Testimony of
Robert S. Mueller, III
Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Before the
Senate Committee on Intelligence of the
United States Senate


February 16, 2005

Introduction

Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, Senator Rockefeller, and members of the Committee. I appreciate this opportunity to discuss our current view of threats to the United States and the FBI's efforts to address them.

Before I begin, I would like to take a moment to thank all of our partners in the Law Enforcement and Intelligence Communities. They have shared their information and expertise, and in many cases worked side-by-side with us, and together we made great progress over the past year to protect our nation and our communities from terrorism and crime.

I would also like to thank the men and women of the FBI for continuing to embrace our changing mission, for working to enhance our intelligence capabilities, for adapting to new technologies and new ways of doing things, and for doing all of this without ever pausing in our forward push to protect this country from active threats.

Mr. Chairman, over the past year, through unprecedented cooperation, enhanced intelligence capabilities, and continued unwavering commitment to protect the American people, we have achieved considerable victories against national security and criminal threats facing the U.S. However, I must also report that these threats continue to evolve and to pose new challenges to the FBI and our partners.

It remains the FBI's overriding priority to predict and prevent terrorist attacks. The threat posed by international terrorism, and in particular from al Qa'ida and related groups, continues to be the gravest we face.

Al-Qa'ida and Related Terrorist Groups

In 2004, our efforts in the War on Terrorism grew more intelligence-driven, more coordinated, and produced many tangible results.

In 2004 we learned that operatives had conducted detailed surveillance of financial targets in New York, Washington DC, and New Jersey. In response to this threat, in coordination with DHS, the threat level was raised from yellow to orange for the cities referenced in the threat and we mobilized a large contingent of analysts and agents to review the massive amount of information connected with the attack planning, and to uncover any additional information that would give us insight into the plot .

Previously, in the Spring of 2004, our allies in the United Kingdom arrested a group of terrorists who were plotting an imminent attack inside the UK. In response, we immediately formed a task force of analysts and agents to determine if there was a U.S. nexus to the plot or if any of the UK subjects had links to individuals in the U.S.

Later in the year, we received information suggesting that there was an attack being planned-possibly timed to coincide with the 2004 Presidential Election. To counter the threat, the FBI created the 2004 Threat Task Force in May 2004. With thousands of FBI personnel, supported by individuals from outside agencies, it was the largest task force created since 9/11, and it brought to bear every possible resource in an effort to identify the operatives and disrupt the attack plan.

As part of the Task Force's initiatives, field offices conducted a thorough canvass of all counterterrorism investigations and FBI sources to develop any further information that could help us find these individuals. During the seven months the task force was up and running, we also checked every tangible lead provided in the threat intelligence. It was an extraordinary effort and while we may never know if an operation was indeed being planned, I am certain that the FBI's tremendous response to the threat played an integral role in disrupting any operational plans that may have been underway.

Mr. Chairman, since we last spoke, the FBI has identified various extremists located throughout the U.S. and is monitoring their activities. Although these efforts have made us safer, they are also a sobering reminder of the threat we continue to face.

• In Virginia, Mohammed Ali al-Timimi, the spiritual leader of the Virginia Jihad training group disrupted last year, was indicted for his involvement in the recruitment of US citizens for extremist training and jihad preparation. Al-Timimi, the primary lecturer at a northern Virginia Islamic center, preached jihad to a small core group of followers, provided them paramilitary training and facilitated their travel to Pakistan in the days after September 11th to attend Lashkar-e-Taiba training camp in preparation to fight the United States in Afghanistan
• In Minneapolis, we arrested Mohamad Kamal El-Zahabi, a Lebanese citizen who admitted to serving in Afghanistan and Chechnya as a sniper and to providing sniper training at Khalden camp in Afghanistan and in Lebanon in the 1990s. We first learned of El-Zahabi during our investigation of Boston-based Sunni extremists Ra'ed Hijazi, convicted for his role in the Millennium plot in Jordan, and Bassam Kanj, who was killed in a plot to overthrow the Lebanese government in 2000.
• In New York, Yassin Muhiddin Aref was arrested on money laundering charges connected to a possible terrorist plot to kill a Pakistani diplomat.

Unfortunately, in spite of these accomplishments, al-Qa'ida continues to adapt and move forward with its desire to attack the United States using any means at its disposal. Their intent to attack us at home remains-and their resolve to destroy America has never faltered.

