CHAPTER 4
ANALYSIS IN LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT

This chapter provides guidance for analysis in LIC and is in three parts: Analysis in depth, techniques of analysis, and factors of analysis. MDCI analysis process is addressed in Appendix C.

ANALYSIS IN DEPTH

Information is transformed into intelligence at the processing step of the intelligence cycle. This intelligence supports the commander’s needs and guides his decision-making process. It also allows him to successfully complete his mission and at the same time protect his own force. Of course, the analyst does not make decisions for the commander. But the commander cannot make quality decisions without the input analysts provide.

Analysis determines the significance of raw data, relative to information and intelligence already known. And then it draws conclusions about the evaluated information. All analysts, whether OB, MDCI, imagery, or traffic go through this mental process.

Analysis in LIC involves a combination of tools and skills. Some of these tools have been developed to support one discipline and are now used by others. This is true for certain techniques—specifically, link and pattern analysis.

This chapter follows the pattern for analysis outlined in FM 34-3, Chapter 5, but has been tailored to address applications in LIC.

MEETING USER REQUIREMENTS

The ultimate user of intelligence is the commander. However, in LIC this may not always seem to be the case—at least not a commander in the sense we are accustomed to. There are situations when you may support an HN commander, a DEA special agent-in-charge, or an ambassador. They, too, need intelligence to form decisions; yet, each has unique requirements.

We need to ensure the HN commander understands the terms and products you present to him. Always remember to produce what the user needs. Make sure you are responding to stated PIR and IR. By doing so, you respond directly to the user’s needs.

You must understand these needs in order to satisfy them. If the analyst and the user do not view PIR and IR from the same perspective, the intelligence product will not support the mission. You must feed back to the user your understanding of what he needs or wants. You must also be visionary and proactive.

For example, if you are involved in a forced entry mission, such as Operation JUST CAUSE, look beyond the immediate mission’s PIR and IR. Ask yourself the following questions:

- What will be needed to support a nation assistance operation following hostilities?
- Will a threat remain against US forces?
- What information needs of a displaced person (DP) will the commander and civil military officer have?
- Will there be IR from non-DOD agencies such as USAID or DOS? If so, what will they need?

In conventional operations, the commander and his staff view the mission in similar terms: usually a tactical situation with an identifiable threat within an AO and AI.

In LIC, your end-user may not possess the same focus or views that you do. Your considerations of threat to the force are more detailed than those of some non-DOD agencies.

For example, in preparation for a counter-drug operation, an analyst was informed by the DEA special agent-in-charge that he maintained over 100 target folders on potential laboratory sites in the proposed AO. When the analyst was presented with the folders, they contained jumbled information in no set format. Later, the special agent-in-charge was presented a number of military style target folders. The special agent-in-charge was initially flabbergasted; he had never seen intelligence products of that caliber and detail before.
DETERMINING THE RISK FACTOR

Defining the degree of uncertainty, or filling in information gaps, is the job of intelligence. To succeed, analysts handle uncertainty from many sources. While objective ground truth is found in the laboratory, it is not a part of analysis of the battlefield. The analyst frequently deals with ambiguous or even misleading information.

The analyst’s greatest concern is uncertainty the commander’s is risk. Good analysts translate uncertainty into risk. Figure 4-1 shows the relationship between lethality and risk.

Risk increases as threat lethality moves from low to high. When a degree of uncertainty is added to the estimate of lethality, the potential danger becomes even greater. The degree of risk a commander will accept governs the amount of uncertainty the analyst reports.

Risk is the voluntary exposure to danger. In combat, there is always risk in not preparing responses to potential threat action—whether or not that action has a high possibility of execution. Risk increases in response to possible danger and decreases when the threat potential goes down.

The analyst’s uncertainty plays a key role in the evaluation of the enemy and the amount of risk accepted. Uncertainty may arise for many reasons:

- There is uncertainty about the enemy’s intent. For example, what is the enemy’s real objective? What are the various means of achieving this objective?
- There is uncertainty in evaluating the capabilities of the enemy force to achieve these objectives.
- There is uncertainty in other factors: lethality, warning time, enemy and friendly options, and environment conditions.
- There is uncertainty that the method of response will produce the desired outcome.

