[Page: H5814]
Mr. BEILENSON. Mr. Speaker, by direction of the Committee on Rules, I call up House Resolution 468 and ask for its immediate consideration.
The Clerk read the resolution, as follows:
[Page: H5815]
H. Res. 468
Resolved, That at any time after the adoption of this resolution the Speaker may, pursuant to clause 1(b) of rule XXIII, declare the House resolved into the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union for consideration of the bill (H.R. 4299) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1995 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes. The first reading of the bill shall be dispensed with. General debate shall be confined to the bill and shall not exceed one hour equally divided and controlled by the chairman and ranking minority member of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. After general debate the bill shall be considered for amendment under the five-minute rule. It shall be in order to consider as an original bill for the purpose of amendment under the five-minute rule the amendment in the nature of a substitute recommended by the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence now printed in the bill. The committee amendment in the nature of a substitute shall be considered by title rather than by section. Each title shall be considered as read. Points of order against the committee amendment in the nature of a substitute for failure to comply with clause 7 of rule XVI or clause 5(a) of rule XXI are waived. No amendment to the committee amendment in the nature of a substitute shall be in order unless printed in the portion of the Congressional Record designated for that purpose in clause 6 of rule XXIII before its consideration. At the conclusion of consideration of the bill for amendment the Committee shall rise and report the bill to the House with such amendments as may have been adopted. Any Member may demand a separate vote in the House on any amendment adopted in the Committee of the Whole to the bill or to the committee amendment in the nature of a substitute. The previous question shall be considered as ordered on the bill and amendments thereto to final passage without intervening motion except one motion to recommit with or without instructions.
[TIME: 1510]
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Serrano). The gentleman from California [Mr. Beilenson] is recognized for 1 hour.
Mr. BEILENSON. Mr. Speaker, for the purpose of debate only, I yield the customary one-half hour to the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Goss] pending which I yield myself such time as I may consume. During consideration of this resolution, all time yielded is for the purpose of debate only.
Mr. Speaker, House Resolution 468 is the rule providing for the consideration of H.R. 4299, the Intelligence Authorization Act for fiscal year 1995.
Mr. Speaker, this is an open rule providing 1 hour of general debate, equally divided and controlled by the chairman and ranking minority member of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
For the purpose of amendment, the rule makes in order the Intelligence Committee amendment in the nature of a substitute now printed in the bill as an original bill.
Under the rule, the bill shall be considered by title, with each title considered as read.
Clause 5(a) of rule XXI, prohibiting appropriations in a legislative bill, is waived against the committee substitute. The chairman of the Intelligence Committee requested this waiver for sections 601 (a) and (b) and 806(a), which give authority for the use of appropriated funds for purposes different than those for which they were appropriated and therefore may constitute a technical violation of the rule mentioned above.
In addition, the rule waives clause 7 of rule XVI, which prohibits nongermane amendments, against the committee substitute. The chairman of the committee requested this waiver of a point of order that might arise because the bill as introduced was narrow in focus and the amendment in the nature of a substitute is broader.
Mr. Speaker, the rule makes in order only those amendments printed in the Congressional Record prior to the consideration of the bill. The chairman of the Intelligence Committee based his request for this notification requirement on the need to recognize the sensitivity surrounding the components of the intelligence budget.
He testified that advance notification of amendments would give the committee a chance to help protect the security of sensitive information that could be affected by amendments modifying the authorization levels in the bill.
He asked also that the debate on such amendments be carefully structured to minimize the risk that classified information will be inadvertently disclosed, and testified that directing the debate away from classified matters can best be accomplished by an advance notification requirement.
Finally, Mr. Speaker, the rule provides one motion to recommit with or without instructions.
Mr. Speaker, H.R. 4299, the bill for which this rule provides reconsideration, authorizes funds for all the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States for the coming fiscal year. It also provides legislative authorities for the conduct of U.S. intelligence activities which are regularly found in an intelligence authorization bill.
The authorization levels in the bill are classified, but are available for review by Members. The amount authorized is 2.2 percent less than the President's budget request, but approximately 2.6 percent more than last year's appropriated level.
The bill contains several important provisions, some of which are in response to the Ames espionage case which caused so much concern to all of us who are interested in the successful operation of the CIA.
The bill also recognizes the necessity for the entire intelligence community to adjust to the post-cold war era. It is obvious that the intelligence agencies need to reexamine their overall roles and missions in that world and the committee has given the agencies guidance in this respect.
Mr. Speaker, the 1980's were a period of substantial growth in the budgets and personnel rolls of U.S. intelligence agencies. That growth was felt to be necessary to counter the national security threat posed by the Soviet Union.
With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the cold war, the primary focus of intelligence activities and the principal justification for the intelligence resource levels of the 1980's was eliminated. The intelligence community has been struggling since that time to define its mission and to properly size itself for the future.
In the last three authorization bills, the Intelligence Committee has attempted to make the intelligence budget reflect the reality of a world significantly changed from a national security standpoint, while ensuring that the United States maintains its ability to provide timely and reliable intelligence to its policymakers and military commanders. That approach is continued in this year's bill.
The committee is bringing the intelligence budget down, but in a measured way which preserves essential capabilities and encourages investment in the collection and processing systems which will be needed in the future. Personnel rolls are being trimmed as well and, as a result of actions mandated by Congress 2 years ago, by the end of fiscal year 1997, employment levels will be at least 17.5 percent less than they were in fiscal year 1992.
Despite the demise of the Soviet Union, the world clearly remains an unpredictable and dangerous place. There is need for effective intelligence, especially in light of the world-wide reduction of U.S. military personnel. That need, however, does not have to be met by an intelligence community of the size and orientation of its cold war predecessor.
The committee's bill continues to provide encouragement for intelligence agencies to review their operations, discarding those which are no longer necessary, while retaining those which remain important. Intelligence support to the military commander is emphasized. Special attention is placed as well on providing sufficient resources to respond to intelligence challenges on issues such as terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
Spending throughout the national security establishment has been reduced in recent years, and intelligence has been no exception. This was inevitable given the significant changes which have occurred in the world. It is the Intelligence Committee's judgment that neither the reductions made in past years, nor those contained in this year's bill, will hinder the ability of the intelligence agencies to respond to essential intelligence requirements.
Mr. Speaker, the Committee on Rules believes this is a good, a fair rule, and I urge my colleagues to approve it so that we may proceed with consideration of this important bill today.
[Page: H5816]
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
(Mr. GOSS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, it is remarkable, I think, having listened closely to my colleague from California, how much in agreement we are on this subject. I think that is a very encouraging sign. I think many of the remarks that I am about to make are going to seem very similar to the remarks the gentleman from California has made, and that pleases me because I think we are facing a challenge here.
Obviously, I am pleased to be able to support an open rule. I have no objection to the reasonable requirement included in this rule that amendments offered on the intelligence authorization be preprinted in the Record. I do not feel that way about preprinting for other bills, but intelligence is a little special because of its sensitivity and confidentiality and the need to not have surprises here on the floor. I think that is an entirely reasonable request and a legitimate one, given the importance of protecting classified information.
I very much doubt if any Member is going to mind the extra review of amendments to insure that national security is not compromised in the process of this bill. I think we all understand that the national security is very significant for us and, unfortunately, we have had incidents where it has been compromised in the past.
The rule also waives certain points of order against the committee substitute, supported by the chairman, Mr. Glickman, and our ranking member, Mr. Combest.
Given the complexity of the subject in front of us, I have no objection to the technical waivers that have been made. I certainly commend the gentleman from Kansas [Mr. Glickman] and the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Combest] for their work and their interest in having as open a debate as possible without jeopardizing national security. And again, I think the comments by my colleague from California underscore that we have had a good discussion in the Committee on Rules and we have come forward with a good product today to deal with this matter.
I am, however, deeply troubled by the trend that the bill itself perpetuates. For the past several years, resources devoted to intelligence gathering have been cut repeatedly.
[TIME: 1520]
The authorization levels in this bill are 16 percent below what they were in 1992, and total intelligence spending has declined by 20 percent since 1990. Looking against the national performance review standards, I understand the cuts are about double what the target was, done on a percentage basis, and the actual dollar amount is a significantly greater cut than was actually necessary or called for.
So, some real sacrifice has been made here, and I am wondering if maybe we have not gone too far. Some people might believe that we no longer have use for intelligence because the Soviet Union is not there anymore as a monolith and because the sweeping changes that have transformed Europe are all good. But, as we know, that simply is not the case. We have in some ways more challenges for good intelligence and for good information for our decisionmakers than we have ever had before. The recent crises in North Korea, Iraq, Bosnia, Haiti, and Somalia probably all underscore the dangers of attempting to navigate the volatile and uncertain waters of global politics without the best possible compass and
the most accurate and up-to-date charts. I do not think we should be fooled by those who say the storm is past and it is all smooth sailing ahead. I do not think anybody really believes that. We have seen what happens when decisionmakers operate without good information delivered in a timely and useful way.
In fact, Mr. Speaker, it was not that long ago that this Nation watched in some puzzlement and embarrassment as the U.S.S. Harlan County, loaded with American service people, retreated in haste from the docks of Haiti because a band of thugs were menacing them from the port. Where was the intelligence? Why did we not have better information available to our decisionmakers at the State Department and the Pentagon to make a better policy statement and figure that one out a little bit better?
And what about the potentially deadly game of hide and seek we are still playing with North Korea over the issue of nuclear weapons? Do we really have the necessary resources in place to develop good information about the capabilities and the motivation, the motivation of the North Koreans? Does anybody really understand Kim Jong-Il, what he stands for, and where he is going?
What about Africa? Recently we read two articles in the newspaper, the first outlining how the CIA is planning to scale back its operations there by closing 15 stations as a way to absorb budget cuts. Five days later another news article quotes President Clinton decrying the `pretty low' level of understanding Americans have about Africa. So, here we have the left hand reducing our ability to get good human intelligence, good human information in Africa, while the right hand is seeking to improve our understanding of that region. It seems a little curious. No wonder people are confused.
There are some in this Chamber who see no practical use for intelligence at all. Perhaps they have watched too many old cloak and dagger movies; I do not know. Perhaps they do not understand world affairs. But despite the undercurrent of animosity for covert operations and classified information, Mr. Speaker, America should be reminded that we have for decades been the beneficiaries of constant, consistent, accurate information that has made good intelligence. Picture a hidden hand guiding decisionmakers through crucial policy options and helping to
avoid potentially deadly and costly mistakes. Of course things do not always go smoothly, and we always read about the problems every time there is a high profile policy mistake or a security breach. Just about everybody hears about it, just as we have all heard about Aldrich Ames and should have heard about Aldrich Ames. There are those clamoring to excoriate our intelligence services as a result, but we must not give in to that temptation in my view.