Al-Qa'ida's overall attack methodology has adapted and evolved to address the changes to their operating environment. While we still assess that a mass casualty attack using relatively low-tech methods will be their most likely approach, we are concerned that they are seeking weapons of mass destruction including chemical weapons, so-called "dirty bombs" or some type of biological agent such as anthrax.

Every day, personnel in our Counterterrorism Division and in 100 Joint Terrorism Task Forces around the country, work to determine where, when, and how the next attack will occur. The fact remains-America is awash in desirable targets-those that are symbolic like the U.S. Capitol and the White House-as well as the many infrastructure targets, like nuclear power plants, mass transit systems, bridges and tunnels, shipping and port facilities, financial centers, and airports-that if successfully hit, would cause both mass casualties and a crippling effect on our economy.

We continue to be concerned that U.S. transportation systems remain a key target. The attacks in Madrid last March show the devastation that a simple, low-tech operation can achieve and the resulting impact to the government and economy, which makes this type of attack in the U.S. particularly attractive to al-Qa'ida.

Another area we consider vulnerable and target rich is the energy sector, particularly nuclear power plants. Al-Qa'ida planner Khalid Sheikh Mohammed had nuclear power plants as part of his target set and we have no reason to believe that al-Qa'ida has reconsidered.

Looking ahead, there are three areas that cause us the greatest concern.

First is the threat from covert operatives who may be inside the U.S. who have the intention to facilitate or conduct an attack. Finding them is a top priority for the FBI, but it is also one of the most difficult challenges. The very nature of a covert operative-trained to not raise suspicion and to appear benign-is what makes their detection so difficult.

Mr. Chairman, while we are proud of our accomplishments this year and the additional insight we have gained into al-Qa'ida's activity, I remain very concerned about what we are not seeing.

Whether we are talking about a true sleeper operative who has been in place for years, waiting to be activated to conduct an attack or a recently deployed operative that has entered the U.S. to facilitate or conduct an attack, we are continuously adapting our methods to reflect newly received intelligence and to ensure we are as proactive and as targeted as we can be in detecting their presence.

Second, because of al-Qa'ida's directed efforts this year to infiltrate covert operatives into the U.S., I am also very concerned with the growing body of sensitive reporting that continues to show al-Qa'ida's clear intention to obtain and ultimately use some form of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear or high-energy explosives (CBRNE) material in its attacks against America.

Third, we remain concerned about the potential for al-Qa'ida to leverage extremist groups with peripheral or historical connections to al-Qa'ida, particularly its ability to exploit radical American converts and other indigenous extremists. While we still believe the most serious threat to the Homeland originates from al-Qa'ida members located overseas, the bombings in Madrid last March have heightened our concern regarding the possible role that indigenous Islamic extremists, already in the U.S., may play in future terrorist plots. Also of concern is the possible role that peripheral groups with a significant presence in the U.S. may play if called upon by members of al-Qa'ida to assist them with attack planning or logistical support.

The potential recruitment of radicalized American Muslim converts continues to be a concern and poses an increasingly challenging issue for the FBI because the process of recruitment is subtle and many times, self initiated and radicalization tends to occur over a long period of time and under many different circumstances.

As part of our continued efforts to identify populations that may be a target for extremist recruitment, the FBI has been involved in a coordinated effort between law enforcement and corrections personnel to combat the recruitment and radicalization of prison inmates. Prisons continue to be fertile ground for extremists who exploit both a prisoner's conversion to Islam while still in prison, as well as their socio-economic status and placement in the community upon their release.

Extremist recruitment at schools and universities inside the United States also poses a particularly difficult problem. Because the environment on campuses is so open and isolated, schools provide a particularly impressionable and captive audience for extremists to target.

Additionally, keeping in mind al-Qa'ida recruitment efforts occur primarily overseas, we are closely monitoring any possible methods for moving individuals to extremist-linked institutions overseas, specifically religious schools and mosques that have overt ties to al-Qa'ida or other terrorist organizations.

We are also concerned about the possibility that individuals who are members of groups previously considered to be peripheral to the current threat, could be convinced by more radical, external influences to take on a facilitation or even worse-an operational role-with little or no warning. Individual members of legitimate organizations, such Jama'at Tabligh, may be targeted by al-Qa'ida in an effort to exploit their networks and contacts here in the United States.

Efforts by extremists to obtain training inside the U.S. is also an ongoing concern. Although there are multiple reports and ongoing investigations associated with the paramilitary training activities of suspected extremists nationwide, the majority of these cases involve small groups of like-minded individuals who are inspired by the jihadist rhetoric experienced in radical mosques or prison proselytizing.

