence community if it adopted the attitude of providing the right support at the right time and in the right place. A quick review of lessons learned from recent military operations reveals most commanders do not believe intelligence support is very responsive. (11:95) Simplicity: The principle of usefulness of the intelligent community is a good principle to keep. However the intelligence community could probably better serve the commander by not only providing useful information, but also by keeping the process as simple as possible. The intelligence community could incorporate the logistical principle of simplicity which states, "simplicity is the avoidance of complexity," in with the principle of usefulness. If the intelligence community would adopt the principle of simplicity it would be able to provide better support to the commander. Currently the intelligence community operates under the concept that more information is better support. This concept has exactly the opposite effect. The intelligence community inundates the commander with so much information concerning every data point known to man that instead of supporting the commander the information just baffles him. All the information the intelligence community tries to provide the commander is usually so voluminous that instead of helping the commander it usually just overloads the commander's communication circuits. A Marine Lieutenant Colonel, remarked on intelligence support for Marines of the First Marine Expeditionary Force, during Operation Desert Storm, "that is was so voluminous that the headquarters could not process the 6,000 messages it received hourly on intelligence."(9) This bottleneck of message traffic when finally processed was outdated information leaving the commanders with the impression that for all of the sophistication on today's modern battlefield the intelligence community has not changed since the time of Clausewitz who wrote, "Many intelligence reports in war are contradictory; even more are false and most are uncertain."(3:117) The intelligence community could better support the commander with useful information by keeping the support as simple as possible. By knowing the objective and the commander's intent, the intelligence community could determine the simplest support required to provide the most useful information in aiding the commander in outthinking his opponent. An example of this concept of simplicity in intelligence support would be to get timely and useful information to the commander, he would only need a picture updated daily, a few Intelligence Summaries (INTSUMS) every six to twelve hours, open source material concerning weather and terrain, and all Human Intelligence (HUMINT) reports of the AO. By keeping the intelligence support as simple as possible, focused on the objective, the information would be useful, easier to transmit, receive and disseminate to higher, adjacent, and subordinate units then the voluminous message traffic that contributes minimum results. In adopting the principle of simplicity, the intelligence community would better serve the commander with more useful and timely information. Timeliness: The principle of simplicity also facilitates the intelligence principle of timeliness. By keeping the intelligence support process as simple as possible, the intelligence community will be able to speed up the dissemination process thus providing the commander with more timely information. Sun Tzu said, "Speed is the essence of war."(13:134) A modern translation of this concept by an unidentified Marine fighter pilot is "Speed is life." If the principle of simplicity speeds up the intelligence community in providing more useful and timely information then it should be immediately adopted. Flexibility: The principle of flexibility is important. However, the principle of flexibility written by the intelligence community should be dropped and replaced with the principle of flexibility written by the logistical community. The intelligence community could better serve the commander if it had the ability to adopt structures and procedures to changing situations, missions and concepts of operations. As stated in FMFM-1 Warfighting, "Success depends in large part on the ability to adapt to a constantly changing situation."(4:8) The intelligence community if it wants to successfully support the commander should retain the ability to adapt to a constantly changing situation by adopting the logistical principle of flexibility. Imagination: The intelligence community should drop the principle of imagination. The principle of imagination reads as if someone needed a space filler and lacked the imagination of writing something useful to fill it. In 1885 Nietzche stated it best, "Man shall be framed for War, and Woman for the entertainment of the Warrior, all else is folly."(8:363) Although interesting, Nietzche's statement is as much folly as the principle of imagination and recommend both should be dropped. Ecomony: The intelligence community could replace the principle of imagination with the logistical principle of economy. The "resources available" that the intelligence community needs to economize are communication assets. Communication assets are always going to be scarce wherever the intelligence community deploys and this concept needs to be recognized "up front." All the time and communication assets the intelligence community use in trying to receive and disseminate every data point known to man does not help support the commander in trying to outthink his opponent in the dimensions of time and space. By simply adopting the logistical principle of economy, the intelligence community would be able to provide responsive, useful, and timely information to the commander in a constantly changing environment. Attainability: The intelligence community needs to adopt the logistical principle of attainability. The manner in which the principle of attainability could read for the intelligence community is; "attainability is the ability to provide essential information required to conduct military operations." The intelligence community in using more open source material could make more information attainable throughout the command. Sustainability: Another logistical principle the intelligence community should adopt is the logistical principle of sustainability. It is critical for the intelligence community to be able to sustain the commander throughout the continuum of operations with timely, responsive, useful, and attainable information. The principle of sustainability for the intelligence community could read word for word as it does for the logistical community. Security: The principle of security that the intelligence community uses does not need to be changed. It is vital for the intelligence community to keep the intelligence information secured, The intelligence community by applying the principle of simplicity throughout the intelligence process will be able to keep the security process as simple as possible so as to not hamper the attainability and sustainability of the information to the commander and the command. Survivability: The logistical principle of survivability does not apply to the intelligence community. The intelligence community in applying the principle of security already provides for the survivability of the systems. PART FOUR COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT DETACHMENTS Another concept the intelligence community could borrow from the logistics community is the concept of Combat Service Support Detachment (CSSD). A CSSD is a tasked organized unit formed for the purpose of providing support to a designated subordinate unit.