Mr. Speaker, we hear about the mistakes and problems. We rarely hear about the averted crises and the success stories for obvious reasons. That is the nature of the intelligence business. Those of us who are charged with oversight responsibility must remember to make a fair judgment about how well the intelligence community is doing, realizing that we are never going to be able to have an even playing field to talk about the successes.
Of course, as one who worked in the intelligence community, I agree wholeheartedly that management reforms are needed. I will say that again. I do believe we need to get at this issue of reform, and I am glad for the resolve of the gentleman from Kansas [Mr. Glickman] in ensuring these matters are addressed, which was supported by the ranking member, the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Combest]. In that process I hope we will also make some necessary changes in the classification and declassification process to ensure that the guise of, quote, national security, unquote, is not used in vain, while guaranteeing truly sensitive material is, in fact, not compromised. This is a very difficult balancing act, but it is crucial to ensuring accurate information and the protection of the human component of intelligence gathering. The people who risk their lives to provide this service do not want to risk their lives in vain, and we owe them protection of that information.
Finally, Mr. Speaker, I once again call on my colleagues in the House to take the important step of requiring a secrecy oath for Members of Congress. Members are granted extraordinary access to classified material, very sensitive material I would add, and mountains of it. I hope it is understood that we have a responsibility to protect that information. Repeated, if isolated, leaks of substance from classified briefings to the front pages of morning newspapers suggest, perhaps, that some Members still do not understand our important responsibility in this area. So I will, once again, join the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Hyde], my friend, in offering an amendment to this bill to require that Members and staff seeking access to classified information sign a pledge that they will, not willfully disclose such material. I know that this will be seen as symbolic by some, but sometimes it is the symbolism that gets the point across, attracts people's attention, and ensures that they do the right thing.
[Page: H5817]
OPEN VERSUS RESTRICTIVE RULES 95TH-103D CONG.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Congress (years) Total rules granted 1 Open rules Restrictive rules
Number Percent 2 Number Percent 3
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
95th (1977-78) 211 179 85 32 15
96th (1979-80) 214 161 75 53 25
97th (1981-82) 120 90 75 30 25
98th (1983-84) 155 105 68 50 32
99th (1985-86) 115 65 57 50 43
100th (1987-88) 123 66 54 57 46
101st (1989-90) 104 47 45 57 55
102d (1991-92) 109 37 34 72 66
103d (1993-94) 75 17 23 58 77
[Footnote] 1 Total rules counted are all order of business resolutions reported from the Rules Committee which provide for the initial consideration of legislation, except rules on appropriations bills which only waive points of order. Original jurisdiction measures reported as privileged are also not counted.
[Footnote] 2 Open rules are those which permit any Member to offer any germane amendment to a measure so long as it is otherwise in compliance with the rules of the House. The parenthetical percentages are open rules as a percent of total rules granted.
[Footnote] 3 Restrictive rules are those which limit the number of amendments which can be offered, and include so-called modified open and modified closed rules, as well as completely closed rule, and rules providing for consideration in the House as opposed to the Committee of the Whole. The parenthetical percentages are restrictive rules as a percent of total rules granted.
[Footnote] Sources: `Rules Committee Calendars & Surveys of Activities,' 95th-102d Cong.; `Notices of Action Taken,' Committee on Rules, 103d Cong., through July 12, 1994.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
OPEN VERSUS RESTRICTIVE RULES: 103D CONG.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Rule number date reported Rule type Bill number and subject Amendments submitted Amendments allowed Disposition of rule and date
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
H. Res. 58, Feb. 2, 1993 MC H.R. 1: Family and medical leave 30 (D-5; R-25) 3 (D-0; R-3) PQ: 246-176. A: 259-164. (Feb. 3, 1993).
H. Res. 59, Feb. 3, 1993 MC H.R. 2: National Voter Registration Act 19 (D-1; R-18) 1 (D-0; R-1) PQ: 248-171. A: 249-170. (Feb. 4, 1993).
H. Res. 103, Feb. 23, 1993 C H.R. 920: Unemployment compensation 7 (D-2; R-5) 0 (D-0; R-0) PQ: 243-172. A: 237-178. (Feb. 24, 1993).
H. Res. 106, Mar. 2, 1993 MC H.R. 20: Hatch Act amendments 9 (D-1; R-8) 3 (D-0; R-3) PQ: 248-166. A: 249-163. (Mar. 3, 1993).
H. Res. 119, Mar. 9, 1993 MC H.R. 4: NIH Revitalization Act of 1993 13 (d-4; R-9) 8 (D-3; R-5) PQ: 247-170. A: 248-170. (Mar. 10, 1993).
H. Res. 132, Mar. 17, 1993 MC H.R. 1335: Emergency supplemental Appropriations 37 (D-8; R-29) 1(not submitted) (D-1; R-0) A: 240-185. (Mar. 18, 1993).
H. Res. 133, Mar. 17, 1993 MC H. Con. Res. 64: Budget resolution 14 (D-2; R-12) 4 (1-D not submitted) (D-2; R-2) PQ: 250-172. A: 251-172. (Mar. 18, 1993).
H. Res. 138, Mar. 23, 1993 MC H.R. 670: Family planning amendments 20 (D-8; R-12) 9 (D-4; R-5) PQ: 252-164. A: 247-169. (Mar. 24, 1993).
H. Res. 147, Mar. 31, 1993 C H.R. 1430: Increase Public debt limit 6 (D-1; R-5) 0 (D-0; R-0) PQ: 244-168. A: 242-170. (Apr. 1, 1993).
H. Res. 149 Apr. 1, 1993 MC H.R. 1578: Expedited Rescission Act of 1993 8 (D-1; R-7) 3 (D-1; R-2) A: 212-208. (Apr. 28, 1993).
H. Res. 164, May 4, 1993 O H.R. 820: Nate Competitiveness Act NA NA A: Voice Vote. (May 5, 1993).
H. Res. 171, May 18, 1993 O H.R. 873: Gallatin Range Act of 1993 NA NA A: Voice Vote. (May 20, 1993).
H. Res. 172, May 18, 1993 O H.R. 1159: Passenger Vessel Safety Act NA NA A: 308-0 (May 24, 1993).
H. Res. 173 May 18, 1993 MC S.J. Res. 45: United States forces in Somalia 6 (D-1; R-5) 6 (D-1; R-5) A: Voice Vote (May 20, 1993)
H. Res. 183, May 25, 1993 O H.R. 2244: 2d supplemental appropriations NA NA A: 251-174. (May 26, 1993).
H. Res. 186, May 27, 1993 MC H.R. 2264: Omnibus budget reconciliation 51 (D-19; R-32) 8 (D-7; R-1) PQ: 252-178. A: 236-194 (May 27, 1993).
H. Res. 192, June 9, 1993 MC H.R. 2348: Legislative branch appropriations 50 (D-6; R-44) 6 (D-3; R-3) PQ: 240-177. A: 226-185. (June 10, 1993).
H. Res. 193, June 10, 1993 O H.R. 2200: NASA authorization NA NA A: Voice Vote. (June 14, 1993).
H. Res. 195, June 14, 1993 MC H.R. 5: Striker replacement 7 (D-4; R-3) 2 (D-1; R-1) A: 244-176.. (June 15, 1993).
H. Res. 197, June 15, 1993 MO H.R. 2333: State Department. H.R. 2404: Foreign aid 53 (D-20; R-33) 27 (D-12; R-15) A: 294-129. (June 16, 1993).
H. Res. 199, June 16, 1993 C H.R. 1876: Ext. of `Fast Track' NA NA A: Voice Vote. (June 22, 1993).
H. Res. 200, June 16, 1993 MC H.R. 2295: Foreign operations appropriations 33 (D-11; R-22) 5 (D-1; R-4) A: 263-160. (June 17, 1993).
H. Res. 201, June 17, 1993 O H.R. 2403: Treasury-postal appropriations NA NA A: Voice Vote. (June 17, 1993).
H. Res. 203, June 22, 1993 MO H.R. 2445: Energy and Water appropriations NA NA A: Voice Vote. (June 23, 1993).
H. Res. 206, June 23, 1993 O H.R. 2150: Coast Guard authorization NA NA A: 401-0. (July 30, 1993).
H. Res. 217, July 14, 1993 MO H.R. 2010: National Service Trust Act NA NA A: 261-164. (July 21, 1993).
H. Res. 220, July 21, 1993 MC H.R. 2667: Disaster assistance supplemental 14 (D-8; R-6) 2 (D-2; R-0) PQ: 245-178. F: 205-216. (July 22, 1993).
H. Res. 226, July 23, 1993 MC H.R. 2667: Disaster assistance supplemental 15 (D-8; R-7) 2 (D-2; R-0) A: 224-205. (July 27, 1993).
H. Res. 229, July 28, 1993 MO H.R. 2330: Intelligence Authority Act, fiscal year 1994 NA NA A: Voice Vote. (Aug. 3, 1993).
H. Res. 230, July 28, 1993 O H.R. 1964: Maritime Administration authority NA NA A: Voice Vote. (July 29, 1993).
H. Res. 246, Aug. 6, 1993 MO H.R. 2401: National Defense authority 149 (D-109; R-40) A: 246-172. (Sept. 8, 1993).
H. Res. 248, Sept. 9, 1993 MO H.R. 2401: National defense authorization PQ: 237-169. A: 234-169. (Sept. 13, 1993).
H. Res. 250, Sept. 13, 1993 MC H.R. 1340: RTC Completion Act 12 (D-3; R-9) 1 (D-1; R-0) A: 213-191-1. (Sept. 14, 1993).
H. Res. 254, Sept. 22, 1993 MO H.R. 2401: National Defense authorization 91 (D-67; R-24) A: 241-182. (Sept. 28, 1993).
H. Res. 262, Sept. 28, 1993 O H.R. 1845: National Biological Survey Act NA NA A: 238-188 (10/06/93).
H. Res. 264, Sept. 28, 1993 MC H.R. 2351: Arts, humanities, museums 7 (D-0; R-7) 3 (D-0; R-3) PQ: 240-185. A: 225-195. (Oct. 14, 1993).