Fortunately, the recent amendment to Title 18 adding a provision whereby an individual knowingly receiving military-type training from a designated foreign terrorist organization is committing an offense, makes it possible to now prosecute individuals who participate or assist individuals in receiving this type of training.

Another area of concern is the recent merging of Iraqi jihadist leader Abu Mu'sab al-Zarqawi with al-Qa'ida. Zarqawi has a demonstrated capability of directing external operations while maintaining his focus on Iraq as noted with the disrupted Jordan plot in April.

Another aspect of extremist activity in the U.S. is the extensive fundraising efforts by various terrorist groups. We continue to identify and block funding conduits, freeze assets of terrorists and those who support them, protect legitimate charities, and disrupt the movement of money through peripheral financial systems such as Hawalas.

As part of this effort, the FBI has engaged in extensive coordination with authorities of numerous foreign governments in terrorist financing matters, leading to joint investigative efforts throughout the world. The FBI's participation in a U.S. - Saudi Arabia Joint Terrorism Task Force, the U.S. - Swiss Terrorism Financing Task Force and the International Working Group on Terrorist Financing has enhanced cooperation between these agencies and the U.S. and allowed the FBI unprecedented access that has increased our understanding of these complex financing networks. Since 2002, we have provided terrorism financing training and technical assistance to liaison partners in almost 50 countries.

The Threat from Other International Terrorist Groups

Mr. Chairman, al-Qa'ida and the groups that support it are still the most lethal threat we face today. However, other terrorist groups that have a presence in the U.S. require careful monitoring.

It is the FBI's assessment, at this time, that there is a limited threat of a coordinated terrorist attack in the U.S. from Palestinian terrorist organizations, such as HAMAS, the Palestine Islamic Jihad, and the al-Aqsa Martyr's Brigade. These groups have maintained a longstanding policy of focusing their attacks on Israeli targets in Israel and the Palestinian territories. We believe that the primary interest of Palestinian terrorist groups in the U.S. remains the raising of funds to support their regional goals.

The FBI is committed to staunching the flow of funds from the U.S. to Palestinian terrorist organizations. As an example of this effort, the former leadership of the Holy Land for Relief and Development, a HAMAS front organization, was indicted this past year and convictions were won against the Elashi brothers who owned and ran Infocom, another HAMAS front organization.

Of all the Palestinian groups, HAMAS has the largest presence in the U.S. with a robust infrastructure, primarily focused on fundraising, propaganda for the Palestinian cause, and proselytizing. Although it would be a major strategic shift for HAMAS, its U.S. network is theoretically capable of facilitating acts of terrorism in the U.S.

Like HAMAS, but on a much smaller scale, U.S.-based Palestine Islamic Jihad members and supporters are primarily engaged in fundraising, propaganda and proselytizing activities. In 2003, the Palestine Islamic Jihad, or PIJ, activities and capabilities in the U.S. were severely undercut by the arrests of the U.S. PIJ leader, Sami al-Arian, and three of his top lieutenants. There have also been two additional arrests of suspected PIJ activists on charges unrelated to terrorism. There has been no indication of a new U.S. PIJ leadership since the arrest of al-Arian.

Currently, the most likely threat of terrorist attacks from Palestinian groups to the U.S. homeland is from a "lone wolf" scenario. In this scenario, a terrorist attack would be perpetrated by one or more individuals who may embrace the ideology of a Palestinian terrorist group, but act without assistance or approval of any established group.

Lebanese Hizballah retains the capability to strike in the U.S., although we have no credible information to indicate that US-based Hizballah members have plans to attack American interests within the U.S. or abroad. In 2004, we had some success in uncovering individuals providing material support to Hizballah.

• In Detroit, Mahmoud Youssef Kourani was indicted in the Eastern District of Michigan on one count of Conspiracy to Provide Material Support to Hizballah. Kourani was already in custody for entering the country illegally through Mexico and was involved in fundraising activities on behalf of Hizballah.

The Threat from Domestic Terrorism

While national attention is focused on the substantial threat posed by international terrorists to the homeland, law enforcement officials must also contend with an ongoing threat posed by domestic terrorists based and operating strictly within the U.S. Domestic terrorists motivated by a number of political or social agendas-including white supremacists, black separatists, animal rights/environmental terrorists, anarchists, anti-abortion extremists, and self-styled militia-continue to employ violence and criminal activity in furtherance of these agendas.

