Today's MAGTF--Fighting Blind? AUTHOR Major Terry Hamilton, USMC CSC 1991 SUBJECT AREA - Warfighting EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TITLE: TODAY'S MAGTF--FIGHTING BLIND? Since the beginning of aviation hi story, aerial reconnaissance has provided military commanders with a dimension of knowledge that offered many advantages. From 1965 to 1990, the RF-4B Phantom II provided vital aerial reconnaissance for the MAGTF commander. The decision to decommission the RF-4B with no comparable replacement degraded the MAGTF's autonomous capability and proposed replacement assets may not adequately fill the void if implemented as envisioned. The RF-4B was unique in its capabilities. Its specialized equipment allowed it to provide many different types of aerial imagery products to support the MAGTF. Although updated as often as technology would allow, fiscal and supportability constraints forced its retirement on 1 October 1990. Unfortunately, its retirement was not without cost to the MAGTF. The loss of the RF-4B created a degradation in targeting capability, a lack of pre-mission planning information, an inability to accurately and effectively assess bomb damage, and an increased reliance on national and theater intelligence assets that may or may not be available to the MAGTF on the future battlefield. Several gap-fillers have been used, including the U.S. Navy F-14 with TARPS, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, and the Marine Corps' F/A-18C. Each offers some capability, but none duplicate the RF-4B's performance and multisensor imagery capacity. Even the RF-4B's eventual replacement, the F/A-18D, may not adequately duplicate the capabilities of its predecessor. The F/A-18D will be a multi-role aircraft with missions ranging from limited fighter/interceptor to night attack to aerial reconnaissance. The overall training requirements, doubled over those of the RF-4B, may result in the dilution of the Corps' imagery capability as reconnaissance occupies only a small percentage of the training syllabus. The impact of such a multi-missioned aircraft is yet to be seen, but limitations will be noticed. Consideration must be given to dedicating F/A-18D assets to the aerial reconnaissance mission if that function is to be adequately fulfilled in the MAGTF. TODAY'S MAGTF---FIGHTING BLIND?. OUTLINE Thesis Statement: The decision to decommission the RF-4B with no comparable replacement has seriously degraded the MAGTF's autonomous capability and proposed replacement assets may not adequately fill the void if implemented as envisioned. I. RF-4B History A. Need for Dedicated Aerial Reconnaissance Platform B. Evolution of the RF-4B 1. Airframe Characteristics 2. Reconnaissance Equipment 3. Technological Updates C. Rationale for Retirement II. Impact of Loss to the MAGTF A. Degradation in Targeting Capability B. Lack of Pre-mission Planning Information C. Inability to Assess Bomb Damage D. Reliance on National/Theater Assets III. Analysis of Current Aerial Reconnaissance Assets A. U.S. Navy Assets (F-14 TARPS) 1. Proficiency of Aircrew 2. Availablilty to MAGTF 3. Information Flow Back to MAGTF B. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles 1. System Capabilities 2. System Limitations 3. Performance in Operation Desert Storm C. U.S. Marine Corps Assets (F/A-18C) 1. System Capabilities 2. System Limitations IV. Comparison of RF-4B to Future Platform (F/A-18D) A. F/A-18D Capabilities (ATARS) B. RF-4B Training and Readiness Requirements C. F/A-18D Training and Readiness Requirements D. F/A-18D Shortfalls TODAY'S MAGTF---FIGHTING BLIND? Imagine the dilemma of a boxer who chooses to fight while blindfolded. Technically, he can still fight, but the absence of visual cues limits his ability to fight successfully. This handicap would no doubt lead to a short boxing career, but he certainly would not lack willing opponents. Sounds ridiculous, doesn't it? Consider, then, a modern military force deployed 10,000 miles from home conducting offensive operations to neutralize a well- equipped and highly mobile adversary defending its homeland. Give this modern military force wide latitude in planning and conducting these operations, but limit its ability to collect tactical target imagery and analyze its success through bomb damage assessment (BDA). Additionally, task the commander of this force to minimize casualties and to terminate the conflict as quickly as possible. Is this scenario feasible? Unfortunately, it is not only feasible, it is a current reality. The Marine Corps has long prided itself in its unique ability to fight as a Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF)-- a tailor-made, task-organized unit that quickly deploys and arrives with "everything" it needs to accomplish a particular mission. Obviously, an integral part of this MAGTF