The SRI Group; Some Reappraisals AUTHOR Major Larry K. Hamilton, USMC CSC 1991 SUBJECT AREA - Operations EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Title: THE SRI GROUP; SOME REAPPRAISALS The SRIG was created to bring direction and cohesiveness to what had heretofore been a fragmented Marine Corps intelligence capability. Essentially, most of intelligence units in the FMF were placed under one commander. Although the idea of the SRIG is fundamentally sound, increased experience indicates that further conceptual and organizational modifications are required. Since its inception, the SRIG has been plagued by confusion about its concept of operations. Is the SRIG commander a "type" commander responsible for training, equipping, etc., of his subordinates, but deferring in their operational employment to the supported MAGTF commander via doctrinal staff relationships? Or is he an operational commander, exercising control of the MAGTF's intelligence and some operational efforts with direct responsibility to the MAGTF commander for their performance? In the FMF, the SRIG commander is in practice essentially a "type" commander. MAGTF intelligence officers tend to use SRIG personnel to reconstruct a pre-SRIG intelligence structure. They are also skeptical of SRIG capabilities and have advised against giving it operational authority. This reluctance to grant operational authority may be frustrating the full potential of the SRIG. THE SRI GROUP; SOME REAPPRAISALS Thesis: Although the idea of the SRIG is fundamentally sound, increased experience indicates that further conceptual and organizational modifications are required. I. Surveillance, Reconnaissance and Intelligence Group A. Mission B. Organization II. Concept of Operations A. Type vs operational command B. Task-Organized detachments C. Historical Examples 1. Panama 2. Persian Gulf War III. The Case for greater operational responsibilities A. Allows full use of intelligence capabilities B. Potential to ease burdens on S-2/G-2 C. Reluctance of S-2/G-2 to allow SRIG operational responsibilities 1. Loss of assets and personnel to SRIG 2. Skepticism about SRIG capabilities 3. Valid concerns about dissemination and responsiveness 4. Source for additional intelligence personnel THE SRI GROUP; SOME REAPPRAISALS The Surveillance, Reconnaissance and Intelligence Group (SRIG), one of the newest organizations in the Marine Corps, is in its third year of existence. Enough real-world experience has now been obtained to test some of the initial assumptions and propose some changes. The SRIG was a creation of the CMC convened Force Structure Study, conducted in January of 1988. 2d SRIG, the first of three SRIGs, was activated on 1 October 1988. The intent behind the SRIG was to rationalize the Marine Corps intelligence structure by consolidating most of the specialized intelligence units (and some others) resident in the MEFs under one commander. Although the idea of the SRIG is fundamentally sound, increased experience indicates that further conceptual and organizational modifications are required. Such modifications may allow it to more tightly focus on its basic intelligence missions and restore some lost intelligence capabilities to MAGTF CEs. The SRIG has the following mission and tasks: . . .provide surveillance, reconnais- sance, intelligence, counterintelligence, electronic warfare, air/naval gunfire liaison, tactical deception, and communications support to the MEF, subordinate MAGTF's, and other commands as directed. Its tasks are to -- a. Provide trained and equipped task organized detachments to MAGTFs or other designated commands to execute integrated surveillance, reconnaissance, intelli- gence, counterintelligence, electronic warfare, direct action, air/naval gunfire liaison, communications, tactical deception, and other directed operations. b. Provide elements of the Maritime Special Purpose Force (MSPF) for deploying MAGTFs or other commands as directed. (1:2) The SRIG consists of an H&S Company, Radio Battalion, Communications Battalion, Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company (ANGLICO), Force Reconnaissance Company, Remotely Piloted Vehicle Company, and Intelligence Company. Further, Intelligence Company consists of several specialized intelligence units such as Counterintelligence Teams, Interrogator-Translator Unit, Force Imagery Interpretation Unit, Topographic Platoon, etc. (15: 2-3 and 2-4) Unfortunately, from its inception, the SRIG has been plagued by confusion about its concept of operations and the role of the SRIG commander. Regrettably, this confusion appears to have hampered the intelligence effort in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm; this will be discussed later. Essentially, is the SRIG commander an operational commander, exercising control of the MAGTF's intelligence effort through the operational command of his