Animal rights and environmental extremists, operating under the umbrella of the Animal Liberation Front (ALF) and Earth Liberation Front (ELF) utilize a variety of tactics against their targets, including arson, sabotage/vandalism, theft of research animals, and the occasional use of explosive devices.

Serious incidents of animal rights/eco-terrorism decreased in 2004, a fact we attribute to a series of law enforcement successes that are likely deterring large-scale arsons and property destruction. Following a rash of serious incidents of animal rights/eco-terrorism, including a $50 million arson in San Diego and two bombing incidents in the San Francisco area, law enforcement authorities achieved several significant successes which have likely deterred additional terrorist activity. Despite these successes, we anticipate that animal rights extremism and eco-terrorism will continue to threaten certain segments of government and private industry, specifically in the areas of animal research and residential/commercial development.

The potential for violence by anarchists and other emerging revolutionary groups, such as the Anarchist Black Cross Federation (ABCF), will continue to be an issue for law enforcement. The stated goals of the ABCF are "the abolishment of prisons, the system of laws, and the Capitalist state." The ABCF believes in armed resistance to achieve a stateless and classless society. ABCF has continued to organize, recruit, and train anarchists in the tactical use of firearms.

US-based black separatist groups follow radical variants of Islam, and in some cases express solidarity with al-Qa'ida and other international terrorist groups.

Incidents of organized white supremacist group violence decreased in 2004. This is due to several high profile law enforcement arrests over the last several years, as well as the continued fragmentation of white supremacist groups because of the deaths or the arrests of leaders. We judge that violence on the part of white supremacists remains an ongoing threat to government targets, Jewish individuals and establishments, and non-white ethnic groups.

However, the right-wing Patriot movement - consisting of militias, common law courts, tax protesters, and other anti-government extremists - remains a continuing threat in America today. Sporadic incidents resulting in direct clashes with law enforcement are possible and will most likely involve state and local law enforcement personnel, such as highway patrol officers and sheriff's deputies.

Potential violent anti-abortion extremists linked to terrorism ideologies or groups pose a current threat. The admiration of violent high-profile offenders by extremists highlight continued concerns relating to potential or similar anti-abortion threat activity.

WMD Proliferation and other Foreign Intelligence Threats

Although the impact of terrorism is more immediate and highly visible, espionage and foreign intelligence activity are no less a threat to the US national security. Many countries consider the US to be their primary intelligence target; so long as the US maintains its position in world affairs, it will continue to be targeted. As part of its reinvigorated and refocused foreign counterintelligence (FCI) program, the FBI has applied a more rigorous methodology to its efforts to assess and articulate the current threat environment.

One of the key elements of the FBI's National Strategy for Counterintelligence (adopted in August 2002) is the threat assessment. Over the past two years, the FBI has produced comprehensive threat assessments on several countries deemed to be of particular CI concern. The National Strategy for Counterintelligence identified five categories of foreign intelligence activity as being especially harmful to the US national security. These five categories of activity are weighted in terms of importance, the in the following order:

• Proliferation of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-energy explosives (CBRNE) information and technology:
• Penetration of the US Intelligence Community (USIC)
  
• Penetration of US Government entities and contractors
  
• Compromise of Critical National Assets (CNAs), defined as any information, policies, plans, technologies, or industries that, if stolen, modified, or manipulated by an adversary would seriously threaten US national or economic security; and
  
• Conduct of clandestine foreign intelligence activities in the US.

Several countries have traditionally considered the US to be their primary intelligence target, as well as an adversary or threat. This prioritization is manifested through their continued large and active intelligence presence in the US and their aggressive targeting of US persons, information and technology. Other countries, while not necessarily viewing the U.S. as an adversary or threat, seek information to help them compete economically, militarily, and politically in world affairs. As the current leader in all three areas, the US becomes their primary target. For still other countries, rather than being an intelligence target, the US represents an operating environment in which to conduct intelligence-related activities focused on their domestic security.

Some foreign countries are becoming increasingly sophisticated in their CI awareness, training and capabilities. Also of growing concern is the asymmetrical threat posed by certain intelligence services that supplement their collection capabilities in the US by using non-traditional collectors. These collectors include students, delegations, business visitors, émigrés, and retired intelligence officers who are collecting against targets of opportunity or responding to ad hoc requests from the intelligence services. Such non-traditional collectors pose a potential threat across the US, requiring a coordinated response by all FBI field offices.