H. Res. 265, Sept. 29, 1993 MC H.R. 3167: Unemployment compensation amendments 3 (D-1; R-2) 2 (D-1; R-1) A: 239-150. (Oct. 15, 1993).
H. Res. 269, Oct. 6, 1993 MO H.R. 2739: Aviation infrastructure investment N/A N/A A: Voice Vote. (Oct. 7, 1993).
H. Res. 273, Oct. 12, 1993 MC H.R. 3167: Unemployment compensation amendments 3 (D-1; R-2) 2 (D-1; R-1) PQ: 235-187. F: 149-254. (Oct. 14, 1993).
H. Res. 274, Oct. 12, 1993 MC H.R. 1804: Goals 2000 Educate America Act 15 (D-7; R-7; I-1) 10 (D-7; R-3) A: Voice Vote. (Oct. 13, 1993).
H. Res. 282, Oct. 20, 1993 C H.J. Res. 281: Continuing appropriations through Oct. 28, 1993 N/A N/A A: Voice Vote. (Oct. 21, 1993).
H. Res. 286, Oct. 27, 1993 O H.R. 334: Lumbee Recognition Act N/A N/A A: Voice Vote. (Oct. 28, 1993).
H. Res. 287, Oct. 27, 1993 C H.J. Res. 283: Continuing appropriations resolution 1 (D-0; R-0) 0 A: 252-170. (Oct. 28, 1993).
H. Res. 289, Oct. 28, 1993 O H.R. 2151: Maritime Security Act of 1993 N/A N/A A: Voice Vote. (Nov. 3, 1993).
H. Res. 293, Nov. 4, 1993 MC H. Con. Res. 170: Troop withdrawal Somalia N/A N/A A: 390-8. (Nov. 8, 1993).
H. Res. 299, Nov. 8, 1993 MO H.R. 1036: Employee Retirement Act-1993 2 (D-1; R-1) N/A A: Voice Vote. (Nov. 9, 1993).
H. Res. 302, Nov. 9, 1993 MC H.R. 1025: Brady handgun bill 17 (D-6; R-11) 4 (D-1; R-3) A: 238-182. (Nov. 10, 1993).
H. Res. 303, Nov. 9, 1993 O H.R. 322: Mineral exploration N/A N/A A: Voice Vote. (Nov. 16, 1993).
H. Res. 304, Nov. 9, 1993 C H.J. Res. 288: Further CR, FY 1994 N/A N/A
H. Res. 312, Nov. 17, 1993 MC H.R. 3425: EPA Cabinet Status 27 (D-8; R-19) 9 (D-1; R-8) F: 191-227. (Feb. 2, 1994).
H. Res. 313, Nov. 17, 1993 MC H.R. 796: Freedom Access to Clinics 15 (D-9; R-6) 4 (D-1; R-3) A: 233-192. (Nov. 18, 1993).
H. Res. 314, Nov. 17, 1993 MC H.R. 3351: Alt Methods Young Offenders 21 (D-7; R-14) 6 (D-3; R-3) A: 238-179. (Nov. 19, 1993).
H. Res. 316, Nov. 19, 1993 C H.R. 51: D.C. statehood bill 1 (D-1; R-0) N/A A: 252-172. (Nov. 20, 1993).
H. Res. 319, Nov. 20, 1993 MC H.R. 3: Campaign Finance Reform 35 (D-6; R-29) 1 (D-0; R-1) A: 220-207. (Nov. 21, 1993).
H. Res. 320, Nov. 20, 1993 MC H.R. 3400: Reinventing Government 34 (D-15; R-19) 3 (D-3; R-0) A: 247-183. (Nov. 22, 1993).
H. Res. 336, Feb. 2, 1994 MC H.R. 3759: Emergency Supplemental Appropriations 14 (D-8; R-5; I-1) 5 (D-3; R-2) PQ: 244-168. A: 342-65. (Feb. 3, 1994).
H. Res. 352, Feb. 8, 1994 MC H.R. 811: Independent Counsel Act 27 (D-8; R-19) 10 (D-4; R-6) PQ: 249-174. A: 242-174. (Feb. 9, 1994).
H. Res. 357, Feb. 9, 1994 MC H.R. 3345: Federal Workforce Restructuring 3 (D-2; R-1) 2 (D-2; R-0) A: VV (Feb. 10, 1994).
H. Res. 366, Feb. 23, 1994 MO H.R. 6: Improving America's Schools NA NA A: VV (Feb. 24, 1994).
H. Res. 384, Mar. 9, 1994 MC H. Con. Res. 218: Budget Resolution FY 1995-99 14 (D-5; R-9) 5 (D-3; R-2) A: 245-171 (Mar. 10, 1994).
H. Res. 401, Apr. 12, 1994 MO H.R. 4092: Violent Crime Control 180 (D-98; R-82) 68 (D-47; R-21) A: 244-176 (Apr. 13, 1994).
H. Res. 410, Apr. 21, 1994 MO H.R. 3221: Iraqi Claims Act N/A N/A A: Voice Vote (Apr. 28, 1994).
H. Res. 414, Apr. 28, 1994 O H.R. 3254: NSF Auth. Act N/A N/A A: Voice Vote (May 3, 1994).
H. Res. 416, May 4, 1994 C H.R. 4296: Assault Weapons Ban Act 7 (D-5; R-2) 0 (D-0; R-0) A: 220-209 (May 5, 1994).
H. Res. 420, May 5, 1994 O H.R. 2442: EDA Reauthorization N/A N/A A: Voice Vote (May 10, 1994).
H. Res. 422, May 11, 1994 MO H.R. 518: California Desert Protection N/A N/A PQ: 245-172 A: 248-165 (May 17, 1994).
H. Res. 423, May 11, 1994 O H.R. 2473: Montana Wilderness Act N/A N/A A: Voice Vote (May 12, 1994).
H. Res. 428, May 17, 1994 MO H.R. 2108: Black Lung Benefits Act 4 (D-1; R-3) N/A A: VV (May 19, 1994).
H. Res. 429, May 17, 1994 MO H.R. 4301: Defense Auth., FY 1995 173 (D-115; R-58) A: 369-49 (May 18, 1994).
H. Res. 431, May 20, 1994 MO H.R. 4301: Defense Auth., FY 1995 100 (D-80; R-20) A: Voice Vote (May 23, 1994).
H. Res. 440, May 24, 1994 MC H.R. 4385: Natl Hiway System Designation 16 (D-10; R-6) 5 (D-5; R-0) A: Voice Vote (May 25, 1994).
H. Res. 443, May 25, 1994 MC H.R. 4426: For. Ops. Approps, FY 1995 39 (D-11; R-28) 8 (D-3; R-5) PQ: 233-191 A: 244-181 (May 25, 1994).
H. Res. 444, May 25, 1994 MC H.R. 4454: Leg Branch Approp, FY 1995 43 (D-10; R-33) 12 (D-8; R-4) A: 249-177 (May 26, 1994).
H. Res. 447, June 8, 1994 O H.R. 4539: Treasury/Postal Approps 1995 N/A N/A A: 236-177 (June 9, 1994).
H. Res. 467, June 28, 1994 MC H.R. 4600: Expedited Rescissions Act N/A N/A
H. Res. 468, June 28, 1994 MO H.R. 4299: Intelligence Auth., FY 1995 N/A N/A
H. Res. 474, July 12, 1994 MO H.R. 3937: Export Admin. Act of 1994 N/A
H. Res. 475, July 12, 1994 O H.R. 1188: Anti. Redlining in Ins N/A
[Footnote] Note: Code: C-Closed; MC-Modified closed; MO-Modified open; O-Open; D-Democrat; R-Republican; PQ: Previous question; A-Adopted; F-Failed.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Utah [Mr. Hansen], a member of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
[Page: H5818]
Mr. HANSEN. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of this rule. I want to comment Chairman Glickman and my colleague, Mr. Combest, for their leadership. We worked well in this committee this year. When disputes arose, they were quickly settled with the result being a bipartisan bill that we can all support.
As a member of both the Intelligence and Armed Services Committees, I have closely followed a number of controversial crossover issues, the most significant being intelligence support for Department of Defense drug interdiction operations. I remain very concerned that there is no one in charge of supply reduction efforts. The Defense Department has unilaterally picked a fight with the Governments of Peru and Colombia by ceasing to pass radar tracking data to these Governments that would facilitate the force-down of narcotics trafficker aircraft. At the same time that the Defense Department was driving a wedge between Peru and Colombia and our Government, it was requesting more money for radar programs in Latin America. This mismanagement has a direct impact on Americans at home because cocaine destined for the United States that would otherwise have been interdicted is now freely moving from Peru to Colombia. I have received assurances that the administration has focused on this problem and hopes to have it resolved soon. They should have thought about this before they reversed a long held policy on force-downs without prior consultation with other affected Federal agencies.
The problem I have described with the drug war is symptomatic of a larger problem: Lack of policy direction that will permit the intelligence community to efficiently allocate scarce collection assets. This has been clear throughout the year as we looked to the administration for a clear statement of its global priorities, which can best be described as constantly in flux. Barring such a vision, we will be forced to continue to provide direction. This is both unfortunate and unnecessary. Eighteen months into the Clinton administration is far too long to wait for a clear sense of policy direction. Mr. Speaker, I hope they do better next year.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the distinguished gentleman from Texas [Mr. Combest], the ranking member of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
Mr. COMBEST. Mr. Speaker, I appreciate the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Goss] yielding this time to me. And to the gentleman from California and the gentleman from Florida I simply want to say I appreciate very much the cooperation of the Committee on Rules in granting this rule that allows a full and open debate, allows any amendments that wish to come up under the preprinted rule. And I strongly support it and would urge passage of the rule.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I have no further requests for time and am prepared to yield back the balance of my time, if I can be assured by my colleague that he has no further requests.
Mr. BEILENSON. Mr. Speaker, I have no further requests for time.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. BEILENSON. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.
In closing, Mr. Speaker, this is an open rule. The only way it could otherwise be characterized is because of the preprinting requirement, but because of the problems associated, or potential problems associated, with national security interests, that is, we believe it a reasonable requirement, one that was agreed to by the minority on the Committee on Rules.
[TIME: 1530]
The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence we believe has brought us a good bill which can be fully debated under this rule. I urge my colleagues to vote for this rule.
