HEARING OF THE
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
ON THE NOMINATION OF
GENERAL MICHAEL V. HAYDEN
TO BE THE
DIRECTOR OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
ON THE NOMINATION OF
GENERAL MICHAEL V. HAYDEN
TO BE THE
DIRECTOR OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
THURSDAY, MAY 18, 2006
216 HART SENATE OFFICE BUILDING, WASHINGTON, D.C.
216 HART SENATE OFFICE BUILDING, WASHINGTON, D.C.
SEN. ROBERTS: The committee will come to order.
The committee will proceed with members and their questions on a 20-minute time frame.
And the next senator to be recognized is Senator Hatch. Senator Hatch.
SEN. ORRIN HATCH (R-UT): Well, General Hayden, there's been some commentary about the fact that you continue to wear the uniform that you have so proudly distinguished over your long I think 35-year career. Certainly you're not the first director of Central Intelligence to wear -- but let me just ask you directly, because I think this needs to be on the record.
Let's say that you've stepped out from your office for a moment and then you return; there are two messages for you. They're marked exactly the same time, these two messages. One is from Ambassador Negroponte, and the other one is from Secretary Rumsfeld. Whose call are you going to return first?
GEN. HAYDEN: Yes, sir, that's pretty straightforward.
SEN. HATCH: That's straightforward.
GEN. HAYDEN: Yes, sir. I work for the ambassador, and so I would return his call.
SEN. HATCH: That's right, you're going to report to Ambassador Negroponte.
GEN. HAYDEN: Yes, sir.
SEN. HATCH: Now let me add the chairman of the Intelligence Committee -- (laughter) --
GEN. HAYDEN: Yes sir, I would set up a conference call. (Laughter.)
SEN. HATCH: On a more serious question, what does your military experience bring to this position, you know, should you be confirmed?
GEN. HAYDEN: Yes, sir. I mean, as you said, I'm proud of my military experience. Actually it's been fairly broad, but if you stop and do the math, there's a big chunk of time -- I actually stopped and did this over the weekend -- more than 20 years in intelligence. And if you look at the career in another way, there's an awful lot of it with an interface to the civilian world -- four years as an ROTC instructor, two years on the National Security Council staff, two years in an embassy behind the Iron Curtain. So I think, frankly, it's given me a pretty good background in terms of the military aspect that has to do with leadership and management; the intelligence aspect, lots of experience. And working in a civilian environment is not going to be something that's foreign or alien to me.
SEN. HATCH: Thank you. There aren't too many people who can match you. In fact, I don't know of anybody really. There are some pretty good people out there.
I just got this letter that was directed to Speaker Denny Hastert as of yesterday's date, signed by Mr. Negroponte, Director Negroponte. Now this letter says I am responding on behalf of National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley to Ms. Pelosi's May 2nd, 2006, inquiry regarding the classification of the dates, locations, and names of members of Congress who attended briefings on the terrorist surveillance program. Upon closer review of this request, it has been determined that this information can be made available in an unclassified format. The briefings typically occurred at the White House prior to December 17, 2005. After December 17th, briefings occurred at the Capital, NSA or the White House. A copy of the list is enclosed.
You remember those briefings?
GEN. HAYDEN: Yes, sir.
SEN. HATCH: You were there.
GEN. HAYDEN: Yes, sir.
SEN. HATCH: Well, it just said on 25th of October '01, the members of Congress who were briefed at that time were Porter Goss, Nancy Pelosi, Bob Graham, and Richard Shelby.
GEN. HAYDEN: Yes, sir.
SEN. HATCH: Those are the chair and vice-chair of the Senate Intelligence Committee, and of course, Nancy Pelosi was the ranking minority member over there and Porter Goss was then the chair.
GEN. HAYDEN: Yes, sir.
SEN. HATCH: On November 14th, the same four were briefed again. Is that correct?
GEN. HAYDEN: Yes, sir. That's right.
SEN. HATCH: On December 4th, not only were the members of the Intelligence Committee leadership briefed, by the chair of the Senate Appropriations Committee, Daniel K. Inouye, Senator Inouye, and the ranking minority member, Senator Ted Stevens, were briefed. Is that correct?
GEN. HAYDEN: Yes, sir.
SEN. HATCH: On March 5th, you again briefed Porter J. Goss, Nancy Pelosi, and Richard Shelby. In other words, the people who were --
GEN. HAYDEN: Yes, sir.
SEN. HATCH: -- leaders of the intelligence --
GEN. HAYDEN: And Senator Graham couldn't make that meeting so we swept him up a week or two later.
SEN. HATCH: Okay. Well, yeah you did on April 10th; Bob Graham got briefed on the same materials, I take it.
Then on June 12th, Porter Goss and Nancy Pelosi, the chair and the ranking member over in the House were briefed again, right?
GEN. HAYDEN: Yes, sir.
SEN. HATCH: On the 8th of July of '02, the chair and the ranking member, Bob Graham and Richard Shelby, were briefed.
GEN. HAYDEN: Yes, sir.
SEN. HATCH: Okay. On January 29th '03, again the leaders of the two intelligence committees were briefed, Porter J. Goss, Jane Harman, Pat Roberts, and John D. "Jay" Rockefeller IV.
GEN. HAYDEN: Yes, sir.
SEN. HATCH: Okay.
Okay. Then on July 17th '03, Porter Goss, Jane Harman who was then ranking member, Pat Roberts and Jay Rockefeller were again briefed.
GEN. HAYDEN: Yes, sir.
SEN. HATCH: Is that correct?
GEN. HAYDEN: That's right.
SEN. HATCH: Then on March 10th '04, you briefed the speaker of the House, Denny Hastert; the majority leader of the Senate, William Frist -- Bill Frist -- the minority leader of the Senate, Tom Daschle; the minority leader of the House, Nancy Pelosi --
GEN. HAYDEN: Right.
SEN. HATCH: -- the chair and ranking member of the House and the chair and ranking member of the Senate Intelligence Committee, is that correct?
GEN. HAYDEN: Yes, sir.
SEN. HATCH: Then on the 11th of March '04 --
GEN. HAYDEN: Next day.
SEN. HATCH: Yeah, the very next day, you briefed the majority leader of the House. This is all on the warrantless surveillance program. Is that right?
GEN. HAYDEN: Yes, sir.
SEN. HATCH: Okay. Then on the 23rd of September '04, you briefed Peter Hoekstra, who's now the chairman of the House Intelligence Committee.
GEN. HAYDEN: Right.
SEN. HATCH: Then on 3rd of February '05 you briefed Pete Hoekstra, Jane Harman, Pat Roberts, Jay Rockefeller, the leaders of the respective intelligence committees, right?
GEN. HAYDEN: Yes, sir.
SEN. HATCH: Then on the 2nd of March '05, you briefed Harry Reid, the minority leader of the Senate, right?
GEN. HAYDEN: Yes, sir.
SEN. HATCH: And on the 14th of September, again, the leaders of both intelligence committees, Hoekstra, Harman, Roberts and Rockefeller, right?
GEN. HAYDEN: Yes, sir.
SEN. HATCH: I'd just thought I'd get this all on the record because I don't think people realize the extent to which you and the administration have gone to try and inform Congress, even though you've followed the past history where since Jimmy Carter where you did it this way, right?
GEN. HAYDEN: Yes, sir.
SEN. HATCH: On the 11th of January, again, the members of the intelligence committees of both the House and Senate and Speaker Hastert, right?
GEN. HAYDEN: Yes, sir and -- yes, sir, that's right.
SEN. HATCH: And on the 20th of January, Harry Reid, Nancy Pelosi, Pat Roberts and Jane Harman, right?
GEN. HAYDEN: Yes, sir.
SEN. HATCH: On the 11th of February '06, Pat Roberts, our current chairman. On the 16th of February, Denny Hastert and Pete Hoekstra, right?
GEN. HAYDEN: Yes, sir.
SEN. HATCH: On the 28th of February you briefed the chairman of the House Appropriations Committee and the Defense Subcommittee, Bill Young; you briefed the ranking minority member, House Appropriations Committee of the Defense Subcommittee, John Murtha.
GEN. HAYDEN: Yes, sir.
SEN. HATCH: Right?
GEN. HAYDEN: Yes, sir.
SEN. HATCH: On March the 3rd, '06, you then briefed Jay Rockefeller individually, right?
GEN. HAYDEN: Yes, sir.
SEN. HATCH: Okay. Then on March 9th, you briefed the seven members of this subcommittee that was formed.
GEN. HAYDEN: That's right.
SEN. HATCH: Okay. And that included me?
GEN. HAYDEN: Yes, sir.
SEN. HATCH: Okay. And so the names were Roberts, Rockefeller, Hatch, DeWine, Feinstein, Levin and Bond.
Then on the 10th of March, you briefed Senator Bond by himself.
Then on the 13th of March, you briefed Pat Roberts, Dianne Feinstein, and Orrin Hatch, right?
GEN. HAYDEN: Yes.
SEN. HATCH: Okay. On the 14th of March, Mike DeWine, Senator DeWine; on the 27th of March, Carl Levin. Is that correct?
GEN. HAYDEN: Yes, sir.
Sir, I believe these latter ones now include visits to NSA where they --
SEN. HATCH: That's right.
GEN. HAYDEN: -- they visited the agency and had --
SEN. HATCH: In other words, all these people had --
GEN. HAYDEN: -- extensive periods of time --
SEN. HATCH: -- familiarity with --
GEN. HAYDEN: Yes, sir.
SEN. HATCH: -- the warrantless surveillance program, and you made yourself available to answer questions and to make any comments that they desired for you to make --
GEN. HAYDEN: Yes, sir.
SEN. HATCH: -- that were accurate. Okay.
SEN. ROBERTS: Excuse me, Senator, on that last one you may have missed, but the general indicated, that was a trip out to the NSA --
SEN. HATCH: Well, sure.
SEN. ROBERTS: -- so we could actually see how the program worked.
SEN. HATCH: Okay. And then on March 29th, my gosh, you briefed Pete Hoekstra, Jane Harman, John McHugh, Mike Rogers, Mac Thornberry, Heather Wilson, Jo Ann Davis, Rush Holt, Robert E. "Bud" Cramer, Anna Eshoo, and Leonard Boswell, all members of the HPSCI in the House, the Intelligence Committee in the House, right?
GEN. HAYDEN: Yes, sir.
SEN. HATCH: Then on the 7th of April '06, you briefed Hoekstra, McHugh, Rogers, Thornberry, Wilson and Holt again.
GEN. HAYDEN: Yes, sir, I believe that was actually a field trip to NSA for them.
SEN. HATCH: Well, that's fine. But my point is, you were briefing them on this warrantless surveillance program.
GEN. HAYDEN: Yes, sir, that was the subject.
SEN. HATCH: Then on the 28th of April, you briefed Jane Harman, Heather Wilson, and Anna Eshoo, right?
GEN. HAYDEN: Yes, sir. Again, a trip to NSA.
