APPENDIX E
REQUIREMENTS, SOURCES, AND AGENCIES

This appendix covers the intelligence requirements for LIC by operational category. It looks at available sources and agencies which can fulfill those needs.

The four operational categories of LIC are—
- Supporting insurgencies and counterinsurgencies.
- Combatting terrorism.
- PKO.
- PCO.

These transcend the operational continuum of—
- Peacetime engagement.
- Hostilities short of war.
- War.

The ever-changing political and military realities of today require us to be prepared to fight in any place on the globe, and at any or all of the conditions of the operational continuum. Figure E-1 shows this relationship.

In all military operations the commander identifies his PIR and IR based on METT-T factors. However, the diversity of LIC missions demands that IEW support be more visionary and proactive in identifying potential dangers before, during, and after hostilities.

INFORMATIONAL CATEGORIES

In broad terms, LIC information requirements are placed into five basic categories:
- Political.
- Economic and social.
- Geographic and environmental.

Since each of these categories interact, it is important to view each of them as an interdependent part of the whole.

REQUIREMENTS FOR SUPPORT TO AN INSURGENCY OR COUNTERINSURGENCY

IEW support for insurgency and counterinsurgency is similar. But there are enough differences to justify a separate look at each.

INSURGENCY

This is half of the first operational category. It involves supporting foreign political and military entities engaged in pro-democracy struggles within their own borders.

When deemed appropriate by the NCA, US forces can be tasked to provide training, materiel, and intelligence support to pro-western insurgents. Although this mission would probably be assigned to SOF, conventional forces may also participate in a limited support role.

To assist in determining the intelligence requirements for this operational category, mentally put yourself in the place of the insurgent.

Political

Political questions include—
- Is the insurgency legitimate?
- What portion of the population is politically supportive of the insurgents?
- What are the political issues which fueled the pro-western insurgency?
- What existing political organizations share political views with the insurgents?
- What is the position of neighboring countries and other regional powers via-a-via US support to the insurgency?

Economic and Social

Economic and social questions include—
Figure E-1. US support to UCS.
What economic factors influenced the outbreak of the insurgency?

What are the government’s economic choke points?

Can the insurgents weaken the government by attacking economic targets without alienating the civilian population?

How long can the government finance its counterinsurgency campaign?

What ethnic, religious, cultural, and other sociological divisions exist within the country?

Which of these social categories are hostile to the government?

Can the insurgents exploit these divisions?

**Geographic and Environmental**

This intelligence requirement includes a detailed study of the country's terrain and climate much as is done in conventional warfare. In fact, if the government employs conventional forces against the insurgents, then all the usual terrain and weather factors apply.

**Military and Security**

In certain cases, a neighboring country may either openly or covertly allow the insurgents to use their territory as sanctuary, training, and staging areas. For example, Pakistan often allowed Afghanistan rebel activity in Pakistan. In these cases, we need information pertaining to the degree or level of support activity a neighboring country will allow or provide the insurgents.

What segment of the military supports the insurgency? Will the military engage any military force (neighboring government or rebel) crossing the border? This can also include an inward evaluation of the supported insurgency. How well trained are they? Are their tactics effective?

**Threat**

In a support to an insurgency role, the threat is the government force and their allies. Traditional OB factors are prominent in the database. If the government has conventional warfighting capabilities, then IPB for enemy conventional operations will be necessary.

**COUNTERINSURGENCY**

This is the other half of this operational category. We could find ourselves involved in a counterinsurgency effort as part of a FID program in support of a HN. In this case, our involvement primarily would be advisory in nature. However, we could also become directly involved if the HN requests US combat troops and the request is approved by the NCA.

In either case, we will require detailed knowledge of the AO and the existing military and political situation. Of course, we ask the usual questions: What are threat capabilities and immediate intentions? What are threat strengths, weaknesses, and how can they be exploited?

But we also must be aware of weaknesses in the HN society, political base, and administrative machinery which allows for insurgent development. Therefore, understanding the threat goes far beyond identifying military capabilities. It must include understanding the political, economic, and sociological factors which made the existence of an insurgency possible in the first place.