In the past, the strength of El Salvadorian efforts against the FMLN was its ability to quickly move troops by helicopter. There were sporadic reports of the FMLN’s possessing shoulder-fired SAMS or their members’ receiving training on the weapons. This information was never supported nor confirmed. The range of uncertainty was high and the risk was low.

However, in 1991 shoulder-fired SAMS were used against El Salvador Air Force (ESAF) helicopters. The level of uncertainty became low, although it was not known when or where the weapons would be used next. Therefore, the risk was high. As a result, analysts supporting tactical operations had to consider the risk SAMS presented. One way to reduce this risk was to develop air mobility corridor overlays and select routes that were not channelized.

THE THREAT MODEL

As an analyst, you develop a model to portray the threat you may encounter in an operation. It allows you to piece together information; identify gaps; and speculate, predict, and solve problems. More importantly, it assists you in lowering some of the risk.

There will always be some information gaps in your threat model; thus, you will always have some degree of uncertainty. However, by comparing the model to current activity you can identify patterns, trends, and activity levels. Your model consists of five color-coded categories:

- Battlefield environment (including terrain, hydrology, and weather)—WHITE.
- Organizational structure of threat—RED.
- Organizational structure of friendly forces—BLUE.
- Population—GREEN.
- Physical objects such as weapons, vehicles, aircraft, and drug laboratories—BLACK

The model forms an organizational structure from which the analyst can mentally picture the AO and AI. Once the model is developed, it is refined and updated to maintain its validity.

First, think WHITE. This is your framework for the model. This portion of the model relates to time and space. Here, time is a sequence of periodic snapshots within which events will occur. This will present problems when your threat is an insurgent or terrorist organization.

It may be difficult to determine time when countering these groups. You want to key on significant dates to the HN or threat; they may want to conduct an action in concert with a specific date; for example, HN’s independence day. You may also know certain events that will occur before this group conducts an operation. You do not know the time, but you do know the sequence. Herein lies the uncertainty.
In a counter-drug operation, time will not be such a problem. Determine growing patterns and cycles in your AO and AI. For example, if coca, the leaf will have to be moved to a base laboratory within a certain period.

Your map is a model of the real world. It contains valuable information about the battlefield environment. Use it as a base for your model. Overlay the time period snapshots to highlight patterns and changes.

_Thinking RED is_ seeing the current situation in the AO and AI from the threat’s point of view. This color anchors your model to the current situation. Remember that the combat arm of the insurgent or terrorist group is an extension of the political or religious faction. Therefore, actions on the battlefield follow the political or religious strategy of the organization.

Counter-drug operations maybe tethered to production cycles or economic concerns. The security elements of the drug producer will follow basic site defense tactics. Plot the threat locations, known and perceived. This will help you view the AO from his vantage.

_Thinking BLUE refers to seeing the operation from the friendly commander’s viewpoint._ Friendly forces may become the threat target in an insurgency or terrorist environment. Plot friendly locations determine effect on threat positions and likely threat COA.

**Figure 4-1. Translating uncertainty to risk.**

[Graph showing risk vs. lethality]
The concept of thinking GREEN is new to the threat model. Consider the impact the populace has on the threat and friendly forces as well as their location in the AO and AI. Will they impede operations? Will they assist the threat? Are there areas pro-government or anti-government?

This information affects the uncertainty of the situation. It is an added dimension to analysis not considered on the dispersed battlefield. Plot the disposition of the population by type of support (pro, anti, or neutral) and ethnic, racial, religious, and even economic divisions.

Thinking BLACK pertains to manmade objects that are displayed on any map. When you think black, consider all structures whether they are buildings, bridges, towers, or transportation routes. For example:

- In insurgency and counterinsurgency operations, these objects may provide concealment and cover or targets for both friendly and threat forces.
- In search and rescue or DRO, you will need to know key structures for planning purposes.
- In NEO, knowing the locations and condition of structures such as hospitals, police stations, and governments aids in planning and executing NEO.

TESTING THE MODEL

With a model of how the AO appears, the analyst can test hypotheses of how threat and population may interact. A hypothesis is an explanation for a set of facts that can be tested by further investigation. It should consist of a set of logically related propositions and an expected outcome.

A hypothesis can be proven false based on evidence, but it can never be proven correct in advance. The best that you can do is to rank order several hypotheses or assign rough probabilities to them. When seeking evidence to support or reject a hypothesis, consider the following:

- The threat may be engaged in deception or disinformation.
- Sensors and platforms may not be able to operate in all areas or situations.
- Indicators may be common to several hypotheses.
- A number of assets may collect the same or very similar information. This gives undue validity to a hypothesis.

