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INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1991

(House of Representatives - October 17, 1990)

[Page: H10020]

The SPEAKER. Pursuant to House Resolution 487 and rule XXIII, the Chair declares the House in the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill, H.R. 5422.

The Chair designates the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Nelson] as Chairman of the Committee of the Whole, and requests the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Kanjorski] to assume the chair temporily.

[TIME: 1425]

IN THE COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE

Accordingly the House resolved itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill (H.R. 5422) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1991 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the U.S. Government, the Intelligence Community Staff, and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes, with Mr. Kanjorski, Chairman pro tempore in the chair.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Kanjorski). Pursuant to the rule, the bill is considered as having been read the first time.

Under the rule, the gentleman from California [Mr. Beilenson] will be recognized for 30 minutes, and the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Hyde] will be recognized for 30 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California [Mr. Beilenson].

[Page: H10021]

Mr. BEILENSON. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of H.R. 5422, the Intelligence Authorization Act for fiscal year 1991.

H.R. 5422 authorizes funds for all intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the U.S. Government for fiscal year 1991. These funds are allocated between the National Foreign Intelligence Program, which consists of those U.S. intelligence programs which provide information to the President and other national decisionmakers, and the tactical intelligence and related activities programs which supply intelligence to military commanders.

The bill is the product of more than 70 hours of hearings by the Budget Subcommittee and the Subcommittee on Legislation. It enjoys the bipartisan support of the Intelligence Committee's 19 members, which is a testament to the constructive and cooperative spirit which the members brought to their work.

I want to thank in particular the committee's ranking Republican member, the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Hyde], for his invaluable counsel and assistance. The work of the committee reflects his many contributions and was greatly facilitated by his efforts. I also want to commend the committee staff for the dedicated and professional manner with which they assist all members in carrying out the committee's business.

On behalf of the Intelligence Committee, I also want to extend my appreciation to the members and staff of the Armed Services Committee for their assistance in our work. Because elements of the Department of Defense conduct the majority of U.S. intelligence activities, and for reasons of security, the intelligence budget is contained within the defense budget. The committee has worked closely, as it does each year, with the Committee on Armed Services to produce a package of recommendations which treats the programs over which there is shared jurisdiction in as consistent a manner as possible.

While the actual amounts authorized are contained in a classified schedule of authorizations incorporated by reference into H.R. 5422 and explained in a classified annex to the committee's report, those documents are available for the examination of members in the committee's offices. I urge Members who have not already done so to review this material.

The powerful political and social forces which have rocked the world in the past year will have a profound effect on the way in which our intelligence agencies pursue their mission. The focus of our intelligence efforts is changing as threats such as narcotics, international terrorism, and the spread of chemical and biological weapons vie with traditional adversaries like the Soviet Union and its allies in Eastern Europe for attention and resources. Redeployment assets to meet new threats, while continuing to address the remaining security concerns posed by the old, will require careful planning, flexibility, and resourcefulness.

As the intelligence agencies enter this period of transition, they must contend with the same fiscal constraints which beset other elements of the Federal budget. The growth which characterized the intelligence budgets of the 1980's is over, and the challenges presented by new intelligence priorities will have to be reconciled with the reality of reduced resources.

This bill begins that process. The sum of the committee's recommendations is not only below the President's budget request, but below the amount authorized in fiscal year 1990 as well.

While the committee believes that H.R. 5422 assured adequate funding for all essential intelligence programs and activities, a high degree of cooperation between the agencies and the Congress will be critical if the lean budget years likely in the future are not to impair the ability of the United States to meet its intelligence needs.

The recent changes in the world should produce a reexamination of more than just intelligence budget numbers. The means by which to achieve those foreign policy objectives supported by intelligence programs must also be reviewed. It will be asserted in debate today that U.S. foreign policy goals should not be pursued by secret means, and that important policy decisions should be publicly debated, and openly implemented. That is an argument with which I find myself in substantial agreement.

We will also hear that there are times when, for a variety of operational reasons, U.S. assistance programs cannot be undertaken or sustained if they are publicly acknowledged. As much as I might wish it were otherwise, I believe that there is validity to that argument as well.

A degree of tension therefore exists between the desire of many in this House that policies be determined through open debate, and the likelihood that some policies can be most effectively promoted only through secret means. That tension increases the longer policies are pursued in secret, and it is exacerbated when the details of supposedly covert programs are regularly reported in the media. The result is that we spend far too much time debating whether a policy should be pursued in secret and far too little time considering whether it should be pursued at all.

The Intelligence Committee has tried for a year or more now, to do two sometimes consistent, sometimes conflicting things to resolve this issue.

First, we have attempted to encourage the administration to wind down or bring to an end, a small number of programs which originated some time ago under different conditions--during the height of the cold war. The circumstances under which they were originally undertaken have changed considerably; many of the arguments originally given in justification of pursuing them have themselves since changed because of those changing circumstances.

In the alternative, we have urged the administration, if it feels it necessary to continue any of these programs, to ask publicly for our--and for the American peoples' support for them through public discussion and debate, and through an open vote in the Congress.

These are programs which are, in fact, quite well known to the public, and well covered and reported by the media. Everyone is free to discuss and debate them except for those of us who are members of the committees which must consider the policy the programs are designed to support, and authorize their funding. We are the only ones who cannot discuss them publicly. In my view, such programs should be debated publicly and voted on publicly. If they are policies worth pursuing, the Congress will support and authorize them and thereby strengthen the position of the administration; if they are not supported, it is likely that they are policies the Government should not be pursuing.

In sum, major component parts of U.S. foreign policy should not be secretly authorized and voted upon unless there are terribly compelling reasons for that procedure. I think it is obvious that there is in general less reason to pursue some of these policies secretly now, than there may well have been just a very few years ago.

Those are the feelings of a great many members of the Intelligence Committees of both Houses of the Congress, but I must also tell you that, most of us at least, have also been trying to help the administration in its effort to wind down some of these programs. Democrats as well as Republicans on the committee are persuaded that this administration seriously is searching for the best way to bring them to a close.

Mr. Chairman, I want to make it clear that members of the Intelligence Committee are determined to promote a review of the general issue of the appropriateness in certain cases of the maintenance of secret means of furthering foreign policy. I again commend the classified documents accompanying H.R. 5422 to the Members' attention. These documents reflect the committee's intention to pursue this issue in the coming months with the administration. I am hopeful our efforts will lead to clear understandings about the limits on the effectiveness of secret means of policy implementation, and on an agreement as to how policies originally pursued in secret can be brought into the open in ways that will allow for a debate on their merits without ending their utility.

Before explaining in summary form the legislative provisions of H.R. 5422, I want to make some comments about the oversight title, title VII, of the Senate version of this legislation. I know that many Members have been contacted by constituents concerned that title VII will convey to the President broad new authorities in the area of covert action which will enable such actions to be conducted without fear of interference by the Congress.

I want to assure the Members that, in my judgment, nothing could be further from the truth. I can think of few legislative provisions which have been so badly misinterpreted as has title VII of the Senate intelligence authorization bill.

No new authority for the conduct of covert action is provided to the President by title VII. No congressional powers or prerogatives are transferred to the executive branch.

In fact, the existing system of congressional oversight of covert action programs is substantially strengthened by improvements that these title VII provisions would make in the procedures by which information about these programs is provided to Congress. More information would be available to Congress as a result of the enactment of title VII. The procedure for approval of covert actions by the President would be tightened, and oversight would be enhanced rather than weakened.

Why am I so certain? Because provisions essentially the same as those contained in title VII comprised a bill reported 2 years ago as a response to the Iran-Contra affair by the House Intelligence Committee. For reasons unconnected to those particular provisions, that bill never reached the House floor. It may be that some drafting improvements can be made in the Senate's language to make more clear what the bill does, and does not do, with respect to oversight of covert action. We will be discussing necessary changes in conference and I can assure Members that any provisions we agree to will result in strengthened oversight.

At this time, I would like to briefly describe the major legislative provisions of H.R. 5422.

Title III contains provisions developed in cooperation with the Post Office and Civil Service Committee which are intended to bring the CIA's retirement systems into conformance with the retirement systems in effect at other Federal agencies. I want to note in particular the following sections:

Section 304 which will enable a retiree who failed to elect a survivor benefit before retirement to make that election for a spouse married after retirement;

Section 305, which will reduce from 60 to 55 the age before which the remarriage of a former or surviving spouse shall terminate that person's entitlement to retirement or survivor benefits; and

Section 307, which will provide for a restoration to former spouses of the benefits they lose upon remarriage should the remarriage and in death, divorce, or annulment.

Title IV contains recurring provisions which, among other things, provide that authorizations in the bill are not to be construed as authorizing intelligence activities not otherwise authorized by the Constitution or laws of the United States.

Title V contains provisions of particular relevance to the Department of Defense. I want to highlight the following sections:

Section 501, which will enable the Secretary of Defense to charge the CIA the same rate for airlift services that is charged to components of the Department of Defense;

Section 502, which was developed with the assistance of the Government Operations Committee, creates a limited exception to the Freedom of Information Act to permit the withholding from public disclosure of certain unclassified products of the Defense Mapping Agency. This exception would only apply when classification of the products is not feasible, but provision of them pursuant to a Freedom of Information Act request would reveal the sources and methods by which they were produced, or military operational or contingency planning;

Section 503, which will enable the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Director of Central Intelligence, to better protect the identity and mission of those DOD clandestine human intelligence collectors needing a commercial cover for their activities. Under current law, a DOD human intelligence collection operation may hold itself out to be a business, but may not engage in routine business activities such as establishing checking accounts, buying and selling products, or furnishing an office. This section will provide the authority for the conduct of those kinds of activities so that the necessary security for the cover operation is provided. The new authority may be used only to support intelligence collection activities conducted abroad, and the intelligence committees must be informed each time a commercial entity is established. In addition, the provision contains a 5-year sunset clause which is intended to ensure that the need for the authority, and its operation in practice, is reviewed.

As the official U.S. defense presence declines in many parts of the world, the execution of the defense intelligence mission may depend to a greater degree than in the past on the ability to gain access to a country through the use of a nonofficial cover. The committee was persuaded that a valid need existed for a reliable nonofficial cover alternative for the Defense Departments human intelligence collectors. The proposal presented by the Department was well developed and well coordinated within the intelligence community. The committee was persuaded that the limited use envisioned by the Department for the authorities provided will adequately address current shortcomings in nonofficial cover arrangements.

Finally, I want to mention section 504 which contains the text of an amendment adopted by the Armed Services Committee during its sequential referral of the bill. The provision requires the Secretary of Defense to provide any Member of Congress with access to a certain classified report concerning the operation of the Defense Department's POW/MIA office.

Mr. Chairman, H.R. 5422 is a well-balanced response to the needs of our intelligence agencies, and I urge its adoption.

[Page: H10022]
[TIME: 1440]

Mr. KASTENMEIER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BEILENSON. I am happy to yield to the gentleman from Wisconsin.

Mr. KASTENMEIER. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding.

I would like to commend him for his leadership as chairman of this committee. As a person who has served with him for 6 years on this committee, I am delighted with the sort of leadership that, as chairman, he has given, the good will that he has promoted, and the good sense, in my view, and I would like to associate in general with his assessment of the report.

This is a subject which by its very nature involves many controversial areas and policy decisions. We could not possibly come to a conclusion with respect to a report which would satisfy everyone. The fact is that we are in a new age, the post-cold-war age, in which some of the assumptions are being challenged openly through the amendatory process. This is something we accept.

In any event, I do want to express my appreciation to the chairman.

Mr. BEILENSON. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for his kind comments.

Mr. SCHEUER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BEILENSON. I am happy to yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. SCHEUER. Mr. Chairman, I congratulate the gentleman and the committee on their fine record and especially for the gentleman's desire to wind down or bring to an end certain covert programs.

There is an urgent need for Congress to have more information than it does on the long-term military threat that we face in the world today, either regional threats or whatever in this postcold war world, in order for us to wind down or bring to an end many of the very comprehensive military programs that we wonder whether they are relevant to the world that we live in. Is the B-2 bomber relevant to a current threat that we face? Is star wars relevant? Is the mobile missile system relevant? Is there any likelihood that Congress is going to get a sophisticated long-term military threat appraisal from the collection of intelligence agencies under the jurisdiction of the gentleman's committee? Are we going to get it from the Defense Department? Are we going to get it from the National Security Agency in cooperation with the President?

[Page: H10023]

Mr. BEILENSON. The answer to my friend, to the gentleman's question, is yes, without question, and I think in the relatively near future.

As the gentleman may know, such material has been requested already of the Defense Department and of the Secretary of Defense who has responded and is in the process of responding.

Both Mr. Nunn on the other side and the other House, the other body, the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. Aspin], the distinguished chairman of our own Committee on Armed Services have requested such information. In fact, yes, that will be available to us, I would say to my friend, in the relatively near future.

Mr. SCHEUER. If the gentleman will yield further, will it be made available to all Members of this House?

Mr. BEILENSON. I am not sure I can answer the gentleman with respect to that partcular question. It may well come in both classified and unclassified form. Quite obviously the relevant material would be available to all Members.

Mr. SCHEUER. As long as it is made available, even in classified form, as the gentleman mentioned, the information about these covert activities is available to us in classified form, that would be sufficient for our public-policy judgments as to whether these major weapons systems, new ones that we are being called upon to fund, are relevant to the military threat that we face in the world, and the world signified by Mikhail Gorbachev's receiving the Nobel Peace Prize yesterday.

Mr. EDWARDS of California. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BEILENSON. I am happy to yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. EDWARDS of California. Mr. Chairman, I join my colleague in complimenting the chairman of the Select Committee on Intelligence and the subcommittee chairs and other ranking members, the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. Kastenmeier], the gentleman from New York [Mr. McHugh], and the very splendid staff you have that has worked very closely with the staff of the Committee on the Judiciary and, in particular, the staff of my subcommittee that has jurisdiction over the FBI chiefly regarding the budget, laws affecting the FBI, and general day-to-day oversight of activities here in the United States that are not necessarily within the jurisdiction of the Intelligence Committee.

In the many years that I have been here, I have found that this is the best-run Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence in my experience, and it is really a great relief to all of us to understand that and to see the working of the committee and realize that the intelligence agencies are being subjected to daily strict scrutiny as is absolutely necessary.

There are some of us here who had the unpleasant experience of living through the 1970's where the intelligence agencies got out of control, and we had to establish select committees in the House and Senate to find out what was going on.

I assure the Members it was a great disappointment to all of us to find out what was going on back on those days.

The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence here in the House and its sister committee in the Senate have really done a spendid job, and I compliment the gentleman. I compliment the gentleman and his committee on this good bill that is coming up.

The gentlewoman from California [Mrs. Boxer], I believe, has an amendment later on that perhaps will not pass, but I want to commend it to my colleagues. It is a pretty darn good amendment.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. HYDE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, profound changes have occurred in the world since the Intelligence Committee brought last year's intelligence authorization bill to the House floor. Many of these far-reaching developments were somewhat surprising, even by those closest to the situations involved. For example, some of the most astute German politicians were saying less than a year ago that the two Germanys were a long way from reunification. Yet, just a few weeks ago, in a breathtaking rush of popular will, Germany was officially reunified after 45 years of division.

Meanwhile, the experts on the Middle East were taken by surprise. Saddam Hussein's sabre-rattling threats suddenly gave way to the `blitzkreig' seizure of his small but resource-rich neighbor, Kuwait.

Some of these unforeseen changes have encouraged a degree of optimism, while the implications of others are profoundly sobering. Amidst all of this stunning turmoil, our committee has studied the intelligence budget and programs with great care. We have attempted to grasp the significance of these changes in the world situation vis a vis U.S. intelligence requirements and resources. Perhaps the most important conclusion the committee reached is that the world is still a terrible uncertain place, and consequently we must strive to maintain a strong and flexible national intelligence capability. Therefore, I would like to commend the whole committee for its cautious approach toward the budget cuts we have recommended in this intelligence authorization bill.

Moreover, in the course of our authorization hearings, our committee has endeavored to impress upon the intelligence community that it should continue to reevaluate carefully intelligence requirements and priorities in light of the changes in the international arena which are still unfolding.

I also wish to take this opportunity to thank Chairman Beilenson for his exceptional leadership of the committee's work on this legislation. Under his stewardship, the process of developing this legislation has been characterized by comity and openness to the views and input of all Members, including the minority. In fact, a number of the important topics discussed in the committee's unclassified report reflect specific concerns of minority members.

One very important thrust of this bill is a strong and well-focused effort to reduce unnecessary redundancy among various intelligence programs. I believe our committee has been successful in accomplishing that task. This authorization bill will, in fact, result in more bang for the buck in the intelligence budget.

In short, Mr. Chairman, I am generally satisfied with this bill, as reported by the Intelligence Committee. I believe that the other members of the committee from this side of the aisle are as well. I would note, however, that counterintelligence remains a major concern of mine. In this regard, I believe that there is a need for better coordination among intelligence agencies responsible for sensitive classified programs and U.S. arms control negotiations. Improved coordination is essential if we are to minimize potentially serious counterintelligence problems in connection with on-site-inspection regimes which are likely to be included in arms control agreements. Nevertheless, I urge the House to pass H.R. 5422.

In conclusion, let me add a special word of appreciation for the dedicated efforts of our committee's very capable staff: Dan Childs, Tom Smeeton, Mike Sheehy, Bob Fitch, Diane Dornan, Cathy Eberwein, Louis Dupart, Joyce Pratt, Virginia Callis, Merritt Clark, Sharon Curcio, Calvin Humphrey, Dee Jackson, Jack Keliher, Ken Kodama, Jeannie McNally, Larry Prior, Bernie Raimo, Karen Schindler, Jeannie Seelbach, Bernie Toon, Angel Torres, and Steve Nelson. Without their loyal and diligent assistance, our legislative responsibilities would be virtually overwhelming.

[Page: H10024]
[TIME: 1450]

Mr. BEILENSON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 6 minutes to the gentleman from New York [Mr. McHugh], chairman of our Subcommittee on Legislation.

Mr. McHUGH. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of this Intelligence Authorization Act and urge my colleagues to support it. I would like to commend our chairman, the gentleman from California [Mr. Beilenson], our ranking Republican, the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Hyde], and all the members of the committee for working together to forge a consensus on intelligence funding during this challenging time of transition brought about by the remarkable and welcome events that have occurred in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

The budget figures authorized by this bill, while less than last year, are significant. Given our interests in the world and our intelligence requirements, I think that these figures are reasonable. They represent a sensible accommodation of diverse pressures and interests during this unique transition year.

It is clear, however, that much of America's massive intelligence effort must be refocused to reflect both the new strategic environment and the urgency of our budget crisis. I believe that the intelligence requirements of the Nation in this decade and beyond can be met adequately with less money than is now being spent. Therefore, while supporting this year's authorization, I look forward next year to a leaner intelligence budget, a budget that realistically responds to changing conditions while continuing to protect the national security.

Mr. Chairman, in addition to authorizing spending levels for intelligence activities, this bill also contains several nonbudget legislative provisions considered by the Subcommittee on Legislation which I chair. I believe that they are reasonable provisions and can be briefly summarized as follows:

Sections 301 through 307 make several technical or conforming changes to the laws applicable to the CIA retirement system so as to more equitably treat surviving spouses and former spouses.

Section 502 authorizes the Secretary of Defense to withhold from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act certain maps and other geodetic products of the Defense Mapping Agency that are properly classifiable, but are not classified because to do so would limit their utility and availability and would unnecessarily increase costs for storage and handling.

Section 503 permits the Secretary of Defense to authorize certain intelligence elements of the Department of Defense to engage in commercial activities necessary to provide more secure cover for authorized intelligence collection activities conducted abroad. Our subcommittee agreed to this provision, which has been reviewed and refined during several years of consideration by the intelligence committees, only after concluding that the underlying intelligence collection activities are

legitimate and necessary, that the new cover authority is needed to protect these activities from disclosure, and that the Department of Defense and the Defense Intelligence Agency are fully and irreversibly committed to careful implementation and rigorous oversight of the commercial activities to be conducted. I would also point out that section 503 contains a number of important safeguards which would:

Restrict the use of commercial cover to collection activities, ensuring that it cannot be used for covert action;

Require that the Director of Central Intelligence concur in the use of the commercial activities authorized;

Mandate strict internal financial controls, as well as full reporting to the intelligence committees of activities conducted pursuant to the cover authority, including prompt notice to the committees each time a corporation, partnership, or other legal entity is established; and

Terminate the authority in 5 years, a provision that would ensure a thorough review of this authority by the intelligence committees before it could be renewed.

With all of these oversight safeguards, I am confident that the Department of Defense will utilize the proposed authority prudently, paying close attention to the intelligence risks involved as well as to the potential for financial abuse.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, there are two matters of particular interest to me that, while not treated in the bill before the House today, involve significant issues of intelligence oversight.

The first concerns provisions contained in the intelligence authorization bill passed by the Senate dealing with congressional oversight of intelligence activities in general and approval and reporting of covert actions in particular. These provisions, found in title VII of the Senate bill, are not contained in this House authorization. However, our committee's decision not to include them reflected a desire to pursue related issues with the administration, not a judgment that the Senate provisions are not acceptable. If, as is likely, the House conferees bring most of the provisions in title VII back in the conference agreement, I will, of course, discuss their content and background fully at that time. I would note now, however, that most of these provisions were endorsed by the Foreign Affairs and Intelligence Committees in 1988, and recommended by the Iran-Contra committees in their 1987 joint report. I mention this now only because I participated directly in the drafting of the 1988 provisions upon which title VII is based and because a recent lobbying effort seeks to portray the Senate provisions as providing broad new authority for the conduct of covert actions, with a corresponding lessening of congressional oversight. That is not an accurate characterization of these provisions. In fact, title VII would impose a number of new requirements, limitations, and prohibitions on the process for Presidential approval of covert

actions and the reporting thereof to Congress, thereby increasing the ability of the intelligence committees to conduct adequate oversight.

The second issue I would like to mention involves physical searches conducted in the United States to collect intelligence information. I believe it would surprise most Americans, including many Members of Congress, that such searches, including the surreptitious entry of the homes of American citizens, occur periodically--without a court order of any kind and without statutory authorization. I and other members of the committee have been troubled by this state of affairs for several years and believe it is important to impose a requirement that a court order be obtained to safeguard the privacy rights of our citizens whenever the FBI seeks to conduct a physical search for the purposes of intelligence collection. My subcommittee conducted a hearing on this issue in May, and had hoped to include physical search legislation in this authorization bill. However, because our legislative recommendations were going to be reported so late in the session, sufficient time did not remain for the Judiciary Committee to fully consider the measure. Therefore on September 12, primarily for discussion purposes I introduced H.R. 5588, the Intelligence Search Procedures Act. It would subject physical searches to essentially the same court order requirements that were successfully applied to foreign intelligence electronic surveillance in 1978. I want to alert my colleagues to the issues addressed in H.R. 5588, and I look forward to addressing its provisions in the next Congress. In my judgment, due process and the fourth amendment to the Constitution require that independent judicial review and a court order be secured before a private citizen is subjected to a physical search by the Government.

Mr. Chairman, during the course of our consideration of this bill a number of important amendments will be offered relating to so-called covert operations. I look forward to debating those issues. Regardless of how they are disposed of, however, I urge my colleagues to support this authorization bill on final passage.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, as I was reciting the litany of excellent staff people, I forgot one of our most valuable staff members, Mr. Dick Gieza. Forgive me, Mr. Gieza. Also, Mr. Mike O'Neill, our very skilled clerk.

Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Combest].

[Page: H10025]

Mr. COMBEST. Mr. Chairman, I want to also join with the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Hyde] and others in expressing appreciation to the Chair, and to the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Hyde] and other members as well as the staff of the committee. I think those who are on the committee, in the atmosphere in which we work, work very well together, with concern for the best interests of the country.

Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of this authorization for the intelligence community for the next year. I would encourage my colleagues who have not made it available to themselves to go to H.R. 405 of the Capitol and look at the Classified Annex which is available to Members of Congress to see what it is that some of these funds are expended for.

As was mentioned earlier, it is difficult and I guess impossible to speak about some of the things that are in the budget for intelligence authorizations. I think it is very important that Members look at what is happening in terms of reality and what is happening in terms of, I think, responsibility by the intelligence community, and certainly by the committee. As we are experiencing and have been now for several months a basic breaking out of peace all over the world, certainly in some of the most sensitive areas, and areas we have been concerned of in the past, primarily the Soviet Union, I think it is important to note that there are still real problems which exist, as evidenced today in the Persian Gulf, and in what is referred to as the gulf crisis.

[TIME: 1500]

I think it is such incidents that point out that in fact while there may be a peaceful breaking out in the world in many areas, there is also a very tremendous need for continuation of a very active and very adequate intelligence community.

In fact, some of us, certainly myself, Mr. Chairman, are of the basic feeling that maybe at a time of build down in other areas this may be a time to look for potential building up of intelligence. As we are pulling back and we are becoming fewer in numbers of Americans around the world in sensitive areas, it becomes more and more important that we know exactly what is going on. We can do this basically and primarily only through adequate and efficient intelligence.

We need to make certain that what is being said and being done is actually what is being done.

I think we need to look very carefully that while in the past there has been a tendency to link somewhat the spending levels of the Department of Defense and of the intelligence commuity, that those need to be separated and looked at based on what their own needs, are what their requirements are, and yet while they are many times linked very closely together, they do serve different purposes.