SEN. HATCH: And then finally on May 11th -- and you've had some briefings since, but this is the last I've got -- May 11th, you briefed Bill Young and John Murtha, who were both on the House Appropriations Committee.
GEN. HAYDEN: That's right.
SEN. HATCH: That sounds to me like you made a real effort to try and help member of Congress to be aware of what was going on.
GEN. HAYDEN: Sir, my purpose in the briefing was to be as complete and as accurate as possible.
SEN. HATCH: What's the purpose of this warrantless surveillance? My gosh, are you just doing this because you just want to pry into people's lives?
GEN. HAYDEN: No, sir.
SEN. HATCH: What's the purpose, if you can succinctly tell me that.
GEN. HAYDEN: It's not for the heck of it. We are narrowly focused and drilled on on protecting the nation against al Qaeda and those organizations who are affiliated with al Qaeda.
SEN. HATCH: You wanted to protect American citizens from terrorists all over the world.
GEN. HAYDEN: Yes, sir. Yes, sir. Exactly.
And under this program, we can only touch the information that is provided under this program if we can show the al Qaeda or affiliate connection.
SEN. HATCH: That's right.
GEN. HAYDEN: It's the only purpose for which it's used.
SEN. HATCH: And instead of saying you monitored the calls, what you did -- this program only applied to foreign calls into the country or calls to --
GEN. HAYDEN: In terms --
SEN. HATCH: -- known al Qaeda or suspected al Qaeda people outside of the --
GEN. HAYDEN: Sir in terms of listening or eavesdropping or whatever phrase is used in the public domain -- what we call intercepting the call --
SEN. HATCH: Right.
GEN. HAYDEN: -- what we call the content of the call, the only calls that are touched by this program are those we already believe, a probable cause standard, are affiliated with al Qaeda and one end of which is outside the United States.
SEN. HATCH: Isn't it true that the president had to reauthorize this program every 45 days?
GEN. HAYDEN: On average. It varied depending on schedules and his travel and so on; but on average, about 45 days, yes, sir.
SEN. HATCH: How would you describe the classification of the warrantless surveillance program?
GEN. HAYDEN: It was very closely held. It was for all practical purposes a special access program. We had to read people into the program specifically. We have documentation that --
SEN. HATCH: Do you consider it one of the most serious classified programs --
GEN. HAYDEN: Oh, yes, sir.
SEN. HATCH: -- in the history of the nation?
GEN. HAYDEN: That is fencing it off. I mean, everyone refers to my old agency as the super-secret NSA. This was walled off inside NSA; that's the compartment that it was in.
SEN. HATCH: Okay. So this wasn't just monitoring calls of domestic people; this was monitoring into the country and out of the country to or from suspected affiliates of al Qaeda?
GEN. HAYDEN: That's accurate. That's precisely accurate, Senator.
SEN. HATCH: Now if we had this program let's say a year before 9/11, what effect would it have been on 9/11, do you believe?
GEN. HAYDEN: I have said publicly -- and I can demonstrate in closed session how the physics and the math would work, Senator, but had this been in place prior to the attacks, the two hijackers who were in San Diego, Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al- Hazmi, almost certainly would have been identified as who they were, what they were, and most importantly, where they were.
SEN. HATCH: Now the media -- Senator Levin said phone calls, but the media has made that sound like you were intercepting phone calls. The fact of the matter is is that -- well, maybe I can't ask that question.
Well, you said you always balance privacy rights and security rights.
GEN. HAYDEN: Yes, sir.
SEN. HATCH: But your major goal here was to protect the American people.
GEN. HAYDEN: Oh, sir, the only goal -- let me narrow it down so it's very, very clear. This activity wasn't even used for any other legitimate foreign intelligence purpose. I mean, there are lots of reasons, lots of things that we need to protect the nation against.
SEN. HATCH: And you have --
GEN. HAYDEN: This extraordinary authority given to us by the president --
SEN. HATCH: Right.
GEN. HAYDEN: -- didn't look left or didn't look right.
SEN. HATCH: And you had --
GEN. HAYDEN: Al Qaeda and affiliates.
I'm sorry.
SEN. HATCH: And you had specific rules and specific restraints, specific guards.
GEN. HAYDEN: Yes, sir.
SEN. HATCH: Okay. Now, the distinguished senator from Oregon said that you admitted you were wiretapping Americans. That's a pretty broad statement --
GEN. HAYDEN: Yes, sir.
SEN. HATCH: -- but it certainly isn't true.
GEN. HAYDEN: Sir, we were intercepting the international calls entering or exiting the United States which we had reason to believe were associate with al Qaeda, is how I would describe it.
SEN. HATCH: If I understand it correctly, when you could, you went to FISA and got the warrants --
GEN. HAYDEN: There were other circumstances in which clearly you wanted more than the coverage of international communications, and under this authorization, you would have to go to the FISA court in order to get a warrant for any additional coverage beyond what this authorization --
SEN. HATCH: And FISA was enacted over 30 years ago.
GEN. HAYDEN: Yes, sir.
SEN. HATCH: And so FISA did not apply to some of the work that you were doing.
GEN. HAYDEN: Well, the way I would describe it, Senator, is that a lot of things have changed since the FISA act was crafted. It was carefully crafted in '78 --
SEN. HATCH: I'm not criticizing.
GEN. HAYDEN: -- it reflects the technology and -- I need to add -- and the threat as we knew it to be in 1978. The technology had changed; the threat had changed. The way I describe it, Senator, is I had two lawful programs in front of me, one authorized by the president, the other one would have been conducted under FISA as currently crafted and implemented. This one gave me this operational capability; this one gave me this operational capability.
SEN. HATCH: You would have no objection if we could find a way of amending FISA so it would accommodate this type of protection for the American people.
GEN. HAYDEN: No, of course not, sir. And again, we've made it clear throughout, though, that we would work to do it in a way that didn't unnecessarily reveal what it was we were doing to our enemies.
SEN. HATCH: Well, knowing what I know about it, I want to commend you because I think you have really protected the American people.
When was the last time we had a major terrorist incident in this country?
GEN. HAYDEN: Well, sir, I would go back four and a half years.
SEN. HATCH: There's no way we can absolutely guarantee that we won't have another one --
GEN. HAYDEN: No, sir.
SEN. HATCH: -- but you're certainly doing everything you know how to do.
GEN. HAYDEN: Well, sir, that was the commitment. Everything under law.
I said earlier in the morning we knew what this was about. Senator Levin asked me earlier if there were privacy concerns, and I said there are privacy concerns with regard to everything the National Security Agency does. I said to the work force, I'll repeat: We're going to keep America free by making Americans feel safe again.
SEN. HATCH: So as I've asked the question about Senator's Wyden's comments, you really weren't wiretapping Americans unless it was essential to the national security interests of this country.
GEN. HAYDEN: Sir, and again, it was international calls and we had already established a predicate that that call would reveal information about al Qaeda.
SEN. HATCH: And you have always been able to monitor foreign --
GEN. HAYDEN: Oh yes, sir.
SEN. HATCH: -- calls? There's never been any question?
GEN. HAYDEN: No. Foreign-to-foreign, and even in many circumstances, I suggested earlier this morning, a targeted foreign number that would happen to call the United States is incidental collection; there are clear rules that are created and approved by this committee that tell us what it is we do with that information.
SEN. HATCH: Now as I understand it, you were not monitoring domestic-to-domestic calls?
GEN. HAYDEN: No, sir.
SEN. HATCH: That was not your purpose?
GEN. HAYDEN: No.
SEN. HATCH: And that was an explicit direction by you and others --
GEN. HAYDEN: Oh yes, sir.
SEN. HATCH: -- not to do that.
GEN. HAYDEN: When we had the original conversations as to what NSA could do further, certainly that's what we talked about.
SEN. HATCH: Okay.
Now, General Hayden, one of the responsibilities of the DNI, as required by the Intelligent Reform and Terrorist and Protection Act of 2004, was to set guidelines for the protection of sources and methods. Now, did you participate in the requirement of the DNI?
GEN. HAYDEN: Oh, yes, sir. We did.
SEN. HATCH: Are these new guidelines in effect for the community and for the CIA?
GEN. HAYDEN: Sir, I do not know if they have been published yet. I'll have to get an answer for you.
SEN. HATCH: All right.
What new approaches will you bring to protecting against illegal public disclosures from the CIA?
GEN. HAYDEN: Sir, I said in my opening comments that we need to get the agency out of the news as source or subject, and both of those are very important. Let me tell you the really negative effects of it. I mean, obviously, there are sources and methods effects, but -- impacts. But you all asked me this morning about analysis and hard- edged analysis. Do you know how hard it is to stop an analyst from pulling his punches if he expects or fears that his work is going to show up in unauthorized, unwanted public discourse in a couple of days or a week?
SEN. HATCH: That's right.
GEN. HAYDEN: You keep the hard edge by keeping it private.
SEN. HATCH: Let me just ask you one last question here. I've got a lot of others, but I think you've answered all of my questions well.
General Hayden, you've spent enough time in the military to deeply appreciate that the military is a learning organization. When soldiers, Marines, airmen, sailors, Coast Guardsmen are not in combat, they are in training. Even in combat, every engagement is followed by a lessons-learned exercise. When not in combat, the military is constantly studying and training. The military, in short, is a learning organization.
Now, do you believe that the CIA is a learning organization? Should it be? How often should officers be exposed to training and studies? What are the institutions of learning in the CIA, and do you foresee changing them?
GEN. HAYDEN: Yes, sir, a couple of aspects to that. Number one, my experience in DOD has been a blessing because DOD actually has a rotation base and allows folks who are not actually out forward in operations to be put into a training curriculum. And that almost feeds a demand for lessons learned.
Frankly, the intelligence community isn't in that model firmly, yet. And we have got to look at the armed forces and see how they do lessons-learned and embed that in our processes for improvement.
SEN. HATCH: Let me interrupt you for just a second, because in - - and ask you just another one before my time runs out.
In several parts of you testimony you allow that, quote, "lessons-learned," unquote, exercises are distracting or demoralizing, quote, "archeology of picking apart every past intelligence study and success," unquote. Why would the CIA be any different from the military in the sense that you suggest? GEN. HAYDEN: Oh, no, sir. I'm sorry to interrupt, but I didn't mean we wouldn't do lessons-learned. That is absolutely essential.
SEN. HATCH: No, no, I understand. I'm just giving you a chance to make a --
GEN. HAYDEN: As I said in my opening remarks, there's a downside to being so prominent, so much in the news. And I even allege from time to time we're the political football. And I would ask everyone involved -- this committee and others -- to allow us to focus on the important work and not overdo the retrospectives.
SEN. HATCH: Thank you so much.
Mr. Chairman, I would ask that this letter from Director Negroponte and all of these listed briefings be placed in the record.
SEN. ROBERTS: Without objection.
SEN. ROBERTS: Senator Warner, with your indulgence and my colleagues' intelligence: I misspoke earlier. I'd like to set the record straight, if I might.