- A seemingly insignificant indicator maybe vital to a specific COA.

BIASES

Errors in thinking can lead to false alarms or rejecting good ideas. Other errors that affect analysis are biases. There are four types of biases:

- Cultural.
- Organizational.
- Personal.
- Cognitive.

Cultural biases are formed at an early age and continue through life. They are based on your cultural or social perceptions. Remember, you will view certain areas—religion, customs, or even local dress—from a different point of view than the threat and the local populace.

Organizational biases are based on your knowledge of how your organization operates and the personalities of your commander and supervisors. This bias makes it easy to idealize a situation. Be careful not to alter your deductions or recommendations in an attempt to please the commander.

Personal biases come from your own experiences. If you previously had success using a particular analytical process, you may continue to try to fit every situation to this model. Do not attempt to put square pegs in round holes. Alter your thinking to accommodate different situations.

Cognitive biases have strengths and weaknesses. These vary from source-to-source and sometimes from message-to-message. This variance creates doubt about the reliability of some sources. Contributing to this are—

- Vividness. A clear and concise report will receive more attention than something vague, even if it is wrong.
- Absence of evidence. Do not hold back information because it is not conclusive.
- Oversensitivity to consistent. Do not validate information simply due to consistent reporting. Instead, consider if the information is representative of the potential total of information available.
TECHNIQUES OF ANALYSIS

There are two primary analytical techniques that help the analyst identify the presence of indicators-pattern and link.

PATTERN ANALYSIS

This technique is based on the premise that threat COAS reflect certain characteristic patterns that can be identified and interpreted. Ideally, paragraph 3 of the intelligence estimate (see Appendix F) should identify the presence of these indicators.

Analysts are faced with problems of organizing and recording incoming information and adding it to existing information so that meaningful relationships are clarified. The working situation map (SITMAP) and IPB templates are the primary tools used to organize information. Indicators can be ambiguous and incomplete. The analyst identifies patterns of activity or tip-offs which characterize specific threat units.

For example, you are supporting a counter-drug operation. You have data available concerning previous raids. This data, plotted on an overlay, gives you trends and patterns. You then apply these trends or patterns to other locations, predicting possible laboratory sites.

Current information is posted to your incident map as received. This map is a working aid allowing you to graphically show threat activity in both AO and AI that you consider important. Information on the incident map can provide a good foundation for the more formal SITMAP.

In another example, you are supporting a disaster relief mission following an earthquake. Your IPB process reveals certain high-cost areas that may be prone to looters. Information from your incident map reveals a trend in looting within two areas. These areas would go onto your SITMAP as confirmed threat target areas.

Working files are critical to properly store the extensive research material you will generate. You may be fortunate to be in a unit that has its files on computer; otherwise, you will have to do this manually. Either way, you must ensure that your filing system is easily understood, information is easy to retrieve, and includes cross-referencing.

The hot file is your most important working file. Here you will keep all available material pertaining to a specific incident, as well as information from related incidents. Reports of planned demonstrations, sabotage, or attacks all initiate hot files. A hot file becomes inactive when the event occurs, does not occur, or your priorities change.

It is critical that you stay alert and recognize all possible patterns that may be formed. The following illustrates the possible fusion of information:

- A tactical analysis team supporting counter-drug operations OCONUS receives a report from the FAA that three new Cessna aircraft have been registered by an export company located in the HN.
- Information from the personality files reveals that the owner of the export company is a relative of a major drug trafficking family residing in a neighboring country.
- The drug trafficking organization and family files reveal that the family in the neighboring country recently decided to move its export base to another country, location unknown.
- A request for information from the DOJ and DOT reveals that the corporation is being investigated for a number of federal offenses.

Once all related items of information from the intelligence files, sources, and agencies are obtained, the analyst begins to assemble the available information to form as many logical solutions or hypotheses as possible.

Assembly of information to develop logical hypotheses requires good judgment and considerable area expertise. When you develop hypotheses, avoid reaching conclusions based on prejudices or preconceived notions. In the above example, it would be easy to assume that the owner and relative are actually the export link for the drug trafficking family.