I did not coin the phrase or the idea and I am not even certain who did Mr. Chairman, but I think it is important to point out that intelligence and defense and the consequences of defense and peace are the two areas in this country that every American shares equally in, regardless of income level, regardless of race. Everyone who is in America shares equally in the freedom that we have. I think it has been due to lot of adequate capability that we have had in the past, and I want to be very careful as we move forward that we do not throw away 40 years of potential problems because of 1 year of peace and that we do not move faster than some of our adversaries would like to see us move, that we do not build down in areas in which they would be willing to give up something in their own regard to see us build down in, but rather that we recognize this as something positive, but we also recognize very quickly that can change as rapidly in the other direction as we have changed in the breakout of peace.

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate this opportunity and I thank the gentleman for yielding the time to me.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Shuster], a formidable opponent in this coming election, I might add.

(Mr. SHUSTER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. SHUSTER. Mr. Chairman, I thank my friend, the gentleman from Illinois, for yielding me this time.

Mr. Chairman, several months ago one of America's top spies who had just recently retired was pushing a shopping cart through one of the grocery stores here in the Washington, DC, area and he heard a voice calling to him saying, `We won, we won,' and he turned around to look and see who was calling and what it was all about. It turned out it was another one of America's top spies who also had recently retired, both men having put their lives on the line for their country many times, saying to each other as they stood there with their shopping carts, `We won the cold war. Finally, after 40 years, we won.'

And indeed, Mr. Chairman, we have and it is a cause for celebration, but is also a cause for caution, because we find ourselves in te very American condition of wanting to be so thankful and celebrate and assume that because we have won the cold war, our worries are over, America is indeed secure.

We find ourselves really in a transition year, in a year where the cold war is behind us, a new world order is in front of us with the opportunity for us to help mold that new world order, and yet a world which is still dangerous and te challenge and the risk to us is that we refuse to see the world as ir really is, that we as Americans so naturally want to see it through rose colored glasses because of our fundamental optimist and do not recognize that indeed, it still is a very dangerous world.

As we speak today, Mr. Chairman, throughout Washington in the Embassies of our enemies and up at the United Nations, there are literally hundreds of intelligence agents watching C-SPAN and watching this debate. We have a different kind of audience today who are not only watching the debate, you can bet they are taping the debate as well to send it back home so that they can analyze what we say here today, hoping to discern some shift in our direction, hoping to understand not only what we plan to do in America to preserve and protect the security of our country, but even more importantly, perhaps, hoping to measure the extent of our resolve to continue providing security for our country as we move into this new world order.

Now, we have heard much talk and we are going to hear more today about the idea of eliminating covert operations. Why should we have covert operations when the cold war is over? And yet if we stop and pause and think for a moment, is there any among us who does not wish that we would have had covert operations to tell us what is happening in Iraq? Is there any among us who does not wish that we had very effective convert operations to tell us what was happening in Iran for the past 10 years? Is there any among us who does not wish that we had the kind of operations necessary to know what was happening in Libya and Lebanon so we could get our hands on our hostages and indeed in the killing fields of Cambodia? Is there anybody who eally does not believe that covert operations are very necessary to help provide us with the kind of information we need in order to protect America and to protect American citizens in this dangerous world in which we live?

Yes, it is a changing world, and the targets for intelligence have got to change. The intelligence community, it is no secret, many of them have made their careers by focusing on the Soviet threat, and indeed the Soviets still are the only ones who could blow us to smithereens, but we all acknowledge that there are other threats today. There are other threats which must get more attention. Certainly we must give more emphasis to the narcotics threat, not only to the narcotics threat, per se, but to the narcoterrorism which may well engulf our country in the years ahead.

We have had mnay successes. The intelligence community has had many successes in dealing wiht the narcotics threat. I wish we could talk about them in detail here, but as we all know in the intelligence business, it is only the failures that we can talk about and it is the successes which must go unheralded.

And yes, the terrorism threat, certainly we must focus on that as well. There are new threats. They are very serious threats and we must focus on those threats. We must give the support to the intelligence community which it needs so that it can indeed focus and address these very serious threats facing our countries.

I would close by quoting Felix Dzerzhinsky, the founder of Cheka, the Soviet intelligence system from which came the KGB and virtually the model for all the Marxist intelligence systems and operations in the world. He was talking to Lenin one day and Dzerzhinsky said to Lenin, `the people in the West are wishful thinkers, so what we must do is give them what they want to think.'

We must be very careful, Mr. Chairman, that we do not let this dangerous world in which we live beguile us and guide us and soothe us into thinking that there are not serious dangers out there. We must more than ever provide and protect America, and as we do that we must also reorder our priorities in intelligence to focus on the real and most pressing threats facing us in the decade ahead.

[Page: H10026]

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from California [Mr. Dornan].

Mr. DORNAN of California. Mr. Chairman, there has been some interesting philosophizing in the well today, and I would like to make a contribution to it.

But, first, let me add my congratulations to the staff of the Select Intelligence Committee. I have never seen a better staff on either side of the Hill on any committee or one that operates in a more bipartisan fashion.

Also let me just reiterate what I said yesterday before our discussion on the floor was interrupted with trying to balance the budget of our great country about the people who work for our intelligence agencies. I am just sick and tired of the incessant Hollywood image that most of these fine people are either engaged in drug running or looking the other way when it accurs. And this is not a recent accusation, but goes back to the Vietnam period, indeed all the way back to the middle fifties. The truth is contrary to what one of the greater intellectual fops of our generation, Bill Moyers, perpetrated on television in his pseudo-documentary called `The Secret War', in which he viciously castigated both parties and every administration from Truman on forward. Moyers' argued that somehow or other intelligence agencies run the Government of the United States, not the executive branch or our great parties on this Jenkins Hill. This, of course, is delusional. A leftist fantasy that was shot down when the left-wing loonies at the Christie Institute brought the secret team conspiracy theory into court.

[TIME: 1510]

The intelligence communities of the United States, those excellently trained men and women who come before us as analysts or as advocates of various programs, are the finest public servants I have ever seen in my life.

Now, if the chairman will indulge me just a bit of philosophy: I said on the House floor during the debate on our defense bill to one of our better orators, if not the best, the gentleman from California [Mr. Dellums] that Plato--the greatest of the Greek philosophers--had said that only the dead have seen the end of war. Mr. Dellums got up and said that it was a cynical remark.

Well, a lot of philosophers are cynics.

Other great historians from Josephus to Toynbee have said all of history is military conflict interrupted by very brief periods of peace. Another cynical remark, but historically accurate, unfortunately.

Take one of the oldest of all warlords, Szun Zsu of China, whose books are still taught after three millenia, from Sandhurst to West Point, to the Air Force Academy to the Naval Academy. He said this about warfare: The greatest victor of all is that who wins without ever firing a shot. And that is what every Member in this Chamber dreams for, prays for, will be the outcome of Desert Shield. A victory for freedom. A collapse of the vicious tyranny. An end of the atrocities committed by `Sadist Insane' and his gang in Baghdad. And an end to his cruel occupation without firing a shot.

Now, how do you do that? Well, no less a person than Szun Zsu said that the principal, the cardinal rule of anybody who is faced with conflict or trying to avoid it is to `know thy enemy.' That is what intelligence is all about.

When President Carter was sworn in, bless his peanut-pickin' heart, he did away with about 700 or 800 hardworking, talented people within the CIA with an institutional memory of about a quarter of a century each. We paid a heavy price for that for years to come because there is no replacing the infantrymen. Ask two majority Members who have sons over there involved in Desert Shield right now, Mr. de la Garza and Mr. Costello. The ultimate weapon on the ground is that young soldier, that marine, that sailor. And the ultimate person in intelligence is what we refer to in our abbreviation, humint, human intelligence. That we had no human assets in Baghdad is one of the reasons they were able to mount an operation, even though some voices were saying that an attack was coming. Those voices were heard least by the Kuwaiti Government. We need people of high skill and talent in our intelligence agencies so that we can know in an ever-dangerous world, in spite of the collapse of communism, what is happening around the world.

I mentioned yesterday a General Electric commercial that has been running, it seems like 2 years now, on every serious discussion show across the networks and PBS and CNN. I will close with the two opening lines of that: `Freedom is wonderful, freedom is everything.'

One of these great clerks behind me said every time he sees it he gets goose pimples.

In the defense of freedom, the first line of defense is intelligence, the people who are trying to find out what we are up against.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I have no more requests for time, but I ask unanimous consent that I be permitted to yield whatever time I have left to the gentleman from California [Mr. Beilenson].

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Kanjorski). Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Illinois?

There was no objection.

Mr. BEILENSON. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for that.

Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as she may consume to the gentlewoman from Connecticut [Mrs. Kennelly], a very valuable member of our committee.

(Mrs. KENNELLY asked and was given permission to revise and extend her remarks.)

Mrs. KENNELLY. I thank the chairman.

Mr. Chairman, I rise to support the authorization, I thank the chairman and take this opportunity to commend the staff.

Mr. BEILENSON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to gentleman from Kansas [Mr. Glickman], a member of the committee.

(Mr. GLICKMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. GLICKMAN. Mr. Chairman, first of all, I want to compliment both the gentleman from California [Mr. Beilenson] and the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Hyde] for doing an excellent job of making sure that our intelligence operations are properly monitored and that there is effective oversight to ensure that the appropriate role for intelligence is carried out by our Government.

The purpose of intelligence is to provide informational support for our Government to carry out its defense and foreign policy objectives.

Intelligence does not set policy. On the contrary, it provides the support base and relevant information so that the policymakers in the administration and in Congress can achieve this country's foreign policy and defense objectives.

Intelligence operatives are the servants of others in Government, not the actors; not the initiators of policy. Intelligence must do that in order to not create the mistakes of the past.

I would say that not only Mr. Beilenson and his staff have done an excellent job, but I would compliment the administration, this administration, for doing a better job of understanding the proper role of intelligence and not making the terrible mistakes of the previous administration as it related to intelligence and its role in foreign policy.

Now, as Mr. Shuster and others talked about, those defense and foreign policy objectives of the United States have changed dramatically in the last year. I will not run through the litany of world change in 1989 and 1990, but there is one thing that has changed that I think needs to have more focus by the intelligence community. That has to do with economic intelligence.

With respect to the economic realities of the world, it is important to remember that in this changing world the greatest threat to America is in the economic arena now. It is not in the military arena, it is in the economic arena, both from our allies as well as from our adversaries that we will experience our greatest challenges. These economic challenges are the threats to the American way of life, to jobs, to our ability to produce, to our ability to provide a standard of living second to none in this world.

The intelligence agencies of our Government must be alert to that and must provide appropriate information so that our Government and our policy-makers are able to make those decisions necessary to protect America's interests. And whether those interest have to do with ownership of U.S. assets, U.S. companies, U.S. patents and trademarks, scientific and technical data, or whether they have to do with the protection of U.S. jobs, unfair competition, and all sort of other things that relate to the economic structure of our country, our intelligence agencies must be collecting and providing information and disseminating it to Government policymakers to make sure we know what the rest of the world is doing with respect to economic matters that affect our national interests.

The impact of economic competition in the world on the average U.S. citizen is great. It affects his job; his or her economic security is at stake with what is happening in the world as it is changing. The challenges from Japan, the European Community, Brazil, and a host of other countries to our economic security are significant. Opportunities with respect to changing United States-Soviet relations are great, but so are the emerging challenges from other nations in the world that want to take the lead from the United States in manufacturing, in research in technology and in the financial markets. That is why we must focus as much as possible, and as relevant, making sure our intelligence agencies provide that information base on economic issues.

It has been said that political theory is simply the rationalization of economic self-interest. Our intelligence agencies can and should be a powerful information base to protect our economic self-interest.

[Page: H10027]

Mr. BEILENSON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to our friend, the gentleman from New Mexico [Mr. Richardson].

(Mr. RICHARDSON asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. RICHARDSON. Mr. Chairman, first, this is a very exciting committee to serve on, one of the most interesting. Unfortunately, you can never talk about what you do.

The chemistry between the chairman and the ranking minority member I think has made this committee especially interesting and positive, especially the Chairman who, I think, in his opening remarks laid out what we are trying to do with this intelligence budget.

First it is to scrutinize. Second it is to ensure that we get the best bang for the buck. And I think we are doing that.

I think large credit goes to him and the very fair and impartial and gentlemanly way that he runs the committee. We have to move faster into the new arenas of American national security. The cold war is over. Our intelligence community needs to move into these new areas that have already been discussed, whether they be international narcotics, nuclear proliferation, economic intelligence, drugs, the whole variety of new challenges that are equally of danger to American national security.

[TIME: 1520]

Mr. Chairman, there are going to be two good amendments today on Angola that I commend to this body, good amendments that relate to the end of the cold war and the United States moving into new relationships in the Third World. They are moderate amendments. They are amendments that deal with incentives for peace.

I also commend to my colleagues one amendment that I will have on Cambodia that I believe is consistent with this process of moving away into new challenges, away from cold war issues and into new priorities for American foreign policy.

Mr. BEILENSON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 of the minutes allotted to me by the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Hyde] to the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Traficant].

Mr. TRAFICANT. Mr. Chairman, there was a comment made earlier that intelligence now should be able to tell us what Mr. Hussein is doing. I would like to say that I look at intelligence a little differently.

Mr. Chairman, I think our intelligence community should have played a part in preventing Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in the first place.

I would like to say this to the Members: I think that we are a little preoccupied with war ourselves. Our priorities reflect that in our budget.

Second of all, we have several major government academies. They are all military. We teach our brightest young minds how to be military warriors.

In fact, Mr. Chairman, I have a bill that called for the creation of a national academy of science and technology. I had over 100 cosponsors. After graduation students shall serve 4 years in some Government service other than military and, after it is all over, these students come back and work for the government.

Mr. Chairman, 100 cosponsors said, `Gee, that's a lot of money. We better not look at that this year.'

Mr. Chairman, I would like to just caution our Members about one thing. It is a fact. I heard about Iraq's invasion of Kuwait on the CNN news, just like most of my colleagues did. I literally wonder if our strong chairman with close ties with the intelligence network knew, but I want to know why our intelligence community has satellites that can read the small print off a pack of cigarettes from outer space, but did not see the mobilization of 120,000 troops and 5,000 tanks on the border moving on Kuwait.

Mr. Chairman, I think those are legitimate questions that Congress should ask, and I do not think there are any two better chairmen in the House than the gentleman from California [Mr. Beilenson] and the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Hyde], and I would hope they would work toward those ends.

I have a little amendment today that I am going to be bringing up. I do not care what the chairmen do with it respectively to make it appropriate for this bill. I do not want to see it thrown out in conference. If they are going to be purchasing goods covertly, they can buy American goods overtly, and that is what my amendment does.

Mr. BEILENSON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from California [Mr. Dymally].

Mr. DYMALLY. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from California [Mr. Beilenson], my very good friend, for giving me these 2 minutes, and the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Hyde] for releasing this time so that I could speak.

Mr. Chairman, most of the Members are going to talk about the strategic importance of stopping aid to UNITA. I want to deal with a very human problem today, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee. I want to talk about these children who we have maimed with our bombs.

These beautiful children in the face of tragedy, Mr. Chairman, continue to smile. Why are we doing this to these children? Is it because they are Angolans? I think not. Is it because they are Africans? I think not. Is it because they are Marxists? Certainly we would not be so preposterous to think that these beautiful children are Marxists.

Mr. Chairman, we are doing it because we are blind politically. We are doing it because the cold war continues to rage in Africa, and the victims are these beautiful, innocent children, Mr. Chairman.

We need to stop the armed aid to UNITA so that these children, 55,000, Mr. Chairman, more than the people who reside in the city of Bellflower, CA, which I represent, more than the people who reside in the city of Gardena, which I represent, 55,000 of these innocent children, these women, are maimed because of our bombs in the coffee plantations, and in the schoolyards and on the country roads. That is the reason why I come to the well of the House to appeal to my colleagues as mothers and fathers and uncles, so that they can see the tragedy of our policy in Angola.

I ask my colleagues, `As you listen to the debate today, think about these children. Think about what we are doing to them.'

[Page: H10028]

Mr. BEILENSON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to our distinguished colleague, the gentleman from Oklahoma [Mr. McCurdy].

(Mr. McCURDY asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. McCURDY. Mr. Chairman, I spoke the other day on the rule, so I do not intend to take all this time today, and I will reserve time for addressing the question of Angola during the debate on the amendments.

However, Mr. Chairman, I wanted to rise and comment briefly about the changing environment in intelligence and some of the new challenges that face us.

I think the gentleman from Kansas [Mr. Glickman] spoke articulately on some of the challenges that lie before us, and the gentleman from New Mexico [Mr. Richardson], and I am sure others in this Chamber have as well.

I was also taken by the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Traficant] about CNN. As my colleagues know, it is true that television, mass media, has had a tremendous impact on the change in the world this year. I believe that the television coverage of the events in Eastern Europe accelerated the pace of change that occurred there, and it provides a tremendous resource to us today.

I think many of these political changes, the globalization of the communications, has allowed the aspirations and hopes of people all over the world to be expressed and to feel that they are not isolated. It is only in those countries like Iraq and others, where they do not have free communication, where they do not have free press. Countries such as in Angola, where they still have one-party systems, that do not allow for freedom of expression, we do not see this dramatic change.

So, Mr. Chairman, what I would argue is perhaps it is not a question of whether the U.S. Government ought to be funding CNN, which has been advocated. I think what we need to do is to continue to use our resources in this Government, and the prestige and the diplomacy of this Government, to try to open up those systems so that communication can get there so we can have this cross-fertilization of democratic ideas around the globe.

Also I would like to indicate that the agencies in the intelligence community are going to have to change. They are going to be challeged in a way that they never have been before.

Some have mentioned satellites and capabilities. The real issue is how do we get into the intentions of individuals.

We knew there was a mobilization on the Kuwaiti border, but we did not know the intentions of a dictator because there is no freedom of communication in that one-party country.

We have to improve our human capability to not only understand the intentions of tyrants, and dictators, and people that threaten militarily other nations and freedoms, but also those of competitor governments. It is becoming more that governments are competing economically against the United States, and I think we have to have an understanding of their intentions and capabilities as well.

Mr. Chairman, it is true that the cold war is over.

[TIME: 1530]

The Warsaw Pact threat has diminished, if not totally collapsed. I believe that the changes in the Soviet Union are positive. I am pleased that Mikhail Gorbachev was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. But obviously he did not get the Nobel Prize for economics, because they have a long way to go there, and there is going to be much turmoil and difficulty as they try to make the shift from a Marxist system to more of a cpaitalist system.

Furthermore, when you look at the trends in the future, I think that the nature of threats will change. We have to understand them better. By year 2020 the population of Africa will exceed the combined populations of Japan, North America, Europe, and the Soviet Union. China's population will be eclipsed by India. Brazil will double in population. The claims on global resources will be greater.

We have to have an appreciation of where those strains and challenges are going to be. We need to use our intelligence capabilities to further improve the world's ability to feed itself and to deal with strains on the ecostructure and, of course, the economic competition that could arise as well.

Mr. Chairman, all of these changes are going to challenge the intelligence community, and I believe that a valid, robust intelligence capability is vital to our overall national security.

Mr. BEILENSON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. Burton].

Mr. BURTON of Indiana. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Chairman, I would just like to say in response to my friend, the gentleman from California [Mr. Dymally], that we are all concerned about the loss of life of young children in Angola and the maiming that is taking place of women and children because of the indiscriminate bombing that is taking place and the mines that have been placed in the fields of battle and around villages. But I would just like to say that much of these terrible tragedies have occurred because of Soviet weapons and Cuban weapons that have been used by the Communist MPLA.

As a matter of fact, when the recent attack on Mavinga took place, because they could not bomb at low levels, the MPLA was doing carpet bombing from 30,000 and 35,000 feet so they would not be hit by ground-to-air missiles.

I would just say that we must make absolutely sure, when we are talking about this issue, that we do not misplace the responsibility.

Mr. DYMALLY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BURTON of Indiana. I am happy to yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. DYMALLY. Mr. Chairman, I stated that to Mr. Savimba. I am not here to place blame on UNITA or the MPLA. I am simply here to say, let us stop bombing. Let us save the children.

The CHAIRMAN. All time has expired.

Pursuant to the rule, the bill is considered under the 5-minute rule by title and each title is considered as read. The amendments recommended by the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on Armed Services printed in the reported bill are considered as having been adopted, and are considered as original text for the purpose of further amendment.

The Clerk will designate title I.

Mr. BEILENSON. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the bill be printed in the Record and open to amendment at any point.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from California?

There was no objection.

The text of the bill is as follows:

H.R. 5422

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That this Act may be cited as the `Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991'.

TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 1991 for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the following elements of the United States Government;

(1) The Central Intelligence Agency.

(2) The Department of Defense.

(3) The Defense Intelligence Agency.

(4) The National Security Agency.

(5) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, and the Department of the Air Force.

(6) The Department of State.

(7) The Department of the Treasury.

(8) The Department of Energy.

(9) The Federal Bureau of Investigation.

(10) The Drug Enforcement Administration.

[Page: H10029]

SEC. 102. CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS.
The amounts authorized to be appropriated under section 101, and the authorized personnel ceilings as of September 30, 1991, for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the elements listed in such section, are thoe specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations prepared by the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence to accompany (H.R. 5422) of the One Hundred First Congress. That Schedule of Authorizations shall be made available to the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and House of Representatives and to the President. The President shall provide for suitable distribution of the Schedule, or of appropriate portions of the Schedule, within the Executive Branch.

SEC. 103. PERSONNEL CEILING ADJUSTMENTS.
The Director of Central Intelligence may authorize employment of civilian personnel in excess of the numbers authorized for fiscal year 1991 under sections 102 and 202 of this Act when he determines that such action is necessary for the performance of important intelligence functions, except that such number may not, for any element of the Intelligence Community, exceed two percent of the number of civilian personnel authorized under such sections for such element. The Director of Central Intelligence shall promptly notify the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate whenever he exercises the authority granted by this section.

TITLE II--INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY STAFF

SEC. 201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
There are authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Staff for fiscal year 1991 $27,900,000.

SEC. 202. AUTHORIZATION OF PERSONNEL END STRENGTH.
(a) The Intelligence Community Staff is authorized 331 full-time personnel as of September 30, 1991. Such personnel of the Intelligence Community Staff may be permanent employees of the Intelligence Community Staff or personnel detailed from other elements of the United States Government.
(b) During fiscal year 1991, personnel of the Intelligence Community Staff shall be selected so as to provide appropriate representation from elements of the United States Government engaged in intelligence and intelligence-related activities.
(c) During fiscal year 1991, any officer or employee of the United States or a member of the Armed Forces who is detailed to the Intelligence Community Staff from another element of the United States Government shall be detailed on a reimbursable basis, except that any such officer, employee or member may be detailed on a nonreimbursable basis for a period of less than one year for the performance of temporary functions as required by the Director of Central Intelligence.

SEC. 203. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY STAFF ADMINISTERED IN SAME MANNER AS CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.
During fiscal year 1991, activities and personnel of the Intelligence Community Staff shall be subject to the provisions of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.) and the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403a et seq.) in the same manner as activities and personnel of the Central Intelligence Agency.

TITLE III--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM AND RELATED PROVISIONS

SEC. 301. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
There are authorized to be appropriated for the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund for fiscal year 1991 $164,600,000.

SEC. 302. CIA FORMER SPOUSE QUALIFYING TIME.
Section 204(b) of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act of 1964 for Certain Employees (50 U.S.C. 403 note) is amended by inserting before the period at the end of paragraph (4) `during the participant's service as an employee of the Central Intelligence Agency'.

SEC. 303. ELIMINATION OF 15-YEAR CAREER REVIEW FOR CERTAIN CIA EMPLOYEES.
Section 203 of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act of 1964 for Certain Employees (50 U.S.C. 403 note) is amended by striking out the second sentence and inserting in lieu thereof the following: `Any officer or employee who elects to accept designation as a participant entitled to the benefits of the system shall remain a participant of the system for the duration of his or her employment with the Agency. Such election shall be irrevocable except as and to the extent provided in section 301(d) of this Act and shall not be subject to review or approval by the Director.'.

SEC. 304. SURVIVOR ANNUITIES UNDER CIARDS FOR CERTAIN POST-RETIREMENT SPOUSES.
(a) Computation of Annuities for Other Than Former Spouses: Section 221(n) of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act of 1964 for Certain Employees (50 U.S.C. 403 note) is amended by inserting `or elected under section 226(e)' after `(unless such reduction is adjusted under section 222(b)(5))'.
(b) Survivor Annuities: Section 226 of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act of 1964 for Certain Employees (50 U.S.C. 403 note) is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:
`(e) Upon remarriage occurring on or after the date of the enactment of this subsection to a spouse other than the spouse at the time of retirement, a retired participant whose annuity was not reduced (or was not fully reduced) to provide a survivor annuity for the participant's spouse or former spouse as of the time of retirement may irrevocably elect by means of a signed writing received by the Director within one year after such remarriage, a reduction in the retired participant's annuity for the purpose of providing an annuity for such retired participant's spouse in the event such spouse survives the retired participant. The reduction shall be effective the first day of the month nine months after the date of remarriage. For remarriages that occurred prior to the date of the enactment of this subsection, the retired participant may make such an election within two years after the date of the enactment of this subsection. The retired participant, to the greatest extent practicable, shall pay a deposit under the same terms and conditions as those prescribed for retired employees under the Civil Service Retirement and Disability System under section 8339(j)(5)(C)(ii) of title 5, United States Code. A survivor annuity elected under this subsection shall be treated in all respects as a survivor annuity under section 221(b).'.