I think I indicated that I had been present during the briefing since the inception of the program. Obviously, that is not accurate. I was not chairman until three years ago. I'd like that to be corrected.
But the thought occurs to me as you go down the list of people who were briefed -- I'm just going to mention a few here: Ted Stevens, Dennis Hastert, Nancy Pelosi, Bob Graham, Dick Shelby, Jay Rockefeller, John Murtha, Harry Reid. These are not shrinking violets. These are pretty independent people and they say what is on their mind.
So my question to you is, basically, when you were doing the briefings, did anybody -- it's my recollection, at least, that this did not happen, but I want to rely on yours because there were some there during the earlier times of this program. And I want to ask you this question: Did anybody express real opposition to this program?
GEN. HAYDEN: Sir, again, I don't want to get into private conversations, but to generalize questions asked and answers, concerns raised and addressed -- and I can tell you in my heart of hearts, Senator, I never left those sessions thinking I had to change anything.
SEN. ROBERTS: Well, did anybody say at any particular time that the program ought to be terminated?
GEN. HAYDEN: No, sir.
SEN. ROBERTS: That it was illegal?
GEN. HAYDEN: No, sir.
SEN. ROBERTS: There was, as I recall, a conversation onto the necessity, perhaps, to fix FISA -- if that's not an oxymoron -- to improve FISA, to reform FISA, and that is an ongoing discussion in this committee and in the Judiciary Committee. And my memory is that it was members of Congress who gave you advice not to do that. Is that fair?
GEN. HAYDEN: Sir, that was in the large group in March of 2004, and there were discussions. FISA was considered to be one of the ways ahead. And my memory of the conversation is that there were concerns, I would say almost universally raised, that it would be very difficult to do that and maintain the secrecy, which is one of the advantages of the program.
SEN. ROBERTS: There was in fact during these briefings pretty much a unanimous expression of support. Is that correct?
GEN. HAYDEN: Sir, again, I'm reluctant to characterize members, but again, issues raised and concerns answered, questions answered, we all left knowing we had our jobs to do. And I had no -- I came away with no course corrections.
SEN. ROBERTS: Now, these are the private conversations that went on with the briefings.
GEN. HAYDEN: Yes, sir.
SEN. ROBERTS: Were you surprised at the public statements expressing concern and opposition and other adjectives and adverbs that I won't get into?
GEN. HAYDEN: Sir, I was -- I'm reluctant to comment, Senator. I mean --
SEN. ROBERTS: It seems like there's a little bit of disingenuous double-talk going on here for some reason. And I'll just leave it at that.
Senator Warner.
SEN. JOHN WARNER (R-VA): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
May I say I think this has been an excellent hearing thus far and the chair and others are to be commended.
General, I have the privilege of knowing you for so many years and worked with you. You have my strongest support and I wish you and your family well. I know how important family support is to our U.S. military. But the people in uniform across this country, both those now serving and those retired, take great pride in seeing one of their own selected to this important post.
GEN. HAYDEN: Thank you.
SEN. WARNER: The fact that you will continue in uniform certainly doesn't in any way, I think, denigrate from your ability. I think it enhances it as you continue your work. People who say that the intelligence should be headed by a civilian are reminded that the DNI is a civilian.
GEN. HAYDEN: Yes, sir.
SEN. WARNER: General, I wakened this morning, as others, listening to the early, early reports on this proceeding. And there was a gent on there -- I think he was with the 9/11 commission -- talking about how the morale at the agency has just hit rock bottom.
Well, I'm proud to say that in my 28 years here in the Senate and five years before that in the Pentagon -- now over 30 years of public service working with the CIA -- and I visit regularly. I've been twice this month, briefings on Afghanistan, Iraq, meeting with Director Goss. I don't find that morale rock bottom.
Do you have any assessment of it?
GEN. HAYDEN: Sir, I would say it's been a difficult time for the agency. Just, you know, go back through the headlines of the past week, month or three months. I do find that the folks in the field -- very highly motivated, operationally focused, and in a way we unfortunately can't describe to the public, some great successes going on.
SEN. WARNER: No question about it. And having had this long association with them, it is clearly one of the most remarkable collection of professionals, dedicated professionals, to be found anywhere in government service. But are there some steps you feel you're going to have to take when you, hopefully, cross the threshold here in a manner of days?
GEN. HAYDEN: Yes, sir. I mentioned some things with regard to analysis and collection and S&T this morning. I think most important is to just get the agency on an even keel, just settle things down. With all the events, Lord knows, over the past several weeks, it can't be a pleasant experience for the folks out there, despite, as you point out, their continued dedication.
So I actually think, if I'm confirmed and I go out there, I would intend to spend an awful lot of my waking moments for some period of time just getting around and seeing and being --
SEN. WARNER: That's -- I commend you that.
GEN. HAYDEN: -- and be seen.
SEN. WARNER: Stick with that even keel -- for an Air Force general to use that able term.
GEN. HAYDEN: (Laughs.) Yes, sir.
SEN. WARNER: I like the idea of getting around. When I was privileged to serve in the Department of Defense, I used to take a little time almost every week to go to the remote offices --
GEN. HAYDEN: Yes, sir.
SEN. WARNER: -- where the Navy and Marine Corps personnel were and it paid off great dividends. Well, I agree with you. The morale's strong and they're doing their job and they'll continue to do it and you'll provide that strong leadership.
That brings me to the next question -- it's a little tough -- but our national security, as it relates to the executive branch, of course, is the president and his team: the secretaries of State and Defense, Homeland Security, Department of Justice. And then there's the department -- now Department -- DNI -- Negroponte's outfit, of which you will be a part.
And I really think your opening statement was very well done. You paid respect to Porter Goss, which I think was highly deserving. We've all known him, worked with him through the years. The chairman served with him in the House. He and I set up a commission about a dozen years ago at the time when the Congress was looking at possibly abolishing the CIA. And that commission, I think, successfully re- diverted that action and we're where we are today with a strong CIA.
And you said, in a word, the CIA remains, even after the Intelligence Reform Act, central to American intelligence, and other statements in here which I was very pleased to read. But we cannot lose sight of the fact that -- I was visited by Director Goss in the month of April, by Director Negroponte, just talking general things with him, and then we awaken one morning to this resignation at a time when this country's at war, and one of the major pillars of our security team -- now the director stepping down.
What can you tell us about -- I'm not going into all of the perhaps differences in management style and so forth -- but was there something that the DNI and yourself -- you were the deputy; presumably he shared with you -- felt that wasn't going right? And what steps are you going to take to correct that?
GEN. HAYDEN: Sir, I mean --
SEN. WARNER: I read through your opening statement about all the things you intend to do, but I go to the narrow question: It had to be some actions which said -- (inaudible) -- and the president had to step in and make his decisions.
GEN. HAYDEN: Sir --
SEN. WARNER: What is it when you hit that deck are you going to do that was not being done, in your judgment, either according to law, otherwise?
GEN. HAYDEN: Well, Senator, I mean, Director Goss had a tremendous challenge. He had transformation that everyone's talked about within an agency, and then he had to adjust that agency's relationship with the broader intelligence community. That's really heavy lifting. He was moving along both tracks. And I'm not privy to decisions that were made a few weeks ago and announcements that were made and so on, but was asked by the president, would I be willing to serve as the director. The next Monday, the president made that announcement in the Oval Office. And I said a few words at that time along the lines of standing on the shoulders of those that went before me. I mean, I'm not Porter. I'm different from him. I'll probably end up doing some things differently, but I'm not going out, you know, there repudiating him or what he was trying to do.
Frankly, I just want to look forward, assess the situation and move on.
SEN. WARNER: All right. We need not be concerned because under the Constitution, we are acting on the president's request, your nomination, to fill that vacancy. And we want to rest assured when we do fill that vacancy, whatever omissions -- omissions or otherwise -- were taking place to justify this are corrected. And you assure us that that will be done?
GEN. HAYDEN: Yes, sir.
SEN. WARNER: Perhaps in closed session you can amplify on that.
GEN. HAYDEN: Okay.
SEN. WARNER: The distinguished chairman of the House Armed Services Committee said the following the other day with regard to Iran, and it really caught my eye. And he said there -- the question was, how close is Iran to actually developing a nuclear weapon? I'd say we really don't know. We're getting lots of mixed messages. Obviously, we're getting lots of different messages from their leadership, the stuff they say in public.
Then he went on to say, hey, sometimes it's better to be honest and to say there's a whole lot we don't know about Iran that I wish we did know. As we and the public policymakers need to know what that -- as we are moving forward and as decisions are being made on Iran, we don't have all the information that we'd like to have. Now, I'm not asking you to agree or disagree, but that's a very forceful public statement and acknowledgment.
Yesterday, a group of us had a chance to speak to the DNI and that question was addressed by the DNI. But America's greatly worried about Iran. It poses, in my judgment, the single greatest risk, not just to this country but to a whole region and, indeed, much of the free world.
What can you tell us in open will be some of your initial steps to strengthen that collection of intelligence as it relates to Iran?
GEN. HAYDEN: Yes, sir. And you chose the right word; it's strengthening rather than some sharp departure. The ambassador has appointed a mission manager for Iran, Leslie Ireland. Leslie has that task as her full-time job. And what she's doing is not just inventorying what we're doing as a community, but actually redirecting our emphasis as a community. And in closed session, I'll give you a few more details, but she's narrowed it down from everything there is to know to four key areas that will best inform American policy. And we're moving additional resources into those areas.
SEN. WARNER: Fine. I just wanted to have the public hear that you're going to put that down as your top priority.
GEN. HAYDEN: Sure.
SEN. WARNER: I misspoke. Of course, Hoekstra is the chairman of the --
GEN. HAYDEN: Oh, yes.
SEN. WARNER: -- House Select Committee on Intelligence.
GEN. HAYDEN: Yes, sir.
SEN. WARNER: Let's turn to another issue, and that is, do you plan to have any significant large numbers of transfer personnel from CIA to the DNI?
GEN. HAYDEN: Sir, the only thing that's on the table -- and I thank you for asking this, because there are a few urban legends out there that need to be scotched. The only thing on the table is a redistribution of our analytic effort with regard to terrorism.
So the stories out there that the DI's going to be dismantled or the DI's going to be moved -- there are not thoughts, let alone plans, to do that. And the amount of movement within the counterterrorism- analytical force is going to be measured in double digits, not triple digits.
SEN. WARNER: In other words, less than 100 people.
GEN. HAYDEN: Oh, yes, sir.
SEN. WARNER: Thank you.
Well, you said in your opening statement, "The CIA must remain the U.S. government's center of excellence for the independent all source analysis," end quote. And I agree with that. Now, my understanding that our distinguished colleague, former colleague Mr. Goss, Porter Goss, was endeavoring to retain a strong counterterrorism analysis capability internally to the CIA. Do you intend to continue that initiative?
GEN. HAYDEN: Yes, sir. But frankly, that's the friction point that generated your previous question. How much --
SEN. WARNER: This question being his resignation?