There are still some information gaps you must explore. Are there other family members of the traffickers in the same country or surrounding countries? In what illicit market is the front company involved? At a minimum, you have linked the owner of the front company to new aircraft, a drug trafficking family, and a US corporation suspected of federal offenses.
In the example above, if the owner is involved in the shipment of drugs, first you will have to determine from where the shipments originate. This will dictate your future actions. If it is from your country, you will be involved directly. If not, you will be on the periphery. In either case, you will be in direct contact with the DEA.

If the owner is not involved in drug trafficking, you will report the situation to the appropriate HN and US agencies. You will also search for other information that may link the drug trafficking family to other personalities residing within your AO.

A resource file includes all material which is important but not of immediate value. It includes hot files that are overcome by events (OBE), inactive incident files, inactive personality and organization files, and photographs.

The coordinate register is a valuable analytical tool. It keeps track of threat activity in a given area over time. Each page represents an important geographic area or town. This register has two parts: written entry record, Figure 4-2, and a blowup of the map grid, Figure 4-3. Both products help identify trends and patterns.

Figure 4-4 shows the personality card format which is maintained on each threat personality and organization. The correct identification of threat personnel will help you build the threat data base. Therefore, you must include all personalities, not just leaders. For example, you are supporting a counterinsurgency mission. You know that the threat is acquiring shoulder-fired SAMS.

Your PIR are focused on where the SAMS will be located and which force will receive them. A review of personality files will reveal which individuals have been trained on the weapon. With this data, you can focus your collection assets on specific people and areas. By identifying personalities and activities, you can construct organizational line-and-block charts and other data.

**LINK ANALYSIS**

Link analysis is used to depict contacts between persons, events, activities, and organizations. It can be used with four different recording devices:

- Association matrix.
- Activities matrix.
- Time event charts.
- Link diagrams.

The association matrix, Figure 4-5, is used to determine the degree of relationships, contacts, or knowledge between individuals. It is used to register members of a threat organization and chart their relationships with each other. The structure of the threat organization is formed as connections between personalities are made. (Acronyms and names used therein are fictional.)

The activities matrix, Figure 4-6, is used to connect individuals to any organization, event, entity, address, activity-anything other than people. Information from this matrix, fused with information from the association matrix, assists you in linking personalities as well.

For example, you may determine that three people who have never been seen together are all involved in the finance section of an insurgency. By linking their common activities, you can request surveillance to determine association. You may find that each is in charge of finances for separate cells of the same faction.

Time event charts are shown at Figure 4-7. This is a chronological record of individual or group activities designed to store and display large amounts of information in a small space.

Link diagrams are a graphic display used to assist the analyst conducting link analysis. It allows the analyst to show linkage between individuals and various sections of the threat organizations. An example is at Figure 4-8.

**COMBINED ANALYSIS**

Link and pattern analysis are often combined. For example, over a period of two months you have determined that every time a shipment of cocaine has been made from the AO, a request for plastic medical refuse bags emanated from that specific laboratory. By linking the two activities-request for medical refuse bags and the shipment of cocaine-you have established one pattern in the shipment of cocaine.

You should attempt to link another activity or possibly a person to this activity for the development of other indicators. If you know that medical plastic bags are ordered, you should also know who receives the order. Most likely that person is the logistician of the organization. You now link the logistician to other activities and personalities.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEM</th>
<th>TIME</th>
<th>COORDINATE</th>
<th>ACTIVITY</th>
<th>NOTES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>101428</td>
<td>XK124679</td>
<td>COCAINE LAB</td>
<td>15 KILOS COCAINE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>121544</td>
<td>XK179600</td>
<td>PRECURSOR ELEMENTS CACHE</td>
<td>ACETONE, ETHER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>130523</td>
<td>XK155693</td>
<td>CESSNA 172 SEIZED</td>
<td>300 KILOS COCAINE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 4-2. Written entry coordinate register.