subordinates? Or is the SRIG commander a "type" commander, responsible for training, equipping, etc., of his subordinates, but deferring in their operational employment to the supported MAGTF commander via doctrinal staff cognizance relationships (e.g., G-2 directs Radio Battalion as part of its collection effort)? In the FMF, the SRIG commander is in practice essentially a "type" commander, contributing resources to MAGTF operational and intelligence efforts that function within doctrinal staff relationships established by FMFM 3-1. Command and Staff Action. Yet, the concept that the SRIG is an operational command, directing the MAGTF intelligence effort (and some operational efforts) is increasingly being seen in recent doctrinal publications. This split between the theory and reality of SRIG can be traced back to the Force Structure Study that envisioned a SRIG that: . . . provides the MAGTF commander with an organization for coordinating and directing MAGTF assets that conduct intelligence functions . . . The SRI Group is the MAGTF commander's focal point for all information gathering, intelligence and special operations functions. It is the point of contact in this area for all agencies external to the MAGTF. (9:2) This operational view of the SRIG was subsequently used as the baseline by MCCDC for the development of doctrinal guidance. Recently published guidance concerning the SRIG notes: (The SRIG) exercises command and control over organic assets conducting reconnaissance, surveillance and intelligence operations . . . Prepares and executes detailed intelligence collections plans . . . Conducts all source collection management... . . . develops general and tailored intelligence products . . . (14:2-4) This dichotomy between SRIG theory and reality is applicable to other operational areas such as communications, special operations, fire support coordination, etc. Shortly following the Force Structure Study, Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic (FMFLANT) was directed to standup the 2d SRIG, the first of eventually three SRIGs. During the staff planning for this standup, it quickly became apparent that problems existed with the operational concept envisioned by the Force Structure Study. If the SRIG commander was to be operational, then long established doctrinal roles, contained in publications such as FMFM 2-1, Intelligence, and FMFM 3-1, Command and Staff Action, etc., could be overturned. Doctrine can, of course, be changed as circumstances change. But in this case, it appeared to planners at FMFLANT, and subsequently FMFPAC, MCCDC, and HQMC, that the problems with this operational SRIG concept threatened to negate many of the advantages of the SRIG creation. For example, the SRIG headquarters could become another layer in the chain of command, one that had not previously existed. Accordingly, FMFLANT, in its "Plan of Action and Milestones for the 2d SRI Group," changed the operational concept from one of an operational command to a type or administrative command: The commanding officer of 2d SRI Group will be directly responsible to CG, II MEF for the training, equipping and performance of the SRI Group . . . Intelligence collection, analysis dissemination and EW missions will be conducted under the staff cognizance of the MAGTF G-2/S-2. (Communications is under the staff cognizance of the MAGTF G-6/CEO; special ops, fire support, etc., is under the cognizance of the G-3/S-3.) It is not a tactical unit to be fought as a regiment or battalion. Rather, it is a source of specialized capabilities, specifically structured to provide detachments in support of MAGTF's . . (9:2) The concept of operations employed within FMFLANT has become the model for 1st and 3rd SRIGs. MCCDC subsequently drafted a new SRIG Concept of Operations bringing it in line with FMF practice: (SRIG mission) is to provide trained and equipped task organized detachments . . (The SRIG commander) commands the SRIG in garrison (less detachments). If the entire MEF deploys, the SRIG commander still commands the SRIG, but operational control of the SRIG units is exercised by the MEF commander. (1: 2 and 7) From the perspective of planners, and probably MAGTF commanders and their staffs, the real virtue of the SRIG is its capability to provide task organized detachments tailored to the MAGTFs and their missions. In April of 1988, this virtue received its first test with the deployment of Marines to Panama and the establishment of Commander, Marine Forces Panama (COMMMARFORPM). The initial deployment of forces pre-dated the standup of 2d SRIG. But by early 1989 establishment of rotating SRIG detachments was underway. These detachments would become increasingly more refined and "customized" to the particular requirements of COMMARFORPM. Early missions focused around defense of fixed facilities such as the Arraijon tank farm, placing emphasis on use of