is the aviation assets it contains. By doctrine, Marine Corps aviation provides up to six distinct functions in support of the MAGTF. (11:5-8) These functions can be offensive, defensive, or supportive in nature, but each is interrelated and gives the MAGTF its def initive combat power. The inability to perform any of these functions can seriously degrade the MAGTF's capabilities. One such example is tactical aerial reconnaissance. Until 1 October 1990, the function of tactical aerial reconnaissance was accomplished by the RF-4B Phantom II. Although an aged airframe, the RF-4B possessed capabilities that enabled it to be the MAGTF commander's tactical eyes. It was a dedicated reconnaissance platform that could accomplish its mission in almost any weather condition. The decision to decommission the RF-4B with no comparable replacement has seriously degraded the MAGTF's autonomous capability and proposed replacement assets may not adequately fill the void if implemented as envisioned. In analyzing the situation, several questions come to mind. What makes the loss of one series of aircraft so significant? The RF-4B was not the first dedicated aerial reconnaissance platform, nor will it be the last. What impact will the loss have on the MAGTF? What short-term assets will fill the void in the Marine Corps' tactical aerial reconnaissance-gathering capability? What platform will eventually replace the RF-4B and how can it best be organized to fulfill its mission? These questions reflect valid concerns and merit closer examination. The need for a dedicated aerial reconnaissance platform has been acknowledged since the very beginning of aviation history. Even a cursory study of encyclopedic aviation historical data would show that the first military applications of scout aircraft in World War I were to observe the enemy and collect information for future exploitation. (3:29) The inherent advantages of seeing well past one's own front lines into enemy territory has always been understood by the prudent military commander. On any battlefield, knowledge equates to potential power if that knowledge is used correctly. Aerial reconnaissance simply adds depth to the battlefield and extends the commander's level of knowledge. How he uses that knowledge could mean victory or defeat. Like most reconnaissance aircraft that preceded it, the RF-4B was not created in itself to be a reconnaissance platform. It grew out of an already existing design--the McDonnell F-4 Phantom II. Although the Navy/Marine Corps can take credit for the birth of the F-4, the U.S. Air Force gets the credit for creation of the RF-4 variant. Because the Navy chose to retain its RF-8 Crusader and RA-5C Vigilante assets to meet its shipboard reconnaissance requirement, it did not order a reconnaissance variant of the Phantom. (2:25) This created a dilemma for the Marine Corps since it had neither the RF-8 nor the RA-5C. Fortunately, the McDonnell engineers and Pentagon officials recognized that the F-4's performance made it ideal for use as an intelligence gathering platform. When the USAF developed the RF-4C, the Marine Corps ordered that twelve F- 4Bs be converted to RF-4B standards, sharing much of the same equipment as its USAF counterpart. The Marine Corps bought a total of 46 RF-4B aircraft beginning in 1965 and these aircraft became the longest serving Phantom variant in the Marine Corps. (3:29) The squadron that flew the RF-4B, later to evolve into Marine Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron-Three (VMFP-3), was tasked to conduct multisensor imagery reconnaissance in support of the Fleet Marine Force. (14:5-38) The new squadron brought with it a new mission, new aircraft, and new equipment. The equipment aboard the RF-4B is what makes it unique. Grouped into three basic categories, it includes Side Looking Airborne Radar (SLAR), infrared detectors, and cameras. SLAR records a high definition radar picture of the terrain on either side of the flight path. It has the advantage of providing acceptable imagery at night, in light rain, dust, smoke, or haze. Covering large areas quickly, it can also serve as a moving target indicator. (9:10-9 and 10-10) An infrared detector is used to locate enemy forces under cover by measuring heat differentials. In essence, it detects and measures differences in temperature. While it can be affected by atmospheric conditions such as dust, smoke, or fog, it is passive and resistant to jamming. (9:10-9 to 10-10.) Finally, cameras capable of looking forward, vertically, and to the side are mounted on rotatable mounts in the nose camera bay to provide hard copy photographic data. (4:54) The advantage of photography is that it produces the most familiar, easily recognizable picture to be used by aircrew or commanders. Flexibility in terms of angle, film speed, and scale