GRID SQUARE 32U XK1267

Figure 4-3. Coordinate register map grid.
Figure 4-4. Personality card format.
Figure 4-5. Association matrix.
Figure 4-6. Activities matrix.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Political Trainer</th>
<th>Crew-Served Wpn Trainer</th>
<th>Recruiter</th>
<th>External Logistics</th>
<th>External Travel</th>
<th>Propaganda</th>
<th>Registered Communists</th>
<th>News Media</th>
<th>External Business Trade</th>
<th>External Tng Received</th>
<th>Financial</th>
<th>Logistics</th>
<th>Assassination</th>
<th>Illicit Drugs</th>
<th>Weapons Support</th>
<th>Weapons Buyer</th>
<th>Weapons Supplier</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DeMoya</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gomez</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costello</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maris</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mantle</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valdez</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berruz</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gonzalez</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zindaro</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hernandez</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Martinez</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raphael</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanchez</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marrero</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emdez</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rodriguez</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blanco</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Garcia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lopez</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**LEGEND:**
- Known association
- Suspected association
**Figure 4-7. Time event chart.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18 JAN 89</td>
<td>Gomez and Gonzalez issue joint communiqué announcing revolutionary government. Communiqué issued by Mantle.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 JAN 89</td>
<td>PLF applies to national university for position in student union.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 APR 89</td>
<td>PLF sponsors peaceful rally on university campus. Lopez was coordinator.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 JUN 89</td>
<td>Gonzalez and Gomez visit with communist leaders at a location out of country. Raphael led advance party.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 SEP 89</td>
<td>Violence at PLF rally at university. Lopez, Sanchez and Gonzalez in attendance. Two students (PLF) killed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 OCT 89</td>
<td>PLF communiqué announces Gonzalez and Gomez will enter May 90 elections; released by Maris.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 OCT 89</td>
<td>Assassination attempt on university president, linked to international terrorist known as Berruz believed working with PLF.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 NOV 89</td>
<td>PLF communiqué announces Mantle will be campaign organizer. Gonzalez will be assistant.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 DEC 89</td>
<td>As Christmas break begins, a university student group &quot;10 September&quot; is announced. They state &quot;They are formed in memory of students killed that day supporting PLF.&quot; Costa and Gomez in attendance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 JAN 90</td>
<td>President assassinated; his assailant, Hernandez, known PLF member, is arrested at scene. Mantle announces PLF saddened by news on the PLF anniversary.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 FEB 90</td>
<td>Hernandez escapes, 10 Sep takes responsibility. Costello is also announced as newly elected leader of 10 Sep.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 APR 90</td>
<td>Costa and Costello meet at Costa's university office for a third time.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 MAY 90</td>
<td>Garcia, PAO for 10 Sep, announced &quot;War of reprisals and retribution against government, on this day of worldwide revolution.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 MAY 90</td>
<td>Members of PLF are encouraged by low voter turnout. Government blames PLF and 10 Sep, citing violence and death threats to voters.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 4-8. Link Diagram.

LEGEND:
- Known association
- Suspected association
FACTORs OF AnalySIS

FM 100-20/AFP 3-20 provides an excellent model for the factors of analysis when analyzing an insurgency or counterinsurgency. We follow that guide but tailor it for LIC. Areas addressed are—

- Mission analysis.
- Nature of the society.
- Nature of the threat.
- Nature of the government.
- General conclusions.
- COAs.

You must identify the principal factors for these broad areas and study each in turn. Then you weigh and compare the factors in each area and reach tentative conclusions. These conclusions lead to development of possible COAs. You can then rank the probability of each COA and select the most likely one.

Figure 4-9 shows a threat analysis worksheet. This worksheet provides a guide to collection and analysis. The worksheet can also serve as a model for factor analysis.

MISSION ANALYSIS

Mission analysis requires a concise, but encompassing, description of the final outcome wanted. Consider all constraints and restrictions affecting mission achievement. Among these are material and human resource constraints, as well as the demands of politically active groups in the society. You will first use assumptions and then replace them with facts as the situation develops.

NATURE OF THE SOCIETY

Demographics of the HN society includes these five areas:

- Social organization.
- Economic organization and performance.
- Political organization and dynamics.
- History of the society.
- Political environment.

Social Organization

In evaluating social organization, look at—

- Density and distribution of population by identifiable groups; balance between urban and rural groups; sparsely populated areas; and concentrations of predominantly racial, linguistic, or cultural groups.
- Race, religion, national origin, tribe, economic class, political party by group affiliation, ideology, education level, union memberships, management class, occupation, and age of the populace.
- Overlaps among classes and splits within them. For example, do union members belong to one or many religious or racial groups? Are there ideological divisions within a profession?
- Composite groups based on their political behavior and the strength of each. For example, who actively or passively supports the HN, the insurgents, or remains neutral.
- Current or potential issues driving the political, economic, social, or military behavior of each subgroup-group and population growth or decline, age distribution, and changes in location by groups; for examples, economic benefits, social prestige, political participation, and perception of relative deprivation.