The FBI does not foresee any significant changes in the official foreign intelligence presence in the US over the next two to three years. However, in addition to using non-traditional collectors, several countries appear to be exploiting their military liaison officers, who are in the US on overt, legitimate intelligence-sharing missions, to target and collect sensitive defense information that is outside the scope of their official access. Most difficult to identify and assess is the intelligence collection activity being directed and/or conducted by non-intelligence organizations, such as other foreign government agencies and/or foreign companies. The FBI sees this type of activity most frequently in the targeting and collection of CBRNE information and technology.

Another challenge the FBI will face is the tendency of some foreign intelligence services to leverage liaison relationships for intelligence collection purposes. US Government representatives participating in international conferences and exchanges, or whose duties include routine liaison with foreign intelligence representatives, frequently report that their contacts engage in elicitation, sometimes to a surprisingly aggressive level.

The FBI expects to see a continued increase in the use of technology as an enabler for intelligence operations, such as contacting, tasking, and debriefing sources and agents in the US.

Over the near term, the priority collection targets for these countries will be:

• The effects of the recent 2004 US elections on US foreign and domestic policies;
  
• US military actions in Iraq and Afghanistan;
  
• US counterterrorism policy;
  
• US dual use technologies; and
  
• US policy vis-à-vis particular countries or regions of the world.

The FBI expects to see continued lobbying, political influence, and/or perception management activities by countries hoping to affect US policy.

Many foreign intelligence services will also continue to exploit their presence in the US to target and collect against third countries. Most will also engage in defensive intelligence activities, targeting their own expatriate and ethnic communities in the US, especially those groups deemed to be a threat to the current regime.

The FBI's National Strategy for Counterintelligence sets forth national priorities and strategic objectives as well as changes in management and organizational culture intended to redirect and significantly enhance the overall performance of the FBI's FCI program. Program objectives and outcomes include:

• Identify intelligence service objectives, officers, assets, and operations;
  
• Disrupt the operations of intelligence services; and
  
• Change the behavior of exploited institutions and individuals.

To that end, the FBI has identified five program strategies: Know the Domain; Understand the Threat; Engage in Strategic Partnerships; Conduct Sophisticated Operations; and Inform Policymakers.

During FY 2004, the FBI FCI program accomplished the following:

• Six foreign intelligence officers and/or agents were arrested;
  
• 67 requests for persona non grata actions and visa denials were issued;
  
• 1,667 Intelligence Information Reports were disseminated.

In addition, the Asset Validation Review process was implemented in July 2002, and the FBI began providing mandatory asset validation training for Asset Coordinators in the field regarding procedures and policies. The FBI also implemented the Agents in Laboratories Initiative (AILI) in February 2003, through which FBI agents have been placed in Department of Energy nuclear weapons and science laboratories.

The FBI has also developed several strategic partnerships, to include the Regional CI Working Group (RCIWG) Initiative, which was established in October 2003 to implement the National Strategy for Counterintelligence, leverage the RCIWGs in tasking our USIC partners, address intelligence gaps, identify CI trends and priorities in the operational arena among USIC agencies at the field level, and ensure that all CI operational initiatives and projects across agencies are coordinated through the FBI.

Similarly, the National CI Working Group (NCIWG) was established and is led by the FBI and consists of other CI agency head-level representatives. The mission is to establish ongoing interagency planning discussions to better coordinate CI operations USIC-wide. Domain Task Forces are CI project level task forces led by the FBI, in vulnerabilities associated with at-risk national security projects, i.e., sensitive technologies, information, and research and development.

FBI field offices are developing "business alliances" to build executive-level relationships and foster threat and vulnerability information sharing, with private industries and academic institutions located within their territories having at-risk and sensitive national security and economic technologies, research and development projects.

Finally, the FBI has reinvigorated its CI training process. For example, field agents are trained in the key components of basic CI operations through an intensive four-week Basic CI Operations course. Other advanced, highly specialized CI courses and seminars provide training to agents and analysts through a variety of innovative instructional methods and include in-services and conferences, the Interactive Multimedia Instruction and Simulation (IMIS) computer-based training program, and the FBI Intranet.

Cyber Threats

The cyber-threat to the U.S. is serious and continues to expand rapidly the number of actors with both the ability and the desire to utilize computers for illegal and harmful purposes rises.