(7:D-6) The intelligence community could solve several problems with dissemination by forming intelligence support detachments focused on supporting designated subordinate units. The British used this process very successfully during World War II. The British used Special Liaison Units from Blecthley Park (the British Intelligence Center) and assigned these units to work for a specific commander to insure the commander would obtain the information he wanted.(2:60) The concept of intelligence support detachments facilitate the employment of the concept of top-down planning. As stated in FMFM 2-1, the Marine Corps will use top-down planning to, "focus and allocate resources toward accomplishing the most critical functions to succeed in combat."(5:1-13) The intelligence community could provide intelligence support to subordinate units and staffs with detachments thereby enhancing the rapid dissemination of information to units who are the focus of effort. The rapid dissemination of information will greatly aid the command in "accomplishing the most critical functions to succeed in combat." An example of where the intelligence community could have used the concept of intelligence support detachments to subordinate units that were the focus of effort was during Operation Desert Storm. During the air campaign, the First Marine Expeditionary Force had a National Military Intelligence Support Team (NMIST) at their headquarters to correlate Battle Damage Assessments (BDA) reports. The air wing, flying air strikes into Iraq and Kuwait, was located in Bahrain and was not directly tied into the NMIST network. Because the air wing was not receiving timely intelligence data through the NMIST network, several air strikes were launched that were not required. If an intelligence support team had deployed to Bahrain to aid in the rapid dissemination of critical intelligence information from the NMIST network, a more effective air campaign could have been orchestrated. SUMMARY Descartes built a system of thought that once shook the monolith of Aristotelian-Thomistic philosophy to its core with the words, "I think - therefore I am."(15:174) The intelligence community should seriously think about changing its doctrine to reflect concepts more in line with the Marine Corps philosophy of maneuver warfare if it wants to shake loose from the perceptions held by most commanders and be useful to the commander other than just his "whipping boy." The intelligence community keying in on principles of responsiveness and simplicity will be able to be more flexible in attaining and sustaining the timely flow of useful information through the economical and secure use of scarce resources; communication assets and personnel. By rapidly disseminating useful information the intelligence community will be better able to support the commander in outthinking his opponent in both dimensions of time and space or as FMFM-1 Warfighting describes this as, "fighting smart."(4:77) Today's commanders only want from the intelligence community the same information as in the days of the Duke of Wellington who said, "(all I want to know) is beyond the next hill."(8:161) This information could be supplied by the intelligence community with a simple picture or simply enough information to paint a picture of what is beyond the next hill. But in trying to get a picture of the next hill or target most commanders are currently left totally frustrated and muttering some form of Shakespeare that sounds like, "...my kingdom for a picture!" In Operation Desert Storm, two Marine divisional commanders solved their problem of lack of intelligence support by sending individuals all the way back to Washington, D.C. in order to get pictures of minefields the divisions were going to soon breach.(l:40) Clausewitz once wrote, "Everything in war is very simple, but the simplest thing is difficult."(3:119) The simple truth of the matter is the intelligence community needs to change its doctrine to better support the commander. In the future, commanders simply may not have the luxury of time to send individuals back to Washington, D.C. to "trade kingdoms" in order to get a picture of the next hill, objective, or target. The intelligence needed to win on today's modern battlefield is obtainable, but is doesn't always get to the right person, at the right place, at the right time. As the Marine Corps shrinks in both size and budget, the criticality of intelligence for success on the battlefield disproportionately increases. The Marine Corps Doctrine Center at Quantico, Virginia could greatly increase the chance for success on the battlefield by providing the intelligence community with new doctrine that supports the rapid dissemination of information throughout the command structure. The doctrine for the intelligence community does not need to be re-invented, but it does need to be refined to incorporate the Marine Corps philosophy on "fighting smart." The Doctrine Center could solve several problems for the intelligence community by rewriting its doctrine to integrate it better with the concepts of maneuver warfare. The intelligence community needs a new paradigm to work with or be forever doomed to after action reports that read, "tactical intelligence was the weakest area observed." Click here to view image BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. Armed Forces Journal Interview with LtCen Walter E. Boomer, USMC. Armed Forces Journal International, August 1992, 38-42. 2. Berkowitz, Bruce D. and Allen E. Goodman. Strategic Intelligence for American National Security. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1989. 3. Clausewitz, Carl Von. On War. Edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton: University Press, 1984. 4. FMFM 1. Warfighting. U.S. Marine Corps, 6 March 1989. 5. FMFM 2-1. Warfighting the MEF (Draft). Quantico, Virginia, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, 1992. 6. FMFM 3-21. MAGTF Intelligence Operations. Quantico, Virginia, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, 1991. 7. FMFM 4-1, Combat Service Support Operations. 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