GEN. HAYDEN: No, sir. No, not that. With regard to the --
SEN. WARNER: But I know it was an issue.
GEN. HAYDEN: -- moving analysts. Yes, sir, I mean, an issue. It's something we have to resolve. Right now in the Counterterrorism Center at CIA you have a wonderful group of people performing magnificently. By legislation, and I think by logic, the National Counterterrorism Center, however, has been given the task of strategic analysis with regard to terrorism. What we're trying to do is shift our weight -- and this is not going to be a mass migration -- but shift our weight of some analysts from CIA's CTC and some other points around the community so that the NCTC, the National Counterterrorism Center, can do its mandated task and do that without in any way cracking the magnificent synergy we now have between DO and DI inside CIA, with analysts in direct support of operations.
That's the problem, Senator.
SEN. WARNER: That's a very helpful clarification.
And in that context, do you have, I think, only one reporting chain, and that's the DNI? Is that correct?
GEN. HAYDEN: Yes, sir, that is correct.
SEN. WARNER: No other reporting chains to the White House?
GEN. HAYDEN: No other -- I'm sorry?
SEN. WARNER: No other reporting chains directly to the White House.
GEN. HAYDEN: Sir, there is a little bit with regard to the additional activities in the legislation, in terms of all the intelligence functions, is unarguably through Ambassador Negroponte; with a few other things, it's with Ambassador Negroponte. Porter, for example, would be there at the White House with the ambassador explaining things. It's a comfortable relationship. I don't think there will be any problems.
SEN. WARNER: So there is some -- you have a direct chain through Negroponte?
GEN. HAYDEN: Yes, sir.
SEN. WARNER: And at times you work in conjunction with him.
GEN. HAYDEN: Yes, sir, that's how I would describe it.
SEN. WARNER: And that's a workable situation?
GEN. HAYDEN: Yes, sir. Yes, sir.
SEN. WARNER: On the question of the chiefs of stations, they're remarkable individuals all over the world, and I think most of us who travel make a point of visiting with the chiefs of station on our various trips.
Are the chiefs of station in our embassies abroad representative of the DNI or the director of Central Intelligence?
GEN. HAYDEN: Senator, all the above. We have -- with initiation --
SEN. WARNER: Do they have a dual reporting chain?
GEN. HAYDEN: They do. For community functions they report to the DNI; for agency functions, they report to the director of CIA.
SEN. WARNER: Now that won't pose any problems?
GEN. HAYDEN: It should not; no, sir.
SEN. WARNER: We hope that will be the case.
Now the relations with the Federal Bureau: How many times, Mr. Chairman, did we sit in this room at the time we were working on this new law and addressing this issue?
Now, the Silberman-Robb report, which is a very good report, and I've gone through it, and they have a whole section in here relating to ending the turf war between the bureau, FBI, and the CIA.
Can you bring us up to date on where you are --
GEN. HAYDEN: Yes, sir.
SEN. WARNER: -- in addressing that issue?
GEN. HAYDEN: Number one, we've created the National Security Branch inside the FBI. And the funding and the tasking for that come from the DNI, come from Ambassador Negroponte. So that's one reality that's different since the publishing of the report.
Secondly, the ambassador has assigned to the director of CIA the function of national HUMINT manager. So with regard to training and standards and de-confliction coordination, the national HUMINT manager does have a role to play with human intelligence as conducted by the FBI, and as conducted by the Department of Defense.
SEN. WARNER: Do you have a liaison from the bureau in your office out at the agency?
GEN. HAYDEN: Senator, I'm a little unclear whether he is there or is about to get there as the deputy of the community HUMINT office. The senior there is a Marine two-star, former head of the defense HUMINT service, and the expectation is, if it's not the reality, his deputy will be from the bureau.
SEN. WARNER: I recommended that, because I think that they should have access, a free flow of that information.
Now there was a memorandum entered into in 2005 by Director Goss. Are you familiar with that memorandum?
GEN. HAYDEN: Yes, sir. Is this the one with the bureau or the one with the department?
SEN. WARNER: The bureau.
GEN. HAYDEN: With the bureau, yes, sir.
SEN. WARNER: Do you intend to continue that?
GEN. HAYDEN: Yes, sir.
SEN. WARNER: That covers that subject.
On the question of the national HUMINT manager -- now look here, we had a discussion earlier today about the Army Field Manual, and I and Senator McCain and Senator Graham and others had worked on that issue for some time. We're continuing to work on a regular basis with the Department of Defense as to the promulgation of procedures and so forth.
But there is a question of how the agency intends to, presumably, continue its interrogation process, and indeed perhaps get into detainees. Now if I understand it, earlier in this testimony you said that you fully intend, that is the agency, to comply with the basic standard of not involving in any cruel or inhumane or degrading treatment; I understand that. But there is a whole manual out here guiding the men and women in uniform. Should there not be a companion manual guiding the civilians who will be performing much of the task?
GEN. HAYDEN: Senator, speaking in generalities now, and perhaps --
SEN. WARNER: Yes.
GEN. HAYDEN: -- in more detail in a closed session, absolutely. I mean, one of the key things that -- I use the line in this report about creating the conditions for success in my opening statement. That's one of the conditions for success that anything the agency does -- let me put it that way -- anything the agency does, that the people of the agency understand what is expected of them; that the guidelines are clear; that they meet those standards; and that obviously there are consequences if any of them were unable to meet those standards.
SEN. WARNER: That's clear, but --
GEN. HAYDEN: So it's got to be clear, specific, written, for all the activities.
SEN. WARNER: Understood, but will there be any differences in how these interrogations are --
GEN. HAYDEN: Yes, sir, I don't want to --
SEN. WARNER: -- on the uniform side and the civilian side?
GEN. HAYDEN: Yes, sir. I don't want to go into any great detail here in open session, but just say that even in the Detainee Treatment Act itself, it talks about the Army Field Manual applying to DOD personnel with regard to detainees under DOD control. The cruel, inhumane, degrading parts of the statute apply to any agency of the government.
So I think even the statute envisions that there may be differences.
SEN. WARNER: All right. Well, we'll be looking at that very carefully, because we will have to explain to our constituents and others --
GEN. HAYDEN: Yes, sir.
SEN. WARNER: -- if in fact there is a significant difference, basis for it.
I happen to be a great champion of the science and technology. I think few people realize that you have a magnificent setup out there that are devising all types of devices to not only do the work of your agency, but they have parallel uses by other departments and agencies. Indeed, some of it may be incorporated in the advancements we're going to take in the border security.
So tell us about the emphasis that you will put on that. I look upon that as one of the four stools of the agency.
GEN. HAYDEN: Yes, sir, absolutely -- a remarkable record of success; maybe enabled by legislation that gives the CIA a bit more freedom of action when it comes to these kinds of things, not quite as -- I don't want to say rule-bound, but let's say administrative- burden-bound. And I need to learn more about it and what their current focus might be. I said in my opening comments, though, job one is that S&T activity supporting two of the other key pillars of the agency, the human collection and the analysis.
SEN. WARNER: All right. Well, I think you -- I'm delighted to hear you'd put emphasis on that.
Lastly, in your statement, you said, quote, "We must set aside the talent and energy to take the long view, and not just chase our version of the current news cycle," end quote.
I agree with that. What steps will you do to impress on the agency the need that? Because you know, these people have followed a course of action which is extraordinary for many years, throughout the history. And you've got to change, I suppose, some of the old entrenched beliefs and work styles, and this is one of them.
GEN. HAYDEN: Yes, sir. In fact, I actually think it might be worse now than it has been historically, that this is a particular problem with the current age. I mentioned the CNN effect this morning where our customers seem to want us to have the same kind of pace that you get on headline news.
The other aspect is, we're engaged in war in several major theaters, and that's just pulling energy into current operations. I mean, it's understandable; it's legitimate.
So I think left to itself, there will be so much gravitational pull to the close term that you'll really have to expend energy to push the field of view out, and that's what's going to be required.
SEN. WARNER: Good luck.
GEN. HAYDEN: Thank you, sir.
SEN. WARNER: Take care of those people out there.
GEN. HAYDEN: Yes, sir.
SEN. WARNER: I'll be knocking on your door.
GEN. HAYDEN: Yes, sir.
SEN. WARNER: Thank you very much.
SEN. ROBERTS: Senator Hagel.
SEN. CHUCK HAGEL (R-NE): Mr. Chairman, thank you.
General Hayden, welcome.
We are most grateful to you and your family for your almost 40 years of distinguished service to this country, and we look forward to many more years of this same quality of service. And we are not unmindful of the toll it takes on a family. So thank you, and thank you for your family being here today.
I was impressed with your opening statement, General Hayden, because I think it reflects clearly the kind of world that we live in today. It is a world of grand transformations. As you have cataloged, not only your priorities -- and I'd like to explore some of these points that you made in a little more details as has been done already for the past few hours here today. But I think it encompasses and frames the larger picture of what you will be dealing with as the new CIA director. But also, it pulls, like all of us, from our experiences and our conditioning and our molding and our shaping and the product that we have before us in a four-star Air Force general who is the preeminent intelligence officer in our government. And that accumulation of experience and knowledge and mistakes in judgment has brought you to this point.
It has been my belief, and I think it's reflected in the polls - - people read political polls sometimes with only the politics in mind -- but the polls today in America say to me, General Hayden, that Americans have essentially lost confidence in their government. They've lost confidence in us, those who govern, those who have the privilege and responsibility.
When the president's poll numbers are as low as they are, when the Congress' approval ratings are lower than the president's -- I don't know if that comforts the president or not -- but nonetheless it is beyond politics, because politics is the avenue that we use to arrive at leaders and the shaping of the policy and therefore the direction of a country.
And that's what these poll numbers are telling us, that American has lost confidence in the leadership of this country. We all have some responsibility -- Democrats, Republicans, the White House, all of us.
So I was particularly struck by one of your points in your testimony about an emphasis on trust. And you and I had a very good conversation in my office last Friday about this issue and others. And at a time when I believe we are still reeling from what happened in September 11th, 2001, trying to find that new center of gravity, technology, 21st century threats have overtaken all of our laws. They've overtaken institutions and structures. That's not unusual; it is that way every 50 or 60 years in the world, a dynamic world.
So our task here as policymakers, your task as the new leader of the premier intelligence agency in the world, will be to address these 21st century threats with 21st century structures and solutions. And that was to me very clear in your testimony this morning.
And I'm particularly grateful for that because we do tend to get lost in the morass of the underbrush and the technicalities of leaks and who said what to whom and all the details that actually veer us away from the center of purposefulness -- some consensus of purpose that we strive for all the time here, or we should, to try to govern.
But more to your point, you have a very clear center of purpose in your job in the intelligence agency. And when you -- in response to some of the questions here -- talked about -- if I have it about right -- we will not defeat international terrorism without a very clear relationship with our international terrorism without a very clear relationship with our international partners -- something to that extent.
