Threat Intelligence: A Critical Element Of TAMPS AUTHOR Major Roy D. Bryant, USMC CSC 1991 SUBJECT AREA - Intelligence EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TITLE: THREAT INTELLIGENCE: A CRITICAL ELEMENT OF TAMPS While air power is glamorous and sensational, a tremend- ous amount of detailed, time-consuming planning takes place before each mission is flown. The focus of this preparation is the enemy's Integrated Air Defense System (IADS). The Tactical Aircraft Mission Planning System (TAMPS) is a computerized tool that helps shorten the planning process. It is essential that the TAMPS data base contains the most up-to-date information available concerning the locations of enemy weapon systems. The actical Electronic Reconnais- sance Processing and Evaluation System (TERPES), developed to aid Marine EA-6 aircrews in mission preparation and post-mission analysis, maintains just such a data base which is kept up-to-date by the fusion of data from a variety of intelligence sources. At the present, the Marine Corps does not have a timely and reliable method to keep the TAMPS threat location data base current. However, the information to update TAMPS is resident within TERPES and we need to fully develop a computer-to-computer communications interface between TAMPS and TERPES to pass that information. A major flaw in TAMPS is the way the threat data base is maintained. It is updated monthly by computer tape but relys on manual updates for any changes that occur in between tape deliveries. We needs to keep the TAMPS threat data current with real-time or near-real-time information. TERPES has developed the capability of being a data fusion center, combining intelligence data gathered from multiple sources to produce a more accurate threat data base for the area of interest. We need to be able to electronically transfer this information from TERPES to TAMPS in a form that can be readily used. In July of 1990, a proof of concept test was conducted in which data was successfully transferred between TAMPS and TERPES through a direct wire interface. While this would need to be developed into something more robust, it is a starting point. A logical follow on to the direct wire interface between TAMPS and TERPES would be a communications interface that would allow an information exchange between TAMPS and TERPES systems that were not collocated. Capabilities that currently exist in TERPES make it a logical choice to provide data base updates to TAMPS, but we need to connect the two systems through a communications interface and capitalize on these capabilities. THREAT INTELLIGENCE: A CRITICAL ELEMENT OF TAMPS OUTLINE Thesis Statement. At the present, the Marine Corps does not have a timely and reliable method to keep the TAMPS threat location data base current. However, the information to update TAMPS is resident within TERPES and we need to fully develop a computer-to-computer communications interface between TAMPS and TERPES to pass that information. I. PENETRATING ENEMY INTEGRATED AIR DEFENSE (IADS) A. Function of IADS B. Proper Mission Planning 1. Time Consuming Process 2. TAMPS: Computerized Planning Tool II. THREAT DATA BASE A. Need for Accurate Threat Data B. Current Data Base Maintenance C. Need for Near-Real-Time Updates III. TERPES CAPABILITIES A. TERPES Development B. TERPES-TRE Interface C. Data Fusion Center IV. TAMPS-TERPES INTERFACE A. Proof of Concept B. Future Communications Interface Air power, without a doubt, is the most glamorous and sensational of modern combat forces. During the opening days of Operation Desert Storm, the world watched in awe as allied air forces bombarded their targets with intimidating accuracy and devastating lethality. However, there is much more to an air strike than that which occurs between take- off and landing. A tremendous amount of detailed planning takes place before each mission is flown. The focus of this intense preparation is the enemy's Integrated Air Defense System (IADS) whose primary responsibility will be the elimination of our ability to fly into enemy airspace. With the recent addition of the Tactical Aircraft Mission Planning System (TAMPS) to the inventory, Marine aircrews now have a computerized tool to aid in this time-consuming planning process. Yet, while TAMPS can cut the required planning time tremendously, the solutions obtained are only as good as the information used. The adage "garbage in/garbage out" certainly applies. It is absolutely essential that the TAMPS data base contains the most accurate and up-to-date information available concerning the locations of enemy weapon systems. The Tactical Electronic Reconnaissance Processing and Evaluation System (TERPES), developed to aid Marine EA-6 aircrews in the preparation and the post-mission analysis of their missions, maintains just such a data base which is kept up-to-date by the fusion of data from a variety of intelligence sources. (1) At the present, the Marine Corps does not have a timely and reliable method to keep the TAMPS threat location data base current.(5) However, the information to update TAMPS is resident within TERPES and we need to fully develop a computer-to-computer communications interface between TAMPS and TERPES to pass that information. Because of the tremendous power available in the aggregate air forces of all branches of the United States military, any sophisticated enemy that we will face will posses an IADS intent on neutralizing our air power. This IADS will include a network of early warning RADARs, reporting stations, Surface to Air Missile (SAM) sites, Anti-Aircraft Artillery (AAA) sites, and fighter air bases that are linked to his command and control system. The primary mission of friendly strike groups will be to penetrate enemy air space to destroy assigned targets. At the same time, the focus of the enemy's IADS will be on shooting these aircraft down. Although we have an impressive ability to jam enemy RADARs and degrade the ability of the IADS to function, one of the best ways to defeat an enemy's air defense is through the proper planning of the mission. A mission commander will greatly enhance the survivability of his strike package if he selects a route of flight that avoids enemy weapon systems to the extent possible and uses terrain masking to exploit weakness in the enemy's defenses. If the enemy can't see you, he can't shoot you. However, just the procedure of plotting enemy weapon system locations on a chart and computing the areas where these systems are "blinded" because of the surrounding terrain can consume a considerable amount of valuable time. The speed of a computer is a superb asset in this process. TAMPS represents a concept that is long overdue. But, more important than reducing the required planning time is ensuring that the intelligence data used in constructing