Counterinsurgency data base building is essential at all levels beginning with basic intelligence data. Your basic intelligence data should answer two prime questions: Do you know your enemy? Do you know yourself? We need to look at these requirements in more detail.

**Political**

Does the HN truly recognize it has an insurgent problem? This is critical. If they do not, you could have a big problem trying to implement counterinsurgency policy. Your questions should include:

- How do the political structure, laws, and regulations of the HN support or hinder counterinsurgency operations?
- What are the HN’s national policies (foreign and domestic)?
- What are the significant political groups?
- What biographic data is available on key political figures?
- Where, and by whom, were major leaders taught?
- Where did they go to college or university?
Economic and Social

What is the status of the country’s commerce and industry?

Industries. Who owns them and where are they located?

Agriculture and Land Ownership. What agricultural products are grown; what percent of land is owned by what percent of the population?

Labor. How is the labor force organized and into what categories? What is the status of economic organizations, activity, and development?

Foreign Interchange. Look at foreign trade, treaties, exchange, investment, and aid. Who do they trade with? Who is providing aid and in what form? Who has large investments in the country? What treaties do they have and what are they about?

Natural Resources. What are the surpluses and shortages? What is imported, at what cost, and in what amounts?

Communications. How advanced is the communication systems? How widespread? What is the percent of population with television, radio, and newspapers? Who owns the different media systems and what are their political leanings?

Culture. What is the country’s social structure and the characteristics of the people? How about customs and manners number of languages and dialects; identity of minorities or tribes?

Religion. What religions are being practiced? What is the percent of population in each? Are there hostile rivalries?

Education. What is the literacy rate; education program; number of higher education facilities?

Arts and Sciences. How advanced is their science? What kinds of arts, music, and dance are established?

Public Information and Assistance. What information is available and to what extent is assistance provided? Who owns the media?

Census Data. Collect all that is available. What are the popular opinions and attitudes in the HN? What are the locations, attitudes, and opinions of refugees, evacuees, or DPs?

Health and Welfare. Do sanitation and hygiene facilities meet the needs of the population? If not, what is needed to bring them to acceptable standards? Is there a public welfare program in operation and what is the scope of its responsibility? What social problems, related to health, are contributing to the insurgency?

Geographic and Environmental

All standard military weather and terrain requirements such as surface configurations and land features, drainage, and vegetation exist in LIC. However, counterinsurgency operations require detailed analysis of population-related key terrain and other nonstandard terrain factors. These are discussed in Chapter 3 and Appendix H. MC&G maybe scarce or not available and will have to be augmented by foreign or commercial tourist maps. Up-to-date imagery can be an asset to your geographic intelligence by displaying changes in vegetation, roads, villages, and fields.

Military and Security

When conducting counterinsurgency in support of a HN, we need information on the government and the armed forces. On the government, we must look at how it addresses and responds to problems and issues identified during the study of the country’s political, social, and economic posture. Is the government implementing reforms? Is it structured and committed to meet the needs of the people?

For the armed forces, some areas that you will probably gather information on are—

- **Capabilities.** Who is responsible for providing internal security and what are their capabilities? What are their manpower resources and their ability to replace personnel?

- **Command and staff.** What is their doctrine, and what does it allow and restrict them from doing? What is the structure of their armed forces, both conventional and unconventional? How does structure affect operational capabilities?

- **Attitudes.** What percent of the armed force-s can be considered loyal to the HN; who is not, why and where are they? What status does a soldier enjoy in the society and how does it differ between officer and enlisted?

- **Traditions.** What traditions does the armed forces uphold and do they favor or hinder the insurgent’s plan? What are the feelings of soldiers towards the civilian population? Do these feelings hinder the counterinsurgency effort?
Organization. How are national level agencies, regular armed forces, and unconventional forces organized? What are their equipment and level of training?

Biographies. Collect data on senior military leaders to discover where they received their education and their military training. Determine their political leanings, if any. What are their attitudes towards insurgents and population? How much military experience and level of training do key military leaders have? All of this will give you an insight on how those individuals intend to deal with insurgent activity and their relationship to the government in power.