Mr. Speaker, I have no further requests for time, I yield back the balance of my time, and I move the previous question on the resolution.
The previous question was ordered.
The resolution was agreed to.
A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. (Mr. Serrano). Pursuant to House Resolution 468 and rule XXIII, the Chair declares the House in the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill, H.R. 4299.
The Chair designates the gentlewoman from New York [Ms. Slaughter] Chairman of the Committee of the Whole, and requests the gentlewoman from Hawaii [Mrs. Mink] to assume the chair temporarily.
[TIME: 1531]
IN THE COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE
Accordingly, the House resolved itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill (H.R. 4299) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1995 for intelligence, and intelligence-related activities of the U.S. Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes, with Mrs. Mink of Hawaii (Chairman pro tempore) in the chair.
The Clerk read the title of the bill.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the bill is considered as having been read the first time.
Under the rule, the gentleman from Kansas [Mr. Glickman] will be recognized for 30 minutes, and the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Combest] will be recognized for 30 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Kansas [Mr. Glickman].
Mr. GLICKMAN. Madam Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Madam Chairman, at the outset I want to compliment the committee's ranking Republican member, Larry Combest, for the leadership he provided in fashioning this legislation. We have not agreed on every issue, and I know he has reservations about the funding levels in the bill, but we worked together in a cooperative spirit to produce a measure which the committee could support.
The bill before the House authorizes the funds for fiscal year 1995 for all of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the U.S. Government. The intelligence budget is comprised chiefly of two parts, the National Foreign Intelligence Program [NFIP] and the Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities [TIARA] Program. The NFIP includes those activities involved in the provision of intelligence to national policymakers and includes programs administered by agencies like the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and the Defense Intelligence Agency.
Tactical intelligence programs reside solely within the Department of Defense and are primarily, although not exclusively, concerned with the provision of intelligence to military commanders. There is not always a clear distinction between national and tactical programs and the Intelligence Committee has jurisdiction over the budgets of both. In our review of the funding requests for intelligence activities of particular concern to the Armed Services Committee and I want to acknowledge the assistance provided to us by Chairman Dellums, the members of his committee, and the committee staff.
Since so much of the Intelligence Committee's work deals with classified information, it is not possible to discuss the contents of the bill publicly except in broad terms. I am aware that this situation is frustrating to many Members and when we reach the amendments
phase of these proceedings, Bob Torricelli and I will offer an amendment which would bring a degree of openness to the consideration of the intelligence budget. Our amendment will require that, beginning with the submission of the budget for fiscal year 1996, the aggregate amount of money spent on, and requested for, intelligence will have to be disclosed.
Although their funding levels are not public, all of the programs and activities authorized by H.R. 4299 are, however, set forth in a classified schedule of authorizations which is incorporated into the bill by reference, and discussed in detail in a classified annex to the committee's report. These documents have been available for review by Members since June 10. I urge Members who have not yet done so to visit the committee's office, room H-405 in the Capitol, and familiarize themselves with these materials.
This is the third consecutive year in which the committee has reported an authorization which is below both the President's request and the amount authorized the year before. The congressional intelligence committees, much more so than the agencies they oversee, have been the agents for change in the intelligence community. Responding to the end of the cold war, it was the committees that mandated a 17.5-percent reduction in personnel to be accomplished by fiscal year 1997, and cuts in spending which have amounted to approximately 7 percent in the aggregate over the last 3 years. We have taken these actions largely as a result of a conviction that with the changes in the world arising from the demise of the Soviet Union, some alteration in the size of the intelligence community, which after all had been created to respond to the national security threat posed by the Soviets, was required.
The committee has been frustrated, however, by the inability of either this administration or its predecessor to articulate a clear vision of what the intelligence community should be doing in the post-cold-war world. Without that vision, and a well-defined implementation plan, it is difficult for the committee to effectively assess resource needs. Budget reductions are a blunt instrument for producing change in either the direction or method of operation of any agency or department of Government. Budget cuts must be reacted to, but those reactions do not always produce the efficiencies which might have resulted if the savings had been the end result of change, and not its cause. Thus far, however, the intelligence community's response has been primarily to react to the budget initiatives of Congress rather than looking to the future, attempting to define its role in it and matching its budget needs to that future role.
That is not to say that the maintenance of an effective intelligence capability will not continue to be necessary or that its maintenance will not be expensive. The world will remain an unpredictable place and intelligence will continue to be the insurance policy which will hopefully enable our leaders to deal with crises and conflicts in ways which reduce the risk to American interests and American lives. I believe, however, that the premium on that insurance should be going down because, as dangerous as the world may be, it is quite simply not as dangerous as it was when we had an enemy of the dimensions of the Soviet Union.
The committee's actions to refocus intelligence spending and activities are of necessity ad hoc. They cannot be expected to substitute for strategic planning by the executive branch. We need a strategic plan for intelligence and it is my judgment that the individuals from outside of Government need to be involved in its formulation. The planning effort must be undertaken promptly and completed expeditiously. We cannot afford another budget cycle in which the committee trims the request because of a gut feeling that it is too high.
The committee needs to be able to judge the budget by how well it allocates resources to priority intelligence activities. The identification of priorities has not been done clearly and the resulting impression is that the intelligence community is trying to do most of what it did during the cold war, in the same way as it did in the cold
war, and that is difficult because there are fewer resources. In the committee's judgment, there are intelligence priorities. They include countering the threats posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, international terrorists, and narcotics traffickers, and ensuring that our military commanders, no mater where they are deployed, have timely access to intelligence collected by national and tactical systems. These activities need to be emphasized and if that requires terminating some things which are no longer necessary because of changes in the world, that has to be done--and much more quickly than it has thus far. That is why a strategic plan is so important.
The fiscal year 1995 budget submission requested an increase in the NFIP, a cut in TIARA, and marginal growth when the two were combined. The committee's recommendation cancels almost all of the requested increase in the national programs, deepens the reduction in the tactical programs, resulting in an authorization below the request and below the amount appropriated in fiscal year 1994. I recognize that it will be argued by some that we did not cut enough and by others that we cut too much. We are proceeding cautiously, for the reasons I have already stated. In reducing spending and personnel, our goal has been twofold. First, we have tried to keep the pressure on the intelligence community to reorient itself, a process which takes time especially when it involves systems which are complex and expensive. Second, we have sought to avoid creating gaps in intelligence coverage by a too rapid reduction in resources. We are walking a fine line in a difficult area and while I do not believe that the committee's recommendations will cause any diminishing of essential capabilities, I am concerned that substantial additional reductions would have that result. I urge the House to reject amendments which would require such reductions.
In addition to the budget recommendations, the bill contains a number of legislative proposals which will be explained in detail by the chairman of our subcommittee on legislation, Mr. Coleman. Some of these proposals involve matters within the jurisdiction of other committees and I want to acknowledge the assistance we have received from those committees in moving this legislation forward. At this point in the Record, I would like to insert an exchange of letters between Chairman Ford of the Committee on Education and Labor and myself on one such proposal.
Among the legislative recommendations in H.R. 4299 are several which comprise the committee's initial responses to the Ames espionage case. While these recommendations should be of help in deterring espionage, the Ames case was not caused by deficiencies in the law. The committee has an inquiry underway to help determine why a CIA employee could conduct espionage for 9 years, from different CIA posts in the United States and abroad, under the noses of his supervisors and coworkers, without detection. I am concerned that the Ames case reflected the continuation of a problem that the committee publicly identified in 1986 and 1987--counterintelligence has not been a high enough priority of senior management at the CIA or elsewhere in the intelligence community. Until protecting our secrets becomes as important to management as acquiring the secrets of other countries, we will continue to court disaster. No amount of legislation will correct the problems which allowed Mr. Ames to operate successfully for so long. They will be remedied only by a heightened emphasis on counterintelligence by top management and closer coordination of counterintelligence activities between intelligence and law enforcement agencies.
Madam Chairman, I urge the House to endorse the committee's judgments as
reflected in H.R. 4299. Those judgments reflect a balancing of interests but
I believe the bill makes progress in encouraging the community to invest in
its future rather than cling to its past.
PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE
On Intelligence,
Washington, DC, July 12, 1994.
Hon. William D. Ford,
Chairman, Committee on Education and Labor, Rayburn House Office
Building, Washington, DC.
[Page: H5819]
Dear Mr. Chairman: Thank you for your letter of July 12, 1994 concerning section 501 of H.R. 4299, the fiscal year 1995 intelligence authorization bill.
As noted in your letter, section 501 amends a number of statutes to enable the Secretary of Defense to manage the civilian employees of the Central Imagery Office in the same personnel system as exists for comparable employees of the Defense Intelligence Agency. One of these statutes, the Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988, is within the jurisdiction of the Committee on Education and Labor pursuant to Rule X of the Rules of the House of Representatives.
The Intelligence Committee appreciates your willingness not to seek the referral of H.R. 4299 to which your committee would have been entitled on the basis of its jurisdiction over section 501. Your decision has facilitated the floor consideration of H.R. 4299.
Sincerely,
Dan Glickman,
Chairman.
Committee on Education and Labor,
Washington, DC, July 12, 1994.
Chairman, Hon. Dan Glickman,
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.
[Page: H5820]
Dear Mr. Chairman: This week the House of Representatives will consider H.R. 4299, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995. Section 501 of the proposed legislation provides the Secretary of Defense with the statutory authority to manage the civilian employees of the Central Imagery Office in the same personnel system as the one which exists for comparable employees of the Defense Intelligence Agency. This section modifies a whole range of statutes to ensure that employees of the Central Imagery Office are subject to the same statutory provisions as employees of the Defense Intelligence Agency.
One provision of Section 501 amends the Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988 to include employees of the Central Imagery Office in the same stautory exemption as the Defense Intelligence Agency.
The Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988 is a statute within the Rule X jurisdiction of this Committee. The Committee does not oppose the amendment proposed in H.R. 4299 and sees no need to take action upon the bill. Our decision to forego action, however, should not be construed as a waiver of the Committee's Rule X jurisdiction. We would appreciate it if this letter and your response could be printed in the Congressional Record with the debate on H.R. 4299.
With kind regards,
Sincerely,
William D. Ford,
Chairman.
[TIME: 1540]
Madam Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. COMBEST. Madam Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
(Mr. COMBEST asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)
Mr. COMBEST. Madam Chairman, as the ranking Republican member of the Intelligence Committee, let me first express my appreciation to my colleague from Kansas, Chairman Glickman, for his hard work in leading our committee through some extremely difficult deliberations. The pressure to continue cutting when common sense dictates it should cease has made preparation of the authorization bill for intelligence more difficult in each of my 6 years on this committee.