SEC. 305. REDUCTION OF REMARRIAGE AGE.
(a) Reduction of Remarriage Age for Survivor and Retirement Benefits: The Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act of 1964 for Certain Employees (50 U.S.C. 403 note), is amended--

(1) in section 221--

(A) in subsections (b)(1)(A) and (b)(3)(C), by striking out `age 60' each place it appears and inserting in lieu thereof `age 55'; and

(B) in subsection (g)(1), by striking out `age sixty' each place it appears and inserting in lieu thereof `age 55';

(2) in section 222--

(A) by striking out `60 years of age' each place it appears in subsections (a)(2), (a)(3)(A), and (b)(2) and inserting in lieu thereof `55 years of age'; and

(B) by striking out `age 60' each place it appears in subsections (b)(3), (b)(5)(A), (c)(3)(C), (c)(3)(D), and (c)(4) and inserting in lieu thereof `age 55'; and

(3) in section 232(b)(1), by striking out `attaining age sixty' in the last sentence and inserting in lieu thereof `attaining age 55'.
(b) Effective Date of Amendments: (1) The amendments made by subsection (a) relating to widows or widowers shall apply in the case of a surviving spouse's remarriage occurring on or after July 27, 1989, and with respect to periods beginning after such date.
(2) The amendments made by subsection (a) relating to former spouses shall apply with respect to any former spouse whose remarriage occurs after the date of enactment of this Act.

SEC. 306. ELECTION BETWEEN CIARDS ANNUITY AND OTHER SURVIVOR ANNUITIES.
Section 221(g) of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act of 1964 for Certain Employees is amended by adding at the end the following paragraph:

`(3) A surviving spouse who was acquired after the participant's retirement shall be entitled to a survivor annuity payable from the fund under this title only upon electing this annuity instead of any other survivor benefit to which he or she may be entitled under this or any other retirement system for Government employees on the basis of a marriage to someone other than the participant.'.

SEC. 307. RESTORATION OF FORMER SPOUSE BENEFITS AFTER DISSOLUTION OF REMARRIAGE.
(A) Survivor Annuity: Section 224 of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act of 1964 for Certain Employees (50 U.S.C. 403 note), is amended--

(1) in subsection (b)(1) after `fifty-five' by inserting `, except that the entitlement of the former spouse to such a survivor annuity shall be restored on the date such remarriage is dissolved by death, annulment, or divorce';

(2) in subsection (c)(1)(B) after `fifty-five' by inserting `, except that the entitlement of the former spouse to such a survivor annuity shall be restored on the date such remarriage is dissolved by death, annulment, or divorce'; and

(3) by adding at the end thereof the following new subsection:
`(e) Notwithstanding subsection (c)(2)(A) of this section, the thirty-month application requirement for a survivor annuity under this section to be payable shall not apply in cases in which a former spouse's entitlement to such a survivor annuity is restored under subsection (b)(1) or (c)(1)(B) of this section.'.
(b) Retirement Benefits.--Section 225 of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act of 1964 for Certain Employees (50 U.S.C. 403 note), is amended--

(1) in subsection (c)(1)(B)(i) by inserting `, except that the entitlement of the former spouse to benefits under this section shall be restored on the date such remarriage is dissolved by death, annulment, or divorce' after `fifty-five years of age';

(2) in subsection (b)(1) after ""fifty-five' by inserting `, except that the entitlement of the former spouse to benefits under this section shall be restored on the date such remarriage is dissolved by death, annulment, or divorce';

(3) by redesignating subsection (e) as subsection (f); and

(4) by adding after subsection (d) the following new subsection (e):
`(e) Notwithstanding subsection (c)(4)(A) of this section, the thirty-month application requirement for benefits under this section to be payable shall not apply in cases in which a former spouse's entitlement to such benefits is restored under subsection (b)(1) or (c)(1)(B) of this section.'.
(c) Health Benefits: Section 16(c) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403a et seq.) is amended by adding after paragraph (2) the following new paragraph:
`(3)(A) A former spouse who is not eligible to enroll or to continue enrollment in a health benefits plan under this section solely because of remarriage before age fifty-five shall be restored to such eligibility on the date such remarriage is dissolved by death, annulment, or divorce.
`(B) A former spouse whose eligibility is restored under subparagraph (A) may, under regulations which the Director of the Office of Personnel Management shall prescribe, enroll in a health benefits plan is such former spouse--

`(i) was an individual referred to in paragraph (1) and was an individual covered under a benefits plan as a family member at any time during the 18-month period before the date of dissolution of the marriage to the Agency employee or annuitant; or

`(ii) was an individual referred to in paragraph (2) and was an individual covered under a benefits plan immediately before the remarriage ended the enrollment.'.
(d) Effective Date: The amendments made by this section shall take effect October 1, 1990. No benefits provided pursuant to the amendments made by this section shall be payable with respect to any period before such effective date.
(e) Compliance With Budget Act: Any new spending authority (within the meaning of section 401(c) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974) provided pursuant to the amendments made by this section shall be effective for any fiscal year only to such extent or in such amounts as are provided in advance in appropriation Acts.

[Page: H10030]

TITLE IV--GENERAL PROVISIONS

SEC. 401. INCREASE IN EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS AUTHORIZED BY LAW.
Appropriations authorized by this Act for salary, pay, retirement, and other benefits for federal employees may be increased by such additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for increases in such compensation or benefits authorized by law.

SEC. 402. RESTRICTION ON CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.
The authorization of appropriations by this Act shall not be deemed to constitute authority for the conduct of any intelligence activity which is not otherwise authorized by the Constitution or laws of the United States.

TITLE V--DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE PROVISIONS

SEC. 501. REIMBURSEMENT RATE FOR CERTAIN AIRLIFT SERVICE.
(a) The Secretary of Defense is authorized to grant the use of the Department of Defense reimbursement rate for military airlift services provided by the Department of Defense to the Central Intelligence Agency if the Secretary of Defense determines that such services are provided in support of authorized intelligence activities.
(b) As used in subsection (a), the term `Department of Defense reimbursement rate' means the amount charged a component of the Department of Defense by another component of the Department of Defense.

SEC. 502. PUBLIC AVAILABILITY OF MAPS, ETC., PRODUCED BY DEFENSE MAPPING AGENCY.
(A) In General: (1) Chapter 167 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new section:

`2796. Maps, charts, and geodetic data: public availability; exceptions
`(a) The Defense Mapping Agency shall offer for sale maps and charts at scales of 1:500,000 and smaller, except those withheld in accordance with subsection (b) or those specifically authorized under criteria established by Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and in fact properly classified pursuant to such Executive order.
`(b)(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Secretary of Defense may withhold from public disclosure any geodetic product in the possession of, or under the control of, the Department, of Defense--

`(A) that was obtained or produced, or that contains information that was provided, pursuant to an international agreement that restricts disclosure of such product or information to government officials of the agreeing parties or that restricts use of such product or information to government purposes only;

`(B) that contains information that the Secretary of Defense has determined in writing would, if disclosed, reveal sources and methods used to obtain source material for production of the geodetic product; or

`(C) that contains information that the Director of the Defense Mapping Agency has determined in writing would, if disclosed, reveal military operational or contingency plans.
`(2) In this subsection, the term `geodetic product' means any map, chart, geodetic data, or related product.
`(c)(1) Regulations to implement this section (including any amendments to such regulations) shall be published in the Federal Register for public comment for a period of not less than 30 days before they take effect.
`(2) Regulations under this section shall address the conditions under which release of geodetic products authorized under subsection (b) to be withheld from public disclosure would be appropriate--

`(A) in the case of allies of the United States; and

`(B) in the case of qualified United States contractors (including contractors that are small business concerns) who need such products for use in the performance of contracts with the United States.'.
(2) The table of sections at the beginning of such chapter is amended by adding at the end the following new item:

`2796. Maps, charts, and geodetic data: public availability; exceptions.'.
(b) Deadline for Initial Regulations: Regulations to implement section 2796 of title 10, United States Code, as added by subsection (a), shall be published in the Federal Register for public comment in accordance with subsection (c) of that section not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.

SEC. 503. USE OF COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES AS COVER SUPPORT FOR INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE.
(a) In General: Chapter 21 of title 10, United States Code, is amended--

(1) by inserting after the chapter heading the following:

`Subchapter

Sec.

`I.

--
---

`II.

--
---

`SUBCHAPTER I--GENERAL MATTERS';

and

(2) by adding at the end the following:

`SUBCHAPTER II--INTELLIGENCE COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES

`431. Authority to engage in commercial activities as security for defense intelligence collection activities.

`432. Use, disposition, and auditing of funds.

`433. Relationship with other Federal laws.

`434. Reservation of defenses and immunities.

`435. Limitations.

`436. Regulations, internal oversight, and legal review.

`437. Congressional oversight.

`431. Authority to engage in commercial activities as security for defense intelligence collection activities
`(a) Authority: The Secretary of Defense, subject to the provisions of this subchapter, may authorize elements of the Department of Defense to engage in such commercial activities as may be necessary for the purpose of providing security for the conduct of authorized intelligence collection activities abroad undertaken by the Department of Defense. The authority of the Secretary under the preceding sentence may not be delegated. No commercial activities may be conducted pursuant to this subchapter after September 30, 1995.
`(b) Interagency Coordination and Support: Any such activity shall--

`(1) be coordinated with, and (where appropriate) be supported by, the Director of Central Intelligence; and

`(2) to the extent the activity takes place within the United States, be coordinated with, and (where appropriate) be supported by, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
`(c) Definitions: In this subchapter:

`(1) The term `commercial activities' means activities that are conducted in a manner consistent with prevailing commercial practice. Such term includes--

`(A) the acquisition, use, sale, storage and disposal of goods and services;

`(B) entering into employment contracts and leases and other agreements for real and personal property;

`(C) depositing funds into and withdrawing funds from domestic and foreign commercial businesses or financial institutions;

`(D) acquiring licenses, registrations, permits, and insurance; and

`(E) establishing corporations, partnerships, and other legal entities.

`(2) The term `intelligence collection activities' means the collection of foreign intelligence and counterintelligence information.

[Page: H10031]

`432. Use, disposition, and auditing of funds
`(a) Use of Funds: Funds generated by a commercial activity authorized pursuant to this subchapter may be used to offset necessary and reasonable expenses arising from that activity. Use of such funds for that purpose shall be kept to the minimum necessary to operate the activity concerned in a secure manner. Any funds generated by the activity in excess of those required for that purpose shall be deposited into the Treasury as miscellaneous receipts. The Secretary of Defense shall ensure that such deposits are made as often as may be practicable.
`(b) Audits: (1) The Secretary of Defense shall assign an organization within the Department of Defense to have auditing responsibility with respect to activities authorized under this subchapter.
`(2) That organization shall audit the use and disposition of funds generated by any commercial activity authorized under this subchapter not less often than annually. Upon the completion of any such audit, the Secretary shall promptly notify the intelligence committees (as defined in section 437(d) of this title) of the results of the audit.

`433. Relationship with other Federal laws
`(a) In General: Except as provided under subsection (b), a commercial activity conducted pursuant to this subchapter shall be carried out in accordance with applicable Federal law.
`(b) Authorization of Waivers When Necessary To Maintain Security: (1) If the Secretary of Defense determines, in connection with the establishment or operation of a commercial activity pursuant to this subchapter, that compliance with the provisions of certain Federal laws and regulations pertaining to the management and administration of Federal agencies would create an unacceptable risk of compromise of an authorized intelligence collection activity, the Secretary may, to the extent necessary to prevent the disclosure of the commercial activity concerned as an instrumentality of the United States, authorize the establishment and operation of the activity notwithstanding those laws or regulations.
`(2) Any determination and authorization by the Secretary under paragraph (1) shall be certified by the Secretary in writing and shall include a specification of the laws or regulations for which compliance by the commercial activity concerned is not required consistent with this section.
`(3) The authority of the Secretary under paragraph (1) may only be delegated to the Deputy Secretary of Defense, an Under Secretary of Defense, or an Assistant Secretary of Defense.
`(c) Federal Laws and Regulations: For purposes of this section, Federal laws and regulations pertaining to the management and administration of Federal agencies are those Federal laws and regulations pertaining to the following:

`(1) The receipt and use of appropriated and nonappropriated funds.

`(2) The acquisition or management of property or services.

`(3) Information disclosure, retention, and management.

`(4) The employment of personnel.

`(5) Payments for travel and housing.

`(6) The establishment of legal entities or government instrumentalities.

`(7) Foreign trade or financial transaction restrictions that would reveal the commercial activity as an activity of the United States Government.

`434. Reservation of defenses and immunities
`Commercial activity undertaken pursuant to this subchapter, including the submission to judicial proceedings of a State, shall not constitute a waiver of the defenses and immunities of the United States.

`435. Limitations
`(a) Lawful Activities: Nothing in this subchapter authorizes the conduct of any intelligence activity that is not otherwise authorized by law or Executive order.
`(b) Domestic Activities: Personnel conducting commercial activity authorized by this subchapter may only engage in those activities in the United States to the extent necessary to support intelligence activities abroad.
`(c) Supply to Department of Defense: Commercial activity may not be undertaken within the United States for the purpose of providing goods or services to the Department of Defense, other than as may be necessary to provide security for the activities subject to this subchapter.
`(d) United States Persons: (1) In carrying out a commercial activity authorized under this subchapter, the Secretary of Defense may not permit an entity engaged in such activity to employ a United States person in an operational, managerial, or supervisory position, and may not assign or detail a United States person to perform operational, managerial, or supervisory duties for such an entity, unless that person is informed in advance of the intelligence security purpose of that activity.
`(2) In this subsection, the term `United States person' means an individual who is a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted to the United States for permanent residence.

`436. Regulations, internal oversight, and legal review
`The Secretary of Defense shall prescribe regulations to implement the authority provided in this subchapter. Such regulations shall--

`(1) specify all officials authorized to approve commercial activities under this subchapter;

`(2) designate a single office within the Department of Defense to implement, and to maintain accountability for, all activities authorized under this subchapter;

`(3) require that each commercial activity proposed to be authorized under this subchapter be subject to legal review before the activity is authorized; and

`(4) provide for appropriate internal audit controls and oversight for such activities.

`437. Congressional oversight
`(a) Proposed Regulations: Copies of regulations proposed to be prescribed under section 436 of this title (including any proposed revision to such regulations) shall be submitted to the intelligence committees not less than 30 days before they take effect.
`(b) Current Information: The Secretary of Defense shall ensure that the intelligence committees are kept fully and currently informed of actions taken pursuant to this subchapter, including any significant anticipated activity to be authorized pursuant to this subchapter. The Secretary shall promptly notify the committees whenever a corporation, partnership, or other legal entity is established under this subchapter.
`(c) Annual Report: Not later than January 15 of each year, the Secretary shall submit to the intelligence committees a report on all commercial activities authorized under this subchapter that were undertaken during the previous fiscal year. Such report shall include (with respect to the fiscal year covered by the report)--

`(1) a description of any exercise of the authority provided by section 433 of this title to the Secretary of Defense;

`(2) a description of any expenditure of funds made pursuant to this subchapter (whether from appropriated or nonappropriated funds); and

`(3) a description of any actions taken with respect to audits under section 432 of this title to implement recommendations or correct deficiencies identified in such audits.
`(d) Intelligence Committees Defined: In this section, the term `intelligence committees' means the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.'.
(b) Effective Date: The Secretary of Defense may not authorize an activity under section 431 of title 10, United States Code, as added by subsection (a), until the later of--

(1) the end of the 90-day period beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act; or

(2) the effective date of regulations first prescribed under section 436 of such title, as added by subsection (a).

SEC. 504. DISCLOSURE TO MEMBERS OF CONGRESS OF CLASSIFIED DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY REPORT RELATING TO MILITARY PERSONNEL LISTED AS PRISONER, MISSING, OR UNACCOUNTED FOR.
The Secretary of Defense shall provide to any Member of Congress, upon request, full and complete access to the classified report of the Defense Intelligence Agency commonly known as the Tighe Report, relating to efforts by the Special Office for Prisoners of War/Missing in Action of the Defense Intelligence Agency to fully account for United States military personnel listed as prisoner, missing, or unaccounted for in military actions. The Secretary may withhold from disclosure under the preceding sentence any material that in the judgment of the Secretary would compromise sources and methods of intelligence.[H17OC0-X2]{H10031}elligence.

AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. BEILENSON

Mr. BEILENSON. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. Beilenson: On page 4, line 7:

Strike our `331' and insert in lieu thereof `240'.

Mr. BEILENSON. Mr. Chairman, this amendment merely corrects an error in the drafting of the bill. It is purely technical. I have discussed this and cleared it with my friend, the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Hyde], and I ask for adoption of the amendment.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from California [Mr. Beilenson].

The amendment was agreed to.

AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. RICHARDSON

Mr. RICHARDSON. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. Richardson: On page 25, after line 18, add the following:

TITLE VI--CAMBODIAN NONCOMMUNIST RESISTANCE

SEC. 601. RESTRICTIONS ON ASSISTANCE FOR THE CAMBODIAN NONCOMMUNIST RESISTANCE FORCES.

(a) Restrictions: Funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act may be obligated and expended for assistance for the Cambodian noncommunist resistance forces only as follows:

(1) Any such assistance shall be limited to nonlethal assistance.

(2) Any such assistance shall be consistent with section 906 of the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985 (relating to the prohibition on assistance to the Khmer Rouge).

(3) Any funds to be made available for such assistance shall be allocated for that purpose within 30 days after date of enactment of this Act.

(4) Within 30 days after the conclusion of a comprehensive political settlement involving the 4 Cambodian factions, the unexpended balance of the funds allocated for assistance for the Cambodian noncommunist resistance pursuant to paragraph (3) shall be transferred to such agency of the United States Government as the President may designate. The President may not designate an intelligence agency for purposes of this paragraph. Such funds shall be expended in ways that are consistent with the comprehensive political settlement.

(5) After funds are transferred pursuant to paragraph (4), funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act (and any other funds available to any intelligence agency during fiscal year 1991) may not be obligated or expended by any intelligence agency for assistance for the Cambodian noncommunist resistance forces.

(b) Relation to Foreign Assistance Funds: Funds made available for assistance for the Cambodian noncommunist resistance forces pursuant to this section are in addition to any funds that are made available for assistance for the Cambodian noncommunist resistance forces under the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1991.

(c) Intelligence Sharing and Collection: Subsection (a) does not apply with respect to intelligence sharing or intelligence collection.

(d) Definition of Intelligence Agency: As used in this section, the term `intelligence agency' means any agency within the intelligence community, within the meaning of section 3.4(f) of Executive Order 12333 (December 4, 1981).

[Page: H10032]

Mr. RICHARDSON (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the amendment be considered as read and printed in the Record.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from New Mexico?

There was no objection.

(Mr. RICHARDSON asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. RICHARDSON. Mr. Chairman, this amendment I think is very necessary. I believe it has been worked out. It deals with Cambodia. The purpose of the amendment is to provide a clear expression of congressional approval for the adoption of a consistent approach by the United States in its support for the non-Communist resistance in Cambodia.

Mr. Chairman, it has the further effect of establishing a mechanism within this bill by which the United States will be able to assist in the implementation of a negotiated settlement for Cambodia, as soon as the four factions have concluded an agreement.

Mr. Chairman, I believe that United States policy should seek to advance the Cambodian peace process, which is at a critical juncture. A negotiated solution to the civil war in Cambodia will best guarantee the ability of the people of that country to freely determine their own destiny. That result, which is the best insurance possible against a return to power of the Khmer Rouge, appears to be closer at hand than at any time in memory.

Mr. Chairman, I believe this amendment creates a framework which encourages both the conclusion of the peace agreement and the smooth transition to the challenging days such an agreement will herald. I urge adoption of this amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from California [Mr. Beilenson].

Mr. BEILENSON. Mr. Chairman, the amendment of the gentleman from New Mexico [Mr. Richardson] is acceptable to members of the committee on this side of the aisle. The desire for a peaceful end to the conflict in Cambodia is as bipartisan as the intentions that the Khmer Rouge not be permitted to return to power.

To the extent that this amendment contributes to those ends, it represents a worthwhile addition to the bill. It is my understanding the administration does not object to the amendment. Accordingly, we are prepared to accept the amendment.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. RICHARDSON. I yield to the gentleman from Illinois.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, we are prepared to accept the amendment, with the proviso that the distinguished gentleman from New Mexico [Mr. Richardson] will support his amendment in conference unyieldingly.

Mr. RICHARDSON. The gentleman is correct.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, we are pleased to accept the amendment.

Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. RICHARDSON. I yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. SOLARZ. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Chairman, I want to commend the gentleman for what I think is a very constructive amendment, which should make it possible for us to achieve a broader measure of bipartisan support for our policy toward Cambodia than we have had in this House for some time.

As the gentleman will undoubltedly recall, a few months ago we had a rather vigorous debate on our aid program for the non-Communist resistance in the context of our consideration of the foreign aid bill. Those Members who believed that that kind of assistance is important as a way of facilitating progress toward a peaceful settlement of the Cambodian conflict prevailed.

Since that time, some very significant developments have taken place, the most important of which has been the agreement among the five permanent members of the Security Council on a framework for peace in Cambodia, which was subsequently deemed acceptable by each of the four Cambodian factions, and which has brought us very, very close to the conclusion of an agreement which will end the fighting in Cambodia, provide for the introduction of a U.N. peacekeeping force, and make possible an internationally supervised free and fair election.

This amendment, by making explicit what was implicit, and for making a provision for the transfer of these resources in the intelligence bill to other agencies of the Government once a comprehensive settlement is agreed upon and actually implemented and begins to take effect, has created I think the basis for broad bipartisan support in pursuit of our policy, which represents in my judgment the last best chance we have of bringing peace to Cambodia, and preventing Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouge from returning to power in that country.

Mr. Chairman, I want to commend the gentleman from New Mexico [Mr. Richardson] for his efforts, and I urge the adoption of the amendment.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank the gentleman from New York [Mr. Solarz]. As the gentleman and others have said, the purpose of the amendment is so that this issue is openly debated before the American people.

  • Recent progress in efforts to negotiate an end to the civil war in Cambodia provide reasons for optimist but also offer a perfect opportunity to reevaluate United States policy goals and objectives. At a minimum, U.S. policy should be geared to supporting the peace process in a way that does not strengthen the hand of the Khmer Rouge.
  • The most effective way to accomplish that result is through programs of assistance that are openly connected to the U.S. Government. United States support is thereby well-defined and unmistakable, and the position of the non-Communist Cambodian resistance [NCR] is thereby strengthened both materially and by perception.
  • The foreign aid budget already contains a program of assistance for the NCR. To further the goals of the agreement recently reached in Jakarta, that program should be enhanced in such a way that the non-Communist resistance factions remain able to preserve their places in the negotiation process.
  • An openly acknowledged U.S. assistance effort can support the NCR without weakening the government in Phnom Penh, which would only benefit the Khmer Rouge. Our recent diplomatic initiative toward the Cambodian Government was made with the understanding on both sides that United States foreign aid to the NCR would continue. That program obviously is not an impediment to a meaningful United States role in achieving a Cambodian settlement.
  • The United States foreign aid program for the NCR does not benefit the Khmer Rouge because it does not encourage further military action against the Government. Similarly, it does not embolden the NRC to seek to advance its goals through military means. The overt aid program is therefore most in harmony with a United States policy geared toward resolving the Cambodian situation through free elections rather than force of arms.
  • Concentrating U.S. assistance in an overt program also maximizes whatever leverage we have on the leaders of the NRC factions, particularly Prince Sihanouk. To the extent these leaders value U.S. support, cover changes in funding levels can provide necessary encouragement to adopt a realistic negotiating posture.
[Page: H10033]

Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask the gentleman from New Mexico [Mr. Richardson] a question. The language of this amendment indicates that the unspent funds that the gentleman is talking about would be transferred to any agency recommended by the President.

[TIME: 1540]

There are no limitations on what agencies that could be transferred to.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. OBEY. I yield to the gentleman from New Mexico.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Mr. Chairman, it cannot be an intelligence agency. The transfer would be to any kind of defense account; it would not be to a foreign assistance account.

Mr. OBEY. What language does the gentleman have defining how it might be spent?

Mr. RICHARDSON. The second page of the amendment which deals with the language says, `shall be transferred to such agency of the United States Government as the President may designate. The President may not designate an intelligence agency for purposes of this paragraph.'

Mr. OBEY. But my question is how may this money be spent? May it be spent only for operations with respect to Cambodia, or might it be spent in other ways?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Exclusively for Cambodia.

Mr. OBEY. Where does it say that?

Mr. RICHARDSON. I believe right where I just referred, `shall be transferred to such agency of the United States Government as the President may designate.'

Mr. OBEY. It says the money shall be transferred to another agency, but it does not, as I read the language, have any kind of limitation on how that money might be used once it is transferred.

Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. OBEY. Surely, I yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Chairman, I think the text of the amendment makes it clear that these funds are authorized and appropriated and can be obligated and expended solely for assistance for the Cambodia non-Communist resistance forces.

The amendment also provides in section (a)(2) that: `Any such assistance shall be consistent with section 906 of the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985,' which relates to the prohibition on assistance to the Khmer Rouge.

Mr. OBEY. I understand. I am not concerned at this point about how the money might be spent within Cambodia. My question is could the President use this money to fund any other program he wanted to outside of Cambodia?