Cyber threats stems from both state actors, including foreign governments that use their vast resources to develop cyber technologies with which to attack our networks, and non-state actors such as terrorist groups and hackers that act independently of foreign governments. The increasing number of foreign governments and non-state actors exploiting U.S. computer networks is a major concern to the FBI and the Intelligence Community as a whole.

State actors continue to be a threat to both our national security as well as our economic security because they have the technical and financial resources to support advanced network exploitation and attack. The greatest cyber threat is posed by countries that continue to openly conduct computer network attacks and exploitations on American systems.

Terrorists show a growing understanding of the critical role that information technology plays in the day-to-day operations of our economy and national security. Their recruitment efforts have expanded to include young people studying mathematics, computer science and engineering in an effort to move from the limited physical attacks to attacks against our technical systems.

Fortunately, the large majority of hackers do not have the resources or motivation to attack the US critical information infrastructures. Most targets of the hacker are viewed as "challenges" to break into a system. These individuals do not introduce malicious code to the system but usually leave their "cyber signature." Although a nuisance, the single hacker does not pose a great threat; however, the increasing volume of hacking activity worldwide does inadvertently disrupt networks, including that of the U.S. information infrastructures. Hackers that plant malicious code or upload bots that are designed to steal information are the main threats in this group. These individuals have the ability to take down a system or steal trade secrets, either of which can be devastating to a company or agency.

The growing number of hackers motivated by money is a cause for concern. If this pool of talent is utilized by terrorists, foreign governments or criminal organizations, the potential for a successful cyber attack on our critical infrastructures is greatly increased.

To combat these and other cyber threats, the FBI established a national cyber program with a Cyber Division at FBI Headquarters and dedicated cyber squads in the field offices. The program enables us to coordinate and facilitate investigations of those federal criminal violations using the Internet, computer systems, or networks. It also helps us to build and maintain public/private alliances to maximize counterterrorism, counterintelligence, and law enforcement cyber response capabilities. We are also working to aggregate the technological and investigative expertise necessary to meet the challenges that lie ahead. We are recruiting and hiring individuals who possess degrees and experience in computer sciences, information systems, or related disciplines. We are looking for specialists who possess a bedrock of experience and a profound understanding of the cyber world.

Converging Criminal Threats

It is increasingly the case that counterterrorism, counterintelligence, cyber, and criminal investigations are interrelated. There are rarely clear dividing lines that distinguish terrorist, counterintelligence, and criminal activity. Recognizing this trend toward convergence, the first priority of the FBI's Criminal Investigative Program is to leverage criminal investigative resources to enhance the FBI's Counterterrorism, Counterintelligence and Cyber programs.

Terrorists use criminal enterprises and criminal activities to support and fund terrorist organizations. The FBI's criminal investigations of these crimes and criminal enterprises, often in task forces in conjunction with other federal, state, and local law enforcement, continue to develop invaluable intelligence, as well as to initiate investigations, which further identify the United States' vulnerability to attack and directly support the FBI's and the Intelligence Community's counterterrorism, counterintelligence, and cyber crime efforts.

One of the FBI's first investigations to utilize the material support of a terrorist organization statute evolved from a criminal investigation of Hizballah operators utilizing credit card scams, cigarette smuggling and loan fraud to support the purchase of dual use equipment for Hizballah procurement leaders in Lebanon. The FBI used the criminal RICO statute to fully neutralize this terrorist cell.

In combatting converging threats, the FBI's Criminal Program is placing greater emphasis on the collection, analysis, dissemination and effective use of intelligence, including intelligence derived from criminal investigations, including intelligence derived from human sources and the use of sophisticated investigative techniques. We are using intelligence to identify crime problems and trends, to conduct threat assessments, and to drive investigative efforts. Currently, we are aggressively pursuing intelligence collection and threat assessments on Organized Crime, Human Smuggling and Trafficking, Violent Gangs, Public Corruption, Civil Rights, and Middle Eastern Criminal Enterprises.

After CT, CI, and Cyber, the Criminal Investigative Program's other priorities in descending order are Criminal Intelligence, Public Corruption, Civil Rights, Violent Gangs, Criminal Enterprises, Corporate and Securities Fraud, Health Care Fraud, Mortgage Fraud, Major Financial Institution Fraud, and Crimes Against Children and other Violent Crimes.

Public Corruption

Public Corruption continues to pose the greatest threat to the integrity of all levels of government. Recent investigative efforts have been intensified to identify and convict Immigration, Department of State, and DMV officials illegally selling visas or other citizenship documents and drivers licenses to