make this product a most effective tool. It is limited, however, by all the factors that limit normal sight: low visibility, cloud cover, and darkness. (11:113) As would be expected, the RF-4B was updated as often as technology would allow and in 1978 the SLAR/infrared equipment was improved and a carrier inertial navigation system was added. (5:373) The airframe evolved with additional electronic countermeasures (ECM) antenna fairings, thicker wings, larger main landing gear, and a slotted stabilator to improve transonic stability as well as slow-speed handling during landing. (4:54) In fact, Marine RF-4Bs have been subjected to so many minor changes that no two aircraft fly, handle, or perform precisely alike. Experienced aircrew simply memorize each aircraft's "personality" and adjust accordingly.(3:30) The uniqueness of the RF-4B in many ways contributed to its early retirement. According to representatives from the Aviation Plans and the Aviation Weapons sections at Headquarters, Marine Corps, the decision to retire the RF-4B was driven by fiscal and supportability considerations that seemed to outweigh the benefits of the intelligence data produced. The RF-4B was manpower and maintenance intensive. This was a characteristic shared by all Phantoms, but aggravated by the RF-4B's additional requirement for unique avionics support and the photo processors/interpreters necessary to produce the intelligence data. The requirement to maintain assets in CONUS and a continuous detachment in the Western Pacific simply compounded the supply and support problems. As the F-4 began to be replaced by the F/A-18 in the Corps' fighter/attack squadrons, spare parts shortages and maintenance problems worsened. At the same time, a move was afoot within the Navy and Marine Corps to identify and to consider for termination aircraft communities that were highly mission-specific, including the RF-4B. After extenive consideration of cost versus dividend, the Marine Corps' Deputy Chief of Staff for Aviation made the decision to standdown the RF-4B. On 1 October 1990, the Corps' dedicated tactical aerial reconnaissance capability ceased to exist. What impact will the loss of the RF-4B have on the MAGTF? Its loss is significant because no other US Navy or Marine Corps aircraft currently has the capability to produce the variety of intelligence imagery that it provided. Its multisensor capability made it unique in its performance. The RF-4B's ability to provide timely updates of the battlefield in almost any weather condition was the cornerstone of successful planning and subsequent execution. It allowed planners to shape the battlefield and reduced the element of risk for ground commanders. Consequently, shortfalls will be felt, most notably in the areas of targeting, pre-mission planning, and BDA. The RF-4B provides near real-time visual imagery that can be used to effectively establish and prioritize targets. This imagery allows planners to identify enemy weak points, defenses, critical areas of vulnerability, troop or supply locations, and other essential elements of information. Not only does this allow planners to shape the future battle, but it also allows the Air Combat Element (ACE) commander to establish target priorities so that assets are allocated efficiently with no duplication of effort. Enemy weaknesses can be exploited and strengths reduced. This ability to identify and prioritize targets using near real-time data is not only cost effective but also allows the MAGTF commander to "fight smart" as current Marine Corps leadership demands. From an aviator's perspective, the second major area in which the lack of RF-4B support is felt is pre-mission planning. Whoever coined the phrase "a picture is worth a thousand words" must surely have been an attack pilot! Without imagery, maps are the pilot's only tools that help him create a mental picture of a target area during his pre- mission planning. No amount of map study can generate a mental image of a target as effectively as can a photograph. Knowing in advance what a target will look like from a specific attack heading breeds a degree of confidence and allows the pilot to concentrate on the myriad of other tasks that demand attention during a strike mission. This heightened degree of familiarity enables a greater degree of precision in weapons delivery, a greater probability of success for that mission, and the safe return of two scarce commodities--the pilot and his aircraft. Perhaps the most significant shortfall felt by the absence of the RF-4B is in the area of BDA. The value of high priority targets is such that their destruction or neutralization can determine the momentum and ultimate success of a campaign. The ability to accurately and immediately assess the results of the attacks on these targets controls momentum and drives