sensors and night vision devices, including video cameras with night vision capabilities. This asset proved the occurrence of night-time incursions by the Panamanian Defense Forces (PDF), refuting General Noriega's propaganda about trigger-happy Marines. A low intensity conflict, the Panamanian crisis placed a special emphasis on human intelligence (HUMINT) methods. Accordingly, COMMARFORPM received intelligence support from Interrogator-Translator detachments and Counterintelligence subteams. As the mission of area defense vice defense of fixed facilities emerged, increasing emphasis was placed on area security and countering of the PDF and the para-military Dignity Battalions. This resulted in increased emphasis on the SIGINT capabilities of the Radio Battalion detachment. The end result was a generally superb intelligence effort. It is, of course, not clear if the SRIG was significantly responsible, or if such an evolution of intelligence support would have occurred anyway. Nonetheless, Panama appears to have validated many of the SRIG planning decisions and doctrinal concepts. However, initial impressions from the Persian Gulf War, discussed in the Marine Corps Lessons Learned System (MCLLS), indicate that such a "type" command was a source of confusion that had to be worked around. (6:1) Apparently, the I MEF G-3 and G-6 established normal staff-command relationships with SRIG in regards to the employment of Communications Battalion, ANGLICO, Force Reconnaissance Company, and the Remotely Piloted Vehicle Company. However, the MEF G-2 attempted to obtain operational control of other SRIG intelligence assets (in accordance with previously discussed planning decisions and operational concepts). This had a particularly adverse impact on the Intelligence Company, home of the MAGTF All-Source Fusion Center (MAFC) and numerous other intelligence units. The recommended MCLLS Report solution is to designate the SRIG commander as a commander in the same sense as the commanders of the wing, division, and FSSG (i.e., operational vice type). In addition, "dual-hatting" of the Intelligence Company commander as the MEF G-2 Operations Officer has also been recommended. (5:1-2) Interestingly, the MCCDC response noted that the SRIG was indeed an operational vice type command and that such responsibilities were already doctrine as specified in a new FMFM 3-21. This would appear to contradict MCCDC's SRIG Concept of Operations published 10 October 1989. (6:2) There is certainly no contradiction between a Marine Corps unit providing trained and equipped task-organized forces for service with MAGTFs and commanding them when the entire unit goes to war. This is exactly how our divisions, wings, and FSSGs function. Yet, it is not how the SRIG functions. The case for the Intelligence Company commander appears particularly strong. This unit is composed of a Tactical Deception Platoon, Sensor Control and Management Platoon, Topographic Platoon, Interrogator-Translator Team, Force Imagery Interpretation Unit, Some Counterintelligence Teams (the number varies between the SRIGs), a Surveillance and Reconnaissance Center (SARC), and the heart of the SRIG, the intelligence analysis capability of the MAGTF All-Source Fusion Centeer (MAFC). It is at the MAFC that information from all sources is received and then processed into intelligence products for use by the tactical commanders. Many of the organizations that provide this information are in the Intelligence Company. It seems to make sense that the officer who saw to their training and equipping would be ideally situated to ensure that these disparate units focused their efforts to satisfy MAFC requirements, and that the MAFC itself was making proper use of the information. This could ease burdens on the MEF G-2 and his staff. MAFC products and Intelligence Company collection and analysis efforts would still be under his staff cognizance and proceed in the direction he establishes. But the MEF G-2 may also be freer to concentrate on ensuring external collection from national, theater, and other assets are fully utilized. More importantly, it may allow him more freedom to monitor the weak link in intelligence, dissemination to operational commanders who need the information. Understandably, much of the reluctance on the part of the G-2's to give such operational responsibilities to the SRIG and Intelligence Company can be attributed to the manpower and organizational losses they suffered by the creation of the SRIG. Most intelligence units in the SRIG had previously been under their direct control. For example, the MEF possessed a Force Imagery Interruption Unit and greater control over Radio Battalion and Force Reconnaissance Company. The division had an Interrogator- Translator Team, Counterintelligence Team, Remotely Piloted Vehicle Company, and Sensor Platoon. All were lost to the SRIG. But the losses most