Determine which activities and programs accommodate the common goals of politically and socially active groups. You then determine which groups and composite groups support (or are inclined to support) the government, the threat, or remain neutral.

Economic Organization and Performance

Factors to consider when evaluating economic organization and performance are—

- The principal economic ideology of the society and local innovations or adaptations.
- The economic infrastructure. Examples: Fuel and mineral resource locations, bulk electric power production and distribution, transport facilities, and communications networks.
- Performance of productive segments. Examples: Public and private ownership patterns; concentration...
1. US objective (immediate, short-term, long-term).
2. Nature of the society.
   a. Social, economic, political, and security conditions.
   b. Causes of discontent.
   c. Issues.
   d. Groups (segments of the population) and forces (groups trying to influence actions of others).
   e. Variables likely to influence the level of violence (coercive potential, institutions, legitimacy of the regime).
   a. Leadership.
   b. Objectives (immediate, short-term, long-term).
   c. Organization.
   d. Target groups.
   e. External support (third party).
   f. Timing.
   g. Mass support.
   h. Relationship to legitimate political processes.
   i. Use of violence.
   j. Urban or rural base.
   b. Description of program (counterinsurgency, counter-drug, and so forth.)
   c. Evaluation of program.
      (1) Balanced, neutralization, and mobilization programs.
      (2) Preemptive and reinforcing aspects of threat strategy.
      (3) Adherence to operational guidelines.
      (4) Evaluation of each program in terms of likely impact on each segment of the population.
5. Government response (US, HN, third party).
   a. Possible COAs.
   b. Evaluation of each COA.
   c. Recommendation.

Figure 4-9. Threat analysis worksheet.
and dispersal; distribution of wealth in agriculture, manufacturing, forestry, information, professional services, transportation, mining, and others.

- Public health factors. Examples: Birth and death rates, diet and nutrition, water supply, sanitation, health care availability, and endemic diseases.
- Foreign trade patterns. Examples: Domestic and foreign indebtedness (public and private) and resource dependencies.
- Availability of education. Examples: Access by individuals and groups sufficient for national needs; groupings by scientific, technical, professional, liberal arts, and crafts training; surpluses and shortages of specific skills.
- Unemployment, underemployment, exclusion of groups, and horizontal and vertical career mobility.
- Taxing authorities, rates, and rate determination.
- Economic benefit and distribution, occurrence of poverty, and concentration of wealth.
- Population shifts and their causes and effects.
  Examples: Rural to urban, agriculture to manufacturing, and manufacturing to service.

You can now identify economic programs with values and resources which might increase favorable HN support, stabilize neutral groups, or neutralize threat groups.

Political Organization and Dynamics

When evaluating political organization and dynamics, look at—

- The formal political structure of the government and the sources of its power. Examples: Pluralist democracy based on the consensus of the voters, strong-man rule supported by the military, others.
- The informal political structure of the government and its comparison with the formal structure. Example: Is the government legally a democracy but in reality a political dictatorship or oligarchy?
- Legal and illegal political parties and their programs, strengths, and prospects for success. Also, the prospects for partnerships and coalitions between parties.
- Nonparty political organizations; motivating issues, strengths, parties or programs they support, and political action groups.

- Nonpolitical interest groups and the correlations of their interests with political parties or nonparty organizations. These include churches, cultural groups, professional organizations, and unions.
- The mechanism for government succession and the integrity of the process; roles of the populace; regularity of elections; systematic exclusion of identifiable groups; voting blocks; and patron-client determinants of voting.
- Independence or subordination and effectiveness of the judiciary. For instance: Does the judiciary have the power of legislative and executive review does it support constitutionally guaranteed rights and international concepts of human rights?
- Independence or control of the press and other mass media and alternatives for the dissemination of information and opinion.
- Centralization or diffusion of essential decision-making process and patterns of inclusion or exclusion of specific individuals or groups.
- Administrative organization and competence of the HN civil service bureaucracy. For example, are they altruistic public servants or self-serving crooks? Can individuals and groups make their voices heard within the bureaucracy?