So let me begin there, because I happen to believe that it is not a matter of how many Marines and infantrymen we can place around the world that will defeat extremism and terrorism and these threats of the 21st century -- proliferation, which I will get to in a moment.
But the core of this, the hub of this, is what you are about and what the intelligence community in our country and the world is about, a seamless network that you mentioned, not only within our community here in the United States but that same kind of seamless network with our international relationships to stop these things before they occur, to start picking them off where it counts, really counts.
And of course, you get into the next outer circle of that which you all have some responsibility for, too, but can't find solutions to all of it, and that is, what causes these kinds of things. What is the underlying cause? Not simple, complicated, despair, poverty, endemic health issues. We know how those accumulate to bring us to the point we are today.
If you could enlarge upon your comments and your testimony and some of the answers you gave here on what you intend to do as the new CIA chief to in fact address a closer relationship with our friends and our allies in knitting together those seamless intelligence networks, as well, as you noted in your testimony, within the intelligence community.
GEN. HAYDEN: Yes, sir.
I think the first requirement is just a sense of focus; I mean, just paying attention to it. I learned in my job at NSA -- and we have friends around the world -- you pay attention, you spend some time, you understand. There are a lot of allies out there who are not only looking to assist us in the global war on terrorism; in some ways they are looking for -- I don't want to overstate this because it sounds too arrogant -- but they're looking for some sense of leadership, some sense of direction, some sense of direction around which they can organize their own sovereign efforts.
I think you just plain have to pay attention to them, listen to them and understand -- and, although in most cases there will be great disparities of resources and power, to afford them treatment as an equal, some -- some respect. So I think that can be done, I think that's absolutely valuable, and I think our -- our friends and allies would enthusiastically welcome that. And so I'll just try to reinforce what we already have.
Inside -- inside our government, we've probably got two concentric circles to worry about.
One is the intel community itself, and I actually think we've made some good progress there. But as I think it was Senator DeWine mentioned earlier this morning about sharing and technology and it's really policy, and frankly, I think I responded you just have to get on with it. So, then, that's the second.
And then the larger concentric circle is between the intel community and the other parts of the U.S. security establishment -- DOD, especially Homeland Security, the law enforcement aspects of the FBI, and so on. I kept using sports metaphors in my prepared comments, but I really do mean that you have to play team ball here, and that requires everyone to play position and not crowd the ball. You know, the ball will come to you directly; just -- just play your position. And then focus on the scoreboard, not on individual achievement and individual agency or Cabinet-level department.
Sir, I -- Senator, that sounded more like a sermon than a work plan, but -- and that's the approach, and I think a lot of it is -- is attitudinal.
SEN. HAGEL: Well, I happen to believe everything is about attitude.
You might recall that when you were before this committee when we held a confirmation hearing for the current job that you have, the deputy director of National Intelligence, I asked you about your plans for bolstering the energy, strength, teamwork and culture of excellence in the organizations that make up the intelligence community.
And I want you to address that, if you will. And I know you have alluded to it in your answers to some of the questions today, but specifically, the culture of excellence, that you have used that term -- I happen to agree with that term -- within our intelligence community, within the CIA -- how do you not necessarily resurrect that -- I don't think we've lost that.
GEN. HAYDEN: No.
SEN. HAGEL: But I think it's been tarnished, and there is a corrosive dynamic, and you've alluded to that as a result of many things.
But I want you to also focus on the next generation. What will you particularly be doing to focus on this next generation of CIA leaders that this country and the world is going to need?
GEN. HAYDEN: Yes, sir.
We really have an opportunity here -- in fact, so much of an opportunity that it's a real challenge. We have so many folks at the agency who have fewer than four years' service. They make up -- they now make up a significant portion of the population. So here's a group -- if we pay attention to the lessons learned studies and your WMD review and all the other things, these are folks who, you know -- who are not going to have to "unlearn" something. They'll be coming into this with a tested approach, one that's been improved. So there is the opportunity.
Now, here's the bad news. For every individual in -- I'll use the agency's analytic force and -- I'll just have to use comparisons rather than absolute numbers because of classification -- for every 10 individuals we have in the analytic force with one to four years' service, we only have one with 10 to 14 years' service. We don't have any shop stewards or foremen. We got senior leaders and we got workers, but that middle layer of management is very, very thin.
SEN. BARBARA MIKULSKI (D-MD): Mr. Chairman? Excuse me. Could the general repeat those numbers? I had a hard time hearing those numbers to which --
GEN. HAYDEN: Yes, ma'am. Again, I can't get into the specific numbers because at CIA, unlike NSA, they're classified population numbers.
SEN. MIKULSKI: Sir, could you pull it closer --
GEN. HAYDEN: But for every -- I'm talking about the analysts, all right? -- for every 10 analysts with fewer than four years' service, we only have one experienced analyst between 10 and 14 years of service. So what you end up with, again, is you don't have any shop stewards that should be doing the coaching and mentoring.
SEN. MIKULSKI: Got it. Got it.
GEN. HAYDEN: And so here we have this great opportunity -- a new population, lessons learned -- but the demographics are all wrong, and that's just going to take a lot of work and a lot of energy to turn the advantage into true advantage with this new population.
It's very interesting. This is the youngest analytic workforce in the history of the Central Intelligence Agency. It put more - - in more disappointing language, this is the least experienced analytic workforce in the history of CIA.
SEN. HAGEL: But what a marvelous opportunity, as you note, at a time when the world has changed, is shifting at an incalculable rate. And we're all trying to not just catch up, but stay even. And to have that kind of opportunity to shape and mold these bright, new, young leaders is, to use your point, is a big advantage --
GEN. HAYDEN: Yes, sir.
SEN. HAGEL: -- a huge advantage, and we must not squander that.
GEN. HAYDEN: Sir, if I could just add a point. We weren't able to create that demographic at NSA until after 2001. And although that's a real challenge, it's a lot better than the other challenge, which is you don't have many folks coming through the front door.
SEN. HAGEL: Let me ask a question on -- in fact, you were responding to one of Senator Warner's questions about this -- the National Counterproliferation Center. In light of, for example, the agreement that the president signed with India -- and I was just in India last month and spent some time, as well as Pakistan, with government leaders and private industry leaders. Explain to this committee in your view how this center will impact and help shape future arrangements; not just using the India-U.S. agreement, but proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, I don't have to tell you, no one has to tell you, that that represents really the greatest threat to mankind in the 21st century. So how are we going to use the center?
GEN. HAYDEN: Here are a couple of thoughts I'd share with you that I think will really put this into context. First of all, let me tell you what it's not. It's not NCTC, National Counterterrorism Center, which has its own analytic function and so it's a workforce numbered in the hundreds. These guys are numbered in about 60, 65. They are not a source of independent analysis. They're the mission manager. They're the guys -- Senator, they're the guys on the bridge and not the folks shoveling coal. And so what you've got there with a very experienced senior leadership team is the ability to shape the efforts of the community in a more coherent way -- back to that team ball metaphor - than we've had in the past.
One other additional thought. We've got four mission managers right now. Two are topical, two are geographic. Counterterrorism, counterproliferation; Korea, Iran. Well, you quickly do the math, you're going to have some intersections. And so who's the final word, who's the final word on Iranian WMD? Who's in charge? The Iranian mission manager or the NCPC, counterproliferation mission manager?
Because of what this committee has -- in addition to other sources -- told us about the Iraq analysis, which was, I would say, perhaps culturally deficient and technologically heavy, we've met -- that's a cartoon, and probably unfair to a lot of people, but there's an element of truth in there. Because of what we learned there, at those intersections, it's the area mission manager that gets the final call. So now that's kind of the dynamic that we've set in place for NCPC, Senator.
SEN. HAGEL: Thank you.
Let me get to a point, I believe in a response to a question that Senator Wyden asked you, if I have this about right. You said, quote, "Help me understand where to draw the one between liberty and security." And this was in the broader framework of a line of questioning that we've heard a lot about today -- important, as you have recognized many times.
And I appreciated that statement for many reasons. The chairman just talked a little bit about rewriting the FISA law. I don't think there's anyone who questions that. We do need to give the intelligence community a new framework to work within, assuring that what you and all the professionals are doing, you don't have to go to the attorneys every hour -- Is this legal or not legal? Can we do it, can we not do it? -- but let you do your jobs. That's our responsibility as policymakers to give you that new framework. We're going to need input from you --
GEN. HAYDEN: Right.
SEN. HAGEL: -- as to how we best do that, doing exactly what you said, that constant balance of protecting constitutional rights of Americans, as well as protecting the security interests of this country. We've done it pretty well for over 200 years. I think it's one of the most significant policy challenges we have here in this Congress with the president this year. And it has to be done. And we are paying attention to it, but we're going to need some guidance from you.
Here is an opportunity, General Hayden, to lay some of that out, if you care to give us some of your thoughts on how do we rewrite a law that does what you need to do and protects the interests of our country as well?
GEN. HAYDEN: Yes, sir. Let me not get into specifics. If we need to, we can share some ideas in closed session.
A couple of -- let me just say factors bearing on the problem. There are two. One is the nature of the enemy, all right? When FISA was first crafted, it was Cold War. And if you look at the legislative history, I've looked at sometimes and my lawyers at NSA have told me, an awful lot of the language for FISA was drawn from the criminal side of the U.S. Code. So we need to just reassess what is it we're trying to achieve here in a foreign intelligence way, against what kind of threats. And so that would be one approach.
The other one is technology. I've actually said publicly, and I'll just repeat it here, that the reach of FISA, the impact of FISA is well beyond what any of its original crafters could have possibly intended because they could not possibly have known of the dramatic changes in technology.
Again, Senator, just a factor bearing on the problem, not an ironclad solution. It may be that the best way to craft FISA is in terms of not trying to predict all the changes possible in technology over time, but setting up processes by which those changes can be accommodated to a fairly constant standard of what constitutes privacy, so that when communications change from going out of the air to going into the ground, then all of a sudden the impact of the law is completely different, without any context as to how that affected privacy.
Sorry, that's a little obscure, but --
SEN. HAGEL: No, I get it. And we're going to obviously be calling upon you and your colleagues for more detail.
But let me ask one last question while I've got a couple of seconds. There's been some reference made today -- and you referenced it -- what happened with intelligence and why, and how it was used, misused, leading up to Iraq. And we're not here to replay all that. But here's what I would like to hear.
Because we had some gaps, let's put it that way -- and by the way, I'm not one who blames the intelligence community for the decisions to go to war in Iraq. That's an easy way out, as far as I'm concerned. And there was other contradictory alternative analysis out there; it was within our own government, those who chose to make the decisions they did based on their own selective reading of it. That's not what you said, it's what I said.
I say that because I'd like to hear from you what your ideas are about alternative sources of intelligence analysis so that we don't get ourselves back into invading Iran, not knowing what we're doing or not paying attention to consequences, or whatever else may be down the road here with options for policy makers and the president.