Mr. SOLARZ. My interpretation of the amendment is absolutely not.

Mr. OBEY. I would like to know how the gentleman interprets that language, because that is not my interpretation.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. OBEY. I yield to the gentleman from New Mexico.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Mr. Chairman, let me read to the gentleman another relevant section, section (b) of the amendment:

Funds made available for assistance for the Cambodia nonCommunist resistance forces pursuant to this section are in addition to any funds that are made available for assistance for the Cambodian non-Communist resistance forces under the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act.

It is strictly to the Cambodian non-Communist resistance.

Mr. OBEY. It is at this time. The gentleman is telling me that he is certain that it is after the transfer?

Mr. RICHARDSON. That is correct.

Mr. SOLARZ. If the gentleman will yield further, and if I can supplement the observation of the gentleman from New Mexico, I think that is absolutely clear. If there is any ambiguity about it, I think this legislative history should make it absolutely clear. In discussions with the administration which consented to this amendment it was clearly understood that the only purpose for which these funds could, or would or should be used would be for the purposes referred to in the legislation itself, which is the non-Communist resistance in Cambodia.

Mr. OBEY. Let me ask two other questions.

How would the 302(b) numbers be affected with respect to budget authority if there is any remaining funds?

Mr. RICHARDSON. If the gentleman will yield, the funds would go strictly within the Defense Department accounts. They would not go outside of those Defense Department accounts.

Mr. OBEY. Is the gentleman telling me that the funds cannot be transferred to AID?

Mr. RICHARDSON. They could be.

Mr. OBEY. AID is not within the Defense Department account.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Under the purposes of this amendment, the funds subject to the budget act are strictly within the defense appropriaitons account.

Mr. OBEY. Does the gentleman from New York want to comment on that?

Mr. SOLARZ. If the gentleman will yield, my impression is that under this amendment, if the President chooses to transfer money, it cannot be transferred to any other intelligence agency of the Government. But there is no restriction on what other agencies it might be transferred to, so long as they are not intelligence agencies.

Now I would imagine there are all sorts of practical administrative and bureaucratic problems. I doubt that he is going to transfer the money to the Coast Guard. But under the terms of the amendment, if he should choose to transfer it, it can be transferred to any agency which is not an intelligence agency.

Mr. RICHARDSON. If the gentleman will yield, let me just assure the gentleman that we are going to go to conference on this issue very shortly, and I want to assure the gentleman that his concerns would be taken care of, specifically that it would be relegated to the purposes the gentleman said.

Mr. OBEY. How does the gentleman know what purpose it is I want to relegate it to? I mean, here is my problem.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Kanjorski). The time of the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. Obey] has expired.

(By unanimous consent, Mr. Obey was allowed to proceed for 5 additional minutes.)

Mr. OBEY. We have a bill which is classified. We cannot talk about the numbers contained in this bill. We have a program which is classified, moneys which might be, or some which might be, transferred out for another purpose, and at this point I cannot tell what purpose that money might be used for. I cannot tell whether that is going to be counted against the 302(b) ceiling for function 150 account in the budget, for either BA or outlay, and we are supposed to accept the amendment.

Frankly, I am very confused at this point, because we are in the process of adopting a budget which sets specific ceilings for defense, for foreign assistance and for domestic discretionary spending. The administration went to great lengths to try to get a separate cap for foreign assistance, and now my question is whether or not this is going to wind up, or I am wondering whether this may wind up being additional spending within the foreign assistance account above and beyond the 302 numbers, whether this will be counted against our ceiling, whether it will not, and I am trying to figure out about 20 hours after we have passed the initial budget resolution whether we are going to stick to it or not.

[Page: H10034]

Mr. SOLARZ. If the gentleman will yield further, let me say first that if the gentleman from Wisconsin will look on page 2 of the Richardson amendment, it says that such funds shall be expended, assuming they are transferred, `in ways that are consistent with the comprehensive political settlement.' So one thing we do know is that it does have to be for Cambodians.

Second, on the question of how this relates to the 302(b) allocations, I think the answer to that is that that question, which you now raise for the first time, but which is a very legitimate question and in which you certainly have a very real interest, is going to have to be worked out. I have discussed this with people in the administration, and my impression is that insofar as the cap on foreign aid is concerned that they would be prepared to agree to exceptions with that cap with respect to this money.

Mr. OBEY. If that is the case, then therein lies the rub, because the administration wants exceptions to the cap. I do not want exceptions to the cap. I did not want that `turkey' arrangement which the administration worked out with the Congress, but if we get it, I want to know that it is going to be enforced, and I do not want to see foreign aid assistance ceilings breached 20 hours after we have agreed to a budget.

Mr. SOLARZ. I would say, if I may, to my very good friend from Wisconsin, that we may have an honest difference of opinion on this. What I can tell the gentleman is that the overall amount of money requested for Cambodia is not, and which is actually spent on Cambodia will not be increased by this amendment. As the gentleman knows, we have money for Cambodia in a number of different pots. This presumably is one of them, and your bill is another.

Mr. OBEY. If I can reclaim my time, with all due respect, that is not my concern. I am not talking about how much money is going to be spent within Cambodia. My concern is that under the powers given to the OMB under the budget arrangement passed by the Congress, OMB is going to have extraordinary powers to decide who exceeds spending ceilings and who does not. We are giving the administration additional authority to define where money is going to go. We do not know how much. We do not know where and we do not know how it is going to be counted. But we are supposed to support it.

As far as I am concerned, count me out under those circumstances.

Mr. McCURDY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. OBEY. Certainly, I yield to the gentleman from Oklahoma.

Mr. McCURDY. Mr. Chairman, I do not want to interfere with the gentleman's amendment. I share the gentleman's concern. I am curious if in the amendment there was a requirement that a reprogramming action be taken which would thus require votes by the relevant committees, whether that would be preferable or answer the concerns of the gentleman as opposed to a blanket transfer authority that exists in the amendment today?

[TIME: 1550]

Mr. OBEY. That might marginally decrease my concern, but it would not remove my opposition, because as far as I am concerned, the administration has gained incredible authority for scorekeeping under the new budget arrangement. I think we are going to have runaway accounting in OMB under the budget arrangement. In addition to that, we are giving them additional holes through which they can pour money. I think that is a very bad precedent, and I think we ought not to support it.

Mr. RICHARDSON. If the gentleman will yield further, I do not know if he was here in the earlier part of the discussion of this amendment. We cannot discuss these issues as openly as the gentleman wants, but let me just tell the gentleman that the purpose of this amendment is to make the policy, the assistance, open, to open it up.

Mr. OBEY. I understand the purpose. The problem is the effect. Purposes are always wonderful around here. The effects are often screwy. This is one time when I think you achieve that result, and so I simply am going to oppose the amendment if there is a rollcall on it.[H17OC0-X3]{H10034}all on it.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Kanjorski.) The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from New Mexico [Mr. Richardson].

The amendment was agreed to.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Are there further amendments to the bill?

AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. TRAFICANT

Mr. TRAFICANT. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. Traficant: Page 13, after line 14, insert the following new section:

SEC. 403. BUY-AMERICAN REQUIREMENT.

(a) Determination by the Director.--If the Director, with the concurrence of the United States Trade Representative and the Secretary of Commerce, determines that the public interest so desires, the Director is authorized to award to a domestic firm a contract that, under the use of competitive procedures, would be awarded to a foreign firm, if--

(1) the final product of the domestic firm will be completely assembled in the United States;

(2) when completely assembled, not less than 51 percent of the final product of the domestic firm will be domestically produced; and

(3) the difference between the bids submitted by the foreign and domestic firms is not more than 6 percent. In determining under this subsection whether the public interest so requires, the Director shall take into account United States international obligations and trade relations.

(b) Limited Application.--This section shall not apply to the extent to which--

(1) such applicability would not be in the public interest;

(2) compelling national security considerations require otherwise; or

(3) the United States Trade Representative determines that such an award would be in violation of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade or an international agreement to which the United States is a party.

(c) Limitation: This section shall apply only to contracts made related to the issuance of any grant made under this Act for which--

(1) amounts are authorized by this act (including the amendment made by this act) to be made available; and

(2) solicitation for bids are issued after the date of the enactment of this Act.

(d) Report to Congress.--The Director shall report to the Congress on contracts covered under this section and entered into with foreign entities in fiscal years 1990 and 1991 and shall report to the Congress on the number of Contracts that meet the requirements of subsection (a) but which are determined by the United States Trade Representative to be in violation of the General Agreement or an international agreement to which the United States is a party. The Director shall also report to the Congress on the number of contracts covered under this Act (including the amendments made by this Act) and awarded based upon the parameters of this section.

(e) Definitions.--For purposes of this section--

(1) Secretary.--The term `Director' means the Director of Central Intelligence.

(2) Domestic Firm.--The term `Domestic Firm' means a business entity that is incorporated in the United States and that conducts business operations in the United States.

(3) Foreign firm.--The term `foreign firm' means a business entity not described in paragraph (2).

Mr. TRAFICANT (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimoius consent that the amendment be considered as read and printed in the Record.

the CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Ohio?

There was no objection.

Mr. TRAFICANT. Mr. Chairman, last year we passed this similar amendment. It was removed in conference.

I could understand the sensitivity of purchases made in these accounts. I am willing to make the following statements, understanding those dynamics, I am going to request of both the minority vice chairman and the majority chairman that they accept the amendment and tailor and make such classified structural language that may be necessary so that this emphasis be placed on maintaining some taxpayer purchases on our side of the balance line.

I realize there are some significant questions. I appreciate the fact that you had accepted it last year, but I am going to encourage you to make such adjustments and to try and keep it in as a procurement policy with whatever changes you deem so necessary.

Mr. BEILENSON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

[Page: H10035]

Mr. TRAFICANT. I am happy to yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. BEILENSON. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Chairman, I would say to the gentleman and to my colleagues that the committee has had an opportunity to examine the gentleman's amendment.

We note that the amendment makes discretionary with the Director of Central Intelligence the use of the authority conveyed with respect to contract awards. In addition, we note that an exception is provided for compelling national security considerations.

I believe these provisions will address concerns which might otherwise be raised by the intelligence agencies.

With those understandings, we on this side of the aisle are prepared to accept the amendment, I say to the gentleman, and that we will do our level best, and I hope, frankly, this year we will be successful to keep the gentleman's language in in conference.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. TRAFICANT. I am happy to yield to the gentleman from Illinois.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I commend the gentleman. I think it is an excellent amendment. We are certainly happy to accept it on this side and pledge to fight for it in conference.

I have no illusions about how we will fare in conference, but I am ever optimistic. I intend to fight for the gentleman's amendment.

If it needs technical correction, we will get that. I think it is a good idea, and we are happy to accept the amendment.

Mr. TRAFICANT. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate it. I would also like to say that I appreciate the support of the subcommittee chairman, the gentleman from Oklahoma [Mr. McCurdy], on the issue we have discussed and really want it to be known that whatever changes you make, as long as the integrity of the amendment is in there, I appreciate the support.

Mr. McCURDY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. TRAFICANT. I am happy to yield to the gentleman from Oklahoma.

Mr. McCURDY. Mr. Chairman, of all the agencies of the Federal Government, I believe the intelligence community is the one that probably could manage a buy-American amendment the easiest. I have no problem at all, whatsoever, with the amendment as long as those exceptions are provided in unique areas.

But, for the most part, the intelligence community is probaly personnel-driven more than capital, but we need to obviously focus on American-made products and help with competitiveness.

Mr. TRAFICANT. I appreciate the remarks of the gentleman.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Traficant].

The amendment was agreed to.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Are there further amendments to the bill.

AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. DELLUMS

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. Dellums: at the end of the bill, add the following:

TITLE IV--ASSISTANCE FOR MILITARY OR PARAMILITARY OPERATIONS IN ANGOLA

SEC. 601. DECLARATION THAT THE UNITED STATES SHOULD NOT SUPPORT MILITARY OR PARAMILITARY OPERATIONS IN ANGOLA UNLESS SUCH SUPPORT HAS BEEN OPENLY ACKNOWLEDGED AND PUBLICLY DEBATED.

The Congress finds that the United States Government--

(1) should not provide `covert assistance' in support of military or paramilitary operations in Angola; and

(2) should provide assistance in support of such operations only if the provision of that assistance is the openly acknowledged policy of the United States.
It is, therefore, the sense of the Congress that the United States Government should not provide any such assistance until the President has publicly informed the Congress and the American people that United States Government support for military or paramilitary operations in Angola is important to the national security and the Congress has expressly approved such assistance.

SEC. 602. PROHIBITION ON COVERT ASSISTANCE.

(a) Any Support Must Be Openly Acknowledged: During fiscal year 1991, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, or any other agency or entity of the United States involved in intelligence activities may not obligate or expend any funds--

(1) to conduct, directly or indirectly, military or paramilitary operations in Angola, or

(2) to provide any financial, material, or other assistance, directly or indirectly, to any group engaged in military or paramilitary operations in Angola,
unless the use of funds for that purpose is the openly acknowledged policy of the United States Government, as determined in accordance with subsection (b).

(b) Presidential Request and Congressional Approval.--In order to ensure that any United States Government support for military or paramilitary operations in Angola is openly acknowledged, funds may be used for the purposes described in subsection (a) only if--

(1) the President determines that United States Government support for military or paramilitary operations in Angola is important to the national security and submits to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate a request that the Congress approve openly acknowledged United States Government support for those operations; and

(2) the Congress enacts a joint resolution approving United States Government support for military or paramilitary operations in Angola.
Any such support may be provided only to the extent permitted by that joint resolution.

(c) Interpretation of Limitation.--Nothing in this section should be construed to prohibit the obligation or expenditure of funds for--

(1) United States diplomatic activities;

(2) activities of the United States Armed Forces which are reported to the Congress pursuant to section 4(a) of the War Powers Resolution; or

(3) assistance provided through the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees or the International Committee of the Red Cross.

(d) Relationship With Other Laws.--The requirements of this section may not be waived under the authority of any other provision of law This section supersedes any provision of law which might otherwise be construed to allow funds to be used for the purposes described in subsection (a). This section shall be superseded only by a provision of law that states explicitly that it is intended to supersede this section.

Mr. DELLUMS (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the amendment be considered as read and printed in the Record.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from California?

There was no objection.

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee, this is a significant afternoon. It has been a very long time since we have had any discussion of this issue.

I listened very carefully during the general debate, and I wrote down a few quotes from a number of my colleagues: `Know thy enemy; in spite of the collapse of communism, we must have intelligence-gathering capability,' et cetera, as a justification for secret activity.

It is not to this activity that this amendment goes, but, rather, to the activity of covert operations which, Mr. Chairman, and members of the Committee, allow our Nation to carry out policy outside the framework of public scrutiny, public debate, and public accountability with the exception of a few members of the executive branch and the legislative branch of Government.

In this gentleman's humble opinion the whole notion of covert operations flies in the face of an open and democratic society. But we will have that debate later where the broader issue of the role of covert activity in our Nation will be debated and hopefully debated at a very high level.

This amendment goes to one covert operation, Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee. It goes to our covert aid to UNITA in Angola, and I would like to begin, Mr. Chairman, where one of my colleagues on the other side of the aisle began his remarks in general debate. He said. `The cold war is behind us. The new world order is in front of us.' I would begin there.

I would like to lay out for my colleagues, Mr. Chairman, a number of major themes that will come out in the course of this debate with respect to Angola, because I believe, and will assert here, that the funding of the UNITA guerrillas is a cold war anachronism.

My colleague just said without challenge that the cold war is over. So why then are we carrying out the cold war on the continent of Africa where thousands of black African people die and children die, are maimed, harmed, destroyed because of the cold war?

Yet, the Berlin Wall is down. We are talking about peace as a result of the end of the cold war. The West just gave Mr. Gorbachev a great accolade, but we want to continue covertly to provide aid to UNITA in Angola.

It is a cold war anachronism. I would assert, further, Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, that this funding represents an unnecessary and expensive drain on limited resources.

I would remind my colleagues that we are in the throes

of a major, major economic crisis in this country, and I do not believe that it is because of frivolous reasons.

There are major policy differences between and among us here as to why we cannot come to grips with the budget. They are substantial, but one thing we all agree upon is that our resources are limited.

This is a limited-dollar environment, and within this framework, we are providing covert dollars that I will show have wreaked incredible havoc on the people of Angola. It is unnecessary, and it is expensive.

Third, Mr. Chairman, I would assert further that covert activities fly in the face of Democratic ideals and the open conduct of foreign policy.

[Page: H10036]
[TIME: 1600]

Our foreign policy ought to be open, Mr. Chairman. It should not be made in the dark. I am not talking about gathering intelligence. I am talking about carrying out policy.

This is a democratic society. This is a magnificent exercise to stand on this floor and be able to, for whatever part of the country, whatever political framework, whatever value framework, to debate issues openly. If it makes sense to provide aid, military assistance to UNITA and Angola, why should it not be dealt with in the open? Why should American people, as in most other issues, be able to say we support or we do not support? Mr. Chairman, this new world order is going to require greater understanding, greater communication, greater cooperation between and among the nation states.

I would suggest a covert operation, as we move forward on the other side of the cold war is anachronistic, and threatens the very notions of our democratic ideals. The world is rushing toward democracy. Covert operations threaten those ideals.

Further, Mr. Chairman, I assert covert activities by their nature are often doomed to failure at worst, and constitute embarrassment at the best. If it makes sense do it in the open.

(By unanimous consent, Mr. Dellums was allowed to proceed for 5 additional minutes.)

Mr. DELLUMS. UNITA is not a freedom fighting organization. It is not. It is a surrogate, carrying out cold war struggles. Last, I will debate Members all day. Mr. Chairman, numerous reports of human rights abuses by UNITA, no laughing matter. The gentleman laughs, Mr. Chairman. Our covert activity has resulted in the death of 341,000 people, 55,000 children dead. No laughing matter. Amputees by the thousands. No laughing matter. This is serious business here.

My distinguished colleague from California showed pictures of children with one leg, one arm, some with no legs and no arms. This is no laughing matter. I appreciate my opportunity to come here to speak on this issue, make it open.

Mr. Chairman, the focus of this amendment does three things: It requires, first, that the United States not provide

covert assistance in support of military or paramilitary operations in Angola. Second, that support should be openly acknowledged. Third, any open support must be requested by the President of the United States and approved by Congress. It is a very radical extreme idea, that a President in a free and open society should have to request military and paramilitary assistance. The Congress of the United States should have the right to approve a very radical and subversive idea. What are we communicating to the other nations in the world who believe that our form of government is magnificant, for the United States to feel that the President and the Congress should not be able to do that? A few people in the dark arrange and frame covert activity?

Mr. Chairman, I did not participate in general debate. I ask my colleagues to indulge me to allow me to make 2 additional comments. One, I want to focus on the role of the Angola in the situation, and finally the role of the United States. The Government of Angola has made a number of good will gestures toward the United States in order to improve bilateral relations, foster regional peace, and to bring an end to this brutal 15-to-16-year war. In that regard, Mr. Chairman, with your indulgence, I would like to read only in part, from a letter that was sent to the chairman of the Select Committee on Intelligence and others, from the President of the People's Republic of Angola, Mr. Dos Santos.

I am certain that you are aware that the Angolan government is an advanced phase of preparation regarding its reform form with the following objectives: one, the holding of free elections within the context of a multiparty system; creation of a one-person-one vote electoral system; development of a market economy; encouragement of foreign investment; enacting amendments to our constitution and their submission to debate before their approval with the participation of all the national political elements including UNITA, as long as they demilitarize themselves under the framework of the development of a single national army which has been discussed during the contacts held in Portugal.

Finally, I read from this letter,

My government, is a letter addressed to Congressman Beilenson, chair of the House of Representatives Intelligence Committee, manifests a favorable position regarding the Triple Zero plan so long as the United States and its allies also agree not to supply more military aid to UNITA. This political initiative, which I introduced, will certainly be subjected to international verification.

Mr. Chairman, more than half of the 50,000 Cuban troops stationed in Angola have been sent home ahead of schedule by the government under the terms of the United States brokered peace agreement among Angola, Cuba, and South America. Privatization of Angolan economy has been increased to encourage more United States and Western investment. Currently, the United States, Mr. Chairman, is Angola's No. 1 trading partner. The Government has offered amnesty to UNITA, and has agreed to allow UNITA members to run in elections.

(By unanimous consent, Mr. Dellums was allowed to proceed for 5 additional minutes.)

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate my colleagues' indulgence. FMLA, another rebel movement formerly backed by our CIA members, have accepted amnesty proposal. Mr. Chairman, many now occupy high positions in government and industry in Angola.

in government and industry in Angola.

Mr. Chairman. let Members now look at the U.S. role. Sadly, this administration, unfortunately, has not seized the initiative to build upon an enhanced opportunity for peace in Angola. Instead, it has escalated arms shipments to UNITA and has actively encourage the leadership to scuttle peace plans offered last year by the Angolan Government with the support of 18 African leaders and the Organization of African Unity.

Mr. Chairman, the Soviet Union's assistance to Angola has been reduced. The Soviets have publicly agreed to end arms shipments to Angola if the United States would stop funding UNITA. Angola has agreed that if the United States ended aid to UNITA and the Soviet Union cut off arms supplies, that it, Angola, would not go to any other source for arms. Only the United States has not taken the necessary step that would complete this circular movement, Mr. Chairman, and end the arms shipment to both parties.

The gentleman from California [Mr. Dymally] in a very dramatic and compassionate way said, `I am not placing blame. Let's stop the arms, stop the killing, and save the children.' I underscore his remarks for the purpose of emphasis. Mr. Chairman, while the Angolan Government is attempting to renew peace talks with UNITA, an opportunity for peace in Angola is more possible than at any time in the past. The United States, UNITA's principal backer, has not encouraged them to join multinational negotiations. The United States ignores the fact that the Organization of African Unity opposes UNITA and United States aid to them.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, let me point out and go back and recount what has taken place in human terms. The country has the highest amputee rate in the world. More of the amputees, most of them are women and children, and more than 50,000 children are war orphans, and more than 800,000 civilians face starvation resulting from the combined effect of war and drought. Property damage from the war is estimated at more than $20 billion. Every 4 minutes an Angola child dies. Constantly, the beleaguered land has the world's highest infant mortality rate. Mr. Chairman, compassion and wisdom cries out for the United States to open up this process. I believe we ought to end it.

We, as a great and mighty nation, ought to be trying to move these people to the table, not trying to spur more death and destruction.

[Page: H10037]
[TIME: 1610]

The cold war is over. A new era is in front of us and let us march forward finally.

Wearing my hat as chairman of the Congressional Black Caucus, let me assert this. I do not often assert race on the floor casually. Whenever I rise, I do it seriously because I believe it. We would not tolerate this in other countries, thousands of people dying, children, amputees, orphans. We would rise up in righteous indignation, but here blacks are dying.

If peace is good on the other side of the cold war in Eastern Europe, and I believe that, and I want to support it and do, then it is good for Africa and good for Third World countries as well.

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I ask my distinguished colleagues, all of you, to take this out of the context of the East-West struggle and see it in human terms, see the devastation that is taking place and join me in adopting this amendment and ending this madness.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I guess the assumption that one should draw from the remarks of the distinguished gentleman from California is that because these are black children, somehow they are unimportant, but I reject that notion altogether. It is the black children that I am worried about, too; but I am worried about Soviet land mines that are left behind. I am worried about the Communists who are pouring in $500 million this year, as against $800 million last year.

You say the cold war is over. There is a hot war going on in Angola right now and one-third of the people are represented by UNITA, Mr. Savimbi, and they are dying, too.

So yes, let us stop the killing. You can always stop killing. Surrender, give up, turn it over to the Soviet Union. They are still there. Their personnel are there. They are in the front lines. They have launched an offensive within the last 2 months and they are getting ready to do another one.

Yes, stop the killing, but stop the killing on their side.

Freedom, democracy, human dignity, human rights, that is what the gentleman has directed his career toward. That is what we want, to support UNITA in Angola.

The gentleman took the floor in 1976, I hae his remarks here, and he made predictions that if we would stop helping the UNITA, the Communists would leave. The only reason that the Communists are in there is because we were helping one of these factions.

Well, the gentleman prevailed. The Clark amendment, the Tunney amendment passed and for 10 years we did not send a quarter over there. Did the Soviets leave? They are there today, 15 years later, directing the military operations of the Communist MPLA.

As for pictures of children with their legs off, we can show you films of children starving in the UNITA sections of the country because the Communists will not tell Zambia, they will not tell Namibia that it is all right to send United Nations food in there.

Starving kids look just as bad as children with their limbs off.

Now, covert acton, covert activities are somehow unsuitable for a democracy. Well, we have had covert action since the says of Nathan Hale, and let me quote from one of the icons of the Democratic liberal pantheon, Mr. Clark Clifford, who testified before our committee on February 24, 1988. He was saying how terrible, how unworthy it is for a democracy to engage in covert activity.

Reminds me of the time Queen Victoria opposed submarines. It was an un-British way to fight under water.

Well, I asked Mr. Clifford this question:

Let me ask you, I take it when you were in the Truman Administration, you opposed the covert activity that helped save Italy in the post-war years from being taken over by the communists who were pouring millions of dollars in there? Your distaste for covert activity, I take it, was expressed in the Truman Administration?

Mr. Clifford. No. I heartily supported it.

Mr. Hyde. That is one covert activity you supported?

Mr. Clifford. I sure did. And it was very successful.