Threat

Your knowledge and understanding of the threat will, of course, better enable you to defeat him. Here, in a counterinsurgency, that information is usually more detailed than that found in a conventional engagement. Your data needs include—

Leadership. Who are the leaders? What is his or her importance? Are they associated with any certain class? What is their ideological commitment and philosophy? Where, when, and on what were they trained? What are their immediate, near term, and final objectives? Are there similarities to other insurgences?

Organization. Are they divided into covert and overt operations? Typically, the covert information you are interested in includes how extensive is the threat shadow government? How is the C3 system set up, and how effective is it?

EXTERNAL SUPPORT

Combatting terrorism divides itself into two halves: CT and AT. Defining terminology commonly used in discussing terrorism and its associated activities is substantially more complex than you might at first think. See AR 525-13 for defining common terminology.

COUNTERTERRORISM

CT is the offensive half of the combatting terrorism operational continuum. Although the intelligence requirements for CT are similar to those for counterinsurgent, the offensive nature of these missions requires target specific information. This includes layout of terrorist camps, complexes, buildings, habits, traits, and tactics.

Here are the broad requirements:

- What are the terrorist organization, equipment, and tactics?
- Are the terrorists supported or affiliated with international terrorist movements?
- Will terrorists directly attack US interests and personnel?
Terrorists have no overt or legal representation and do not usually employ large numbers of combatants. We must remember that while insurgents use terrorism as a tactic, pure terrorists cannot, by definition, engage in guerrilla warfare or a war of movement. Here are important questions you need to ask in a CT environment:

- **Political.** What are the underlying political motivations of the terrorists? What legal political parties or movements have similar motivations? Do the terrorists have direct ties to an insurgent organization?
- **Economic and social.** Does the HN have unpopular economic policies? Is the HN economy vulnerable to terrorist attack, and, if so, what are key economic targets? What are the economic needs of the terrorist group? Who provides the terrorist group economic aid? What existing social problems contribute to the terrorist cause? What segments of society support the terrorists?
- **Geographic and environmental.** Considerations are similar to those found in support to insurgency or counterinsurgency. Additionally, refine these considerations to apply in a MOUT environment.
- **Military and security.** Although CT missions may be unilateral, some may involve HN forces. Therefore, we need to know if the HN forces are organized, trained, equipped, and have the will for CT missions.
- **Threat.** Already defined.

**ANTITERRORISM**

AT is the defensive aspect of combatting terrorism and encompasses all measures used to reduce the vulnerability of personnel, dependents, facilities, and equipment to terrorist attack. It requires a study of all the factors listed above in CT, but the focus is on prevention and defense. Both US and HN measures are considered.

**REQUIREMENTS FOR PEACEKEEPING AND PEACETIME CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS**

Before looking at the requirements for these operational categories, we must realize that they both present a wide range of challenges to the IEW system. Both may involve the insertion of US forces in between or against the full range of military threats. US forces deploying on these missions may have to perform IPB in conventional or unconventional environments. We need to look at both categories separately.

**PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS**

Here are some examples of the kinds of questions asked in PKO:

- **Political.** US forces performing these types of missions require detailed knowledge of the political and military aspects of the conflict between the cobelligerents. Many of the diplomatic rules that govern PKO limit our intelligence collection efforts.
- **Economic and social.** US forces must understand what the economic factors of the conflict are. Is the war over food or other resources? What about the economic and social conditions of the populace in the buffer zone? Are there deep-seated ethnic hatreds or conflicts between people living in and around the buffer zone? What are social or religious taboos within the populace?
- **Geographic and environmental.** The scope of this information will depend on the type of conflict or level of war. Whether the original conflict was a conventional or guerrilla war will affect the level of detail employed.
- **Military and security.** Although these missions require neutrality and are not in support of a HN, certain parallels exist. The presence of US peacekeepers will be under the auspices of the governing world organization (UN, The Organization of American States [OAS], and others).
  - The legal jurisdiction of the territory on which US peacekeepers are deployed will be as determined by the world body. However, third-party countries may provide bases or staging areas for the US peacekeeping force. We must understand, for instance, if the third-party host country has sympathies for one of the belligerents. If so, how far are they willing to support them? Could HN forces pose a threat to US forces? Are the HN forces
capable of providing adequate security for US forces?