future targeting. The MAGTF does not currently have that capability. Anyone who closely followed CNN's continuous coverage of Operation Desert Storm would be aware of the problems of BDA during the early stages of the air campaign because of weather. When Allied aviation assets were making significant impacts on Iraqi forces, momentum seemed to slow as planners awaited BDA. The RF-4B could follow in trail of the attack echelons, offset from the target to minimize the effects of smoke, dust, and enemy defenses, and create the imagery required to accurately accomplish BDA. This capability would allow targets to be scheduled much earlier in the subsequent targeting process if a reattack was warranted. Vital momentum which could directly affect overall success would be maintained. As was seen in Southwest Asia, BDA on today's battlefield will be much slower and less accurate, if obtainable at all. Finally, the absence of the RF-4B causes reliance on national or theater assets external to the Marine Corps to provide the aerial reconnaissance support so vital to success. Unfortunately, smaller MAGTFs--the Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) and Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU)--may not be of sufficient priority on the national level to warrant allocation of limited national assets. In contrast, even a notional Marine Expeditionary Brigade contained up to seven RF-4B aircraft before their retirement. (15:3-5) In addition, some national assets, particularly satellites, display a degree of predictability in overflight times, resulting in the possible exploitation of that asset. It may even be possible that coverage of the desired area is not available. So where does the MAGTF stand? Current plans call for the F/A-18D to replace the RF-4B in the Marine Corps. Unfortunately, the F/A-18D will not be capable of performing this reconnaissance mission until 1994. (12:3-7) How will the Marine Corps get tactical reconnaissance support until then? Besides the national assets mentioned above, the methods envisioned include the U.S. Navy's F-14 with a Tactical Air Reconnaissance Pod System (TARPS), Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, and the Marine Corps' F/A-18C. Each provides some degree of support and each offers unique advantages and disadvantages--but all fall short of a dedicated tactical aerial reconnaissance platform. The F-14 TARPS system utilizes a pod mounted underneath the fuselage to house a forward oblique or vertical frame camera for photographs, a low/medium-altitude panoramic camera, and an infrared reconnaissance set. (6:369) Its capabilities seem to approximate those of the RF-4B, but it loses its attractiveness when evaluated as a useful MAGTF support tool. To begin, only 49 F-14s were modified to carry the pod in its initial introduction to the Navy. (6:369) Given the advertised autonomous nature of the MAGTF, consider the reality of having a TARPS-capable aircraft available for support in al1 cases. Additionally, the primary role of the F-14 is fleet air defense and air superiority--not aerial reconnaissance. Some consideration has to be given to the effectiveness of a crew that performs this mission on a part-time basis. Finally, because the F- 14 would most likely be operating from a carrier somewhat removed from the MAGTF, the ability to recover, process, and disseminate the data could be diluted. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) represent a wave of new technology that offers some attractive options to the MAGTF commander. Under the current, but evolving UAV doctrine, one UAV company is provided per Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF). Assigned to the Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Intelligence Group (SRIG), the UAV company is composed of three flight platoons with each platoon operating one short range UAV system consisting of eight aircraft. (13:C-1) The Marine Corps presently operates the AAI Corporation's Pioneer aircraft. (1:20) Overall responsibility for UAV operations is retained at the landing force level with operational control of the UAV normally delegated to the Ground Combat Element (GCE) commander. (13:C-2) In theory, the UAV is designed to collect, disseminate, and exploit combat intelligence in near real-time. It can provide fire support adjustments at greater distances and reduced risk to personnel. (8:I-2) Other advantages include the ability to perform rear area security, report BDA, accomplish radio and data relay, and provide for electronic warfare. It has a day/night capability and a reduced probability of detection due to low infrared, visual, and radar signatures. (10:2-2) Unfortunately, technology is not perfect. The UAV cannot operate in icing conditions or in visible moisture. Video quality is reduced by certain weather