Mr. Hyde. Then you support the successful ones, but not the unsuccessful ones?

Mr. Clifford. No. That is not the point. Here was a carefully structured plan to meet the communist menace in Italy. They were making an all-out plan to get a communist government in Italy. Careful, lengthy study indicated to us that the proper, intelligent use of funds in Italy might prevent that from occurring.

So we did it. We did it successfully. I would do it today. That is a very useful covert activity.

Mr. Hyde. That is my point. You are not against all covert activity?

Mr. Clifford. Oh, my, no.

So I cite him as an example of somebody who can teach us a lesson on a very successful salvation of Italy from being taken over by the Communists after World War II by use of covert activity.

Now, the amendment that the gentleman is offering is a drastic amendment. It absolutely renounces, regardless of what the future might hold, the possibility of a United States covert action to support the freedom fighters in Angola.

Now, the gentleman rejects that characterization of UNITA as freedom fighters. All UNITA wants is free and fair elections and a cease-fire. That is all they want.

Mr. Savimbi has conceded four things. First, dos Santos stays as President.

Second, the MPLA is legitimate.

Third, no interim government.

Fourth, we will reduce our fighting while you change your constitution from a one-party government to a multiparty government. All we want is a date for elections.

Do you know what dos Santos has conceded? Zip, zero, zilch.

Why, we even had Mr. dos Santos, the President, on a satellite hookup and the gentleman from New York [Mr. Solarz] asked him when would he set a date for free and fair elections?

May I ask the gentleman from New York [Mr. Solarz], the gentleman did not get an answer, did he?

Let the record show that the gentleman from New York [Mr. Solarz] is shaking his head in the customary `no' symbol.

This amendment cuts off covert aid to people who have been fighting for years for free elections, for a multiparty government and for a cease-fire, and they do not enjoy this war. They do not enjoy starving, but the Communists are still in there. They are in there 15 years after some of you, and I have got it all here, I have got a great quote from the gentleman from New York [Mr. Solarz].

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Kanjorski). The time of the gentleman from Illinois has expired.

(At the request of Mr. Dellums, and by unanimous consent, Mr. Hyde was allowed to proceed for 5 additional minutes.)

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I gratefully accept the gentleman's tender of additional time.

Now, this amendment would eliminate a third option for the United States in Angola, covert action. To help UNITA under this amendment, the President would have to announce it to the world and Congress has to debate and approve it. In the meantime, UNITA starves to death, stands naked against another offensive.

This amendment is the mirror image of one offered by the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. Hamilton] in 1986, September 17, and was defeated 229 to 186.

We have got a House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. We have a Senate Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. Have we got staffs? We have staffs. They are experts. They are skilled. They know their business, and we are designated by Congress and by the law to oversee covert activity, and we talk to them daily, weekly, and monthly on what they are doing and how they are doing it and who is doing it. We are the designated surrogates for the House and for the Senate. That was done because a lot of this information cannot be revealed to the public. Why not? Because other countries are involved occasionally. We cannot do it alone. This is an interdependent world. When we are fighting drugs, when we are fighting terrorists, and we are fighting tyranny, other countries cooperate with us, but they will not if the fact of their cooperation or the extent of their cooperation is made a matter of public record.

So you deny us the opportunity to stand for freedom, free elections, human rights, human dignity in Angola, and it is important.

My God, do you think we want to send our treasure over there? We are already scrambling to try to balance our budget, should we send money over to a continent far away if we do not care? Do you think we want to establish a new colony over there? No, but we are committed to fighting Communist tyranny, whether it is in Afghanistan or whether it is in Cambodia or whether it is in Angola.

So I suggest to you this is an ill-advised amendment. It is reviving the Clark amendment which we put to bed 5 years ago, which had lasted for 10 years and which did not do what they said it would do, namely, diminish Soviet influence in Angola.

[Page: H10038]
[TIME: 1620]

They are still there as we speak. And I hope the gentleman's amendment is rejected.

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield to me?

Mr. HYDE. I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. DELLUMS. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

I certainly do not wish to dominate this debate. There are a number of other people who will be talking.

Let me just first say to my distinguished colleague I choose not to allow this debate to deteriorate into a personality challenge between the gentleman and myself. This is a contest of ideas. I did not quite understand when the gentleman said I used my 15 minutes. I do not mind how long a person takes to debate an issue. My colleague knows full well that I do not speak in the well of this House often. When I do, I try to make my points cleanly.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I personalized the debate because the gentleman is the embodiment of his side of the argument and if he and I can argue it is the same as arguing with the House on this. I am sorry, I mean no disrespect. I have consummate respect for the gentleman.

Mr. DELLUMS. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate keeping it at that level.

Let me make three quick responses. With respect to the Soviet Union's continued existence there, the gentleman knows the record is replete with the fact that the South African Government was shipping arms and continued to ship arms to UNITA.

No. 2, with respect to food, food corridors have been established. The Angolan Government has agreed to the establishment of them.

Finally, I just want to repeat what this amendment does; it says the United States should not provide covert assistance, it says any support should be openly acknowledged and it says any open support must be requested by the President and approved by the Congress of the United States.

So if the gentleman wants to do it, this gentleman is saying do it out in the open and let us debate it, not in a covert manner.

Mr. HYDE. This gentleman would direct the gentleman from California to the staff of the Intelligence Committee for an update, up-to-date information on the subject of starvation in Angola and in the UNITA-held territories.

The gentleman will find, contrary to what he just said, that food is not getting in there, because they cannot get permission from the Dos Santos government. Both Zambia and Namibia will not permit food to go in until they get the OK from Dos Santos. That is the latest information.

I yield further to the gentleman.

Mr. DELLUMS. And I appreciate that.

I think we ought to debate on the issue being asserted. What I said was that food corridors have now been established. In my remarks I said people are starving as a result of drought and hunger. I made that statement openly and asserted that.

So at that point the gentleman and I agree. What I want to end is this covert activity that precludes our capacity to provide support.

Mr. HYDE. Well, I do not agree with the gentleman that that is why people are starving. Drought and hunger have a lot to do with it.

But I would suggest the Communist MPLA government, the government will not permit adjoining governments who do not want to be publicly involved to ship food in. That is a volitional action by the Communist government.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The time of the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Hyde] has expired.

(By unanimous consent, Mr. Hyde was allowed to proceed for 5 additional minutes.)

Mr. HYDE. As far as covert activity is concerned, covert activity is a necessary tool to be used by any Executive. It has been used since the days of George Washington.

The question is whether it is widely used or abusively used.

I would suggest to the gentleman, trusting Mr. Beilenson, trusting the committee, trusting the Senate committee--it is bipartisan and in fact overwhelmingly is it dominated by the majority party in our House--we know what we are doing, and I think you can trust us. Otherwise you destroy the availability of the covert option for the President and many times it is most useful and necessary, primarily when other countries do not want their cooperation with us a matter of public record. And to handcuff the President on Angola or anywhere else is just unwise.

Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. DELLUMS. I thank my colleague.

I know that a number of my other colleagues are going to answer you subsequently. Let me raise another point when you mentioned trusting the gentleman from California and trusting the distinguished gentleman from Illinois, that I have great trust in both gentlemen. That is not the issue. I have trust in the members of the committee.

But the other day I voted against a package that was based on summitry which precluded my capacity to participate openly in the process. A number of colleagues on both sides of the aisle joined me in bringing down the whole motion of summitry where a handful of people make deals in the back room. What I am saying is let us not make policy in the back room; do it in the open. Let us, you and I, earn our income out front. I do not question the gentleman's veracity or the gentleman's activity. I am just saying this is a body of 435 people; let us all participate in the process.

Mr. HYDE. Well, the gentleman just does not think covert activity is appropriate for a democracy, and I cite Clark Clifford as someone who thinks it is a great idea, especially when it works. We have used it for years and years and years. And if the gentleman denies us the opportunity to use covert activity, he denies us the cooperation of other countries in the world on terrorism, in narcotics, and in so many other ways. And that would be a self-blinding and deafening of our country at a time when, despite the euphoria that sweeps over central Europe, it is still a very perilous world.

Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from Indiana.

[Page: H10039]

Mr. BURTON of Indiana. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Covert activities in this particular instance is extremely important, I would say to my colleague from California. The fact of the matter is not too long ago--and I alluded to this a few moments ago in my discussion with Mr. Dymally--there was an attack from Guido Carnavale on Mavinga. At that particular time it was well known or it became known that UNITA was short on petrol. They were short on gasoline.

I submit to my colleague that may be one of the reasons that attack took place.

Now, if Dr. Savimbi, during these very important negotiations that we hope will end up with a peaceful agreement, during these very important negotiations, if the MPLA perceives they are short of ammunition or short of gasoline or short of any kind of supplies, an attack will take place. Now, that attack did take place on Mavinga and they did carpet bombing from 35,000 feet and thousands of innocent people were killed or maimed. Maybe some of the people in the pictures we saw earlier which Mr. Dymally has shown, maybe they were casualties of that conflict.

But the fact of the matter is that it is extremely important that this be covert. If you start telegraphing what we are doing with UNITA, you give the MPLA the upper hand. They know the supply lines, they know the supplies UNITA has if you do this; they know how much weaponry they have, they know when they are short of gasoline. At those particular moments, they will launch an attack as they did on Mavinga.

So I think during these negotiations which we hope will result in a peaceful solution that covert operations is extremely important.

For us to be debating that on the floor of the House would be absolutely insane because then you would tell the MPLA, the Communist government over there, everything that is going on, the kind of supplies that are requested, where we are going to send them. That is something you do not do when a conflict is going on, especially in view of the fact they have been negotiating.

As Mr. Hyde said a moment ago, UNITA has made some serious concessions. They have said that they recognize the Government of Angola, they recognize Dos Santos as the President of Angola, they recognize the Government of Angola as the interim government in the period leading up to elections. Deescalation is something that they will go along with. They are working toward a peaceful settlement. This is exactly the wrong time to be making these changes.

I talked to Jim Baker, I talked to Hank Cohen at the State Department, and they said that the negotiations are moving along at a fairly rapid pace and that we may have an agreement in the not-too-distant future when they will have determined the date for free and fair elections, deescalation of the conflict, and a ceasefire.

I submit to you this is the worst possible time for the United States of America to be considering cutting off aid or going public with what we are doing for UNITA. I think the gentleman from Illinois is right on the money, and I hope he will continue his fight on the Intelligence Committee.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. McEwen].

Mr. McEWEN. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

I just want to emphasize on that particular point the fact that negotiations are taking place at this moment, the fact is, if I may remind the gentleman, due to the fact that we are negotiating this on the floor, some of the people would draw a correlation from the requests of the MPLA to not meet in their fifth negotiating session. They asked 2 days ago to not meet for a temporary period. We do not know for how long.

The world is watching whether or not democracy is going to stand firm. And if there are those who choose to turn our back on what we stood for for these many years and to support the negotiating process and to surrender unilaterally, then it would be absolutely, as you said, be the perfectly wrong moment to take this kind of step when peace is within sight.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words, and I rise in support of the amendment.

(Mr. HAMILTON asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

[TIME: 1630]

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the amendment to H.R. 5422 offered today by Congressmen Dellums, Dymally, and myself.

This amendment requires that any U.S. assistance to the UNITA rebels in Angola during fiscal year 1991 be openly debated and approved by the full Congress.

PROCESS, NOT SUBSTANCE

Mr. Chairman, this amendment addresses the process by which U.S. policy in Angola is made. It does not address the substance of that policy.

This amendment is not a vote on U.S. assistance to UNITA. It is a vote on how we will make decisions on that assistance. This amendment neither prevents nor provides U.S. aid to UNITA. Rather, it seeks to ensure that we address this question in the same policy process through which we address other issues of great importance to our foreign policy.

My support for this amendment arises from my concern about the excessive use of secrecy in American foreign policy in recent years. I may differ with the other two sponsors of this amendment on the substance of U.S. assistance to UNITA.

For example, I do not think U.S. support for UNITA should be prohibited. Under certain conditions--especially in the event of continued Soviet military assistance to the Angolan Government or a threat to UNITA's survival--I support assistance to the rebels.

My view, however, and that of my cosponsors is that any U.S. military support for UNITA should be openly requested by the President, openly debated by the American public, and openly approved by Congress.

Members may disagree on whether and how to assist UNITA, but I would hope we can agree that open consideration of this question by the Congress will enhance the prospects for a successful policy.

U.S. POLICY IN ANGOLA IS MADE IN SECRET

Let's be clear about how our policy in Angola has been made for the past 5 years.

The President and a small group of advisers decide what steps to take among themselves. The congressional intelligence committees are simply notified of these decisions. The intelligence committees do not approve a specific line item for Angola, and are not required to. Other Africa specialists in our Government play no role. Outside experts are not consulted. Public debate is squelched. Even Congress has no voice in this policy. It has never had a chance to give it careful review.

Our policy in Angola has been conducted in this elitist, secretive fashion for the past 5 years.

WHY OPEN CONSIDERATION IS NECESSARY

Open consideration of U.S. assistance to UNITA is necessary for three basic reasons:

First, there are major costs and risks when foreign policy is conducted in secret:

Secret foreign policy undermines democratic accountability. In our normal foreign policymaking process, the President proposes initiatives, Congress suggests revisions, the press comments, and the public debates. Rigorous scrutiny refines policies and ensures accountability. When the President keeps a foreign policy operation secret, as he has done in Angola, Congress is bypassed and scrutiny is limited to the intelligence committees. This prevents the broad and open debate that helps correct mistakes and ensure that policies are consistent with American values and interests;

Secrecy restricts policy coordination. A small group of intelligence officials manages the details of policy implementation, and other responsible officials are excluded from decisionmaking. Executive and legislative branch officials, who have experience and expertise, lack the information necessary to perform their jobs and are not able to make a contribution;

Secret foreign policy weakens intelligence analysis. When our intelligence agencies run policy, large amounts of time and energy are diverted from the collection and analysis of intelligence. Objectivity also suffers if policy goals begin to drive facts;

Most importantly, secrecy makes it more difficult to generate and sustain public support for our foreign policies; In the long run, effective foreign policy requires public support. The key to sustained support is an informed and involved Congress.

There is, of course, a role for secret initiatives in our foreign policy. But secret initiatives should supplement publicly enunciated policies; they should never substitute for them. When a secret initiative becomes the core of U.S. policy, as it has in Angola, the risks of failure grow.

Second, U.S. assistance to UNITA is not secret. We should not pretend it is when it is not.

United States aid to UNITA has been discussed openly by Presidents, officials, and the media for several years. Many of its most important features, including its approximate size and the identity of the countries that support it, are widely known. I cannot understand why United States national interests in Angola require continued official secrecy.

If there ever had been a rationale for a secret foreign policy in Angola, it no longer exists. Insistence upon continued official secrecy on United States aid to UNITA suggests a lack of confidence in the policy and an unwillingness to expose it to public debate.

Third, open consideration of UNITA aid is necessary because events in Angola and the world have brought our policy to a crucial juncture.

Much has happened in the 4 years since Congress last took up this issue: Cuban forces have almost withdrawn from Angola; we are working with the Soviet Union to resove regional conflicts, and we have talked about Angola; UNITA and the Angolan Government are discussing a possible political settlement.

These developments raise tough new questions about our policy: What should be our role in what is now a civil war? How do we enhance the prospects for a negotiated settlement? How can we best promote democracy in Angola? What do we know about UNITA's commitment to the values we support? How does our Angola policy affect our relations with the rest of Africa?

These fundamental questions about the course of our policy have been considered in secret, by too few people, for too long. They deserve broad public consideration. Tey require the input of a wide range of views. To ensure that this occurs, we must bring Angola policy into the normal constitutional process for the making of American foreign policy.

[Page: H10040]

CONCLUSION

Because U.S. assistance to UNITA remains officially secret, Congress is unable openly to debate it and determine its fate. Secret policies are prone to error and lack the kind of accountability that ensures they will be consistent with U.S. interests. An open process produces policies that are better and more likely to receive sustained public support.

If the President believes his course in Angola is correct, he should take his case to the public and to the Congress, for scrutiny and funding. If Congress knowingly and publicly supports military assistance, UNITA will have a better chance of sustained U.S. support based on the commitment of the American people.

I urge you to support this amendment.

So, my colleagues, I urge adoption of this amendment and yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. LIVINGSTON. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words, and I rise in opposition to the amendment offered by the gentleman from California [Mr. Dellums].

(Mr. LIVINGSTON asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. LIVINGSTON. First of all, Mr. Chairman, I would like to associate myself with the incredibly good remarks of the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Hyde], my friend. I think he responded to the issue extraordinarily well.

I would also like to say that it has been a pleasure to work over the years with all of the members of the committee, but particularly under the leadership of the gentleman from California [Mr. Beilenson] and the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Hyde], the ranking minority member, who I think do a great service to this country in working as well together as they do and with all the rest of us as members on the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.

I might say to the former chairman of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. Hamilton], that he has raised a good point. The purpose of the amendment may very well be to withhold funds unless openly acknowledged, but then he must also understand that the rationale for not discussing this covert action on the floor, as we are now doing, is primarily because of the sensitivity of the issue, not only to the United States of America and its policies, but to our allies and friends.

[TIME: 1640]

If this amendment were to pass, if all future discussion of this covert policy and ultimately perhaps other covert policies were to be discussed on the floor, I think one could anticipate that other allies, other friends who have their own sovereign interests to consider, might well withhold any support of assistance, whether it is for UNITA or any other worthy efforts in the world.

We are in effect reacting to force with counterforce, a concept which is deplored by the gentleman from California [Mr. Dellums], the author of this amendment. In my opinion if that first force is evil, then counterforce is necessary and justified.

It would then seem that it is in the interests of men of good will throughout this world that covert activity be employed, if necessary, so that friends and allies can join forces to hold off that evil force.

Saddam Hussein currently has posed a force for evil in the Middle East, and if not contained, might ultimately pose a threat to the entire Middle East and ultimately to the entire world, so counterforce is indeed often necessary and must be employed.

With respect to Angola, the author of the amendment has asked why are we discussing the funding of aid to UNITA in the name of the cold war when the cold war is over, making this effort a `cold war anachronism.'

Nobody told the MPLA that this is an anachronism, but they are still fighting. They promise they will provide free elections, and someday they will provide for an open and free economy, but the time has come to stop promising and start producing.

What we are looking for is a cease-fire in Angola, and we are not getting it. That's not Savimbi's fault.

On June 23, 1989, a cease-fire was tentatively declared. In December of 1989 the MPLA mounted an offensive against UNITA designed to take the strategic town of Mavinga. They took Mavinga and they occupied it for 2 months. Ultimately they were forced by UNITA to withdraw.

If these are people of good will, is this the way they are going to react in the future? We can hardly accept their intentions today or in the future, regardless of what they say, because we can see how they act. We need concrete action. Mr. Savimbi has made any number of concessions. He has recognized Dos Santos as the President of Angola. He has recognized the legitimacy of the current MPLA government. He said UNITA is not insisting on the formation of an interim government prior to elections. He has reduced his demands to only recognizing UNITA as a political entity, and he has asked for only a fixed date for internationally supervised multiparty elections, and yet Dos Santos, as the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Hyde] pointed out, has made no concessions, has not given a date certain for elections, and has not agreed to a cease-fire.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Louisiana [Mr. Livingston] has expired.

(By unanimous consent, Mr. Livingston was allowed to proceed for 5 additional minutes.)

[Page: H10041]

Mr. LIVINGSTON. Mr. Chairman, the Clark amendment withdrew aid to UNITA for some 10 years. After 10 years of lack of aid, and 10 years of watching this war continue incessantly in Angola, the United States repealed the Clark amendment, and we are back in this picture, preferably behind closed doors, but now openly on the floor.

At a time when the entire world is rejecting communism, the MPLA in Angola promises ceasefires and elections, yet does not produce. They have promised the removal of Cuban troops, but there are still half of the Cuban troops in Angola. Soviet advisers remain in Angola today.

The gentleman who authored this amendment apparently puts this discussion of aid to UNITA on the floor, with the hope that friends and allies of the United States would withdraw their support, so that ultimately there would be no United States aid for UNITA, and with the hope that there would be peace in Angola. But those are false hopes.

Mr. Chairman, this amendment is ill-advised for any number of reasons. One, the MPLA only last year launched an offensive, as we have already talked about, after they agreed to a ceasefire! Second, the MPLA has an oil economy. We know what has happened to the price of oil. It has doubled. They have $5 billion in revenue available to them. If we withhold aid to UNITA, obviously UNITA and Savimbi will be at a serious disadvantage.

Third, even though they are ending the cold war in Europe, the Soviets have continued to provide aid and support for the MPLA to the tune of $800 million in 1989 and $500 million in 1990, this year.

The MPLA withholds food shipments and is starving UNITA out. There is rampant famine in Angola. Is it because of the U.S. action? No, it is because of the actions of the Soviet-supported MPLA.

Finally, the MPLA has on one hand a 15-year stockpile of arms, so that even if the Soviets did withhold aid, they still have arms to continue fighting, unless they declare a ceasefire. They should, but they have failed to do so.

Does the war continue simply because we continue aid to UNITA? No, it's because of the MPLA. And I would add that our support for UNITA is not a racist policy, any more than our concern for what is happening in Ireland, Cambodia, or Lebanon, is a racist policy.

Mr. Chairman, Mr. Savimbi has made numerous concessions. The MPLA has made none. So I firmly believe that this amendment is ill to advised.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, would the gentleman yield?

Mr. LIVINGSTON. I am happy to yield to the gentleman from Illinois.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, about 4 years ago when we debated this amendment in another place, the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. Hamilton] said in the debate at that time, `Any covert action in Angola will be difficult to sustain in the absence of a thorough and frank debate of this issue.'

That is what the gentleman said today, but since that time I would remind Members there have been major breakthrough in southern Africa without the full public debate that the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. Hamilton] wanted back then, including the independence of Namibia, a timetable for the complete withdrawal of all Cuban troops, and the first face-to-face UNITA-MPLA negotiations to end the civil war.

Mr. Chairman, If it ain't broke, don't fix it.

Mr. DORNAN of California. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, the accelerated pace of history over the last year has been absolutely astounding. Each passing week something comes up that just amazes all of us.

I am anxious to leave the Chamber right now to go over to the Rayburn Building and meet with the most intelligent, the most forceful, the longest survivor of all of the Communist conquerors of Vietnam. Nguyen Co Thach is over in room 2200 meeting with the MIA-POW Task Force, and in about 12 minutes that meeting will adjourn to go over to the main Foreign Affairs room where Mr. Thach will meet with the whole Committee on Foreign Affairs. We know that they have a warehouse of American remains that they have been deceiving us about for 15 to 17 years now. We hope to resolve it.

Mr. Chairman, communism has brought utter chaos to Vietnam. The reason I bring this up is because Mr. Dos Santos canceled his trip here because he is the last of the Communist dictators who will not concede publicly that communism has failed his people miserably and that his country is in absolute economic decay.

Mr. Chairman, these Communists are the bad guys. The Dos Santos regime in Luanda, the MPLA--they are the bad guys. I remember 15 years ago a Vietnam veteran from Maryland who was at loose ends. He lived an hour's drive from here, Danny Gerhardt, went over to Angola to fight for what he thought were the forces of freedom. He was captured and was executed. The Dos Santos government made his poor parish, a Catholic parish in Maryland, come up with $5,000 of blood money to buy back Danny Gerhardt's riddled body.

Now flash forward 15 years.

[TIME: 1650]

Here is a report from Broadcast Africa just a few days ago, October 10. `A group of MPLA soldiers,' and I do not know if this is true or not, but here is the wire service report, `stationed in Cahombo near Menongue in Cuando Cubango Province, has killed a Catholic priest and a congregation member during an armed robbery at the weekend.' And they did this killing during Mass.

I quoted earlier during this debate one of the major generic spots by a big corporation that has been running for 2 years now, `freedom is wonderful, freedom is everything.' I add to that that freedom is winning. And I cannot understand, why we don't go in for the kill while we can. When you consider all the horrors of communism and the terror and chaos that terrorist groups have brought around the world, from uncovering mass graves of 300,000 people in the Soviet Union that they build apartment buildings on, to incidents like this involving MPLA murders you have to wonder why so many in this Chamber have such a blind spot when it comes to communism. I have great respect for the Black Caucus of this Congress. I do not know one caucus Member that is the son of a multimillionaire, who got here with inherited wealth, as other Members and Senators have. Every one of you in the Black Caucus is a self-made man who fought your way up through life and is afraid of nothing. And yet every time I have asked one of you individually, including the late and much beloved Mickey Leland, `Will you meet with Savimbi?'; The answer was always the same. `Of course.' Mickey Leland said it, and when I asked Bill Gray when he was chairman, `Will you meet with Savimbi?' he said, `Of course.' And yet, the Black Caucus has never had this great heroic black leader before them to make his case.

Why? Because of the South African connection. On its surface that seems logical, but none other than the great statesman, Winston Churchill, the greatest of Western civilization maybe, said, when asked why he was making an alliance with the Soviet Union, and he knew ahead of most of us that Stalin's terror was equal or worse than Hitler's, said, `To conquer Herr Hitler I will make a pact with the devil himself.' Savimbi and I discussed that very remark. He said `I know it is a racist regime, but I am fighting for my people. That is why I studied guerilla warfare in China and why I will take any port in a storm until I can get rid of the Communist terror in my country.'