GEN. HAYDEN: Yes, sir. The approach of alternative analysis obviously has great value. We've done that. It's under way. We do see that. Here's the -- here's the magic spot: how do you institutionalize that without destroying it? I mean, once you institutionalize thinking outside the box, it turns to dust in your hand. I think it's more about process and structure. It's more about insisting on considering alternative views rather than boxing off -- this is my alternative view office. It's just simply demanding that.
Look, Senator, this is four-square in our mind now, everybody in the community. We understand. We know when we're good, we know when we're not so good. Those lessons will have a tendency to wear off as, you know, we age off from the WMD National Intelligence Estimate and so on. The challenge for leadership is not to let that happen, is to -- is to keep that focus on this enriching and challenging aspect of our analysis.
SEN. HAGEL: You're going to be one of America's best CIA directors, General. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, thank you.
GEN. HAYDEN: Thank you, Senator.
SEN. ROBERTS: Senator Feingold.
SEN. RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD (D-WI): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First, General, congratulations on your nomination, on your obvious abilities, your tremendous experience and distinguished career of public service, and also on your manner. I want to say, as one senator, that I find it very easy to work with you and talk with you.
GEN. HAYDEN: Thank you.
SEN. FEINGOLD: And I admire some of the remarks you've made today in candor with regard to Iraq, and some of the comparisons that one might make as we look at the Iran situation, that maybe we will not want to handle it in the same way. So I appreciate all of that.
Before I turn to you, let me just say generally, yesterday, four and a half years after the president authorized a program to wiretap Americans without a warrant and almost five months after the program was revealed in the press, the administration finally began describing the program to this committee. This long overdue briefing, hastily arranged on the eve of this nomination, in my view does not prove enough assurance that the administration's general contempt for congressional oversight has diminished. But Mr. Chairman, it is nonetheless welcome, and I look for more.
Mr. Chairman, I came away from that briefing yesterday more convinced than ever: first, that the program is illegal; and second, that the president misled the country in 2004 before the revelations about this program became public when he said that wiretapping of Americans in this country requires a warrant; and third, that there was absolutely no reason that the administration could not have told the full committee about the program four and a half years ago, as is required by law.
Now, the question before us today is the nomination for the director of the CIA of General Hayden, who directed and vigorously defended this illegal program. Again, General Hayden is highly experienced, and I have enormous respect for his many years of service. But it is our responsibility to ask what kind of CIA director would he be.
Will General Hayden follow the law, not the law except -- except -- when the president says otherwise? And will General Hayden respect Congress's statutory and constitutional oversight role and not just when the president deems it politically convenient?
Let me be very clear -- and I don't think there's any distance between me and General Hayden on this -- al Qaeda and its affiliates seek to destroy us. We must fight back, and we must join this fight together as a nation. But when the administration ignores the law and refuses to involve Congress, I think it actually distracts us from our enemies and weakens us and weakens what the general and everybody else is trying to do.
Our greatest strength as a nation lies in a few basic principles: that no one is above the law and that no one may operate outside of our constitutional system of checks and balances.
So, General, there are many intelligence matters that cannot be discussed publicly, but I think the American people have a right to know that what they are told publicly is in fact neither inaccurate nor misleading. And Senator Wyden was referring to a couple of statements that you've made in the past that may bear on this.
On October 17, 2002, you told the joint inquiry into the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001 that persons inside the United States, quote, "would have protections as what the law defines as a U.S. person, and I would have no authorities to pursue it," unquote. Given that the president had authorized the NSA to wiretap U.S. persons without a FISA warrant, how do you explain this statement?
GEN. HAYDEN: Sir, I'd have to go back and look at the context in which I offered it. It is very clear to me, though, even under the president's authorization, that considerable legal protections would accrue to a, quote, unquote, "target in the United States affiliated with al Qaeda," that would affect the ability of the NSA to track that target compared to that target being in any other place on Earth outside the United States.
I also said that -- and that was in totally open session, as I recall, and I prefaced my remarks that day by pointing out that I had briefed the committee in more detail and that my remarks that day were necessarily limited.
SEN. FEINGOLD: Well, General, I respect what you just said, but you specifically referred in that session -- I have the transcript here -- to U.S. persons in the context of FISA. In other words, you weren't talking about a different program. You weren't talking about some of the other protections that might be there, and to the American people and to members of Congress, when they're talking about FISA, that means a warrant.
So I'm wondering how you can reconcile that with --
GEN. HAYDEN: Again, Senator, I mean, I knew in my own heart and mind that we were not talking about domestic-to-domestic. If my language could have been more precise, I apologize, but the -- it was not an intent to mislead; it was to describe the limitations under which the agency worked and continued to work inside the United States. I think that was a speech where I talked about Osama bin Laden crossing from Niagara Falls, Ontario to Niagara Falls, New York, and saying in -- all of a sudden U.S. law kicks in, and my freedom of action against him is suddenly very limited, so that even though the president's program would, as we all now know, allow me to catch Osama when he called back to Waziristan, I couldn't catch the call from Buffalo to Pittsburgh.
SEN. FEINGOLD: Now, I appreciate that example, but, General -- and I take you at your word that you did not intentionally mislead, but it was misleading. And I think when you say you had no authority to pursue the target, the average person that knows enough about this would have concluded otherwise. But let me move on.
As you know, there is now a vast body of legal scholarship that says that the warrantless surveillance of Americans violates the FISA law. And of course, you said that your lawyers told you it was legal. But you are an intelligent professional with many years of experience conducting surveillance within FISA, then one day you're told that FISA doesn't apply, and by the way, don't tell the full Intelligence Committee.
Forget for a moment, General, what the lawyers said. Have you ever had any doubts that when this change in approach was made that there may be a concern about not following FISA?
GEN. HAYDEN: Senator, obviously there were concerns. I mean, I had an agency that, you know, for decades -- well, since the mid-1970s -- had, frankly, played a bit back from the line so as not to get close to anything that got the agency's fingers burned in the Church-Pike era. And so this wasn't done lightly and it wasn't done automatically.
SEN. FEINGOLD: But did you have any doubts about the legality of doing this?
GEN. HAYDEN: Personally, no, I did not. And that was submitted with the conversation with the lawyers I knew best, the lawyers at NSA. It probably would have presented me with a -- with a bit of a dilemma if the NSA lawyers had said, no, we don't think so. But they didn't. And there was no pressure on me. It was, I need to know what you think.
SEN. FEINGOLD: So were you frustrated prior to 9/11 that this kind of authority, which I take it you believe derives from Article II, the president's powers, was not being used; that only FISA was being followed? Do you think that was endangering American national security?
GEN. HAYDEN: Well, actually there was an interesting article today -- yeah, where was it today? In the Baltimore Sun -- that talked about some NSA activities. And without getting into the fine print of the article and confirming or denying anything about it, it talked about discussions at my agency on the millennium weekend as to what we could or could not do inside the United States when we felt we were under great, great threat. And according to the article -- and just staying within the context of that, Senator -- I made some decisions there that made some of our operators unhappy in order to stay within the confines of statute because I had no other legal recourse to do something other than the FISA statute and Executive Order 12333 --
SEN. FEINGOLD: Article II of the Constitution was in place at that time --
GEN. HAYDEN: It was, but --
SEN. FEINGOLD: -- so why didn't you have legal recourse to that? GEN. HAYDEN: Because the president has not exercised any of his Article II authorities to authorize the agency to do that kind of activity.
SEN. FEINGOLD: Did you urge him to do so?
GEN. HAYDEN: No. We did not at the time. No, sir.
SEN. FEINGOLD: Well, you know --
GEN. HAYDEN: This happened -- this happened very quickly, and --
SEN. FEINGOLD: Well, of course my concern here, naturally, is what is the limit of this Article II power, and where does it leave the role of Congress in this area? And I was struck by your comments that you had had a conversation with Senator DeWine where you talked about earlier -- not today, but an earlier case where you talked about the tension between liberty and security, and what do the American people want.
What I would submit to you, General, is that the American people have expressed what they want through the laws that are on the books now. And there can be helpful discussions, such as the one Senator Hagel just conducted with you, about whether it should change. But at this point, it's the law.
And you know as well as I do that no one and not even the president is above the law. And I want to remind you -- with all respect, General, because I have great respect for you -- that no one can force you to break the law.
GEN. HAYDEN: Sir, I'm well aware of that. And our Uniform Code of Military Justice talks very clearly about the lawfulness of orders in order for the orders to be effective.
SEN. FEINGOLD: Thank you, General.
General, if you're confirmed, there will likely come a moment when the president turns to you and asks whether there is more the CIA can do under the constitutional authority that he's asserted under Article II. What would tell him? Is there more?
GEN. HAYDEN: Well, obviously a hypothetical, but let me just imagine the hypothetical, in which, not unlike the NSA situation, there are additional things that could be done.
Senator, I'd consult my lawyers and my conscience, just as I did in 2001. In this particular case, Senator, I mean, to be very clear -- all right? -- the White House counsel, the attorney general, the Department of Justice's lawyers and my own lawyers at NSA ruled this to be a lawful use of the president's authority.
SEN. FEINGOLD: You're referring back to the wiretapping.
GEN. HAYDEN: Yes, sir. Yes, sir.
SEN. FEINGOLD: I'm asking you whether there are additional things you'd like to see. You just indicated to me, in a helpful response, that prior to 9/11, you thought some things maybe should have been done pursuant to Article II, even though they were not permitted by FISA or perhaps some other statute. Are there other things that you believe now we should be doing that are not covered by statute that would fall into this category?
GEN. HAYDEN: No, sir, none that I'm aware of.
SEN. FEINGOLD: Take another example in this area. The law states that the director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall have no police, subpoena or law enforcement powers or internal security functions. If the president told you that he felt he had power under Article II to override that, would you be bound by the statute, or would you follow the president?
GEN. HAYDEN: Again, Senator, it's a hypothetical, but the statute is clear that unless there was a compelling legal argument as to why that was a legitimate exercise of presidential authority, of course not.
SEN. FEINGOLD: Under this theory, could the CIA conduct convert action inside the United States?
GEN. HAYDEN: Again, Senator, a hypothetical, and I wouldn't even know how to begin to address that. I mean --
SEN. FEINGOLD: I'm just trying to figure out what it is that would limit the president from saying that to you.
And if he gave that order or he made that statement, based on your answers, it seems to me you believe he has that inherent power to do --
GEN. HAYDEN: Oh, no, no, sir. And what I believe is important, but not decisive. There has to be a body of law when people whose responsibility it is to interpret the law for someone, like the position I was in in NSA or, if confirmed, at CIA, who would say that this, indeed, is lawful and a lawful exercise of authority. And like I recommended and was quickly granted in the case in September, October 2001, we informed our oversight body.
SEN. FEINGOLD: I appreciate that answer very much. And I just have to say for the record that the body of law that supports the -- what supports this wiretapping program I think is exceptionally weak compared to the other authorities that have been discussed. But you and I have been --
GEN. HAYDEN: Yes, sir.