- **Threat.** Even in PKO, you must understand the full military capabilities of the cobelligerents. This includes all OB factors and previous combat history in the area. US peacekeepers must be prepared for the possibility that they may be caught in the middle of renewed hostilities or come under attack from terrorists or armed civilians.

**PEACETIME CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS**

This operational category is by far the most diverse and demanding on the IEW system. It includes, but is not limited to—

- Shows of force.
- NEO.
- Strikes and raids.
- Operations to restore order.
- Uw.
- DRO.
- Counter-drug operations.
- Security assistance programs.
- Support to US civil authorities.

These operations can occur at any time and at any place on the globe. Listing all the requirements for these missions would be impractical. As one example, though, we will discuss counter-drug requirements.

Counter-drug operations can fall under the heading of SAS, MTTs, intelligence sharing, or DOD support to drug interdiction. If carried out within US borders, it then falls under the heading of support to US civil authorities.

Currently, US policy is that we will not conduct direct combat operations against drug traffickers. However, we will support HN forces with intelligence, CSS, and training.

Counter-drug operations are similar to counterinsurgency operations—both in the manner in which the US supports the HN and in the tactics employed by the drug traffickers. In fact, most of the major insurgent groups in Latin America today are narco-guerrillas. Therefore, many of the intelligence requirements for counter-drug operations are the same as for counterinsurgency operations. Doctrinally, counter-drug operations fall under the LIC operational category of PCO. Counter-drug intelligence requirements are discussed in the PCO portion of this appendix.

As with the previous missions, we can apply the five basic intelligence categories to counter-drug operations with some minor variations:

- **Political.** What are HN political issues regarding US counter-drug assistance? Do the majority of the people support their government’s counter-drug policy? What is the political sentiment on extradition of HN nationals to the US?

- **Economic and social.** What natural or preexisting social divisions make a segment of society more susceptible to the allure of the drug trade? What social groups are already taking part in the drug trade? What economic factors are pushing the population toward the drug trade? Does the economy offer reasonable alternatives? Are there signs of unexplained affluence among certain groups or in certain areas?

- **Geographic and environmental.** Where in the country are the climate and terrain factors favorable to the cultivation of drugs? When are the growing and harvest seasons? Where is the terrain concealment and cover, availability of water, and transport favorable to establishing processing plants? What natural and manmade LOC are available to the drug traffickers? What areas of the country are populated by pro-drug, anti-drug, or neutral segments which can influence drug trafficking? This includes manpower for harvest, transportation, and protection.

- **Military and security.** Is the HN security and military committed to the war on drugs? Are they trained and organized to carry out the mission? Can they react to US-provided or derived intelligence.

- **Threat.** What is the nature of the drug threat? Are they narco-guerrillas—that is, do they use drugs to finance their insurgency? Are they purely drug runners in it just for the money? What is their organization, tactics, weapons, level of training? What is their transportation capability? Where do the drug traffickers get precursor
chemicals? Do they have cross-border connections with other drug organizations or guerrillas?

**SOURCES AND AGENCIES**

Current intelligence is comprehensive, all-source data that is derived from both tactical and strategic sources. When combined with basic intelligence, it forms your operational data base and can identify planning refinements, additional training needs, operational requirements, and intelligence gaps.

DIA publishes daily and periodic reports on current intelligence developments. Also, US Unified Commands publish periodic intelligence summaries, especially during a regional crisis. Finally, the DA Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence issues a daily, worldwide, electronically transmitted intelligence summary (INTSUM) at a collateral classification level.

**BASIC INTELLIGENCE SOURCES**

Here are some of the basic sources that you can use to fill intelligent gaps in support of LIC operational missions. National products yield a great deal of the information needed and can be found in national and classified products such as estimates, surveys, area handbooks, periodic studies, and reports. Some of these are obtained by submitting a statement of intelligence interest (S11) through channels.