You now correlate those social, economic, and political factors and identify political programs which will neutralize opposition and promote a supporting majority.

History of the Society

When evaluating history, look at the—

- Origin of the incumbent government and its leadership. Examples: Was it elected? Has it been in power long? Have there been multiple peaceful successions of government?
- History of political violence. Examples: Is violence a common means for the resolution of political problems? Is there precedent for revolution, coup d'etat, assassination, or terrorism? Does the country have a history of consensus building? Does the present threat have causes and aspirations in common with historic political violence?

Political Environment

In evaluating the political environment, determine the legitimacy of the government. Observe and analyze
acceptance of violent and nonviolent remedies to political problems by the populace; the type and level of violence exhibited by friendly and threat forces; and the groups or subgroups which support or oppose the use of violence.

**NATURE OF THE THREAT**

Studying the nature of the threat includes their objectives, organization, operational patterns, leadership, tactics, and external support.

In evaluating threat, look at the—

- Desired end state of the threat. Clarity of its formulation. Openness of its articulation. Commonality of point of view among the elements of the threat. Differences between this end view and the end view of the government.
- Groups and subgroups supporting the general objectives of the threat.
- Divisions, minority views, and dissensions within the threat.
- Groups which may have been deceived by the threat concerning the desired end state of the threat.
- Threat organizational structures and patterns; their variations, combinations, shifts, and trends.

Determine the stage and phase of the threat, and how far and for how long it has progressed or regressed over time. You also identify and evaluate unity and disagreement within front groups.

**NATURE OF THE GOVERNMENT**

Here we address the HN government. Areas to examine are—

- National strategy.
- Coercive measures.
- Balanced development.
- Administrative competence.

In evaluating the nature of the HN government response, examine the—

- General planning or lack of planning for countering the threat, comprehensiveness of planning, and correctness of definitions and conclusions.
- Organization and methods for strategic and operational planning and how these plans are executed.
- Strengths, weaknesses, resource requirements and constraints, and the validity of priorities.
- Use of population and resources, and the effects on each group.
- Organization, equipment, and tactical doctrine for security forces. For example, how does the government protect its economic and political infrastructure?
- Areas where the government has maintained the initiative.
- Population and resource control measures.
- Economic development programs.

Next, correlate HN and threat strengths and weaknesses and identify necessary changes in friendly security force programs, plans, organization, and doctrine.

In evaluating the effects on nonbelligerent, look at—

- Mechanisms for monitoring nonbelligerent attitudes and responses.
- Common objectives of groups neither supporting nor opposing the threat.
- Effects of HN military, political, economic, and social operations and programs on the populace. For example, does it kill civilians in counter-threat operations? Are benefits of government aid programs evenly distributed?
- Whether the populace is inclined to provide the threat or the HN with intelligence.

You also determine the strengths and weaknesses of the nonbelligerents; the depth of their commitment to remain neutral; and programs to keep them neutral or to support HN initiatives and forces.

In evaluating the COA for threat, HN, and nonbelligerents, you must consider and integrate the above factors into a comprehensive, flexible report.
GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

You must now try to put your analyses of society, threat, and government together. Your conclusions must accommodate and reflect the interaction of all factors.

You determine the methods with which each side attempts to mobilize human and materiel resources in its favor. This methodology affects specific groups of people in diverse ways. Analysis identifies issues which concern key political, social, and economic groups.

Both government and insurgents offer solutions to the people’s problems and attempt to deliver on their promises within various constraints.

A measured mix of benefits, persuasion, and coercion motivate groups to conform their behavior to the will of the provider. Remember the first principle of people management: Things that are rewarded are things that get done.

COURSES OF ACTION

Conclusions lead to COAs. Determine what is necessary to—

• Persuade a majority of identified groups to support the HN.
• Neutralize opposition groups.
• Prevent unaligned groups from supporting the opposition.

Whether you are actively involved in the operation, or on the periphery, you must keep the COA in balance. Consider the effect of each COA on each targeted group. Frequently, a benefit to one group has a negative effect on another. Consider all group dynamics. Assign priorities to groups in proportion to their importance in influencing the balance of power.

As the analyst, you must also consider using force against groups totally committed to the opposition. You may recommend the use of violence appropriate to the nature of the group’s involvement in the conflict.

In general, select COAS which hold the greatest promise of moving groups to your side and the least risk of driving groups into the threat camp.