SEN. FEINGOLD: -- back and forth on that. But I think it's terribly important to realize because you are acknowledging that you would have an independent obligation to look at whether that law is sufficient to justify the president's claim under Article II.
GEN. HAYDEN: And again, Senator, it's a hypothetical. But you know, four-and-a-half years ago, it was very important to me that the lawyers I knew best personally, that I trusted, and who knew best the National Security Agency were in agreement.
SEN. FEINGOLD: Why wasn't the president's warrantless surveillance program briefed to the full congressional intelligence committees until yesterday?
GEN. HAYDEN: Sir, that was not my decision. I briefed fully to whatever audience was in front of me, and I wouldn't attempt to explain the administration's decision. But it wasn't the decision --
SEN. FEINGOLD: You weren't given any explanation of why the decision was made not to allow it?
GEN. HAYDEN: There were discussions in terms --
SEN. FEINGOLD: What were you told?
GEN. HAYDEN: -- in terms of I believe it's Section 502 and 503 and the phrase "with due regard." And in both of those sections the one that has to do with general intelligence activities and the one that has to do with covert action, in both cases, the paragraphs talked "with due regard to the protection of sources and methods." Beyond that, sir, I --
SEN. FEINGOLD: So it was the sources and methods part that was - -
GEN. HAYDEN: There was, I believe, a strong desire to keep this program as close-hold as possible because of its value --
SEN. FEINGOLD: Fair enough.
GEN. HAYDEN: -- while at the same time informing those who needed to be informed.
SEN. FEINGOLD: Fair enough.
On that point, on the sources and methods justification, the National Security Act states that, quote, "nothing" -- nothing - - "in this act shall be construed as authority to withhold information from the congressional intelligence committees on the grounds that providing the information to the congressional intelligence committees would constitute the unauthorized disclosure of classified information or information relating to intelligence sources and methods." Unquote.
General Hayden, the congressional intelligence committee -- committees -- handle sensitive sources and methods every day.
GEN. HAYDEN: Yes, sir.
SEN. FEINGOLD: What was it about this program that was different, other than the administration knew that it would be politically and legally contentious?
GEN. HAYDEN: Sir, I wouldn't attempt to describe the background to it. I know what the decision was. I was heartened that I was able to brief the senior leadership of both intel committees and the senior leadership of the Congress, and I was heartened that I was able to do it multiple times.
SEN. FEINGOLD: Well, in fairness to you, I got the feeling that you probably did want to tell more people, so I'm going to -- I want to be fair about that. I got that feeling.
But do you see the distinction between sensitive sources and methods which are part of a known program and an entirely new surveillance program whose existence would likely surprise if not outrage many members of Congress? I mean, isn't there a distinction as we look forward in that regard?
GEN. HAYDEN: Sir, I apologize. I don't see the distinction in law. And I do know that practice has been for activities, for example like covert action, that only the senior member and the chairman are briefed.
SEN. FEINGOLD: General, in January you stated that you would, quote, "take no view on the political step of going to Congress for an amendment of the FISA Act," unquote. But the question of seeking a statutory basis for conducting surveillance in this country, in my view is not a political question, it's fundamental to our constitutional system of government. General, if you saw that our country's statutes did not provide the authority you thought was necessary to combat terrorist organizations, would you seek that authority from Congress?
GEN. HAYDEN: If I had no lawful authority to conduct something that I believed needed to be done to protect the nation, of course I would.
But in this case, Senator -- just to make sure I'm misleading by half, by not being complete -- in this case I believed I did have a lawful authority.
SEN. FEINGOLD: Can you explain to me why it is that we even need to pass laws in Congress in this area that relates to Article II, given the claims that are being made by this administration of its power in this area?
GEN. HAYDEN: Senator, again, if you look at the three pillars on which this program was based -- its lawfulness, its effectiveness, and then the care with which it was carried out - - I'm kind of crew chief for two and three, you know, its effectiveness and the care with which it was carried out. And I think I suggested earlier today the Founding Fathers intentionally put tensions between Article I and Article II, and I don't think I can solve those.
SEN. FEINGOLD: Senator Bond asked you whether under the warrantless surveillance program any Americans had been targeted who were not associated with al Qaeda. And you replied only that you didn't see how that could occur within the NSA's culture.
The question remains: Has it happened?
GEN. HAYDEN: In each case when NSA has targeted a number under this program, there has been a probable cause standard met in the judgment of our analysts and those who oversee them that there is reason to believe -- a reasonable person with all the facts available to him or her at the time has cause to believe that this communicant is associated with al Qaeda.
SEN. FEINGOLD: That's not my question, and that wasn't Senator Bond's question.
GEN. HAYDEN: Okay.
SEN. FEINGOLD: It's whether it's every happened that any Americans have been targeted who were not associated with al Qaeda, as a matter of fact, has it happened, despite the cautions --
GEN. HAYDEN: Sir, I'll give you detail in closed session, all right? But clearly, I think logic would dictate that if you're using a probable cause standard as opposed to absolute certitude, sometimes you may not be right.
SEN. FEINGOLD: Has there been a thorough and ongoing review of this question?
GEN. HAYDEN: Yes -- oh, yes, sir. Yes, sir.
SEN. FEINGOLD: And will these reviews be submitted to this committee?
GEN. HAYDEN: Sir, I think they're available to the committee during your visits at the agency in response to the questions that you've asked. I think by review you mean what's been targeted, what have been the results, how long is --
SEN. FEINGOLD: Is there -- are there documents that would lay out for us the answer to my earlier question relating to whether people that were not associated with al Qaeda have been trapped in this thing?
GEN. HAYDEN: Well, how long targeting has gone one, why targeting has ceased.
Senator, let me make something very clear, though. Speaking in the abstract a bit, okay? To put someone on targeting under NSA anywhere in the world -- but obviously we're talking about this program -- and at some point end targeting doesn't mean that the first decision was wrong, it just means this was not a lucrative target for communications intelligence.
SEN. FEINGOLD: I respect that, but you know, this is exactly why, it seems to me, that FISA had it right by having some oversight of this under a court. And you obviously are doing everything you can to avoid any mistakes in this area.
GEN. HAYDEN: Yes, sir.
SEN. FEINGOLD: But if the FISA court were involved, we wouldn't have to be discussing this. And based on the comments of Senator Feinstein and others, I still believe that this could be done within that construct, within that statute.
As you know, General, the law allows for congressional notification to be limited to the so-called Gang of Eight only in cases of covert action. Even in those cases, the president must determine that it is essential to meet extraordinary circumstances affecting the vital interests of the United States. In your view, what kind of circumstances would justify failing to notify the full congressional intelligence committees of covert action?
GEN. HAYDEN: Senator, that's -- I'm sorry, could you just say the last part again?
SEN. FEINGOLD: Yeah. An example of a situation that would somehow take the administration or you out of the responsibility of informing the full committee.
GEN. HAYDEN: That was not a covert action?
SEN. FEINGOLD: What kinds of circumstances would justify failing to notify the full Congressional Intelligence Committee of covert action?
GEN. HAYDEN: Senator, I apologize, that's a very difficult question for me to answer. And as I said in my opening comments -- all right? -- this is a long war and it's going to require broad political support over a long period of time.
SEN. FEINGOLD: You can't give me a hypothetical, something that might fit that category, so I could imagine what it would be?
GEN. HAYDEN: Senator, I'm sorry, I just really can't.
SEN. FEINGOLD: Okay.
GEN. HAYDEN: It's a bit beyond my experience level.
SEN. FEINGOLD: Will you notify the full committee after the covert action has begun?
GEN. HAYDEN: Senator, I'd have to refer myself to the laws in terms of who gets notified and when. I do know that there is a requirement for speedy notification, and we, of course, would do that.
SEN. FEINGOLD: Will you provide to the full committee information on all past intelligence activities, including covert action that has been previously provided only to the Gang of Eight?
GEN. HAYDEN: Senator, I'm sorry, I'm just not familiar with the requirements under the law for that.
SEN. FEINGOLD: Mr. Chairman, I would simply ask that you review that question, if you would, and I do request, unless you have - -
SEN. ROBERTS: We'll be happy to review it.
SEN. FEINGOLD: -- strong objection, that that be provided.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
SEN. ROBERTS: You bet.
Senator Chambliss?
Let me say that we're expecting votes at 4:15, two or three stacked votes. We still have four members under the 20-minute role. It may well be that we'll have to go back to regular order in terms of the time frame for a follow-up on members that wish to continue questioning the general during an open session. I would like to get to a closed session as soon as we can, and I know the general would, as well. And I think a lot of members have questions that can be better answered in regards to a closed session.
Senator Chambliss?
SEN. SAXBY CHAMBLISS (R-GA): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
General Hayden, having had the privilege of working with you for about the last six years or so in your position at NSA as well as more recently as the deputy at DNI, I want to congratulate you on this appointment and as you enter this next phase of your intelligence career. And I know 35 years ago or so when you joined the military, it was a commitment not just of Mike Hayden, but of his family.
And I'm very pleased to see your family here today continuing in that great support of you as you make your presentation here today.
Now, it's truly a great country we live in when we can have differences of opinion, particularly public differences of opinion, relative to something as sensitive as intelligence. And whether the programs conducted by intelligence agencies are right or wrong, I happen to have a significantly different opinion than some of my colleagues who have expressed disappointment or made statements regarding the programs that have been under your leadership. I happen to think that you've done a very good job, a very professional job, of carrying out your duty as director of the National Security Agency. And I think that I am very comfortable in saying -- and I want to be careful how I say this, but the programs that have been carried out by the professionals that worked under you for the last several years have been carried out very professionally. And it's because of the folks at your agency as well as other folks in the intelligence community that we have not had another domestic attack since September 11. And it's because of your leadership and the folks under you as well as the intelligence community team, General Hayden, that American lives have been saved, both domestically as well as abroad. And I suspect that, knowing the way this town is about leaking things, that maybe some of the good things that are happening will get leaked out, too, one of these days. But that's unfortunate that it seems to be just the sensational and negative things that get leaked.
Now, as you know, General, you and I have discussed your nomination privately on several different occasions, and I have had some concerns relative to your nomination that have absolutely nothing to do with your qualifications. I went back and I looked at a lot of the history regarding the director of Central Intelligence and whether or not that individual ought to come from the civilian side, or whether they ought to come from the military side. And as you know, this -- this is one major concern that I have had from day one regarding your nomination by the president.
In the original 1947 act, it was pretty clear that Congress intended that this be a civilian agency. But there was no limitation on whether or not the individual as director ought to come from the military side or from the civilian side. But in the act that we passed in 2005 we set up the director of National Intelligence, we also set up a principal deputy position, and we specifically stated in that legislation that not more than one of the individuals serving in the positions specified in this paragraph may be a commissioned officer of the armed forces in active status. That means either you or your position as the deputy, or in your -- the position of the DNI not -- both of them could not be coming from the military side.
In the -- so there was a lot of discussion about that issue, as to whether or not they ought to be a military or a civilian is my point there.