The Register of Intelligence Products (RIP), published by DIA is a comprehensive list of products that assists you in completing your S11. Gaps or shortcomings in your information maybe filled by going to unclassified sources such as educational institutions, financial institutions, and businesses.

Open sources such as weekly news magazines, encyclopedias, maps and geodetic surveys, wire services, and network television news can provide NRT local information to augment classified current intelligence reporting.

**Informal Sources**

An informal source is an individual or group that works outside the official structure but can provide invaluable information. They can include, but are not limited to, individual troops, general population, teachers, farmers, merchants, bar or pub owners, community leaders, organizers, and socialites.

These examples are all pertinent to operations inside the HN or the target area. Therefore, given the luxury of a cooperative HN, local HUMINT collection would be the most effective. However, PCO in which US forces are inserted without the consent of, or in direct opposition to, the local government will require unilateral collection.

**Agencies**

An agency is an organization designed to collect intelligence or information or perform other official functions in service to the government. These include, but are not limited to, tactical units, LEAs, intelligence and security units, health organizations, public welfare agencies, educational institutions, and government economic, legal, and agricultural agencies. The following list is not all-inclusive:

**Federal Level:**
- CIA. Strategic intelligence on full range of political, economic, social, and military topics.
- NSA. Strategic and tactical SIGINT.

**Department of Defense:**
- DIA. Strategic and operational intelligence with a focus on military matters.
- National Military Intelligence Center (NMIC). I&W, current intelligence.
- Joint Tactical Intelligence Center (JTIC).
  All-source analysis of information and intelligence gathered by DOD and non-DOD agencies, to include host government. JTIC produces tactical support packages (TSPs) for specific targets. Although the focus is primarily South American CI and counter-drug missions, it also supports purely conventional operations.
- The Central America Joint Tactical Intelligence Center (CAJTIC)—out of which JTIC evolved—is a subelement of JTIC with a focus on counterinsurgency operations.
- Counter-drug JTFs 4, 5, and 6. The JTFs are the counter-drug intelligence and operations center for United States Atlantic Command (LANTCOM) (Caribbean, Atlantic); Pacific Command (PACOM) (Pacific); and United States Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) (US-Mexico border, located at Ft Bliss, TX). They consist of personnel from each of the armed forces, the US Coast Guard, and US Customs.
- Defense Medical Intelligence Agency. Information on global medical phenomena, situations, and trends.

Specified Commands, Global Unified Commands, Regional Unified Commands Joint Intelligence Directorate (J2). The J2 oversees the Joint Reconnaissance Center (JRC), which manages all theater R&S (collection assets). The JRC also coordinates support from national level assets.

The Joint Intelligence Center (JIC). This is a new name for an old concept. The name has been used before as a theater all-source intelligence center. Operation DESERT STORM proved the value of top-down intelligence where intelligence products were funneled through the JIC to theater army and down to the corps. Operation DESERT STORM gave the concept formal acceptance-Central Command (CENTCOM) and PACOM now have JICs.

Theater Special Operations Command (TSOC). This command supports the theater commander by coordinating all intelligence requirements for in-theater SOF. Many LIC-related intelligence requirements can be met by this organization and its supporting IEW infrastructure.

Department of the Army:

INSCOM. Various EAC intelligence products.

USAIA. Operational and tactical intelligence imagery.

ITAC. Threat analysis on full spectrum of military and terrorist threat.

MI brigades (EAC). See Appendix A.

Army component commands of unified and specified command G2. US Army South, Allied Forces, Central Europe (AFCENT), others.

Corps G2s.

In addition to the theater army G2, MI brigades (EAC), and the Corps G2 and its MI brigade, there are other standard and nonstandard entities which exist at this level.

Theater Army Special Operations Support command (TASOSC) is a functional command subordinate to the theater army. Under the TASOSC, the TASOSC ISE provides theater ARSOF with CM&D, target development, and intelligence liaison with other Army and theater IEW assets.

The US country team consists of principal representatives of the US departments and agencies working within a specific country. The team is headed by the Chief of Mission (usually an ambassador) and, therefore, is under DOS control.