conditions and battlefield obscurants and it has wind limitations for launch and recovery. Special fuel is required and the Pioneer UAV has a line-of-sight transmission limitation. While multiple simultaneous sorties are possible, sensor data can only be actively processed from a single UAV at a time. (10:2-2 and 2-3) As with any emission-generating equipment, the Pioneer can be electronically jammed. (10:2- 3) The Pioneer UAV performed well during Operation Desert Storm, flying 900 hours in 277 separate flights. (1:30) It proved, however, to be highly suceptable to small arms fire. Of the 40 Pioneer UAVs deployed to Southwest Asia, 26 were either damaged of destroyed. It should be noted that of the 26 damaged, about 75% could be repaired and returned to duty. (1:20) Unfortunately, the damaged or destroyed UAVs created a requirement for some $17 million in fiscal appropriations to buy l2 to 14 new aircraft. If this funding is not approved, the military could lose two of its six units designed to operate the Pioneer. (1:30) Perhaps the UAV will develop into an adequate gap-filler for MEU or MEB operations, but its range of approximately 90 miles will limit its usefulness to the MEF commander as his area of interest could often exceed the Pioneer's capabilities. The F/A-18C has a limited capability to provide BDA. Carrying a built-in strike camera, the F/A-18C can automatically photograph targets before, during, and immediately after weapons employment. Again, it would seem that battlefield obscurants could limit its effectiveness. The F/A-18C can also carry a forward looking infrared (FLIR) pod sensor to record reconnaissance data, although the FLIR mission requires slower aircraft speeds and higher altitudes to allow time for FLIR interpretation. This allows FLIR missions to be performed only in a permissive threat environment due to pilot workload. (12:3-11) Integrated air defense systems, though, are seldom permissive. The final question to be addressed concerns the capabilities of the Marine Corps' follow-on reconnaissance platform--the F/A-18D. How does it compare to the RF-4B and how can it be used to its greatest advantage? The question can best be answered by examining the projected F/A-18D's reconnaissance capabilities, then comparing RF-4B and F/A- 18D training requirements. As stated earlier, the F/A-18D will assume the tactical aerial reconnaissance role as soon as the Advanced Tactical Air Reconnaissance System (ATARS) is developed. This will most likely occur in 1994. ATARS is projected to modernize tactical reconnaissance by utilizing state-of-the-art technology--data links, electro-optical sensors, and recorders. The aircrew will be able to see a target and transmit that target data to a ground system in real-time. ATARS will also offer an enhanced capability to detect targets at night and in bad weather. (12:3-7) If the amount of development time is any indication of potential, ATARS will be a very capable system. The deficiency in the F/A-18D concept is that the aerial reconnaissance mission will be only one of at least six different missions that the aircrew will be expected to perform. Current plans indicate that any F/A-18D aircraft will be able to perform the reconnaissance mission. The internal gun will simply be replaced by the ATARS package to allow for mission accomplishment. This requirement alone could lead to some very interesting maintenance and reliability problems. It will be interesting to see if the reliability of the ATARS is such that there will be no need to prepare two aircraft to meet one mission or if the maintenance crews will find themselves frantically uploading and downloading ATARS packages. The most significant shortfall of the F/A-18D concept centers around training requirements and aircrew proficiency. A comparison of the old RF-4B Training and Readiness (T&R) Manual and the proposed F/A-18D T&R Manual reveals some significant differences. An RF-4B Reconnaissance Systems Officer (RSO) could become fully combat capable (100% qualified in all phases and missions) in 1O5.4 hours of flight time and 74 sorties. Approximately 45% of those hours and sorties related purely to the reconnaissance mission. Overall, 42% of the RSO's combat qualification training was dedicated to reconnaissance. (16:7-5 and 7-6) This is not surprising for aircrew whose primary function is aerial reconnaissance. Experience shows that when aircrew concentrate on one area for a long time, they become very efficient in that area. When those figures are compared to the proposed F/A-18D T&R syllbus--and this certainly cannot be taken as a strict scientific study--a situation much like the F-14 TARPS seems to arise. Because the F/A-18D was envisioned to replace several aircraft in the Marine Corps, it had to be capable of performing their missions. As a result, the