Here is a letter that I will just read the first lines of from our Secretary of State to our Republican leader. It says, `As you know, I am engaged in active diplomacy aimed at achieving a negotiated settlement. Foreign Minister Shevardnadze and I are seeking a negotiated settlement to the Angolan conflict.' A remarkable world, my colleauges. `This is due in no small measure to Moscow's understanding, despite the enormous and continuing Soviet commitment to the Luanda regime, of American resolve on this issue.'

Are those not wonderful words for a change, American resolve? Hanging in there, acting like Americans, helping the good guys against the bad guys.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from California [Mr. Dornan] has expired.

(By unanimous consent, Mr. Dornan of California was allowed to proceed for 3 additional minutes.)

[Page: H10042]

Mr. DORNAN of California. Mr. Chairman, our Secretary of State, James A. Baker III, concludes:

My view boils down to this: All Savimbi wants is a ceasefire and the ability to compete in fair and free multiparty elections. Some in the MPLA seem willing to move toward this peaceful, democratic approach as well. A vote to amend the Intelligence Committee's Angola provisions is a vote against this democratic solution at the absolutely worst time--and would be a vote for more killing, more stalemate, and more suffering.

I will put the whole text in the Record with my remarks. The intervening paragraphs are just as succinct and as powerful.

Here is an article by James P. Gallagher, an analyst and an excellent writer on what has happened in Africa over the last quarter of a century. He says in an article entitled `Africa's Invisible Famine,' that `Just a few short years ago, the American public and the national media were calling the Reagan administration daily to come to the aid of the hundreds of thousands of starving people in Ethiopia.' Mr. Ackerman went there, Mr. Wolf went there, I went there. It was a horrible thing to see. Mickey Leland went there many times.

And what did we do under Ronald Reagan, a great President? We helped a Marxist-Leninist government with a famine that they created. And now Mr. Gallagher makes an excellent case that the MPLA is doing the same thing.

He says:

All indications are that the MPA is using food as a way to increase its leverage over UNITA. Angola is on the brink of a serious and deadly situation. The callous lack of a response by the MPLA and their continued inaction shows the lengths to which the regime will go to retain power. It is apparent that the MPLA is willing to barter with human life. The world community must respond before thousands more die in this humanitarian crisis.

Again, the body of the article is just as good.

Finally, I close, Mr. Chairman, from an article in the Washington Post, the Washington inside-the beltway Post:

There is light at the end of the tunnel of Angola's 15-year civil war. The government and its UNITA challengers have shredded the country and demonstrated that neither can defeat the other; they are engaged in direct negotiations.

At the end of the article the Post says, `Congress is right to be appalled that this awful war goes on,' on into its 16th year, `but a one-sided cutoff expresses only impatience and partiality for one Angolan party,' the Communist Party, the world's greatest killers. That was my aside remark. I do not think the Post has gone that far, yet.

`It is not simply that the government in Luanda receives 10 times as much foreign assistance as the insurgents. Nor is it that either Angolan party has proven itself superior in dedication to the national welfare,' writes the Post analyst. `Despite its relatively scant dimensions, American aid has served the crucial purpose of reinforcing the military stalemate and making possible negotiations aimed at a political settlement.'

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from California [Mr. Dornan] has again expired.

(By unanimous consent Mr. Dornan of California was allowed to proceed for 30 additional seconds.)

Mr. DORNAN of California. Mr. Chairman, for emphasis I will strike a Traficant pose.

`To pull the plug on a policy that was failing might be understandable. To pull the plug on a southern Africa policy that has succeeded in other aspects and now seems near succeeding in Angola is perverse.'

Unfortunately we have to do it in a covert manner. But as with so much that has involved communism over the years, if you get it done covert, leave it alone as long as it gets done, and done legally. If it is not broken, please, do not fix it.

Defeat this amendment.

The text of the letter and articles referred to follow:

The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Hon. Robert H. Michel,
House of Representatives.

Dear Bob: You soon will be voting on HR 5422, the Intelligence Authorization Bill. As you probably know, several amendments are contemplated which, if enacted, would seriously hinder efforts to achieve a negotiated settlement to the conflict in Angola.

As you know, I am engaged in active diplomacy aimed at achieving a negotiated settlement. Foreign Minister Shevardnadze and I are seeking a negotiated settlement to the Angolan conflict. This is due in no small measure to Moscow's understanding, despite the enormous and continuing Soviet commitment to the Luanda regime, of American resolve on this issue. Likewise, some, but not all, MPLA leaders are beginning to realize that they cannot defeat UNITA militarily and must negotiate a settlement, despite the wishes of hardliners in Luanda who continue to seek a military solution. After four rounds of UNITA-MPLA direct talks facilitated by the Portuguese Government, our policy may be on the verge of success. For his part, Dr. Savimbi has been flexible and reasonable in his negotiating positions. Furthermore, he has been steadfast in his calls for free and fair multi-party elections in which UNITA is free to participate.

I firmly believe that Angola, like other regional conflicts, can be resolved through negotiations, if both sides have the incentive to talk and compromise. Our ongoing program is important to persuading the Angolan Government that a military solution to the conflict is not an option. I urge in the strongest possible way that you continue your solid support for this peace process by not endorsing legislative proposals which, although packaged as `compromises', actually would have the effect of undercutting those in the MPLA who want to negotiate and of strengthening the hand of the MPLA hardliners who want to continue the bloodshed.

Any imposition of conditional language will be taken by hardliners in Luanda as the ray of hope they have been looking for and long predicting. They will argue that the U.S. is preoccupied elsewhere, `short of breath,' and willing to pull the rug out from under UNITA--and that there is thus no need for negotiations. This will only lengthen Angola's tragic war.

My view boils down to this: All Savimbi wants is a ceasefire and the ability to compete in fair and free multiparty elections. Some in the MPLA seem willing to move toward this peaceful, democratic approach as well. A vote to amend the Intelligence Committee's Angola provisions is a vote against this democratic solution at the absolutely worst time--and would be a vote for more killing, more stalemate, and more suffering.

Therefore, I ask that you strongly oppose any efforts to amend the Intelligence Authorization Bill with respect to Angola.

Sincerely yours,
James A. Baker III.

--
--

Africa's Invisible Famine

(BY JAMES P. GALLAGHER)

Just a few short years ago, the American public and the national media were calling on the Reagan Administration daily to come to the aid of the hundreds of thousands of starving people in Ethiopia. The Reagan Adminstration and the Congress responded by becoming the largest donor of relief supplies for the people of that Marxist-Leninist nation.

A similar crisis has again developed elsewhere on the African continent. A famine of comparable severity now threaths the people of Angola. This southwest African nation, just north of newly independent Namibia, has known nothing but war for the past twenty five years. Western relief agencies now estimate that 250,000 people are at `immediate risk' of starvation in southern and central Angola. Who is to blame for this threat to human life? Certainly nature must take credit for three straight years of drought. However, much of the blame for compounding an already disastrous situation can be placed squarely on the Marxist government of Angola and its Soviet and Cuban benefactors.

A brief glance at Angola's troubled history shows that it has had a troubled history over the past twenty years. In the 1970s, Angola served as a battleground for Soviet dreams of expanding their empire through the use of surrogate `national liberation movements.' Since 1975, it has been the battleground between the Marxist Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) led by Jonas Savimbi. However, the MPLA appears to be fighting against the tide of history as support for communism and one-party totalitarianism throughout the world is waning.

In a bold attempt to help bring about a solution to this humanitarian crisis and bring food to the starving on both sides of the conflict, UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi proposed the establishment of so-called `corridors of peace.' These corridors would be safe routes through which humanitarian assistance could be provided to the people in both UNITA and MPLA-held territories. The State Department embraced the proposal, but it was rejected by the MPLA. The MPLA charged that it was unacceptable for the U.S. to be involved in any humanitarian relief program because it was possible for U.S. to send lethal aid with such supplies. That outrageous charge was made in a July 2 letter to Members of Congress from the MPLA's paid lobbyist in Washington. It was never retracted and was later expanded upon with charges from the same lobbyist that the U.S. had used previous relief programs to funnel arms to rebels in Ethopia and Sudan within shipments or relief supplies.

The time has passed for diplomatic maneuvering. Officials of the Office of Foreign Disater Assistance (OFDA) estimated just two months ago that 782,000 people in both UNITA and MPLA territory face the threat of starvation. And additional 250,000 are at `immediate risk,' two-thirds of which are in UNITA territory. As the State Department reported earlier this year after sending a Needs Assessment Team to southeastern Angola, `humanitarian assistance can be removed from political disagreements in times of great need.' This crisis in Angola presents an opportunity for the U.S. to rise above the fray to provide the necessary assistance.

As recently as early September of this year, officials OFDA estimated between 3,800 and 10,000 deaths had already occured in southern Angola. This confirms the need and urgency for the United States to take unilateral action to resolve this crisis. To date, little has done by the United Nations to facilitate the movement of any emergency food aid to the starving in Angola. The risk of mass starvation is real and even the Namibian government has estimated that upwards of 1.5 million Angolans face severe food shortages.

All indications are that the MPLA is using food as a way to increase its leverage over UNITA. Angola is on the brink of a serious and deadly situation. The callous lack of a response by the MPLA and their continued inaction shows the lengths to which the regime will go to retain power. It is apparent that the MPLA is willing barter with human life. The world community must responds before thousands more die in this humanitarian crisis.

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[Page: H10043]

MPLA Allegedly Murders Priest At Cahombo

Jamba, Wednesday, October 10--[dateline as received] A group of MPLA [Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola] soldiers stationed in Cahombo, near Menongue, in Cuando Cubango Province, has killed a Catholic priest and a congregation member during an armed robbery on the weekend.

Informed sources, among them eye-witnesses in the Cuando Cubango provincial capital, said the victims, Father Firmino and Jone Mendes, were killed in their church during Sunday mass in Chikimbili village.

It was not immediately known why MPLA troops have targetted members of the religion. However, relations between the regime and Catholic Church have worsened ever since the pastoral letter published last November which called for a ceasefire and multi-party elections aimed at peace in Angola which angered the MPLA regime.

Meanwhile, an elderly woman identified as Domingas Vunda of Camongua village was reported killed by another group of MPLA soldiers stationed at Cambache two days when she complained to the troops about the robbing of her personal property, including chickens at her home.

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From the Washington Post, October 8, 1990

[FROM THE WASHINGTON POST, OCTOBER 8, 1990]

The Angola Debate

There is light at the end of the tunnel of Angola's 15-year civil war. The government and its UNITA challengers have shredded the country and demonstrated that either can defeat the other; they are engaged in direct negotiations. Their respective Soviet and American supporters are working in their fashions to turn them toward a cease-fire and political settlement in the coming months.

If this works, it will follow from a line of Reagan administration policy continued by President Bush. One early result was South Africa's delivery of independence to Namibia. A Second was the departure--completed in Namibia, close in Angola--of Communist Cuba's expeditionary forces. The third would be a settlement in Angola. There American policy has sought not just to move out the Cubans but also to encourage Angolan national reconciliation and to persuade the Soviets that the price of their continued support for an unrepresentative local government is too high.

It is this last segment of American policy in Angola--raising the price to Moscow--that is now being debated in Congress. Everyone wants the Cubans to go home. Everybody wants a political settlement. But the Kremlin, disturbingly slow to apply its `new political thinking' in Angola, has kept immense aid flowing; its annual support, though down perhaps by a billion dollars from the 1987 peak, is put at $500 million. Meanwhile, some in Congress are opposed to or tired of sustaining Jonas Savimbi's UNITA, for which the Bush administration reportedly seeks $60 million. Voices in Congress demand that American aid be phased down or out. Some would use Rube Goldberg-type legislative instructions to try to arrange Soviet reciprocity, and some would simply end the aid.

Congress is right to be appalled that this awful war goes on. But a one-sided cutoff expresses only impatience and partiality for one Angolan party. It is not simply that the government in Luanda receives 10 times as much foreign assistance as the insurgents. Nor is it that either Angolan party has proven itself superior in dedication to the national welfare. Despite its relatively scant dimensions, American aid has served the crucial purpose of reinforcing the military stalemate and making possible negotiation aimed at a political settlement. To pull the plug on a policy that was failing might be understandable. To pull the plug on a southern Africa policy that has succeeded in other aspects and now seems near succeeding in Angola is perverse.

Mr. STOKES. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words, and I rise in support of the amendment.

(Mr. STOKES asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. STOKES. Mr. Chairman, at the outset let me express my appreciation to the members of the Intelligence Committee on both sides of the aisle. This is one of the finest committees in the House. It also has one of the finest staffs in the House. I served on the Intelligence Committee for 6 years; 2 years as chairman. Not only did I chair the full committee but I also chaired the Subcommittee on Program and Budget. There were numerous programs, covert and otherwise, that came under my purview.

I fully appreciate the need and requirement for secrecy and fully understand that there are certain programs which must be kept covert. But, this is not such a case. When a program has gone on for this long and is openly acknowledged, then it is time that we let the sun set on it. Our Angola policy should be openly debated in the Congress.

Also, this is not an anti-UNITA amendment. It is simply an amendment to make overt what is already acknowledged as an open secret--the fact that the United States has provided, and continues to provide, covert assistance to Jonas Savimbi's UNITA forces. In fact, President Reagan acknowledged such a covert program publicly in November 1985.

Mr. Savimbi was in town last week and told reporters that President Bush promised continued support for the rebel movement until a cease-fire is in place and a date set for elections.

A ceasefire in Angola, to put an end to the needless and senseless killing, and free and fair elections are both goals which everyone supports. The question is, how do we get there? The administration believes that we should continue to provide covert assistance to Savimbi. I believe, however, that 5 years of covert aid is enough and that if UNITA's cause is to ensure multiparty democracy in Angola and that is in the national security interest of the United States, then this matter should be openly debated in Congress.

Perhaps a program of covert assistance could have been justified 5 years ago.

There were over 50,000 Cuban troops in Angola then. Today, they are withdrawing.

The United States-Soviet superpower relationship was then confrontational. Today, it is one of cooperation. Secretary of State Baker and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze have been meeting frequently to end the surrogate vestiges of the cold war.

Savimbi was perhaps not well known then. Today, he is represented by Black, Manafort.

South Africa was actively involved in assisting Savimbi then but today, they have supposedly ceased such assistance as a result of the New York accords.

Five years ago, there were no peace talks but today, the contesting parties are close to reaching an agreement.

Clearly, the situation has changed significantly. I believe our Government's position in discussions with the Soviets would be much stronger if this were an overt program supported by the American people and the Congress.

This amendment simply says that if this is a matter important to the national security interest of our Nation, then we, the people, all the Members of the House of Representatives, not just those who sit on the Intelligence Committee, ought to be able to

judge it on its merits. If the administration believes so strongly in its case, then it should be able to enunciate a position that will gain support and put the entire weight of our country on UNITA's side if that is the way the people should decide.

The administration's argument is that we have come so far and we are so close to achieving a peaceful solution, that with negotiations underway, terminating covert assistance would be pulling the plug on Savimbi and his UNITA fighters. We are not asking in this amendment to pull the plug; we are simply asking that if the administration believes that it has a good case--and I think many believe that it does--then they should be willing to make that case openly and not to continue a covert program that is for all intents and purposes overt. When the former President acknowledges it and the current President endorses it there is no plausibility of denial. Let's be open and honest. I urge you to support this amendment.

[Page: H10044]
[TIME: 1700]

Mr. GLICKMAN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. STOKES. I am happy to yield to the gentleman from Kansas.

Mr. GLICKMAN. Mr. Chairman, I want to join with my colleague in his response.

He was the distinguished chairman of this committee when I came on this committee. He did an outstanding job.

I take my responsibilities very seriously as a member of the Intelligence Committee. I do my best not to tell anybody anything about the activities of the committee. This program has disturbed me.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Stokes] has expired.

(At the request of Mr. Glickman, and by unanimous consent, Mr. Stokes was allowed to proceed for 2 additional minutes.)

Mr. GLICKMAN. If the gentleman will yield further, this program has disturbed me, because others outside of the committee seem to know more about it than I do.

The numbers of times that I am approached by people working for Mr. Savimbi and others relating to me information which seems to be the kind of information I would be given as a member of the Intelligence Committee, information that I personally would not transmit to anybody else, gets transmitted to me by people who are being paid by parties to the action down there. That is a perfectly legitimate thing to do, but it seems to me to be a highly inappropriate thing to do when we are talking about an activity which is not legally out in the open.

It has always troubled me, and it has caused me to believe that whoever is doing this is not doing this consistent with my responsibilities as a member of the Intelligence Committee which is supposed to have, as part of its function, us keeping our mouths shut on these matters.

So I think it has made me believe all the more that the whole issue of Angola is one that deserves to be brought out in the open. If people are being paid to represent parties to the action there and do it and filing the documents with the appropriate Government parties of the United States, if people are telling me what they think I ought to do as a member of the Intelligence Committee in a lobbying type of capacity, again, a legitimate thing for them to be doing, it is particularly troubling to me that the program should be kept in a secret type of fashion.

For that reason, I intend to support this particular amendment.

Mr. STOKES. I thank the gentleman for his comments.

I can certainly share in his frustrations, having experienced some of the same while I chaired the Intelligence Committee of the House.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words, and I rise in opposition to the amendment.

(Mr. FASCELL asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Chairman, let me see, I would like to recap.

I do not know that everybody is for covert action under every circumstance, but I gather, generally speaking, that it is recognized that covert action by a government, and our Government in particular, seems to be essential to the accomplishment of certain objectives around the world. At least, I have not heard any speaker say anything to the contrary yet, although some people may have that opinion.

This discussion is not about covert action. Look at the history of this whole question on Angola; off again, on again, and we are now at the point where we are having discussions, finally, on a possibility of the two superpowers supporting a regional settlement. We know that one superpower by a factor of at least 10 and maybe larger has been supplying one side and the United States has been supplying the other side. There has been no secret about it; as a matter of fact, the author of this amendment probably has done a favor to the world and to the United States and certainly with regard to Angola and covert action, because the policy has been debated all afternoon and will continue to be debated.

That is what the issue is all about. The issue is whether or not you are going to continue aid to Angola, at least as far as the United States Government is concerned.

The procedural maneuvering that goes with that is all right, but I asked myself again, why now? Well, we are a little late in the session. The fiscal year has already started, and this bill is a legitimate bill under which you could raise this issue.

But then I began thinking of the wording of the amendment. Why is the wording such? Well, it says if the President feels so strongly about this, let him step up and be counted on the floor of the House. If the amendment passes, the President will have to come down with a supplemental of some kind. He will have to come to the committees. We would then have another public debate.

As a result of the debate today the only thing that we have not found out is exactly how much money is involved exactly what kind of equipment is involved and just exactly when is it going.

Any Member who wants to know that, I submit, can find out, but those are the only matters that have not been debated.

Well, what happens next? The supplemental request then goes to the appropriate committee, and we will have to work on it, and then it will have to come to the floor of the House.

But the thing is we will, hopefully, leave here in a few days or maybe on election eve. I have sent for my absentee ballot, by the way. But maybe we are going to leave. Well, that means we cannot consider it until the next session of Congress.

Then I got to thinking, what is so important about November, December, January, February, and March. I will leave that to your judgment.

Yes, we can have another public debate. We can even have it resubmitted to the Congress with the specifics spelled out so that anybody could know everything about what is going on.

The policy issue will not be any different in March than it is this afternoon. You want aid to go, or you do not want aid to go; and you have a reason for wanting it to go, and you have a reason for wanting it not to go. So you can take your pick.

I do not want to impugn anybody's motives. My sincerity is equal to anybody else's in this room. I take no back seat to anybody's logic.

I just say you draw your own conclusion.

We are in the middle of negotiations. The administration, with relatively little amount of military support, on a comparative basis and in a short period of time, has brought the parties closer than they were.

We all have the sense to know that anybody who is in the field, and if you are negotiating, would like to be in a better position, but if you are at a disadvantage of 12 to 1 or 15 to 1 in terms of armaments, you really do not have much chance particularly, if you only have one-third of the country in your possession and your people are starving.

So you ask yourself, I am in a negotiating posture, but am I really stronger than the other guy? And the answer is yes, if you are the Government. And am I in a better position to dictate the terms of what is going to happen in the future? and the answer is yes, and, you know, I do not like that. I believe in fair play.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Fascell] has expired.

(At the request of Mr. Hyde, and by unanimous consent, Mr. Fascell was allowed to proceed for 2 additional minutes.)

[Page: H10045]

Mr. FASCELL. Let me say this, I believe we should have our politics on top of the table. I have advocated that from the very beginning. But I also have supported oversight.

One of the first bills I introduced when I came here 35 years ago was to have a joint committee on intelligence.

[TIME: 1710]

Because there was absolutely no oversight by Congress. I supported the gentleman from Illinois in the establishment of a joint committee sometime ago. It is too late now. We have two committees. It may be a long time before we can unify it into a single committee, but we have one thing. We have oversight.

We have distinguished Members of Congress on the committee, from all political spectrums. There the issues are raised. They have the right to speak. They do speak. They offer amendments. The policy is debated. There are very few countries in the world where this opportunity exists. Any citizen listening, any citizen watching, can make up his own mind about the policy.

I am not saying that we have a perfect policy in the United States. We do participate in covert action, to do what? To work for an independent Africa, with sovereign countries, a policy which the United States has consistently followed for 35 or 40 years. And with Africa today, despite the chagrin and the anger of our allies, the British, the French, the Italians, the Portuguese, and the Germans, it has been United States policy that has helped make it possible for African countries to reach this. Let people support their own democracy and keep dynasties, literally dynasties, out of Africa, running Africa. Leave Africa for the Africans. That is what U.S. policy has done. This is U.S. policy.

Let me say this in conclusion. Be a little patient.

(On request of Mr. Dellums and by unanimous consent, Mr. Fascell was allowed to proceed for 2 additional minutes.)

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. FASCELL. I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. DELLUMS. It is with some grave misgivings that I rise for this question, because I consider the gentleman in the well my friend.

Mr. FASCELL. Well, it is mutual.

Mr. DELLUMS. I would like for the gentleman to explain to me, and I wrote down his remarks, the gentleman said, `I don't impugn anyone's integrity, but you draw your own conclusions,' I would like the gentleman to explain that.

Mr. FASCELL. I intend that you should draw your own conclusions from the facts, not on the people who are involved. I want to make that very clear.

Mr. DELLUMS. The gentleman is not suggesting in any way that the authors of the amendment are trying to play some tricky game?

Mr. FASCELL. No, no, absolutely not.

Mr. DELLUMS. There were some Members who heard the gentleman in the well differently.

Mr. FASCELL. If it drew that inference I apologize for that. I did not mean that at all.

What I am saying is, the facts are thus, and Members should draw their own conclusions based on two opposite positions that are presented with deep sincerity.

I thank the gentleman from California for calling that out, because I would not want to offend anyone, and meant no disrespect to anyone.

Mr. DELLUMS. I would say in conclusion that yes, I believe this covert policy should become overt, and yes, I do believe that if it became overt that it could not be sustained in the public eye. I believe that, and I have asserted that. I am not trying to hide.

Mr. FASCELL. I understand that. I understand that, and that is not the purpose of your amendment. The purpose of your amendment is to have it debated on the House floor, openly. All I said is, that is what we have been doing for about 2 hours, and I am willing to do it more. I am willing to get specific. I am willing to find out what the differential is between what we are doing and what the other guy is doing. I am willing to get in specific weapons systems. I am willing to get into the body counts. I am willing to get into the times of delivery. I am willing to get into any of this.

Mr. SHUSTER. Mr. Chairman, I move to the strike the requisite member of words.

(Mr. SHUSTER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. SHUSTER. Mr. Chairman, I certainly rise to salute the distinguished chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs for his eloquent argument against this amendment, which is before Members. The bottom line is that if we were to eliminate the covert aspect, the details of this activity of ours, our allies simply would not let Members operate in support of UNITA.

Therefore, the effect for that reason, as well as the reasons given by the distinguished chairman of the committee, the effect would be of killing the program, killing the support of UNITA against the Marxist government of Angola.

I certainly want to compliment the remarks of my friends on the left who eloquently spelled out the cause for peace in Angola, and who spelled out the horrors of war. They certainly were accurately portrayed.

I would simply say, tell it to dos Santos. Tell it to the Marxist government. Tell it to those who were making war on UNITA. UNITA, those patriots who are fighting for freedom in their own country.

Yes, we have heard it said here today that the world is rushing toward democracy. My friends on the left tell Members such, and I agree. Sadly, that is not the case in Marxist Angola.

Just a few days ago, the Luanda Domestic Service, the wire service, had a story in which it said, `In Luanda yesterday, Deputy Foreign Minister Venancio de Moura denounced UNITA's' union and their call for `U.S. backed idea of establishing a multiparty system in Angola.' Just a few days ago, the Government, the Marxist government of Angola, came out once again against multiparty elections.

So who are we kidding? It is UNITA that is calling for free elections. It is the Marxist government of Angola which is opposing those very free elections, and indeed just 2 days ago Marxist government canceled the sixth round of the peace talks with UNITA, and it is obvious that they want to see what we do here on the floor today.

So the world might be rushing toward democracy, but the evidence is overwhelming that the Marxist government in Angola is not rushing towards democracy. It is UNITA. It is Jonah Savimbi and his freedom fighters who have, time and time again, called for free elections. I, for the life of me, cannot understand why my friends on the left do not support free elections, do not support democracy, why my friends on the left rather would see Members pull the plug on the freedom fighters so the Marxist government in Angola can prevail and, indeed, that would be the result. That would be the result of our stopping our support for UNITA. The result would be that we would be propping up a Marxist government, one of the last Marxist governments in the world. I say we should not do that, and I say we should oppose this amendment. We should defeat it.

Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Hyde].

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I just want to say a couple of things in response to what some of the other speakers have said.

It has not occurred to any Member, nor has it been discussed, and appropriately so, because we cannot discuss it, but we are handicapped in here in an open forum discussing a covert activity with any degree of accuracy or freedom, if we are not to betray the rules of the House and the requirement that we keep these things secret.

However, I just ask Members to fantasize for a moment and imagine a continent where people are landlocked who are fighting for their lives, and we have to get food into them, and weapons into them, but they have to cross other countries to do it. Now, those other countries may be willing to cooperate, but they do not want to be publicly identified. How do we discuss that in an open forum? How do we talk about the reality and the reasonableness of other countries assisting in a covert activity, but they do not want their assistance to be made public? We cannot do it. That is the problem with this issue right here.

Yes, it is an open secret, but if we confirm the accuracy of that as some Members have done, then I think again we are betraying our trust.

Lastly, I am increasingly wondering why we have a Committee on Intelligence. What do we spend the hours up there for, going behind closed doors and pretending what we are doing is important or secret, if it really is not? They do not need Members any more, and Mr. Chairman, I suggest we get together when this bill is through and review whether we need a committee.

See, the gentleman from California [Mr. Dymally] and his friends over there do not think we need a Committee on Intelligence. One of the gentleman's friends was mad because there was laughter over here. I am overjoyed that the gentleman is giving me his thumb down, because he is indicating what some think of the Committee on Intelligence.

[Page: H10046]
[TIME: 1720]

I hope that is not lost on your colleagues over there.

Mr. McCURDY. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

(Mr. McCURDY asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. McCURDY. I am glad to yield to the gentleman from Florida.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Chairman, in the rush to get out of the well and answer some questions, I left something unsaid and undone. I left undone something I should have said.

There are 15 or 22 undeclared wars around the world, depending on who you want to believe. The United States may be in all of them. The United States may be in none of them. I have no way of knowing. That is a function of the Intelligence Committee to find out.

I also have no trouble in debating the issue as to whether or not our politics ought to be on top of the table and debated in the normal course of a Foreign Affairs authorization or some kind of authorization bill; but the point I tried to make is that policy debate is going on right now. The detailed debate can take place some other time. Therefore, I do not think this amendment is necessary. That it is the point I was trying to make. We ought not to support this amendment, and I thank the gentleman for yielding to me.

Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. McCURDY. I am glad to yield to the gentleman from Indiana.

Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Chairman, I think it is extremely important that one point be made that has not yet been made in the debate, and that is this. When the attack on Mavinga took place, Dr. Savimbi and his people contacted members of the Intelligence Committee and members of the Foreign Affairs Committee telling us that he was out of gasoline supplies and that if he did not get emergency gasoline supplies, the possibility was that not only would Mavinga fall, but they would be moving on Damba, the headquarters of UNITA, and they could lose the war.

If this amendment had been in place at that time and we had to come to the floor and debate additional supplies for Dr. Savimbi, they would have lost the war and freedom would have been lost in Angola for the foreseeable future; so I think it is extremely important if we want to make sure in cases of emergency that the Intelligence community has the latitude to send emergency supplies to help people, like our friend, Dr. Savimbi, that this amendment be defeated.

Mr. McCURDY. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendments which are offered today regarding United States policy toward Angola.

Mr. Chairman, as a member of the Intelligence Committee, I share the dismay that some of us have as members of the committee with the process by which we are operating under today. It is probably the members of this committee who are more constrained in this debate than anyone. We feel as members of this committee when we are appointed that we uphold our oath of secrecy and that we work to protect the interests of this body and that we provide effective oversight on issues of foreign policy. It is difficult for us to openly debate some of the issues that are before us.

As a matter of fact, it is interesting and somewhat ironic that the authors soley by offering this amendment have achieved the very purpose of the amendment itself, and perhaps we do not even need to vote on it because we have had such an open debate here today.

Mr. Chairman, I oppose these amendments because I share with those who offer them a desire to see a permanent settlement to that country's civil war. But I believe that the ideas which these amendments embody, however sincerely held by those who present them, will not encourage the negotiation process that is currently under way between UNITA and the Government of Angola. On the contrary, respectfully urge my colleagues to restrain their enthusiasm for congressional micromanagement of foreign policy and think about the fundamental point which we must consider: Will a disruption in the United States support for the Angolan resistance, UNITA, help end the war and bring democracy to Angola, or will such a disruption merely prolong that country's misery and agony?

I believe that if the House adopts these amendments, we can expect this conflict to continue, perhaps indefinitely.

Let me explain why by first addressing the substance of the Dellums-Dymally-Hamilton amendment, which proposes to force our policy from its current covert status to one where its most sensitive details would be revealed to those who do not share our values or our interests in this country.

I agree with the views of the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. Hamilton]. I served under him as chairman of the committee. I agree with him that while covert operations are sometimes a useful tool of our foreign policy, they should not become a substitute for publicly enunciated objectives.

But as he well knows, there are a number of considerations which must be taken into account before we open our intelligence operations to full public debate. Among these are our dealings with other foreign leaders, the personal safety of our intelligence sources, and the very credibility of this country to craft a policy and carry it to a successful conclusion.

We must also consider the nature of the regime against which an intelligence operation is mounted. In the case of Angola, we find an authoritarian regime which still relies on the presence of some 15,000 Cuban troops and almost $800 million in Soviet military aid to maintain power.

These factors and others, in my view, preclude us from bringing this policy out into the open at this particular time and warrant the rejection of the Dellum-Dymally-Hamilton amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I also appreciate what the gentlerman from New York [Mr. Solarz] is trying to accomplish with his amendment. I share his desire to encourage the negotiating process. But I must argue that the issue is not quite as complicated as his amendment, which now runs over 10 pages, would indicate. If the objective of United States policy is to promote a solution to the Angolan conflict through democratic elections, and UNITA has been demanding multiparty elections for almost 15 years, why would we string up all of this legislative barbed wire around UNITA at this critical moment?

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Oklahoma has expired.

(By unanimous consent, Mr. McCurdy was allowed to proceed for 5 additional minutes.)

[Page: H10047]

Mr. McCURDY. Mr. Chairman, I think it is clear where the focus of energies should be directed. Once the Government of Angola and UNITA agree to a specific time table for elections as part of a comprehensive settlement, I am confident that UNITA will sign a verifiable ceasefire and the rationale for this program will change dramatically.

Yet it is my understanding that during a recent conversation via satellite with the gentleman from New York [Mr. Solarz], the President of Angola twice refused to give him even the most general time table for when elections might take place.

Despite such obstacles there is reason to be optimistic that an agreement can be reached. UNITA and the MPLA have held four rounds of negotiations, and some progress has been made. Further talks are scheduled and hopefully, with the active participation of the United States and Soviet Union, we can encourage this process further.

But if the House adopts the amendments offered today, we will demonstrate a lack of resolve, give the hardliners in the MPLA the glimmer of hope they have long wanted, and undermine those who are promoting negotiations.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, concern has been expressed by some about alleged human rights abuses on the part of UNITA. The Intelligence Committee has reviewed these charges, and they have not been substantiated by independent observers. But because the question continues to be rasied, I believe that UNITA must do more to assure us that its forces are respectful of human rights.

It is worth noting, however, that UNITA has invited Freedom House, Amnesty International, and Africa Watch, among others, to come to its territory and investigate these charges. UNITA has also allowed the Red Cross to inspect its prisoner-of-war camps. It is my understanding that the MPLA, unfortunately, has always refused these same organizations permission to enter its territory to conduct a review of its human rights practices, and it has not allowed the Red Cross to inspect its POW camps.

But if anyone should have the right to review and pass judgment on these allegations it is the people of Angola. Let them decide at the ballot box if they trust UNITA, the MPLA, or some other party with the powers of government. That is why we should maintain our current policy until firm arrangements for free and fair elections are agreed to.

Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to vote against these amendments not because we whould support UNITA as a political party or Jonas Savimbi as its leader. I do so because we should support a political process, just as we have done in Poland, Nicaragua, Namibia, and South Africa, which will culminate in democratic elections for Angola. This is the best way, indeed the only way, to end this conflict. What Oscar Arias said of Central America holds true for Southern Africa: Without democracy, there can be no peace. And this, in my view, requires that we continue our support to UNITA in its present form at this time.

[TIME: 1730]

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. McCURDY. I yield to the gentleman from Missouri.

Mr. SKELTON. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Chairman, I compliment the gentleman from Oklahoma on his statement and his position on this amendment. I think that this amendment is probably a good example of unanticipated consequences, should it pass. What would actually happen would be that this amendment would effectively end the aid program to UNITA until our President has openly requested the aid and has gone through the congressional process, which might end up March, April, May of next year and really put an end to the negotiations which I believe are underway right now.

I also agree with the gentleman that American policy in Africa has been successful. Southern Africa, for instance, Namibia is independent, the Cubans have started going home. This is no small thing. This is a result of our policy there.

I think what we should do is continue down the same track, down the same road, and we will reap the benefits and have what the gentleman suggests, open, free, and fair elections in Angola.

Mr. McCURDY. I thank the gentleman.

Just one last point. I received a letter from the National Security Advisor to the President in response to a letter that I had written expressing concern about the situation in Angola and urging the President to coordinate more closely with the Soviet Union in order to promote a settlement because I believe a settlement and a cease-fire is important.

I would just like to quote if I could from the response from the National Security Advisor.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Oklahoma [Mr. McCurdy] has expired.

(By unanimous consent, Mr. McCurdy was allowed to proceed for 2 additional minutes.)

Mr. McCURDY. The security adviser wrote:

I am pleased to inform you that our cooperation with the Soviets on this issue has been improving steadily. There have been a number of useful discussions on this sujbect of late, and we plan for that pattern to continue. As you know, at the recent round of talks between the MPLA and UNITA in Lisbon there were delegations from both the U.S. and USSR actively in touch with both sides and with the Portuguese who are serving as mediators. This practice will continue in the future.

It is in that context that I want to emphasize the need for the U.S. to stay the course right now on the commitments we have made on Angola, including those to Jonas Savimbi and UNITA. We may be nearing the end of the Angolan civil war. However, if we are to get the right outcome, it is important that we not change signals at this crucial moment in the process. The MPLA must have no doubt about the fact that a negotiated settlement provides the only appropriate road to the future.

I would ask you to bear these thoughts in mind as the Congress considers the Angola issue in the days ahead.

Sincerely,
Brent Scowcroft.

Mr. BEILENSON. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words, and I will not take the full 5 minutes.

Mr. Chairman, I spoke at length earlier this afternoon in general debate on the bill itself about the propriety and the wisdom of debating and voting publicly on major public policy and foreign policy questions such as this. So I will just add a very brief comment on this particular matter if I may.

I simply want to reiterate my agreement with the premise on which this amendment is based that United States policy toward

Angola should not be determined in secret. Four years ago, I joined Mr. Hamilton, then chairman of our Intelligence Committee, in an unsuccessful attempt to require that our Angolan policy be openly debated. During that effort, I noted that it as the Reagan administration which had removed the cloak of covertness from its Angolan policy, while at the same time insisting that the policy be funded with secret funds.

In my judgment, there are few practices which place the continued availability of covert action as a foreign policy tool at greater risk, than publicly proclaiming the existence of a policy for political purposes on the one hand, while on the other maintaining that the policy should be funded in secret. That was true 4 years ago with respect to Angola, and I believe it is true today.

The result of attempting to have it both ways on a covert program is that it puts the members of the House in general, and of the Intelligence Committee in particular, in a terrible bind. We should not be asked to support policies which are treated in one way for public consumption, and in another way for consideration by Congress.

I support treating the issue of assistance to UNITA in a consistent manner. If it is to be the publicly stated objective of our Government that U.S. support for UNITA is to be steadfast, as President Bush declared when Jonas Savimbi recently visited the White House, then I think it follows that any funds necessary to pursue that objective should be provided after public debate. The amendment now under consideration will ensure an open debate on United States policy toward Angola, and for that reason I intend to vote for it.

[Page: H10048]

Mr. SHUSTER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BEILENSON. I yield to the gentleman from Pennsylvania.

Mr. SHUSTER. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Chairman, I think it is important that the House know that the position of the distinguished chairman is not necessarily the position of the committee and he is not necessarily speaking and reflecting the position of the committee.

Mr. BEILENSON. The gentleman is absolutely correct. This gentleman is only speaking for himself.

Mr. KASICH. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words. I hope to not take the entire 5 minutes.

Let me associate myself with the very good remarks of the gentleman from Oklahoma [Mr. McCurdy]. But I do not want to just take a second here to do something from rote or something from a prepared text because as some of my friends on the Democrat side know, including Mr. Wolpe, I take this issue very, very seriously. It was not without a great amount of study that I have decided to oppose the restrictions on United States efforts to resolve this problem in Angola.

Let me tell you what I have been doing in the last year, about the last year--the last really 2 years. It was sometime ago that I went to Mickey Leland and asked him if he would work with me to establish a caucus on Africa.

Before Mickey's death he had agreed to do that. In fact, we were in the process of lining people up who would participate in a caucus for the purpose of getting people in Congress to understand the problems in Africa.

Since that time I have been involved in writing a letter--being involved in discussions, I cannot remember whether I wrote a letter or not, but I urged the administration to ask the President of the Congo to come to Washington to be honored for his work to try to resolve this problem in Angola.

Subsequent to those efforts that I made along with several others, the President of the Congo was in fact invited to Washington, where he was honored at a state dinner which I had the great privilege to attend. It was done because we wanted to recognize his brave, courageous efforts to try to resolve this very serious problem in Africa.

I also, by the way, just signed a letter the other day that urged Members to attend the telebriefing between President Dos Santos and Members of Congress.

I must tell you that is not an easy thing to do as a Member some time of the conservative party because here I was saying, `Let us hear what Dos Santos has to say.'

Now, I think what is happening or what has happened in Angola is it has been caught up in an East-West confrontation. I think in my own mind I am not convinced that what keeps us from resolving this problem is the East-West confrontation. I am not certain about this, but sometimes I suspect that the problem that we have here is a matter of one group of people who would like to have control battling another group of people who presently have control.

Now, it happens that we are on the side of Mr. Savimbi because they are representing elections, multiparty elections, things that we share and that we believe in here. The other side happens to be supported by the Soviets.

Now, Mr. Dos Santos told me when I was in Angola in a meeting with him that he wanted to open the Government, he wanted to have free enterprise, he wanted all of these things all of us were eager to hear. None of that has been forthcoming really and I am disappointed in that. But I sat down with Mr. Hyde, I sat down with people from the State Department to honestly ask them what we can do to push forward the process to end this conflict.

You see, I did go to the villages, where I saw people who were pulled around in wagons because they had no legs, their stumps and the rest of their bodies were placed on little wagons and pulled by somebody who had also had a limb blown off or maybe both arms.

I saw many, many people, innocent people in Angola, who have been caught in the middle of this conflict. And I want to see it ended. I have worked aggressively within my own party and with my friends on the other side of this aisle to try to get this conflict resolved quickly so that the people of Angola will not continue to die.

[TIME: 1740]

Mr. Chairman, do my colleagues know what it comes down to? How do we most quickly resolve this conflict? The gentlemen from California [Mr. Dellums and Mr. Dymally] and others on that side believe the way to get it done is for the United States to take a certain set of actions.

Let me tell my colleagues something. There is no one who loves life more than the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Hyde]. He has fought for it all of his career, and he has taken a lot of hits for some of the things that he has done. I say to my colleagues, `Mr. Hyde wants to see an end to this conflict as much as you do.'

Mr. Chairman, it is a matter of how we honestly, intellectually feel we will get it resolved.

As my colleagues know, what gave me good reason for optimism, great reason for optimism, was when Secretary Baker went in his last meetings and talked to Shevardnadze about winding down this and ending this conflict in Angola.

Now look. I do not want this conflict to continue on. We have resolved so many other East-West confrontations throughout the world. This continued East-West confrontation continues to result in a lot of people, innocent people over there, being maimed or being killed.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Kasich] has expired.

(By unanimous consent, Mr. Kasich was allowed to proceed for 2 additional minutes.)

Mr. KASICH. Mr. Chairman, I personally believe that Secretary Baker and Secretary Shevardnadze are truly interested in ending this, and, if the United States is to move unilaterally, unilaterally, which gives incentives to those who were presently in power to hold out, I believe in my mind we are hurting the solution in Angola, and the conflict will be continued.

Mr. Chairman, I think about Nicaragua, and I think about so many other places in the world, in Afghanistan, where we have had these kinds of debates, and, as my colleagues know, it always has come down to where we have stood tough and we have said to the other people that we are ready to negotiate, we are ready to have a cease-fire, we are ready to have elections. It has worked in other places in the world, and it can work here also.

However, Mr. Chairman, I want to tell my colleagues from the bottom of my heart that I want to see this conflict ended. It is clearly now a question of how we get it done, and that is why I have reached out, taken some steps that maybe other people would not take because of my concern for what is happening in that region.

But I happen to believe at this point in time, because it is in the best interest of ending this conflict in Angola, not to enact the legislative barbed wire, not to arm or give incentives to one side over the other, but let us let Shevardnadze and let us let Baker sit in their meetings and get this darned thing resolved once and for all, and I think the best way to approach that right now is not to add the restriction.

Mr. WOLPE. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words, and I rise in support of the amendment offered by the gentleman from California [Mr. Dellums].

(Mr. WOLPE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. WOLPE. Mr. Chairman, colleagues, I rise to speak in the strongest possible terms in support of the amendment that has been offered by the gentlemen from California [Mr. Dellums and Mr. Dymally], and the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. Hamilton], that requires that any further assistance to UNITA be openly requested by the administration and openly decided by the Members of this Congress. I have enormous respect for those who have taken a different view on this matter, particularly the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Kasich] who a moment ago indicated that we do have a common goal here--to end this conflict. I am convinced that continued external military flows into Angola have extended the conflict.

Mr. Chairman, it made no sense when our policy of supporting Jonas Savimbi with military assistance was first announced almost 5 years ago. Even then, at the height of the United States cold war with the Soviet Union, this policy was a colossal waste of money, driven by simplistic ideological labels. Our military involvement on behalf of UNITA had the unintended tragic effect of prolonging Angola's war, of delaying Namibia's transition to independence, of further emboldening South Africa in the destabilization of Angola and of deepening Angola's military dependence upon the Soviets and the Cubans. Even though the avowed goal of American policy was to do precisely the opposite.

If the administration's policy made no sense in late 1985, it makes even less sense today, 5 years and, reportedly, over $170 million in American assistance later, when according to published reports the administration has again asked American taxpayers to dig into their pockets to provide UNITA with an estimated $60 million.

Mr. Chairman, the cold war is over. The Soviets are openly searching for the means to scale back their already drastically reduced military flows to Angola--if the United States will cooperate. The Soviets have explicitly accepted the triple zero option in which all sides will end external military flows to Angola. Three-quarters of the Cuban forces have been withdrawn from Angola. The Angolans are engaged in a serious internal reform process and are desperate--for political, for economic, and for diplomatic reasons--to reconcile with the West.

It has been suggested that no concessions have been made by the Government of Angola. That is simply not the case. The Angolan Government has cooperated with American diplomacy for the last several years in ensuring the success of the Angolan-Namibian accords. It has agreed to the withdrawal of Cuban forces, and that withdrawal, as I indicated, is proceeding. It has agreed to facilitate the transition to Namibian independence. The Government of Angola agreed, in fact, to provide a kind of de facto recognition of Mr. Savimbi and his UNITA Party, when it agreed, to meet at Gbadolite where there was a handshake we all will recall between Mr. Savimbi and President Dos Santos. In the eyes of many independent observers, Mr. Savimbi walked away from that agreement. There has been an explicit agreement by the Angolan Government to move to a multiparty system. No ambiguity on that score. The only question is with respect to the specific timetable, and that concession we can expect very shortly.

There has also been an agreement by the Government of Angola to cross-border relief supplies into UNITA-held areas in southeast Angola. Because of that agreement, the International Committee of the Red Cross now has prepared a concrete plan for the delivery of such relief. Implementation of that plan is now in process.

The Angolan Government, moreover, has agreed to a series of major economic reforms that have been advocated by the United States and by Western states.

So, any notion that the Government of Angola has been intransigent or noncooperative, is simply not true.

Mr. Chairman, in the midst of our own dire budget crisis, when domestic programs are being cut across the board and when we must be much tougher in allocating scarce foreign aid to advance America's national security interests, it is patently outrageous for the administration to ask the American taxpayer to subsidize Jonas Savimbi.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gnetleman from Michigan [Mr. Wolpe] has expired.

(By unanimous consent, Mr. Wolpe was allowed to proceed for 5 additional minutes.)

[Page: H10049]

Mr. WOLPE. Mr. Chairman, $60 million in reported military assistance to UNITA represents not only an unadulterated waste of taxpayer funds, but also a step which will continue mindlessly adding to Angola's staggering human misery. We have heard of the indiscriminate use of land mines that has created the world's largest amputee population, estimated to be upwards of 50,000. The war has left over 300,000 dead, over 1 million refugees and displaced persons. In the next 2 months famine will threaten 1.9 million people. If there is no durable ceasefire soon and no effective removal of land mines, Mr. Chairman, two thirds of those at risk of starvation will likely not be reached. That is over 1 million people. If fighting continues at current levels, fueled by continued U.S. military flows, American relief agencies such as Catholic Relief Services and World Vision will fail to reach thousands in need.

Mr. Chairman, I know that the concern of those that continue to support this effort is that somehow we will undermine those perceived to be advocates of human rights and democracy in Angola. The government of Angola has an atrocious record on these matters, and American policy ought to be centered on the development of a genuine multiparty system with free elections and respect to fundamental human rights.

However, Mr. Chairman, let us be equally clear that the notion that Jonas Savimbi is the apostle and advocate of these values is simply belied by his own historical record. This is a man that initially traveled to the Soviet Union for support in the days when it was a different kind of Soviet Union. He then turned to China, became an avowed Maoist, and subsequently turned to South Africa.

[TIME: 1750]

The only thing that has been consistent about this individual over all these years has been the direct correlation between his ideology of the moment and his source of financial support.

Mr. Savimbi tells us today that he espouses democracy, and I hope he does. I genuinely do. But those who may not be conversant with the history of Angola need to know that this is a man who historically espoused a one-party state and saw himself at the helm of that state. During private conversations with me in my office, he acknowledged under questioning that indeed he was a socialist, more comfortable with the Chinese than the Soviet model.

Amnesty International, Africa Watch, and Savinbi's formerly sympathetic biographer, Fred Bridgland, have all documented repeated human rights violations: Witch burnings, forced labor, and disappearances and violent mistreatment of prominent UNITA personalities.

Just 2 weeks ago, yet another disturbing account appeared in the Washington Post, written by the award winning journalist, Leon Dash, which added further corroboration to charges of human rights abuses.

Life in UNITA-held areas has hardly evolved into a democratic model of broad participation. Power is tightly held in the hands of President Savimbi; UNITA's internal structure is designed along classic Marxist-Leninist lines; there is not history of free elections, free debate or pluralistic tolerance of opposing parties. Rather, society in Jamba has been described as a monopolistic personality cult, most recenty in an article by Radek Sikorski in the conservative National Review.

I don't raise these criticism to make the Angolan Government look better; that Government's record can also be roundly criticized. I emphasize these concerns because it is UNITA with which we have a close intimate relationship. It is UNITA which receives U.S. dollars, supposedly in the pursuit of democracy. Let's stop kidding ourselves: U.S. covert aid to UNITA is not about democracy and human rights.

The question is, is that the proper use of American tax dollars at this time of fiscal constraint?

Mr. Speaker, contrary to administration claims, United States policy has not brought the warring parties in Angola to the edge of peace and democracy. There have been several face-to-face, exploratory meetings between the Government and UNITA, but these do not amount to a substantive political breakthrough. For that to happen, we have to work far more actively with the Soviet Union to apply even-handed pressures upon both sides to reach a negotiated settlement.

Thus far this year, four rounds of Portuguese-mediated exploratory talks have failed to dislodge the Angolan Government and UNITA from their mutual deadlock. That is because each side remains mired in profound distrust and bitterness and each continues to rely overwhelmingly upon military might, in the vain hope that by bludgeoning the other side through one more round of fighting, it can improve its military position before compromising politically. Tragically, continued external military flows--United States, Soviet, South African--only feed this terrible dynamic.

Mr. Chairman, some dramatic step is required to push UNITA and the Angolan Government out of their deadlock. The amendment offered by Congressmen Dellums, Dymally, and Hamilton will do just that. I urge all of my colleagues in the House to join me in voting in support of it. It is an action truly in the interests of all Angolans; it is an action in defense of the interests of the American taxpayer.

[Page: H10050]

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. WOLPE. I would be pleased to yield to the gentleman from Illinois.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, the gentleman and I have a different view of Jonas Savimbi. The gentleman is unwilling to concede that he had his ride to Damascus and has been converted.

I too have talked to the man and I am convinced of his sincerity. That is neither here nor there.

All Savimbi and UNITA wants, and they have been fighting very successfully with darn little support compared to what the Soviets have poured into the MPLA, $800 million last year, to our--well, it is still secret. If nobody else will, I will maintain the secrecy of the amount. But they want a date for a cease-fire, a cease-fire that is internationally monitored, a date for an election that is internationally monitored, a change in the constitution so that it can be multiparty, not limited to one. For 15 years they have been waiting for that.