In the bill that we passed out of this committee last year, the report language under Section 421 reads as follows: "The considerations that encourage appointment of a military officer to the position of DNI or PDNI, principal deputy, do not apply to the leadership of the CIA. Indeed, given the CIA's establishment in 1947 as an independent civilian agency with no direct military or law enforcement responsibilities, the committee -- this committee -- does not believe that a similar construct of military leadership is appropriate at the agency, and accordingly, the committee recommends that both the director and the deputy director of the CIA should be appointed from civilian life."
Now, that is the problem that I have been wrestling with, General, and the issue that you and I have had extensive conversations in private about. I also went back and looked just to see what the statute said regarding the differences in the role and mission in the intelligence community on the military side versus the civilian side. And under the 1947 Act, it's not real specific as to the responsibilities, except that it does say in the Act of 1947 that the National Security Agency is primarily responsible for the conduct of signals intelligence activities.
However, under Executive Order Number 12333, it specifically states that the National Security Agency, whose responsibility shall include establishment and operation of an effective, unified organization for signals intelligence activities -- and it goes on to talk about that -- and the issue relative to the responsibility of the Defense Intelligence Agency is also set forth in Executive Order Number 12333, and it says as follows: "That the DIA's responsibilities shall include collection, production, through tasking and coordination, provision of military and military-related intelligence for the secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs and other Defense components."
Now, that's what creates my problem, General. And I just simply want to ask the question and give you the opportunity publicly to tell the American people how you're going to go from 35 years of this military intelligence mindset to heading up an agency, the CIA, that has a different role and function, a role primarily of gathering intelligence from a human intelligence standpoint abroad or outside the United States.
GEN. HAYDEN: Yes, sir.
I guess there is kind of a four-corner matrix here, and let me take each pair.
I think the first issue is national and DOD, all right? I mean, the CIA is a national intelligence organization. And you make the point, quite correctly, that DIA is a Defense intelligence organization.
Now, those lines get blurred, clearly.
I mean DIA actually does a lot of things for Ambassador Negroponte right now. And I already said earlier today CIA is doing an awful lot of tactical things for the Department of Defense. But fundamentally, one's a national agency, one's a defense agency.
Senator, NSA is a national agency. It's on the same line as CIA in terms of its functioning. I know it resides inside the Department of Defense, but its tasking, even under the old law, came from the DCI, not the secretary. And under the new law, you've strengthened Ambassador Negroponte even more in terms of his direct control over NSA.
Defense -- when I was the director of NSA, Defense was our biggest customer, but it wasn't our only customer and it wasn't our most important customer. You know, I feel like I was running a national agency, and that that experience should be able to translate, if I'm confirmed, to my ability to do something at Langley at the CIA.
The other aspect you bring up, Senator, the other pair in this matrix is human intelligence and signals intelligence. And I understand that I spent a lot of time at NSA -- six years. But I do have HUMINT experience. All right? I was an attache. I went through language training for a year in preparation for being an attache. I've crawled in the mud to take pictures of MiG-23s taking off from Bulgarian airfields so I could understand what type and model it was. Had sources. Now, it's an overt collector, not a covert collecter -- but had sources, asked questions, made reports. So I do have a -- I do think I have a sense of that.
And at the NSA job, as Director Tenet -- as George was very fond to point out, there was a convergence between the science and art of SIGINT and the science and art of HUMINT; they were getting very close to one another.
So I actually think I'm not badly prepared. I wouldn't be so arrogant to say, you know, my career has guided me to this job - - not at all. But I don't think I'm badly prepared for this -- running a national agency responsive to the DCI, broad experience in the intelligence community, and answering not tactical military questions throughout my career, but a fair mix of both strategic, operational and tactical.
SEN. CHAMBLISS: The focus at the CIA has got to be on improving our human collection.
GEN. HAYDEN: Yes, sir.
SEN. CHAMBLISS: And you feel comfortable with your intelligence background that you have that you're ready to focus almost purely on HUMINT collection at this point?
GEN. HAYDEN: Yes, sir. I would add -- not meant to correct, but just to be inclusive -- the human collection and the analysis, I think they both have to be dealt with. But in terms of CIA as a collection agency, yes, sir, it's human collection.
SEN. CHAMBLISS: Okay. And let's talk about the analysis just a minute, because the CIA was always intended to be an independent agency. And even under the new structure within the framework of the new organization that we have, all of the agencies still have to be somewhat independent. And you have been the number two guy under the DNI director, Negroponte.
You now are being asked to move over to an agency that sometimes is going to come into conflict with what the DNI may think about the intelligence world.
Now, we've already talked about your relationship with Secretary Rumsfeld. And knowing you like I do and having worked with you, I know that you can be a very independent individual, and that's good. I think you have to be. You're going to have to be even more independent in this position.
Now, I don't know all the ins and outs of what happened, but I do know, just because of what you have said and what I know previously, from conversations with folks within the community over the last couple of weeks, that there was some independence expressed by Director Goss relative to the removal of certain analytical capability out of the CIA over to the NCTC.
Now, when those things happen, are you prepared to face conflicts with the DNI when the situation arises, to sort of stand your ground for the CIA?
GEN. HAYDEN: Yes, sir. Sir, that's a lot better question than the GI heritage and how it will affect things, because I have a great of respect and admiration and a good friendship with Ambassador Negroponte.
But the answer to your question -- of course. I mean, there is no right and wrong in these kinds of scrums.
And you're right. There was a bit of a scrum over counterterrorism analysis, and I went into detail about that an hour or two ago.
You clearly need to represent the interests of your agency, because you've got your lane, and you've got to perform well in your lane. But you also have to understand -- and this doesn't have anything to do with the fact that I'm working for the ambassador now; you can do it when I was director of NSA -- at the end of the day, though, you've got to accept the decision that's best for the community. After having made your points of view, as long as that boss knows the cost he's imposing on you for your peculiar, unique function, as long as he understands that and has come to the conclusion "Yes, but this decision is better for the overall function of the community as a whole," and then it's time, I think, to get on and do it, and do it well.
SEN. CHAMBLISS: Well, let me tell you why this issue particularly concerns me. I felt all along that the position of DNI -- and I still feel -- that person does not need to be an expert in intelligence. And Ambassador Negroponte is not an expert in intelligence. He has good people around him that are, and you're one of those people. You are an expert in intelligence. And when it comes to knowing what's best for the community, I trust your judgment impeccably. And I certainly hope that he does.
But I know that there are going to be times when that -- the conflict is going to occur, and we're going to know that. From an oversight capacity, it's our responsibility to know that.
GEN. HAYDEN: Yes, sir.
SEN. CHAMBLISS: And we expect you, General, to stand up for what you think is the correct thing to do for the Central Intelligence Agency, because it's at a critical juncture right now.
GEN. HAYDEN: Yes, sir.
SEN. CHAMBLISS: It's an agency that's always been a very stable agency, and here we are with our third director in the last two years. We're coming off of two major intelligence failures that happened on the watch of one of those directors, and we can't afford for that to happen again.
So I know you're independent, I know you can and I assume you will stand up every day for what's right for the agency, but know that we're going to be making sure you do.
There's also another issue that we have discussed within this committee any number of times, and we've seen some recent activity at the agency regarding how the director has dealt with leaks and individuals who may or may not be responsible for leaks at the agency. You've had some experience at NSA. You've had experience as the deputy for the DNI.
What is your -- what is going to be your approach to leaks and those responsible for the leaks at the CIA?
GEN. HAYDEN: Yes, senator, I -- obviously, I know how we all abhor leaks, and there's the usual mantra, "It puts at risk sources and methods" and so on, but beyond that, it really has a corrosive affect on the integrity of the community. You can't expect people to make tough decisions and hard-edged assessments and then have that pushed into public debate in ways it was never intended. And so this is a -- (inaudible) -- problem, and I meant what I said in the opening statement -- CIA out of the news as source or subject, so we can get back to business, back to basics and do what the nation expects us to do.
I admire Director Goss for the action he took with regard to this last round of unauthorized disclosures. That is not to say that all circumstances in the future would demand the same kind of response. But you had the same kind of commitment from me that I know you had from him in terms of taking all appropriate and effective action to not leak classified information to those who are not authorized to receive it.
SEN. CHAMBLISS: General, one point that I have continuously made over the last several years regarding the intelligence community and particularly after September 11 was our failure to share information properly. We've made great strides in the sharing of information, but we are still a long ways away from where we need to be.
One thing that was very positive that Director Goss did was, frankly, eliminating some people in positions who tended to encourage information to be held within the agency, so the agency could get the so-called credit for the take down or whatever it may be. We got to get away from that mentality, and I think he's moved us a long ways in the right direction; the same way with Director Mueller at the FBI.
Can you tell us what thoughts you have or what ideas you have about how to improve the information sharing --
GEN. HAYDEN: Sure. And you --
SEN. CHAMBLISS: -- between the folks in the community.
GEN. HAYDEN: Yes, sir. Sorry. You bring up a great point. I mean, the bottom line are results, not credit, and so -- and we wish you to view ourselves as contributing to an overall national effort. And there are legitimate reasons for make some kinds of information close-hold. Lord knows we've talked about that this afternoon, but they have to be legitimate reasons, and those reasons have to be examined and reexamined almost constantly because you just can't get in the culture habits of: We haven't shared this; therefore, we will not in the future share this.
Senator -- the experience of six years at NSA; it's a constant struggle, but progress can be made. And the most intriguing and satisfying aspect is after you've made what seems like this dramatic break from the past, two or three months later, this new state of being you're in where you're sharing at a different level, it seems like it's been that way for 50 years.
You just have to keep moving that line.
SEN. CHAMBLISS: Lastly, General, Senator Warner is right; as we travel around the world, one of things we do is to try to visit with as many government agents as we can in the field, including CIA personnel. And every time I do it's interesting to hear the reaction of folks, but particularly over the last six months it's been interesting because there's almost been a 180-degree change in attitude that I have seen out there, and it's because Director Goss came in and immediately mandated that agents in the field be risk- takers versus being risk-averse. There has been a tendency to be risk-averse over the last decade, and that's part of the problem that we have talked about publicly and privately relative to our HUMINT capability. And folks join the agency because they're excited about getting in that world. They certainly don't come in the agency to make a lot of money, but they enjoy what they're doing, and the more risk they're asked to take the better they like it. Director Goss is moving in that direction, and I hope you will continue to encourage and mandate our agents in the field to be risk-takers as they gather intelligence.
GEN. HAYDEN: Yes, sir. That would be my intent. Can I add an additional thought to it, Senator?
We talked about two things today that as a practical matter is going to be a challenge to get inside the same box. Everyone has recommended risk-taking, and we've also talked in a healthy dialogue about accountability. And you need both, and clearly you must hold people accountable for wrongdoing. But do you see the leadership challenge in terms of getting both a culture of risk-taking and a culture of accountability in the same place?
There was just a phrase in my opening remarks that said something about top cover for people in order to enable them to be more free to take risks. We'll have