F/A-18D is expected to be a day/night bomber, a combined arms coordinator, a limited fighter/interceptor, and a reconnaissance platform. By way of comparison, a Weapon Systems Officer (WSO) will be required to fly 199 sorties and accumulate 251.9 flight hours to become 100% combat qualified in the F/A-18D. (17:3-5) Considering that only 6% of those sorties and 7% of those flight hours are dedicated to reconnaissance, it is easy to see that the F/A-18D's mission emphasis is elsewhere. What does this mean in terms of an aerial reconnaissance capability? Perhaps it means that if all F/A-18D aircraft are reconnaissance-capable, the MAGTF will be assured of having resident reconnaissance support at practically all levels. On the other hand, it could mean that the F/A-18D will be tasked to perform so many dif ferent missions that the aircrew will not be completely proficient in any of them. Hopefully, the ATARS package will be so automated that a lack of aircrew proficiency will not degrade mission completion or product quality. The full impact of the F/A-18D's "do-all" mission will not be felt until all systems are operational and squadron commanders/operations officers develop methods of dealing with the aircrew proficiency issue. The answer could be the dedication of one of the six squadrons to a full-time reconnaissance role, much like the RF-4B. Without exploring all of the pros and cons of that option, the ultimate result would be the availability of competent aircrew and correctly configured aircraft to provide a function that is so vital to MAGTF survival. The RF-4B served a long and profitable career in the Corps. It effectively fulfilled a vital function of Marine Corps aviation. Budget constraints and cutbacks, coupled with technological advances, forced the RF-4B into an early retirement, the results of which were felt almost immediately as witnessed in Operation Desert Storm. These same budget constraints forced the development of a multi- missioned aircraft that will dedicate only a fraction of its time to aerial reconnaissance and will not be fully functional until 1994. The assets available to fill the gap are not collectively capable of providing the same degree of responsiveness resident in the RF-4B. The full impact of fiscal constraints and an overburdened aircraft may manifest itself in compromised aircrew performance. The Marine Corps should seriously consider the dedication of one squadron of F/A-18D aircraft to the aerial reconnaissance role to continue the success enjoyed by the RF-4B. If Desert Storm is any indication, future conflicts will erupt quickly and will dictate a "come-as-you-are" capability. The Marine Corps needs to continue to organize and train to do just that. BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. Baker, Caleb and Leopold, George. "Gulf War Takes Toll on Pioneer UAVs." Defence News, 18 March 1991, pp. 20 and 30. 2. Davis, Larry. F-4 Phantom II in Action. Carrollton, TX: Squadron/Signal Publications, Inc., 1984. 3. Dorr, Robert F. The McDonnell F-4 Phantom. Blue Ridge Summit, PA: TAB Books, Inc., 1989. 4. Kinzey, Bert. F-4 Phantom II. Fallbrook, CA: Aero Publishers, Inc., 1983. 5. Taylor, John WR, ed. Jane's All the World's Aircraft 1978-79. New York: Jane's Publishing, Inc., 1978. 6. Taylor, John WR, ed. Jane's All the World's Aircraft 1981-82. New York: Jane's Publishing, Inc., 1981. 7. Trotti, John. Marine Air. Navato, CA: Presidio Press, 1985. 8. U.S. Marine Corps. Marine Corps Combat Development Command. Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, Joint Publication 3-55.1 (Initial Draft). Quantico, 1991. 9. U.S. Marine Corps. Marine Corps Development and Education Command. Intelligence, FMFM 2-1. Quantico, 1980. 10. U.S. Marine Corps. Marine Corps Combat Development Command. Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Employment, FMFM 3-22-1 (Coordinating Draft). Quantico, 1991. 11. U.S. Marine Corps. Marine Corps Development and Education Command. Marine Aviation, FMFM 5-1. Quantico, 1979. 12. U.S. Marine Corps. Marine Corps Combat Development Command. Air Reconnaissance, FMFM 5-10 (Draft). Quantico, 1991. 13. U.S. Marine Corps. Marine Corps Combat Development Command. Control of Aircraft and Missiles, FMFM 5-60 (Draft). Quantico, 1991. 14. U.S. Marine Corps. Marine Corps Combat Development Command. Fleet Marine Force Organization, FMFRP 1-11. Quantico, 1990. 15. U.S. Marine Corps. Marine Corps Development and Education Command. Aviation Planning, 1P 5-1. Quantico, 1985. 16. U.S. Marine Corps. Deputy Chief of Staff for Training, HQMC. MCO P3500.15A Aviation Training and Readiness Manual, Volume 2, Chapter 7, Washington, 1986. 17. U.S. Marine Corps. Deputy Chief of Staff for Training, MCCDC. MCO P3500. Aviation Training and Readiness Manual, Volume 2, Chapter 3, (Proposed Draft), Quantico, 1991.