bitterly resented were those directly from the G-2 staffs. Manpower sourcing for the MAFC required compensatory Table of Organization reductions from somewhere. Because virtually all of the MOSs involved were intelligence, this burden fell on the G-2 staffs. The MAFC is composed of 9 officers and 41 enlisted. MEF and some MEB G-2s were hit hardest to provide personnel sourcing; division, wing, FSSG and FMF headquarters also provided some. MEUs, regiments, groups and below were spared. (4) Skepticism greeted (and continues to do so) the idea that this enhanced intelligence structure was capable of providing support commensurate with that which had been lost. Consequently, MAGTF G-2s, when employing SRIG assets, tend to use Intelligence Company detachments to replicate their pre-SIRG structure, then to worry about enhanced intelligence support. This is a concern particularly applicable to the MAFC. Early experience with the MAFC tended to reinforce this view. Perversities in the manpower system tended to apply the lost structure to units before the new MAFC structure was properly manned. In addition, when units lost people they tended to have been experienced personnel, trained to the particular requirements of their units. Unfortunately, such losses rarely went directly to the MAFC. Instead, new personnel were frequently assigned via PCS. In some cases they were new to the MOS and even lacked appropriate clearances! (10:63) Further, to avoid providing experienced personnel, some G-2s engaged in manipulation of T/O line numbers. For example, they left line numbers slated for the MAFC unfilled or moved personnel who happened to be in such a line number to a different one. (10:63) However, MAGTF G-2s then expected the MAFC to fulfill their intelligence requirements for garrison and training, such as providing briefings on topics of interest and participating in field exercises, frequently in support of non-MAGTF units or training. (10:63) Skepticism about the MAFC became a self-fulfilling prophecy when the reality was unable to match the promise. It should be understood, however, the skepticism of MAGTF G-2s does reflect legitimate and valid concerns. It is the nature of units to be more responsive to their own commanding officers than to the units they ostensibly support. To use an analogy, a battalion commander receives more timely responsiveness from his own 81mm Mortar Platoon than he can depend on from the more capable division artillery. This same principle applies to intelligence support. For example, a MAGTF G-2 will receive more responsive HUMINT from his own counter- intelligence team than from some other organizations such as DIA. Hence, the tendency of MAGTF G-2s is to replicate their pre-SRIG organizations when they receive a SRIG detachment. It also accounts for their reluctance to give the SRIG and Intelligence Company commanders greater operational roles. Two other problems also lend credence to the concerns of MAGTF G-2s. One is the issue of intelligence dissemination, the weak link in the intelligence cycle. The other is the size of the MAFC; it appears to be too small for all of the tasks expected of it. One of the major subordinate units of the SRIG is the Communications Battalion. Its mission is to: "Provide communications support to the MAGTF." (1:6) A simply stated mission, but one with a significant number of tasks, of which servicing intelligence communications is one of many, and not necessarily the most important. The dilemma for many S-2/G-2s has been how do I communicate my needs to a higher HQ, how do I get feedback on my requests, how are taskings communicated to collectors, how do collectors get this information back to analytical cells, and how do such cells get the intelligence back to the requestor, and can this be done in a timely manner? Yet, taking away assets and responsibilities and moving them to another unit only exacerbates current intelligence communications shortfalls. MAGTF G-2s can no longer do it themselves, someone else now has to do it for them, with all the communications that implies. As previously noted, Communications Battalion is not designed to exclusively support intelligence communications requirements. This accounts for much of the resistance to and puzzlement associated with the inclusion of this battalion within the SRIG. To many, it appears to be a distraction from the basic intelligence missions of the SRIG. Defenders, however, maintain that Communications Battalion can be used to improve intelligence dissemination and other intelligence communications requirements. (5:52) This certainly seems to make a superficial amount of sense. In theory, it sounds nice, but this writer is not aware of any formal program or tests or studies being conducted by any SRIG via its Communications Battalion to forward such an agenda. Nor do such "warm and fuzzy" theories provide any discussion of