The TAFT is a TDA-type organization with no set size, structure, or mission. Each individually tailored mission is to coordinate all US civilian and military activities in support of the host government. Military representatives on the country team include the Defense Attache, the individual service attaches, and the Chief of the SAO. These are excellent sources.

TATs are nonstandard organizations which support selected country teams in Latin America with real-time intelligence analysis. The mission and the situation in a country will determine the TAT’s organization and function. As the focal point for fused tactical intelligence support from national, theater, and local assets, TATs are capable of funneling intelligence support to the host government through the country team. TATs can support counterinsurgency, counter-drug, and other LIC missions.

Non-DOD Agencies: Non-DOD agencies play an important role in the nonmilitary aspects of LIC. In CONUS, they can assist MACOMS with broad informational categories. Many agencies are also present in the host countries and are part of the US country team. Following are some significant non-DOD agencies:

Office of the National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP). The national drug coordinator recommends anti-drug policy to the President. Based on input from other agencies, the ONDCP publishes the annual National Drug Strategy under the President’s signature. ONDCP is a coordinating staff and has no control over any of the agencies employed in counter-drug operations.

DOS. This is the lead agency for US foreign policy. With the exception of some combat situations where the theater or JTF CINC is in control, DOS (through the US Ambassador), has authority over all US activities in a host country. The DOS, both in CONUS and OCONUS, can provide current intelligence and information on the full range of informational categories.
USAID. This is a major agency under DOS and is in charge of implementing US economic policies and programs in friendly nations. Although its focus is economic development, it has access to the full range of informational categories.

FBI. This is the lead agency for domestic and international terrorist threat in the US. It investigates terrorist bombings and attacks on US citizens and facilities and conducts domestic narcotics operations.

DEA. This is the lead US Government agency for drug interdiction (a role shared, in practice, with the US Customs Service). Aside from a managerial staff, DEA maintains two distinct career fields: drug enforcement agents and intelligence analysts. Agents operate in many locations in the US and in US embassies. Analysts process drug-related tactical and operational information at major field offices and operational and strategic information at DEA headquarters.

US Customs Service. By virtue of its responsibility for inspection of goods coming into the US, the Customs Service shares responsibility for drug interdiction with the DEA. US Customs Service, by congressional declaration, is the lead agency for research and development of counter-drug technology.

INS and Border Patrol. Until recently, neither the INS nor the Border Patrol was significantly chartered to conduct drug interdiction missions. However, the close association between illegal immigration and drug smuggling resulted in both agencies involved in drug seizures. The US Border Patrol has been responsible for some of the largest total annual seizures of drugs—even though it is not specifically tasked with that mission.

US Coast Guard (USCG), DOT. The USCG works extensively with DOD, US Customs Service, and DEA in the seizure of illegal drugs in US and under certain circumstance, international waters. USCG Law Enforcement Detachments (LEDETs) are frequently used aboard US Navy vessels to perform seizures and arrests on the high seas.

El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC). This center includes personnel from a number of US Government agencies under the supervision of DEA EPIC personnel perform analysis and dissemination of counter-drug intelligence.

HN Agencies: These are normally the best sources of information. However, usually the user has to be in-country and have good working relationships with the HN officials. While this is possible, we must remember that these agencies are not under our control and may not always be willing to divert resources to support our requests.

HN cabinet level offices. Economic, social, education, and others can provide basic information.

Other HN offices and departments. Medical, census, labor, agriculture, communications, public works, and utilities.

HN defense and security offices. Central and regional level, to include regional intelligence centers.

HN regional level departments. Economic and social data on specific regions and areas of the country.

HN RICs or area coordination centers (ACCs) belong to the HN and are all-source, multi-agency intelligence centers located at the host country tactical level. Their mission is to coordinate and analyze all intelligence activities within their AO. RICs and ACCs support military and paramilitary forces with all-source intelligence, and coordinate with local nonmilitary counterinsurgency, counter-drug, or IDAD activities. In the case of El Salvador, US advisors were present at the RIC to provide training and advice. In the Philippines, where they are known as ACCs, there are no US military advisors present.