the plan is timely and accurate. No matter how quickly a strike mission is planned, it is of little or no value if the enemy Electronic Order of Battle (EOB) and Missile Order of Battle (MOB) that are used are out of date and inaccurate. The quality of any mission plan hinges on the planner knowing the types and locations of his threats. A major flaw in TAMPS is the way in which the threat location data base is maintained. TAMPS is an offshoot of the computerized mission planning system that was developed for cruise missiles. Being a strategic asset, the cruise missile planners receive their threat data via the Consolidated Air Defense Order of Battle (CADOB) data base, a Strategic Air Command (SAC) intelligence product. Because of the developmental ties between TAMPS and the cruise missile program, CADOB is also the primary source of threat intelligence data for TAMPS. (5) This information is received on a monthly basis via magnetic tape and is used to bring the TAMPS data base up to a "current" status. Unfortunately, given the time required to gather the intelligence, build the data base tape, and distribute the product, the information is already dated the day the tape is received. Rather than relying on monthly tape deliveries, Marine aviation needs some method of keeping the TAMPS threat data base current with real-time or near-real-time information. Unfortunately, this does not exist. In an age of high-tech data links and instant information flow, the TAMPS system manager must resort to manually entering any changes that occur in the enemy's EOB/MOB. What's worse is that he won't even know that his system is "broken" unless he sifts through a pile of secret message traffic and discovers that something has moved. The worst possible indication that the TAMPS data base is not current would be for a pilot to report back that his wingman was shot down by an uncharted SAM. In today's highly mobile battlefield, mission planners should expect that even the "fixed site" weapon systems will be moving to alternate prepared positions. Intelligence information that is such a vital element to the effectiveness of TAMPS is being collected and processed almost continuously by a variety of platforms. As one might well expect, technology is in place to disseminate the resulting product to the intelligence community. The key is to be able to rapidly pass the most current EOB/MOB data to the mission commander on the TAMPS machine as soon as it is available. For a solution to this problem, let's look to the electronic warfare assets of the wing, the EA-6 community, and their primary computer support system. TERPES is a support system that was originally developed in the 970's to process intelligence data gathered during both Electronic Surveillance Measures (ESM) missions and RADAR jamming missions conducted by Marine EA-6's. Even more than TAMPS users, EA-6 mission planners using TERPES need to have the clearest possible picture of the enemy's EOB. In that effort, TERPES receives data tapes produced by the Naval Intelligence Processing System (NIPS) that are very similar in content and distribution schedule as the CADOB tapes used by TAMPS.(1) Additionally, TERPES has the immediate benefit of the intelligence gathered during local EA-6 ESM missions. More significant is the recent increase in intelligence capabilities gained through the incorporation of the Tactical Receive Equipment (TRE) into the TERPES suite. Through data-link technology, TRE provides near-real-time threat data that has been collected by a variety of intelligence gathering platforms. This near-real-time intelligence is ported into TERPES via a recently operational TERPES-TRE interface. This information allows the TERPES signal intelligence analysts to rapidly update the threat data bases in a much timelier fashion. Thus, TERPES has developed the capability of being a data fusion center, combining intelligence data gathered from multiple sources to produce a more accurate threat data base for the area of interest.(1) Armed with this information, aircrews can plan their missions with a much clearer picture of the current battlefield. Yet, to benefit TAMPS users, we still need to be able to electronically transfer this information from TERPES to TAMPS in a form that he can readily use. During July of 1990, a proof of concept test was conducted at the Pacific Missile Test Center, Pt. Mugu, CA.(4) Among other demonstrations in this test, a TAMPS and a TERPES were connected through a direct wire interface. EOB data was successfully passed from TERPES to TAMPS and used to update the threat data base in TAMPS. Similarly, strike mission flight path routing was passed from TAMPS to TERPES. While this interface would need to be developed into something more robust, it provides a starting point in the solution of a very real problem. It is much more responsive than transporting the updated information via magnetic tape. And it is light years ahead of updating the data base with information on a computer printout that has to be manually entered. A logical follow on to the direct wire interface between TAMPS and TERPES would be a communications interface that would allow an information exchange between TAMPS and TERPES systems that were not collocated. While TAMPS is a positive move toward easing the mission planner's workload and increasing the survivability of Marine aviation, we must ensure that the TAMPS threat data bases are accurately maintained. Capabilities that currently exist in TERPES make it a logical choice to provide data base updates to TAMPS, but we need to connect the two systems through a communications interface. Marine aviators deserve the most current threat data available when they plan their missions. We just need to capitalize on current capabilities. BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. Carter, T. L., CWO-2 USMC, OIC TERPES Weapons System Support Activity, Pacific Missile Test Center, Pt. Mugu, CA. Personal interview about TERPES developmental issues, April 1, 1991. 2. Cruise Missile Project (PMA-281), NAVAIRSYSCOM, Washington, D.C., "Modified Interface Requirements Specification for the TAMPS, TEAMS, TERPES Interface," (Draft), prepared by Science Applications International Corporation, May 1990. 3. Fry, D. R., LtCol USMC, Head, Intelligence Section, MAGTF Integration Team, Marine Corps University, Quantico, VA, notes from TAMPS Advisory Group Meeting, May 1-3 1990. 4. Rowell, M. O. Maj USMC, Marine Corps Liason Officer to EA-6B Software Support Activity, Pacific Missile Test Center, Pt. Mugu, CA. Personal interview about TERPES/TEAMS developmental issues, February 12, 1991. 5. Womble, A.M., Capt USMC, Chairman, TAMPS Fleet Project Team, Naval Strike Warfare Center, NAS Fallon, NV. Personal interview about TAMPS developmental issues, April 1, 1991.