possible adverse consequences of such a restructuring of Communications Battalion on other functional areas such as operations or logistics. After all, given current manpower constraints, Communications Battalion is unlikely to grow any bigger. To enhance one area may mean taking away from another. The case for inclusion of Communications Battalion in the SRIG is problematic at best. This dissemination dilemma remains and the SRIG has probably increased the difficulties. At 9 officers and 41 enlisted, the MAFC also appears to be too small to handle all of the requirements that will be levied on it, particularly from units that expect the MAFC to adequately compensate for the personnel they provided to it. Units are rarely at full T/O. A certain percentage is always gone, e.g., range, mess duty, sick call, schools, leave, etc. Yet, units still require briefing support, MAFC participation in field exercises and deployments, etc. At the same time the MAFC is trying to satisfy the intelligence requirements of the MEF, a corps level authority. Even in peacetime, it can be quickly overwhelmed. Such a size and the inevitable absences of personnel also means that MAGTFs, particularly ones that deploy, will have to work with a MAFC detachment composed of different individuals for each major exercise. This exacerbates training, teamwork, and leadership problems. Consequently, it becomes easier for a MAGTF G-2 to assimilate these individuals into a pre-SRIG structure rather then try something new with a MAFC detachment. One potential solution is to increase the size of the MAFC or return some personnel to the G-2 staffs that had to provide the initial compensatory reductions. This is a difficult call in a time of shrinking manpower and equally compelling claims from other areas. A partial solution may be to offer the Communications Platoon, resident in H&S Company of the SRIG, as compensatory reduction to achieve some of the above. In June of 1990, FMFLANT conducted a detailed study of the SRIG's internal communications requirements and subsequently recommended to MCCDC that this Communica- tions Platoon was not required. Collocation with MAGTF CEs and Communications Battalion assets could satisfy their internal communications needs. (3:1) In each SRIG this could provide a compensatory reduction billet structure of one officer and 14 enlisted. This could restore intelligence personnel to at least the MEBs, or increase the MAFC size. Clearly, the SRIG is an evolving unit with a need for more clearly defined roles and responsibilities. Possibly, as units become used to it and learn more about its capabilities, greater sophistication will emerge in the employment of this organization with, at the MEF level, operational control being exercised by at least the Intelligence Company commander, and possibly by the SRIG commander. But using the SRIG to replicate pre-SRIG intelligence structures and to "penny-package" many of its assets to subordinate units is to deny the SRIG an opportunity to improve Marine Corps intelligence. BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. CG, MCCDC. "Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Intelligence Group Concept." Quantico, Virginia. Ltr 3900 over WF 10B of 10 Oct 90. 2. CG, MCCDC. "Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Intelligence Group Operational Concept." Quantico, Virginia. Ltr 3800 over WF10 of 22 Feb 90. 3. CG, FMFLANT. "SRIG Internal Communications Requirements." Norfolk, Virginia. Ltr 2000 over G-6/90254 of 22 Jun 90. 4. CG, II MEF. "Sourcing of MAGTF All-Source Fusion Center (MAFC), Intel Co, Second SRI Group, FMF." Camp Lejeune, North Carolina. CG, II MEF 301107Z Jan 89. 5. Ennis, Lt Col Michael E. "The SRI Group--Another Look." Marine Corps Gazette, February 1991: 52-55. 6. Hendrickson, Col. "Surveillance, Reconnaissance, Intelligence Group." Marine Corps Lessons Learned System Report, Number 21049-33665 (00123). MCRDAC, Quantico, Virginia. 19 Mar 91. 7. Leonhardt, Maj K. A. "Improving the MAFC." Marine Corps Gazette, February 1991: 55. 8. Morrison, Cpat R. Bruce. "Completing the SRI Group Organization." Marine Corps Gazette, August 1990. 9. Odell, Robert R. "Analysis of 2d SRI Group Concept of Operations." Camp Lejeune, North Carolina. Memorandum to Commanding Officer, 2d Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Intelligence Group of 15 March 1989. 10. Ryan, Maj Brendan P. "MAGTF All-Source Fusion Center. Marine Corps Gazette, August 1990: 60-63. 11. Ryan, Maj Brendan P. "Updating the MAFC Report." Marine Corps Gazette, Feburary 1991: 51. 12. U. S. Marine Corps. FMFM 3-1, Command and Staff Action. Washington, DC. 21 May 1979. 13. U. S. Marine Corps. FMFM 2-I, Intelligence. Washington, DC. 30 Sep 1980. 14. U. S. Marine Corps. OH 3-20. Commander's Guide to Intelligence, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Quantico, Virginia. 10 July 1989.