H.R. 4299 is not the bill that I or my Republican colleagues would have written. I strongly urge anyone who is concerned with this country's security to read the minority views to the unclassified report, where we discuss at some length our philosophic and practical dissent from some key elements of the authorization report. Realistically, though, we stand united in supporting the bill as the best compromise we can reach at present. I say this in the full expectation that we will in conference, on a bipartisan basis, seek compromise positions which will lessen our concern that this bill endangers some critically important and fragile intelligence capabilities, such as in the area of human intelligence.
The committee is responsible for examining, evaluating, and funding intelligence capabilities and activities, the specifics of which are largely and necessarily unknown to the public. When Congress makes an unwise cut to public works or education, the taxpayer sees the bridge left half built and the school left unfurnished. But, when we cut intelligence the taxpayer sees nothing. If we decide to gamble with public safety by cutting money for law enforcement, the public sees the results and can draw the right conclusions. But, when we gamble with national security by cutting intelligence programs the taxpayer is unaware how we may be risking his and his family's well-being. We cannot disclose publicly the extent and nature of those risks, because that would tip off those in our unsettled and dangerous world who wish us harm about where our intelligence capabilities are thinnest. In practice this often means that we will not face full public accountability until our gambles result in an open disaster.
Frankly the short-term odds are with the Members of this House who press for such irresponsible continuing cuts. After all, those who opposed strong defenses in the years before World War II could claim to be demonstrably right year after year after year. In the gamble of national preparedness they rolled straight sevens and saved the taxpayers billions of dollars--right up until December 1941 and the debacle of Pearl Harbor. Some people refuse to learn from history, but what was true then is true now: Responsible leaders of this country must fight against the short-sighted tendency to think we can safely cut corners in intelligence and national security. Those savings will be lost inevitably many times over, and they will be paid back not only in dollars but in lives. With important national security interests at stake, we must be more cautious about these continuing cuts to intelligence. We cannot afford to search for some illusory right level of intelligence resources by making cuts we later find to our regret are too deep and then working backward to restore lost capabilities.
Madam Chairman, I am not now talking about history, though. Neither am I talking about some sort of hypothetical point of decision off in the future. I am talking about this year, this budget, and what we do about it today. For, in the area of intelligence, push has come to shove. In all but one of my 6 years on this committee we have turned out an authorization bill showing cuts to intelligence in real terms. We have probed, examined, and x rayed the intelligence budget
from every angle. We have torn it down and rebuilt it. We have cut and pared and sliced away at fat. We are now cutting away muscle and sinew. Savings can now be measured only in risks taken.
There is no shortage of facts and figures I can cite to demonstrate the rather remarkable, indeed reckless, slope of decline on which we have put the intelligence community. Despite a consensus of informed opinion that intelligence cuts should be avoided or at least minimized in a period when we are cutting our defense capabilities, we are again this year cutting intelligence more than defense at large. It is downsizing at a rate twice that recommended by the President's National Performance Review for the Government. President Clinton made a campaign promise in 1992 to cut the Bush administration's proposed intelligence budget over a 5-year period by $7 billion. This was an incredibly ambitious--and many would say a foolhardy--goal. Yet, as Director Woolsey has stated publicly, this has been accomplished with 2 years to spare, and it appears the cuts over the 5 years will likely be more than $14 billion. This irrational urge to keep cutting intelligence has taken on a life of its own and it will, unless stopped, inevitably lead to disaster.
Madam Chairman, I have not talked today on the continuing need for intelligence. I did so last year at some length and, I imagine, several of our committee colleagues will discuss it some more. I will only observe that it takes an incredibly naive person to argue that the current world situation is such that our country does not have a pressing need to know the behind-the-scenes realities of: the capabilities and intentions of well-armed hostile states, terrorist organizations, weapons proliferators, and unfair trade competitors worldwide.
In 1944 Secretary of State Edward Stettinius, in his political innocence, convinced President Roosevelt to have Gen. William Donovan of the CIA's predecessor, the Office of Strategic Services, return to the Soviet Union a captured copy of a code book used by the Soviet intelligence services. He did, and the Soviets promptly changed their codes. A chance to follow Soviet intelligence activities in the United States and worldwide was thrown away. Fortunately, Donovan returned the code book only after making a copy--a copy which U.S. intelligence used a few years later, when political leadership was wiser to decrypt Soviet intercepts from before 1945. These messages allowed the United States to wrap up numerous Soviet agents who were still active in the United States. Those who now seek to limit intelligence capabilities are far more short-sighted, naive, and downright foolish than Secretary Stettinius. What Stettinius did was only to limit the benefit of good intelligence work. Those who cut crucial intelligence resources now are, effectively speaking, keeping the code books of today's enemies from ever reaching our hands in the first place.
I urge the House to pass this authorization without further cuts and the even greater risks to our national security interests which further cuts would entail.
I feel I should also take this occasion to comment on the Ames espionage case and the reforms that are under consideration in its wake.
First of all, reform of intelligence and counter-intelligence should not be of the ready-fire-then-aim sort.
While the Intelligence Committees have been considering various options for change, the DCI has refrained from making quick fixes and opted--I think wisely--to wait until he began getting in the results of several external and internal investigations and task forces to propose his remedies. He has taken very careful aim because he wants to fix what is broken without destroying an extraordinarily important and, despite Ames, a highly successful element of the intelligence community--the CIA's clandestine Operations Directorate.
Last week the DCI gave us on the Intelligence Committee his initial read-out of what sorts of changes he envisions. An unclassified version of that talk was given yesterday to the Center for Strategic and International Security. In it he announced `a comprehensive overhaul of a number of key structures, programs, and procedures.' It was a speech which, in the words of the New York Times, was unprecedented: `no other sitting Director of Central Intelligence has offered a public critique quite as pointed as Mr. Woolsey's.' And, as Mr. Woolsey told our committee, this is just the beginning.
I am very much encouraged by the direction the DCI is moving. He has not been misled by the distracting hue-and-cry of those claiming the main scandal is in the longevity of Ame's treachery. Parenthetically, I would note that the two potentially most damaging cold war spy cases, the Whitworth/Walker case in the Navy and the Conrad case in the Army--either one of which could have resulted in hundreds of thousands of U.S. dead if not outright U.S. military defeat in war--went on for 18 and over 12 years, respectively. While identifying factors which hamstrung the CIA and FBI efforts over 8 years to identify the spy responsible for the 1985-86 intelligence compromises, the DCI has rightly focused in on the system which allowed Rick Ames access to so many of the CIA crown jewels to begin with. This is a much more difficult problem and he is to be lauded for attacking it head-on.
Our committee, you can be sure, will be watching these developments closely. The DCI has promised he will consult with us at every step of the way. This is exactly as it should be. We are not content, however, to sit by and be consulted. We are ourselves delving into the details of Ames' espionage activities and all aspects of U.S. intelligence and counterintelligence relevant to it. It is in the interest of every member of our committee--indeed, of the American people--that we minimize the possibility of there being a repetition of Ames' treachery while maximizing the efficiency and effectiveness of the U.S. intelligence community.
[Page: H5821]
[TIME: 1550]
Madam Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. GLICKMAN. Madam Chairman, I yield 9 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Texas [Mr. Coleman], chairman of the Subcommittee on Legislation of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
(Mr. COLEMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)
Mr. COLEMAN. Madam Chairman, I rise in support of H.R. 4299, the Intelligence Authorization Act for fiscal year 1995. As chairman of the Legislation Subcommittee, I feel we have produced a good bill that makes responsible reductions in the intelligence community's budget request while maintaining essential capabilities. In the budget area, we have continued to put pressure on the community to develop innovative, cost-effective solutions to meeting the challenges of the future. More needs to be done, but progress is being made.
On the legislative side, H.R. 4299 contains a large number of substantive proposals, which I would like to summarize briefly:
Section 401 deletes certain archaic provisions of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 to ensure CIA's alcohol rehabilitation program is not seen as inconsistent with the Agency's statutory authorities.
Section 501 provides the Secretary of Defense the statutory authorities to manage civilian employees of the Central Imagery Office [CIO] in the same personnel system as exists for civilian employees of the Defense Intelligence Agency. Providing these authorities to the Secretary of Defense should ensure there is no separate administrative structure created for the smaller CIO.
Section 502 clarifies that the notice requirements of the Privacy Act of 1974 do not apply to Department of Defense [DOD] intelligence officers conducting, outside the United States, an initial assessment contact of a U.S. person as a possible source of foreign intelligence. Section 502 is intended to permit a DOD intelligence officer one opportunity for a face-to-face meeting with the potential source without having to inform the U.S. person of the officer's affiliation with the U.S. Government.
The committee was not convinced that the notice requirements of the Privacy Act were intended to apply to situations covered by the bill, but recognized that the Department of Defense had legitimate grounds for requesting an exemption, in light of the civil penalties that attach to violations. In addition, the committee was concerned about the safety overseas of U.S. intelligence officers and U.S. persons being assessed.
The committee intends that the Privacy Act exemption contained in the bill be construed in such a way as to minimize intrusion on the privacy of the potential U.S. person. The committee believes that no personal information solicited from an individual during the initial assessment contact should be retained in a U.S. Government system of records if the individual is not informed of the intelligence officer's governmental affiliation. Furthermore, the committee expects that under no circumstances should a potential U.S. person be requested or utilized in any fashion to undertake any intelligence activity by defense intelligence officers unless the potential U.S. person is made witting that he or she is acting on behalf of the U.S. Government regardless of the status of the initial assessment contact.
Section 601 of H.R. 4299 establishes independent statutory inspectors general [IG's] for the Defense Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency. These IG's would be appointed by the directors of the respective agencies, and would not be subject to Senate confirmation. The bill spells out the authorities of the statutory DIA and NSA inspectors general, qualifications for the positions, and reporting requirements to the congressional intelligence committees.
The committee has been concerned about the independence and effectiveness of the offices of the inspector general at DIA and NSA for a number of years. A statutory inspector general at each agency should ensure that important intelligence programs operated by the NSA and DIA have a high degree of specialized, professional, inspector-general oversight. Section 601 will be the subject of an amendment from Mr. Conyers at a later point in the debate. I support the adoption of this amendment: it should bring greater clarity to the interpretation of the provisions establishing the NSA and DIA IG's in the law.
Title VII of the bill includes two provisions intended to improve the management of classified information in the Federal Government. Section 701 requires larger intelligence agencies to allocate at least 2 percent of their appropriations for security, countermeasures, and related activities to certain declassification activities, including reducing classified archives. Section 702 requires the President to issue an Executive order on classification and declassification, not later than 90 days after enactment, and includes a sense of Congress on what the Executive order should provide.
Title VIII of the bill contains several measures to improve U.S. counterespionage efforts. These measures should deter U.S. Government employees--including contractors, consultants, and legislative and judicial branch staff--from engaging in espionage, facilitate the detection of espionage, and provide additional authority to prosecute and redress espionage activities.
The bill requires individuals with access to classified information to give consent to disclosure of records held by financial institutions, credit bureaus, and commercial travel entities, to authorized investigative agencies, or employing agencies, during background investigations, while granted access to classified information, and for 3 years thereafter.
Section 801 sets forth the conditions under which an authorized investigative agency may request, obtain, and disseminate this information. While H.R. 4299 requires employees to waive a certain degree of privacy as a condition of access to classified information, the bill carefully places limitations on when an investigative agency may make a request for financial records and how the information contained in the record may be disseminated. This should be less burdensome to individuals than new reporting requirements, and less intrusive on their privacy.
Title VIII also authorizes rewards for information leading to arrests or convictions for espionage; establishes venue for trials involving espionage committed outside the United States; requires post-conviction forfeiture of espionage proceeds; provides for the denial of retired pay to certain individuals convicted overseas of espionage; and authorizes provide post-employment assistance to certain Defense Department civilian employees to maintain their stability and judgment and avoid unlawful disclosure of classified information.
[Page: H5822]
[TIME: 1600]
Mr. Speaker, I would only say in closing that all of the matters that I have listed that we dealt with legislatively on this particular subcommittee and we have included in the bill are the result of the work of a lot of the members of this committee in the area of classification and declassification of items. Of course, our colleague, the gentleman from Colorado [Mr. Skaggs], will perhaps speak on that issue more later.
I would say that were it not for the staff on both sides of the aisle of the committee, I do not believe we could have brought a bill to the floor that has garnered the support of Republicans as well as Democrats on this most important matter, not just for its budget matter but for its authorization and change in the legislative part of the bill.
Mr. COMBEST. Madam Chairman, I yield 7 minutes to the gentleman from Nebraska [Mr. Bereuter], a most valuable member of the committee.
(Mr. BEREUTER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)
Mr. BEREUTER. Madam Chairman, we have had typically the last 5 years I have been a member of the committee sweetness and light at this stage, and I think I will depart from that, unfortunately. This is a time to draw a line in the sand, because I am not happy at all with this budget.
Madam Chairman, this Member would tell his colleagues he has severe reservations about the amount of cuts in the funding of the intelligence community recommended by this committee. Certainly I would strenuously oppose any further cuts from the floor or in conference.
Both Republican and Democratic administrations now have sought to avoid cutting the intelligence budget as much as the cuts in the overall DOD budget within which intelligence funds are obscured. The theory has been that intelligence is a force multiplier and also exceedingly important in an increasingly confusing and unstable world. The Defense Department itself consistently has subscribed to this theory, even though more lenient treatment of the intelligence function in budget-cutting efforts meant that DOD's core military programs had to take deeper cuts to stay within the Department's budget ceiling. However, for several years in a row now, Congress has chosen to take misguidedly higher percentage cuts in the intelligence request than in the overall Defense request.
The reasons for this tough budgetary treatment of the intelligence community budget are mostly political rather than substantive. This year our Democratic Party colleagues on the committee tell us that the committee must cut deeply because a majority of the Democratic caucus is critical of U.S. intelligence, and we might otherwise be unable to carry the bill without draconian cuts on the floor.
Madam Chairman, this member believe, and some other members of the committee believe, especially this year, that real damage is being done by the budget cuts the committee is recommending and that some of these cuts are very unwise. In making such cuts, we do not even have the consolation of contributing to deficit reduction, since the Armed Services and Appropriations Committees, rather than reducing the Defense budget accordingly, routinely divert intelligence savings to other Defense programs, notably those that are not funded in the Defense request but are valued by some members for parochial or political reasons.
Let us examine some of the problems.
First, there is now a real question whether we will be able to support an adequate satellite infrastructure. Second, it seems like only yesterday that Congress itself was leading a highly publicized bandwagon of support for human intelligence collection--`HUMINT for the 90's,' it was grandly called. But we are nothing if not fickle, and in the twinkling of an eye, the mood shifted 180 degrees. CIA's Directorate of Operations now is facing severe cuts that mandate worldwide retrenchment comparable to the worst day of the Carter administration, when disastrously, Adm. Stansfield Turner was Director of Central Intelligence. Intelligence collection for whole regions of the world must be virtually written off.
Obviously, HUMINT cuts and the flagging support for satellite restructuring cripple another recent initiative to support military operations. The cry for intelligence support for military operations became as popular as HUMINT for the 90's, and gained steam after lessons learned in the 1991 Persian Gulf war, but that concern and effort now looks to be equally short-lived.
With this Member's interests being heavily focused on arms control and verification, I have watched in dismay as we have dismantled many of our technical systems for collecting intelligence on Russian weapons, on the theory that they are no longer a threat, or that they will always comply with treaty provisions, or that we will always retain access by other means.
So, Madam Chairman, I rise to tell Members of the House that in certain key areas these cuts have hurt, hurt grievously, and the damage cannot be reversed except at great expense and over long periods of time. That this pain has not even contributed to deficit reduction is insult added to the injury. That a Democratic Congress has called for such cuts even against the recommendations of a Democratic President seems especially unfathomable. That some outside the responsible committees have occasioned these defensive cuts by Democrat members of the committee by calling for percentage cuts, without knowledge of, or apparent concern about, the specific harm inflicted, and that the responsible committees have with good intentions and concern about floor cuts, succumbed to their cries of the anti-intelligence forces is very unfortunate; I believe it jeopardizes our national security.
Therefore, it is with reluctance that I support this bill but only at this stage of debate. Portions of it are unacceptable, but many of us vote for it in order to avoid further cuts. The problem is that if those of us concerned about inadequate funding vote `no' and are joined by the shortsighted or ill-informed who are simply anti-intelligence, the results could be disastrous. I vote for the bill with the hope that the Senate and the conference will restore some of the absolutely necessary funding for the intelligence community. If that is not the case I will strongly urge my colleagues to vote `no' later on the conference report.
Mr. COMBEST. Madam Chairman, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Young].
Mr. YOUNG. Madam Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me the time.
Madam Chairman, I want to compliment him and the chairman of the committee for the hard work that has been done to bring this bill to the floor today. I am going to vote for this bill, but in all honesty I have to say, as my colleague, the gentleman from Nebraska [Mr. Bereuter], has just said, this bill is not adequate, it does not meet the requirements of 1994, 1995, or 1996 for intelligence and national security interests.
We have to understand, intelligence is a vital part of our national security. I think of the words of General Schwarzkopf after the tremendously successful Desert Shield and Desert Storm. He made the point that he had about everything that a field commander could have to win that war and to win it decisively and to win it without a large loss of life. He also said that the intelligence that he had was better than any field commander had ever had before.
[Page: H5823]
[TIME: 1610]
But he also said that he could have used more intelligence, more accurate intelligence and more and quicker intelligence.
We cannot separate intelligence from the national security interests of our Nation. But we have different kinds of intelligence. We have the overhead intelligence, the highly technical, highly classified overhead types of intelligence that can do amazing things. But they are limited to the extent that they cannot get into the brain, or the mind or the thought process of a hostile leader.
Obviously then, human intelligence is equally important. Human intelligence is essential to a comprehensive intelligence program. We have not done the job on human intelligence. Since Vietnam we have spent billions and billions of dollars on high-technology intelligence at the risk of losing our ability to conduct an effective human intelligence program. I am afraid the legislation presented today allows that direction to continue.
A major concern that I have is that the intelligence our policymakers are getting, and I think it is important to make the point that the
intelligence community, those who collect the intelligence, are not the policymakers but provide the information and the assessment and the analysis upon which the policymakers would make their decisions and make their determinations and establish a direction.
It worries me when I believe that our top policymakers are not paying the attention to the intelligence information they are getting that they should. I do not think they are spending nearly enough time in considering, and I do not think that they are placing the importance that the members of this committee place on this intelligence information. I would venture to say that any member of this Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence probably spends more time every week reviewing intelligence information and intelligence matters than some of the highest policymakers in the executive branch of Government, and that is dangerous, that is dangerous. They need to pay more attention to what is happening in the real world.
Madam Chairman, we need some definite direction. We need an intelligence program that meets the Nation's security requirements and not the political whims of a budget cutter. I am all for cutting most budgets. I look at the votes I have cast in this Congress and Congresses before to cut budgets and I am prepared to cut a lot more budget items but, I am not prepared to cut the budget when it threatens the security of this Nation, because without our national security we have very little else to offer the people of this great Nation of ours.
Madam Chairman, I am going to vote for this bill. As I said earlier, I compliment the leaders of the committee and the leadership of the committee, but because of these budget restraints we are not doing the job that we need to be doing. The Berlin Wall may have come down, the Iron Curtain may have melted, but the former Soviet Union's nuclear missiles are still in existence. The KGB, while it has changed its name, it is no longer called the KGB, but it is still there, and they are still collecting, and as the Director of the CIA, Jim Woolsey said, when the big target of the KGB and the Soviet Union want away, there were a hundred new ones in its place.
Madam Chairman, I will vote for this bill today, but we need to make some real serious changes in the future.
In an era of downward spiraling budgetary outlays for intelligence, we must spend every dollar even more carefully so that the Nation receives the absolute maximum in benefits from every dollar spent. I have made clear to the administration, the foreign policymakers, and the Director of Central Intelligence, that we need a strategic plan that will lay out their spending priorities for the remainder of the decade.
We cannot afford to make mistakes now. The world continues to be unstable and changing. The death of Kim Il-song last week highlights the need for continued vigilance on the Korean Peninsula. The unfolding tragedy in Haiti where thousands of Haitians are fleeing their country requires constant surveilliance. Bosnia remains unstable, and our tentative steps at forming a long-term settlement there are not guaranteed to work. Of course Russia remains unstable and armed with thousands of nuclear weapons and it continues development programs on strategic defense weapons. Although we must carefully monitor these developments, I do not see strong planning initiatives on behalf of the intelligence community and the administration. As we approach conference and the next year's budget submission, I pray that the intelligence community will perform better than it did this year. In particular, I would like to see a better synergy between the foreign policy community and the intelligence community to ensure that they are in lock step as they face the challenges that America faces.
Mr. GLICKMAN. Madam Chairman, I am delighted to yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Washington [Mr. Dicks], a vigorous advocate for national defense, both in the State of Washington and throughout the United States, and chairman of the subcommittee of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
(Mr. DICKS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)
Mr. DICKS. Madam Chairman, first I want to compliment the chairman and the ranking member of our committee and the staff of the committee for an excellent job in oversight and review of this year's intelligence authorization bill and budget. Yes, I agree with my friend, the ranking member of the Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight, that the members of the Intelligence Committee I think, the ones the Speaker has appointed after a lot of deliberation, are really spending a great deal of time in the committee listening to the witnesses, attending the meetings and giving the kind of oversight that I think was anticipated when this committee was created.
I will say to my colleagues on the Republican side, yes, we have made large cuts. But as someone who sits both on the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and on the Defense Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, I would remind all of my colleagues that if they look at what we have done in procurement in defense, take the numbers in this year's budget and translate them back to 1985, we have taken procurement down from $135 billion to $43 billion. We have made draconian cuts in defense, so large, in fact, that the President this year right in this Chamber said we were not going to cut defense any further.
So I would urge Members in the context of this kind of draw down in force structure and in the procurement of new systems that what we have done here in the intelligence arena is acceptable, and I in my heart of hearts believe that we have given the intelligence community the money and the resources necessary to do an excellent job in gathering intelligence.
The problem is not there. The problem is that we have too many agencies with too much redundancy, doing too much of the same thing.
I want to commend the chairman. He basically said here today that we need not only the Intelligence Committee to be working on this problem, but I truly believe we need a group of outside experts, very senior people to look at the entire operation of the intelligence community and to make recommendations to the President and to the Congress about how we can restructure and simplify the intelligence community.
The gentleman from Florida [Mr. Goss] got up and said we are not going to have as many places with CIA offices in Africa. The only thing I would say to that is we still have a State Department, and frankly, a lot of what we gather today, in my mind, can be gathered through open sources, through the State Department, through the Commerce Department who are out in these parts of the world. They are out there and they can make a contribution here, because what we are trying to do is get the best information we can to decision makers. It does not always have to come through clandestine activities.
Madam Chairman, I would also say this Director, Mr. Woolsey, and this is to his credit, has called upon us to make investments in national technical collection means. This means some money up front. In this respect I do believe that the committee has stood behind him. We have said yes, we are going to give you the money now to make the investment in improving our national technical collection means. In my view, in the future, that will simplify the architecture and allow us to spend less money on intelligence gathering. So I think we should support him on that.
The Ames case is a national scandal and disaster, there is no other way to put it. I believe the Director was a little slow at first in recognizing that the Congress and the American people want him to clean house.
We have to have a better way of doing counter intelligence and the CIA and the F.B.I. are both, in my mind, responsible.
I will give the Clinton administration a credit in this sense, that the National Security Counsel came into play and presented some very important reforms that have been adopted and put into place.
I would like to say this: Yes, we tried to help the directorate of operations. But one cannot have read the article in U.S. News and World Report without having some skepticism and concern about how well the directorate of operations has been doing its job. We may have given them a lot of money, but I must ask where has been the performance? I intend as chairman of the Investigations and Oversight Subcommittee to spend some time even in this remaining year looking at those problems, because it is clear that in Cuba, and Russia and other areas, in Iran we have some very serious problems.
Madam Chairman, I want to say to the House I think we have done a responsible job. I think we should vote for this bill. I think we have cut as deeply as we should. I think the chairman is right. If we cut further, we would be in some serious trouble, and if we will work with our colleagues in the conference to try and improve the bill when we get there.
[Page: H5824]
[TIME: 1620]
Mr. COMBEST. Madam chairman, I yield 4 1/2 minutes to the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Gekas].
(Mr. GEKAS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)
Mr. GEKAS. Madam Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding.
I, too, want to extend my gratitude to the chairman of the full committee, the ranking member, the chairman of the Subcommittee on Legislation, the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Coleman], and particularly to the staff on both sides for their consistent assistance to us. As a matter of fact, the staff, if they do nothing else, in unscrambling the acronyms for me, I will be eternally grateful to them. I am going to create one called SAM, which is `Staff Assistance to Members,' which I endorse right here and now. If I have to introduce legislation to that effect, I will do it. But anyway, SAM has been good to me.
The message for this particular hour has been amply delivered by the presentations made by our colleagues on both sides of the aisle.
Two gigantic truths emerge from everything that we say here and now. One is that there is a continuing absolute need for our country to engage in intelligence activities. If the only trouble spot in the world were North Korea, that in itself would justify our continuing state of alert in the intelligence community and in the Intelligence Committee in both Chambers for monitoring of that situation.
But when you add to that the hundreds of little and bigger situations across the civilized and uncivilized world, then we say to the American people, and I reiterate this every chance I get in my home district, that notwithstanding the end of the cold war, there is this state of alertness that is absolutely necessary to our national security and that, therefore, we must continue to support an intelligence component of our national being.
And the second truth, one that has been reiterated here, is the agony that we have suffered as members of the committee and as American citizens throughout the land on the disgraceful Ames case. I am one who firmly believes that we will have other cases in the future undoubtedly, other betrayals, other individuals who will for money or for other reasons betray our country, and in my mind the death penalty ought to be considered each and every time such an event occurs.
Notwithstanding my support of the death penalty, however, it appears that some of the antipathy toward that kind of penalty is also apparent even in cases when the entire Nation is put at risk. I must tell you that it is not just wartime espionage and treason that should be punishable by death. Any kind of total sacrifice of the American prestige and the American being on the part of anybody who works for the CIA, but the Ames case definitely proves that an act of treason such as that puts at risk fellow Americans, risk of their lives wherever they may be serving across the world, and not only Americans but other nationals of other nations who work with us, who share our ideals, who share our hopes for the world, and so the death penalty is an appropriate measure for treason and espionage, and to the last day that I serve in this Congress, I will attempt to do everything I can to reinstate that penalty for betrayal of our country.
Mr. COMBEST. Madam Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from California [Mr. Lewis].
Mr. LEWIS of California. I appreciate my colleague yielding. I appreciate the work of not just my colleague but my chairman as well in a very difficult year in the Intelligence Committee.
I am the new kid on the block in this committee, for I am just beginning my second year of service on the committee. Up until now, I have spent most of my time in the Congress on the Appropriations Committee, where I focused on the Housing and Independent Agencies Subcommittee for a few years, now, service on the Defense Subcommittee.
I must say that I have been distressed over the last several years with the rather rapid reduction in national defense spending that was described by my colleague, the gentleman from Washington [Mr. Dicks]. Hand in hand with that, it seemed to me, as we were going about reducing money spent for national defense, it would be very appropriate to have access to the kinds of information that one has made available to them in the intelligence work, so assignment to that committee has been most timely from my perspective.
As others have suggested, we spent hours and hours behind those walls, reading material and trying to get a handle on issues that are largely based upon information that is secret intelligence information, making certain our public-policy decisions reflect those very serious American as well as worldwide needs.
I must say that I am not lightly disconcerted with the pattern of reduced spending in this subject area of recent years. During the decade of the 1990's, it would appear that we could be very well moving toward, adjusted for inflation, by the year 2000 spending 60 percent less on intelligence matters than we spent at the beginning of the decade.
It was only 2 years ago that the former chairman, the gentleman from Oklahoma [Mr. McCurdy], came to the floor and urged us to cut no further a budget that then was 15 percent larger than we are curently spending in this subject area. And how can that be justified, this in view of the world we are living in, a world that is extremely dangerous? Indeed the East-West confrontation has largely been set aside, but to the rest of the world more complex and maybe even more dangerous.
How do you develop the intelligence resources you need to effectively tap that new and complex world?
Madam Chairman, it is very, very important the House recognize these needs, and I urge them to support this legislation.
[Page: H5825]
Mr. GLICKMAN. Madam Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to my colleague, the gentleman from Colorado [Mr. Skaggs].
Mr. COMBEST. I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Colorado [Mr. Skaggs].
The CHAIRMAN. The gentlemen from Colorado [Mr. Skaggs] is recognized for 4 minutes.
Mr. SKAGGS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to commend Chairman Glickman and ranking minority member Combest for their hard and good work in bringing H.R. 4299 to the floor. This is thoughtful legislation that strikes a decent balance between the need for our Nation to engage in necessary intelligence activities with the need for fiscal restrant. This bill also continues the efforts of the Intelligence Committee to bring about reform of overall intelligence activities in a way that saves the taxpayers money and strengthens our democracy.
One thing should be clear from today's bill: While the reform efforts of the Central Intelligence Agency and related offices have begun, they need to proceed with an even greater sense of urgency. The human intelligence program still needs a better strategic plan that defines essential roles and missions in a way that makes sense in the post-cold-war world. The counterintelligence program needs special reform in light of the Aldrich Ames case. Continuing personnel reductions mandated by last year's bill also pose challenges for the intelligence community. Director Woolsey, I know, is committed to necessary changes in these areas, and we all should encourage and support his leadership.
The funding level of the bill, which is less than requested, should be interpreted as an effort to deal with the budget environment we live in and as a message to the intelligence community to recoganize and reform itself as quickly as possible to meet today's new challenges.
In trying to develop sound priorities, it's always helpful to know what is of value to people. Unfortunately, it is difficult to assess the real value of the products produced by the intelligence community. In economic parlance, intelligence products are called free goods, meaning they come with no cost to consumers such as the State Department or the Department of Defense. Because they are free goods, there is no way to determine their value to consumers analogous to the price mechanism of the marketplace. As a result, Congress and the community don't have the best kind of information we need to decide how to allocate intelligence resources according to the priorities of these consumers. To solve this problem, I have worked with Chairman Glickman to include report language requesting the Community Management Staff to develop proposals for pilot projects to test various means for measuring the value of and assigning cost to intelligence information. The committee report specifies that a pilot project should try to develop a market-type mechanism for guiding supply and demand, and as for valuing intelligence products. I believe this is the kind of innovative approach that will help us prioritize our intelligence efforts as intelligently as we can.
The reform of procedures for classifying information has consumed much of my time and attention since becoming a member of the Intelligence Committee. Language I drafted for the report on last year's intelligence authorization bill directed the intelligence community to collect information regarding the annual costs in dollars and personnel associated with the classification of information. Two months ago the Office of Management and Budget released a report documenting that the Government will spend roughly $2.28 billion on classifying information this year and will
assign classification duties to 32,400 Federal workers throughout the Government. The report estimated that another $13.8 billion will be spent to reimburse Defense, State, and intelligence contractors for compliance with security procedures. It was interesting to note that some of the agencies which classify information are those Americans would least suspect, such as the Departments of Agriculture, Health and Human Services, and Education. Unfortunately, the OMB report did not include data from the intelligence agencies themselves because they have thus far failed to comply. An amendment I'll offer in a few minutes will deal with this failure.
In an effort to continue the declassification process, today's bill--in language proposed by the chairman and me--requires the intelligence agencies to develop a phased plan to implement declassification guidelines, begin the process of declassification of archived classified documents, and submit reports to Congress on the declassification process. The President is also required to develop a plan to narrow the definition of information subject to classification, to reduce the time period of classification, and to provide for the automatic declassification of information when a document's period of classification expires. These measures will continue the reform process in a balanced and reasonable manner.
I have two primary reasons for pursuing the reform of the classification process. My first reason is my strong philosophical belief that the American public and American democracy are best served by an open Government. It is clearly necessary to continue to classify certain types of information to protect our national security. But keeping information from Americans which poses no security risk is just as clearly contrary to democratic principles. For example, why should we continue to spend money to store classified material regarding troop movement during World War I? Why is the department of Education spending thousands of dollars to install secure telephone lines? We all recognize that a significant portion of what is classified is likely kept from the public more for political reasons, or to avoid embarrassment, or simply from inaction, rather than to serve any defined security need.
The Founding Fathers believed an educated and informed public would serve as the best protector of our form of government and the best guarantor against tyranny. We can't expect the public to carry out its responsibilities if we allow the classification process to keep outdated information secret or to make secret information that should properly be available to the public. Reform of the classification process will place more information in the public domain and thereby strengthen our democracy.
My second reason for pursuing classification reform involves saving money for taxpayers. The OMB report stated that we spend $16 billion annually on classifying material and then storing and maintaining it, even though much of it is outdated or shouldn't have been classified in the first place. The money spent on maintaining the cloak of secrecy over outdated information or information which never had significant national security content, is simply wasted. Given the huge sum of money involved here, if we save only a fraction of the total we spend each year, we can narrow the budget deficit substantially.
In summary, H.R. 4299 is thoughtful legislation that authorizes funds for necessary intelligence activities and continues the reform of our intelligence apparatus in a way that saves money and strengthens our country. I ask all Members to give their full support to the bill.
[TIME: 1630]
Mr. COMBEST. Madam Chairman, I yield the balance of our time to the gentleman from California [Mr. Dornan].
Mr. DORNAN. I thank the Republican leader and thank the chairman.
Like my fellow Republican members on this committee, I also support the intelligence authorization bill.
I, however, share with many of my colleagues on the other side of the aisle and all of my Republican colleagues a great concern on the degree to which intelligence has been cut over the recent years. In fact, over the past 3 years, while the overall defense budget has been slashed precipitously, it is a mystery to me that the intelligence budget has declined to an even greater degree. I would think any administration, any Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, would want all the information they could possibly accrue for the benefit of our leaders in a most dangerous world.
Our current Secretary of Defense I think came up with the best metaphor I have heard to describe the situation in the world today. He said that we have slain the dragon--and by that he meant the massive evil force of communism, with tens of thousands of nuclear weapons pointed in our direction and we, likewise, we like to think in a defensive, deterrent mode, pointing them back at the other side.
That dragon has been slain, although the poison lies all over the landscape, that is, those nuclear missiles, even the tactical ones, thousands of those have not yet been perfectly disposed of. We now talk of crime syndicates in Russia getting their hands on missiles. But the dragon itself is down. On Christmas Day, of all days, the Communist hammer and sickle came down and we saw the white, powder blue, and red flag of the old Russia go up. But to continue Mr. Perry, our Secretary of Defense's metaphor, we now have a garden of a thousand poisonous snakes replacing that dragon. The snake is not equal to a dragon, but when there are a thousand of them, you have your hands full. Hence the need for even greater intelligence.
I believe I echo the belief of, I think, most of our colleagues in repeating that in these times of military downsizing intelligence capabilities are increasingly critical to the safety and effectiveness of our military and to the wise and effective use of those diminishing resources of the military.
With the demise of the Soviet Union, few would argue these following facts, I believe: That is, intelligent men and women would not argue that robust intelligence capabilities, strategic and tactical, are increasingly critical in this unpredictable, dynamically unpredictable world in which we live.
No longer does our planning focus chiefly on some large-scale engagement, Soviet tank divisions pouring through the gap, fighting it out in the plains of Europe; and to some this meant, `Well, let's all but bring our military down to nothing,' and as the prior speaker said, some few voices in this House wonder why we need intelligence information at all.
Despite the funding reductions that have occurred since the demise of the Soviet Union, it has been said over and over on the House floor this afternoon that Iraq, Bosnia, Haiti, Somalia, possibly to a greater degree we need more intelligence over and throughout North Korea, where we have almost no human intelligence.
I might add here that even in great humanitarian crises, like Rwanda, intelligence is the fastest way to find out how to save human lives by, in Rwanda's case, the tens of thousands. The French have already apparently changed sides from the Hutu to the Tutsi, and this puts them in great danger. When I took the well some months ago to point out a simple historical fact that is actually mind-numbing, that more people died in Rwanda in a 1-month period, the month of early April through early May, than died in all the German concentration camps, the six death camps designed just for death.
In closing, Madam Chairman, I might point out that that figure is now double through a million deaths in Rwanda. We need all the intelligence we can get. Let us stop cutting our intelligence authorization.
[Page: H5826]
Mr. GLICKMAN. Madam Chairman, I yield myself the balance of my time.
Let me just say, Madam Chairman, that we have very constructive members of the committee on both sides. There is general unanimity on the issue, although some difference as to the amount to be spent on intelligence. I would just point out that in the 1970's and 1980's we had very radical, sharp increases in intelligence spending to deal with the Soviet threat, particularly the nuclear threat.
While the numbers are not going up any longer, the numbers this year are essentially a freeze of last year, 2.1 percent below the President's request and 1.7 percent below last year's appropriation. So at a time when the Soviet threat is over, the numbers are not coming down in the same way that they went up in the face of the Soviet threat, because we acknowledge there remain very serious threats to this country, but they are different kinds of threats than we faced in the 1970's and 1980's.
- Mr. SPENCE. Madam Chairman, I rise to join Mr. Combest and the rest of the Republican members of the House Intelligence Committee in expressing deep concern over the latest round of intelligence budget cuts contained in H.R. 4299. As detailed in the minority views contained in the bill report, both the administration and Congress continue to reduce the intelligence budget based on the misguided notion that the end of the cold war dictates drastic cutbacks in our national intelligence capabilities. This policy flies in the face of the reality that, from an intelligence perspective, today's multipolar world is infinitely more complex and challenging than the bipolar world of yesterday.
- Further, as the technology of warfare continues to advance, today's battlefield has become increasingly dependent on timely, accurate and usable intelligence to guide precision weapon systems and make tactical judgments. This battlefield revolution dictates a need for national and tactical intelligence systems able to properly support our military forces of the future. I fear that the intelligence cuts embraced by this administration and made worse by this bill place this critical national security objective at serious risk.
- Beyond these broad concerns, Mr. Chairman, I want to express strong opposition to the amendment filed by Mr. Conyers dealing with the establishment of statutory inspector generals for the National Security Agency [NSA] and the Defense Intelligence Agency [DIA]. I similarly oppose the underlying provision already in section 601 of the bill.
- When the Armed Services Committee received H.R. 4299 under sequential referral, we looked closely at this issue and agreed with the Intelligence Committee that valid and legitimate issues exist with the adequacy of IG oversight coverage for DIA and NSA. However, we disagree with the prescribed solution.
- As component agencies of the Department of Defense, the DIA and NSA already have an IG--the DOD IG. The DOD inspector general is statutorily responsible for carrying out the IG function throughout the entirety of the Department, to include DIA and NSA. While many defense agencies, as well as the military services, have their own IG offices, the ultimate responsibility for this critical function remains with the DOD IG who has the necessary expertise, statutory independence, and investigative resources for the job.
- Section 601 of the bill and the Conyers amendment would directly undermine this arrangement by balkanizing the IG function within DOD into separate fiefdoms. This year its DIA and NSA, next year its CIO and NRO or somebody else. Once you breach the organizational logic behind making the DOD IG universally responsible for department-wide oversight, there is no real rational basis for stopping with just these two agencies.
- Mr. Chairman, I strongly oppose these provisions as they will inevitably lead to a decrease in the quality and effectiveness of IG oversight within the Department of Defense. Congress has a long historical interest in ensuring that adequate independent oversight of executive agencies is provided by IG's and I consider both of these provisions to be counterproductive.
- At the end of my statement I have attached a copy of a letter the Committee on Armed Services recently received from the Department of Defense inspector general detailing the many other substantive objections to these provisions. I have also attached a copy of the letter that Chairman Dellums and I wrote to the Speaker discharging the Armed Services Committee from further consideration of H.R. 4299 and describing our mutual concerns with the impact of section 601.
- I strongly oppose the Conyers amendment and I intend to work vigorously in the conference to modify this section of the bill to address the above-mentioned concerns.
INSPECTOR GENERAL,
Department of Defense,
Arlington, VA, July 15, 1994.
Hon. Ronald V. Dellums,
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: I am writing to express my concern over proposed legislation (H.R. 4299, Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995) that appears to begin a process of creating multiple statutory Inspectors General (IG) offices with congressional reporting responsibilities within the same Federal department or agency. Internal oversight type activities are diffused throughout the DoD where they serve as the `eyes and ears' of command. The proposal to create statutory Inspectors General in subordinate combat support agencies such as the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and the National Security Agency (NSA) would tend to undermine the efficacy of this office. I also believe that creation of such statutory IGs with reporting requirements to Congress will reduce their effectiveness within their agency.