The gentleman from Michigan [Mr. Wolpe] has influence with the Government. Why do you not urge it on them? As long as the Communists have all the weapons, even the ones the Cubans are leaving behind, and they have enough to last 15 years, I am informed, and as long as UNITA is starving to death, do you think it is an encouragement to negotiating democracy with the Communists if we cut off aid to UNITA?

Do you really think that?

Mr. WOLPE. Mr. Chairman, if I may reclaim my time to respond to the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Hyde], let me say, first of all, the objectives the gentleman has just described in terms of the kind of constitutional system that will permit multiparty democracy and the full participation of UNITA in that process, I subscribe to as well.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. Wolpe] has again expired.

(By unamimous consent, Mr. Wolpe was allowed to proceed for 1 additional minute.)

Mr. WOLPE. Mr. Chairman, let me say to the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Hyde] that the real issue at this point is not the difficulty in getting those kinds of agreements with respect to the constitution.

Mr. HYDE. But it is.

Mr. WOLPE. No, it is not. The Government of Angola has made very clear they are planning to address all of the issues and the concerns that the gentleman has just expressed. But the real issue at this point is Mr. Savimbi's insistence his standing army be kept fully in place throughout the election process.

Mr. HYDE. He is just against unilateral disarmament. So am I.

Mr. WOLPE. The issue is, the Government of Angola has made very clear it wishes to create a single military structure, abandon all party forces, and move to a freely elected multiparty government.

Mr. HYDE. If the gentleman will yield further, the tribal system that exists in that country is not going to go away. There are at least three major tribes. Some democracy has to happen soon.

Mr. DYMALLY. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

(Mr. DYMALLY asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. DYMALLY. Mr. Chairman, it is in order to recount at this time some of the relatively recent efforts of the Angolan Government to bring about a peaceful settlement after 15 years of conflict in Angola:

First, the Government of Angola was one of the parties to the important Tripartite Agreement between Angola, South Africa, and Cuba. This agreement provided for the withdrawal of all Cuban troops from Angola; 80 percent of these troops have already been withdrawn; South African withdrawal from Namibia; free elections and independence for Namibia; and termination of South African military aid to UNITA.

Second, the following additional concessions have been made to the United States: The establishment of an open market economy with private ownership of businesses and land; a cease-fire and face-to-face negotiations with UNITA to end the civil conflict; internationally supervised open elections, universal suffrage, the principle of `one person-one vote' and the right of independent candidates to stand for elective office; revision of the Angolan Constitution to permit a multiparty political system and granting UNITA recognition as part of a comprehensive peace agreement.

Third, the Angolan Government has cooperated with the United Nations and the United States in insuring famine relief in UNITA-held territory.

Fourth, it has refrained, at the request of the U.S. administration, from bombing rebel positions in Jamba and has voluntarily withdrawn troops from the Mavinga and Mucundi areas.

Fifth, the Angolan Government has adjusted to the announcement of discontinued military aid from the Soviet Union.

Sixth, the Angolan Government has seriously proposed a triple zero option. This includes no further importation of lethal military weaponry from any country if the United States, including South Africa, would agree not to grant additional lethal military aid to UNITA.

In spite of these concessions and acts of cooperation, the United States continues to provide UNITA with increased military aid and weaponry which are used against civilian urban population centers and have inflicted numerous civilian casualties including very many women and children.

It is, indeed, ironic that in the midst of great human suffering, incredibly large numbers of amputees, endemic hunger and famine, that considerable amounts of money are being used for destructive and not humanitarian purposes.

The following observations are pertinent:

First, significant geopolitical changes have taken place globally since 1985, when the Clark amendment which led to the resumption of covert aid to UNITA was repealed.

Second, the United States continues to make huge miltaristic expenditures and to give lethal aid to UNITA in spite of the fact that famine and hunger are rampant there.

Third, the Angolan conflict has claimed an estimated 340,000 lives and placed at risk of starvation from war and drought, at least 1.9 million civilians. Military campaigns have also displaced an estimated 465,000 and severly disrupted agricultural production.

Fourth, the toll has been particularly heavy on women and children. For example, one child dies every 4 minutes thereby contributing to Angola having one of the world's highest infant mortality rates. Angola also has more than 50,000 amputees, most are women and children, again, among the highest in the world.

Fifth, because of its grave budgetary problems, the United States cannot afford to give financial support of approximately $60 million in lethal aid to UNITA and neglect important domestic program such as Medicare and education.

Sixth, finally the New York Times editorial of Thursday, October 11, 1990, gives further justification for this amenmdment. It pointedly asks, `Does it really make any sense to continue an aid program rooted in the strategic assumptions of a different era?' It concludes by starting that, `This is the deeper question that Congress and the administration have not yet begun to address.'

This amendment, my colleagues, specifically addresses this deeper question and, therefore, calls for your support.

Mr. Chairman, significant and far-reaching changes have taken place globally since 1985, when the Clark amendment was repealed and led to the resumption in 1986 of covert aid to the Angolan rebel movement known as the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola [UNITA].

Paramount among these are the political and economic changes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe which have markedly diminished the Communist threat and have made somewhat irrelevant the role of the United States Government in combatting and containing communism in Angola.

It is, therefore, critically incumbent upon the United States to reevaluate the size, nature, and content of its foreign aid to geopolitical areas such as Angola, which it has supported when Russia was the enemy.

It is, indeed, ironic that the United States is making huge militaristic expenditures in a country like Angola where famine and hunger run rampant. This conflict has lasted without clear cut results for 15 years and has claimed and estimated 340,000 lives and placed at risk of starvation from war and drought, at least 800,000 civilians. Additionally, one child dies every 4 minutes thereby contributing to Angola having one of the world's highest infant mortality rates in the world. Angola also has more than 50,000 amputees, most being women and children, again one of the highest in the world.

Mr. Chairman the present rancorous debates in the U.S. Congress concerning the huge budget deficits which threaten national security, make it quite clear that the United States can no longer afford to give financial support to UNITA to the tune of approximately $60 million. National reconcilation cannot be accomplished by militaristic activities and posturing.

Initially, military aid was extended to UNITA to confront a Soviet-backed government and as a leverage to encourage the withdrawal of Cuban troops. Approximately 80 percent of the Cubans have left Angola with the remainder leaving by July.

Additionally, both the Soviet Union and the United States have indicated plans to continue their successful global efforts of cooperation by becoming actively involved in the fourth round of talks to be held in Portugal in efforts to achieve a lasting cease-fire leading to constitutional changes in Angola which allow for free and fair multiparty elections.

Moreover, the Angolan Government has already made firm moves in that democratic direction and has also instituted merchanisms for a market economy.

Mr. Chairman, it is very difficult to justify continued lethal, military aid to UNITA in view of the fact that the Soviet Union is in agreement with a `zero-zero option' which advocates cutting military aid to UNITA from the United States and military aid to the Angolan Government from the Soviet Union.

This amendment, for which the support of my colleagues is sought, makes the basic assumption that U.S. foreign policy which supports military operations abroad should not be made and implemented covertly.

In essence, it specifically prohibits covert assistance in support of military or paramilitary operations in Angola unless the provision of that assistance is the openly acknowledged policy of the United States. The President of the United States must, therefore, publicly inform the United States Congress and the American people that the support of the United States Government for military or paramilitary operations in Angola is important to the national security and the United States Congress has expressly approved such assistance. According to this amendment no military and lethal aid must be given by the United States to UNITA until or unless this basic condition is met.

In closing, and in keeping with my opening remarks, the New York Times editorial of Thursday, October 11, 1990, raised a cogent and critical question with respect to covert aid to Angola.

The editorial pointedly asks. Does it really make any sense to continue an aid program rooted in the strategic assumptions of a different era?' The editorial concludes by stating that, `This is the deeper question that Congress and the Administration have not yet begun to address'.

This amendment, my colleagues, specifically addresses this deeper question and therefore calls for your support.

Mr. Chairman, I submit for the Record correspondence concerning this matter.
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC,

People's Republic of Angola.

His Excellency Tom Foley,
Speaker of the House of Representatives, Washington, DC.

His Excellency Robert M. Michel,

Republican Leader, House of Representatives, Washington, DC.

[Page: H10051]

Dear Mr. Speaker and Republican Leader: I am pleased to state that my Government immensely appreciates the decision of the House of Representatives of the United States of America to allow for an open debate regarding lethal military aid to Unita, at a time when we are undertaking serious efforts in order to reach a lasting peace in Angola.

My Government is indeed very disappointed by the fact that the Bush Administration has adopted a hostile attitude in relation to the initiatives of my Government and the peace process, in spite of the various concessions and numerous meeting with high U.S. Administration officials. I would also like to highlight that we do not understand if the Bush Administration is truly interested in a negotiated solution and democracy, or if it intends to bring Unita to power by way of force.

I am certain that you are aware that the Angolan Government is in an advanced phase of preparation regarding its reform program with the following objectives:

1. Holding of free elections within the context of a multiparty system.

2. Creation of a one man, one vote electoral system

3. Development of a market economy.

4. Encouragement of foreign investment.

5. Enacting amendments to our Constitution and their submission to debate before their approval, with the participation of all the national political elements including UNITA, as long as they demilitarize themselves under the framework of the development of a single National Army, which has been discussed during the direct contacts held in Portugal.

6. My Government, in a letter addressed to Congressman Anthony Beilenson, Chairman of the [House of Representatives] Intelligence Committee, manifested its favorable position regarding the `triple zero' plan so long as the United States, and its allies also agree not to supply more military aid to UNITA. This political initiative which I introduced will certainly be subjected to international verification.

In spite of these initiatives as well as others, the Bush Administration continues to ignore our pledge to reach a lasting peace and ceasefire, arguing that UNITA has been very `flexible' during the peace negotiations. The truth is that UNITA never discussed or negotiated in good faith. My Government has consistently presented serious proposals regarding peace and an acceptable cease fire. UNITA, on the other hand, has proposed such unrealistic and vague ideas that it leads us to question its sincerity. Because of its lack of sincerity, difficulties have arisen with respect to ending the war in Angola. Because of this, we are convinced that UNITA is much more interested in prolonging the war in furtherance of its hidden agenda. It is for this reason alone that UNITA seeks to obtain even more military aid from the Bush Administration.

I urge that you consider that the Angolan Government by itself cannot end the war, although it is its deepest wish. The Angolan Government needs to count on the collaboration and help of the United States Congress to put an end to the supply of arms to UNITA within the framework of the `triple zero' plan.

It is our feeling that if Congress were to give special attention to the Solarz or Dellums Amendments, you will certainly note that either one of these amendments will help the Angolan people to attain peace and minimize their suffering.

With respect to the issue of free elections within the context of a multiparty system, I would like to state that the Angolan Government is committed to holding them as soon as possible, once peace and stability have been attained. It would first be necessary to proceed with a census of the population and to implement all the necessary steps with regard to the preparation of the electoral process, despite the very complex committed to holding free and democratic elections, and, therefore, they will be organized accordingly.

Please accept the expression of my highest consideration.
JOSE EDUARDO DOS SANTOS,

President of the People's Republic
of Angola.

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PERMANENT MISSION OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA TO THE UNITED NATIONS,
New York, NY, October 11, 1990.
Re U.S. Lethal Military Aid for Unita.

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Dear Representative: I urge your support for efforts to end U.S. lethal military assistance to Unita. Termination of military assistance will bring peace to Angola and end unnecessary bloodshed. Continued lethal military assistance only serves to delay progress in the Angolan-Unita direct peace talks and ignors my Government's efforts to reach a non-military resolution of our civil war.

The Government of Angola has instituted substantive structural reforms in pursuit of peace and democracy. The Angolan economy is moving toward a market-based model free of state subsidies and control. My Government has committed itself to the formation of a constitutional multi-party democracy in Angola and has made numerous other concessions. To continue U.S. lethal military assistance to Unita undercuts our serious efforts and suggests a lack of commitment to finding a peaceful solution to our war.

The military conflict in my country which the United States has funded has resulted in the loss of many lives. Innocent women and children have been maimed and injured by Unita attacks and land mines. Angola presently has the highest per capita amputee rate in the world due to this reckless destruction and guerrilla warfare. The people of Angola deserve peace and my Government is sincerely committed to peace.

In pursuit of peace we have requested that the Bush Administration support the so-called `triple-zero' option. My Government is committed to making no new purchases of military supplies from the Soviet Union, or any other country, provided that, of course, for our army if the U.S. discontinues its delivery of military supplies to Unita. My Government made this commitment in writing to the Chairman of the House Intelligence committee and is committed to implementing such an agreement upon receipt of the Bush Administration's commitment to the `triple zero' option. To date, the Bush Administration has not embraced this important compromise but has persisted in its effort to continue major funding or lethal military assistance to Unita. We believe, therefore, that a Congressional decision to discontinue covert military assistance would send a strong signal of America's desire for permanent peace in my country.

On behalf of my Government, we respectfully urge your support of the efforts of Congressman Dellums, Dymally, Hamilton, Richardson, and Solarz, to change U.S. policy on providing assistance to Unita when their amendments to the Intelligence Authorization Bill are considered.

If you have any questions or desire any additional information, please feel free to call me at 212/861-5656 or contact our Washington representative, Robert B. Washington, Jr., Esquire at 202/857-4017. Thanking you in advance for your careful consideration, I remain,

Sincerely,
MANUEL PEDRO PACAVIRA,

Permanent Representative for
Angola to the United Nations.

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Summary Position of the Government of Angola Regarding Increased Lethal Military Aid to Unita Rebels, October 10, 1990

BACKGROUND

1. War since independence: Since gaining its independence from Portugal in 1975, Angola has been engaged in a war between the Government and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (`Unita').

2. Government agreed to Cuban troop withdrawal:

a. On December 22, 1988, the Government of Angola (the `Government') agreed to sign a Tripartite Agreement as the result of prolonged talks between Angola, Cuba and South Africa mediated by the U.S. The Agreement between Angola, South Africa and Cuba provided for the withdrawal of all Cuban troops from Angola; South African widthdrawal from Namibia; free elections and independence for Namibia; and termination of South African military aid to Unita.

b. South Africa continues to supply major arms and other military equipment to Unita through Zaire. The Government continues to protest these violations of the Tripartite Agreement and has called these violations to the attention of representatives of the Administration.

3. Angolan Government concessions: President Jose Eduardo dos Santos has reached out to the U.S. and, after consultations between governments, has agreed to: (i) the withdrawal of Cuban troops; (ii) the establishment of an open market economy with private ownership of businesses and land; (iii) a cease-fire and face-to-face negotiations with Unita to end the civil conflict; (iv) internationally supervised open elections, universal suffrage, the principle of `one man-one vote' and the right of independent candidates to stand for elective office; and (v) revision of the Angolan Constitution to permit a multiparty political system pursuant to a public referendum.

4. Cooperation on famine relief. The Government has expedited international famine relief to Unita-held territory by inviting a UN census; agreeing to a UN delivery plan; and permitting cross-border deliveries through Namibia to Southern Angola by non-governmental international relief agencies.

5. Offensive against rebel positions delayed. At the request of the Administration the Government refrained from continuing to bomb rebel positions in Jamba and has voluntarily withdrawn its troops from the Mavinga and Mucundi areas although these areas are of strategic importance to the rebels and are sources of resupply.

6. Peace negotiations underway. The Government has participated in good-faith in four rounds of face-to-face peace negotiations using a format similar to that used in Namibia. The Government and Unita have exchanged peace proposals and have invited the U.S. and U.S.S.R. to observe and participate under the auspices of the Portuguese government. Unita continues to insist that it be recognized as a legitimate opposition political party before even a cease-fire is put in place. The Government believes a multiparty system must follow constitutional changes and a popular referendum but is willing to grant Unita recognition as part of a comprehensive peace agreement.

7. U.S. recommends increased lethal military aid to Unita. Only the U.S. refuses to recognize the Government of Angola. The U.S. continues to supply approximately $80 million in covert lethal military aid to the Unita rebels through secret defense appropriations and the CIA contingency fund. Despite important concessions made to the U.S. by the Government, the Bush Administration has reportedly requested increased covert military assistance to Unita for fiscal 1991, and the House Intelligence Committee has approved additional aid.

8. U.S.S.R. to discontinue military aid. The Soviet Union, which previously supplied weapons to the Government, has announced that, in the interest of resolving this conflict, it will discontinue all such supplies.

9. Pledge to import no new arms. The Government has proposed a `triple zero option' in which it would agree to import no new lethal military weaponry from any country if the U.S. and its key allies including Saudi Arabia, South Africa and Zaire would agree not to grant additional lethal military aid to Unita. To date, neither the Bush Administration nor its allies supporting Unita have agreed to this proposal.

B. POSITION

The U.S. should discontinue covert lethal military assistance to Unita in order to: (i) promote a peaceful resolution of the Angolan Civil War; and (ii) promote closer U.S.-Angolan relations and cooperation.

C. RATIONALE

1. U.S. actions could undercut the peace process. Continuing U.S. military aid undercuts the ability of both the Government and Unita to negotiate peace. Unita has side tracked cease-fire discussions in order to maintain additional military support. Despite numerous promises to President dos Santos by the Administration that specific conciliatory actions will lead to upgraded relations with the U.S., relations have not improved and military support for the opposition is actually increasing. The U.S. Administration's response to the Government's initiatives do not encourage further concessions by the Government or the peace process.

2. U.S. weapons kill civilians. U.S. weapons are being used increasingly against civilian urban population centers including: public buildings, utilities and highways. Huge numbers of civilian casualties have been inflicted by U.S. weapons including large numbers of women and children in an attempt to undermine popular support for the Government.

3. Government concessions ignored. The Government has made most of the significant concessions requested by the U.S. and a process is underway which may lead to settlement of disputes and early elections. Increased levels of lethal military aid in the face of these constructive developments is inconsistent foreign policy and is not in the best interests of Angola or the U.S.

4. U.S. action prolongs conflict. U.S. military assistance which could approach $100 million in FY 1991 (if the Administration's request is granted) continues to prolong the process of the peaceful resolution of the conflict. These resources could be used more productively to end economic suffering and famine, or assist in drought relief.

5. U.S. and U.S.S.R. can create peace. The U.S.S.R. has offered to discontinue its arms shipments to the Government and believes superpower involvement in this regional conflict should cease immediately. The U.S. has a golden opportunity to work constructively with the U.S.S.R. create peace, stability, and strengthen an important trading partner in Southern Africa.

6. U.S.S.R. domination no longer a threat. Given the changes in the world political structure, the U.S. can no longer justify a policy that promotes Africans killing other Africans in the name of ending Soviet world domination.

[Page: H10053]

7. Eliminiation of aid would encourage Unita to negotiate in good-faith. Elimination, or a decrease in U.S. assistance to Unita, would create a strong incentive for Unita to bargain in good-faith for a cease-fire and peaceful resolution, rather then expending its resources in a domestic U.S. public relations campaign.

Please telephone Robert B. Washington, Jr., Steven Pruitt or Marc J. Scheineson at (202) 857-4000 if you require additional information.

Mr. DYMALLY. Mr. Chairman, I would say to my friend, the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Hyde], I do not want to abolish the Committee on Intelligence, because my friend is chairman. Given the youthfulness of the chairman of the Committee on Rules, Mr. Beilenson will never become a chairman unless he keeps this one, so for that reason, I want to keep him as chairman. I do not want to abolish it.

Mr. Chairman, I want to thank the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs for bringing to our attention the fact that we may be here for Christmas. In California we have become very sophisticated. We call it the mail vote. But I do want to go home for Christmas. After Christmas I want the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. Burton] and the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Hyde] to visit Angola and see these maimed children with me, so we can have some compassion and bring an end to this war.

Mr. Chairman, we are debating the cold war on this floor. That is not the issue. We missed the point. The point is to have open debate on this subject matter.

My good friend, the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Hyde] may have inadvertently done a disservice to the dedicated, able and loyal staff of the Committee on Intelligence by suggesting that the gentleman from California [Mr. Dellums] should go to them to find out about the food corridors. The fact of the matter is, if we went to them, they would tell us the Red Cross has approved the food corridors, that the State Department knows about the food corridors. My good friend, the eloquent gentleman, the distinguished gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Hyde] may have made a good case of why we should have open debate on this subject and not depend on covert information, because he has given to this House inadvertently wrong information, as a member of the very important and prestigious Committee on Intelligence.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DYMALLY. I yield to the gentleman from Illinois.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I could not hear the gentleman. He said I gave the House wrong information. Would the gentleman tell me what that was?

Mr. DYMALLY. Reclaiming my time, the gentleman suggested to the gentleman from California [Mr. Dellums] that if he really wants to find out about the food corridor, he should go to the staff, and he implied that the food corridors were not open.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman will yield further, I assert that they are starving to death in the UNITA section because Zambia--I said Zaire, but I meant Zambia--and Namibia will not permit food to come in without Dos Santos' OK, and he has not given it.

Mr. DYMALLY. Mr. Chairman, that is not true. That is the point I am trying to make. The fact of the matter is, the State Department will tell you that the Angolan Government has given permission, and the Red Cross has certified it. That is the wrong information, which prompts me to suggest that we need to have open debate on these matters, that we cannot trust the gentleman with this kind of important information.

Now, having said that, let me say this: We ended the war in Nicaragua, not because we had covert aid, but because this Congress, in open debate, stopped the aid. As a result of stopping the aid, we were able to have free elections.

We are asking Angola to have free elections while we supply aid. If we really want to have free elections, we ought to stop the aid. The fact of the matter is, let us stop fighting the cold war in the Halls of Congress.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DYMALLY. It is always a pleasure to yield to the gentleman from Illinois.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, we did stop the aid in 1976 for 10 years, and all that happened were the Communists got stronger and stronger and stronger. No democracy.

Mr. DYMALLY. Mr. Chairman, I am glad the gentleman raised that issue, because I had a note here and I passed over it. The South Africans were supplying the arms when the Clark amendment went into effect. As a member of the Committee on Intelligence, the gentleman knows that. The South Africans today are supplying arms.

The reason why UNITA wants arms, they want to do what the Contras tried to do, to have a separate and private army within the context of a coalition government. That is the reason why. But let us forget whether they are Marxists or whether they are rebels. Let us think about these children. Let us think about the people who are dying.

The gentleman from California [Mr. Dellums] made reference to the fact that as an African-American he is concerned about these children. It was suggested, and properly so, that this was not a question of race. But let me just say this: If you were an African-American, and you looked around the world, you would see my friend Mr. Baker shuttling back and forth to meet the Foreign Minister of the U.S.S.R. bringing peace to Europe, bringing peace to Asia, bringing peace to Latin America, and these two men cannot bring peace to Africa. What are you going to ask? What are you going to say?

[TIME: 1800]

All over the world peace is coming to the forefront, and in Africa thousands of people are dying because of bombing, thousands are dying because of famine, thousands are maimed because of bombs from both sides. I am not putting blame on just us.

Mr. HYDE. If the gentleman will yield, Afghanistan is not in Europe, it is not Latin America. Afghanistan is a very ethnic country. There is a lot of bombing and killing, and a lot of children with legs off, and it is because the Soviets still have dreams of empire. They are there still, they are pouring more in as they are in Angola.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from California [Mr. Dymally] has expired.

(By unanimous consent Mr. Dymally was allowed to proceed for 5 additional minutes.)

Mr. DYMALLY. Mr. Chairman, the gentleman from California [Mr. Dellums] and I are African-Americans. We are not Afghanis. So let me say this, it is a matter of concern to 30 million African-Americans who are concerned about this misery, this suffering, and that is what we are trying to address here today. If we could do this without this amendment, then we should do it.

Why could not Mr. Baker and Mr. Shevardnadze arrange an agreement to stop arms on both sides? By the way, the gentleman keeps saying that the Russians are pouring arms into Angola. For God's sake, Angola is the legitimate government. They must defend the integrity of their system and their turf. They are not rebels.

Mr. WOLPE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DYMALLY. I am glad to yield to the gentleman from Michigan.

Mr. WOLPE. Mr. Chairman, I just want to say that the gentleman's last question he raised is a very important one about the possibility of the Soviet Union and the United States jointly agreeing to stop the flow of arms.

I think it should be emphasized in the course of this debate, by those who have expressed concern, that if we stop and then they do not, then there is an unfair advantage here. The Soviet Union right now, by everyone's acknowledgment, is providing greater amounts of assistance than the United States, and has publicly stated and in private diplomacy as well has made absolutely clear that they are prepared to stop all arms flows whatsoever to the Angola Government if we do the same to the forces of UNITA.

So as a matter of public record there is discussions in the Soviet Union and negotiations, and I thank the gentleman.

[Page: H10054]

Mr. DYMALLY. The gentleman and I have agreed on one thing, and that is that we need to have peace.

The difference between the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. Burton] and the gentleman from California is how do we get there. Why do we not just stop the arms, period?

Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DYMALLY. I am glad to yield to my friend, the gentleman from Indiana.

Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Chairman, the gentleman made a statement that the Government in Luanda, the Communist MPLA, is the legitimate Government of Angola. The fact of the matter is they seized power out of the barrel of a gun, in violation of the ALVOR Agreements. The gentleman well knows that, and that is one of the reasons why this conflict is going on right now.

The other thing I would like to set straight is that the Soviet Union this year is sending $500 million in additional aid into Angola, and there is a stockpile of weapons, some estimated as high as a 10-year stockpile of weapons that the Communist have.

Let me just say we want this resolved. I think this debate probably has gone on long enough. But I would just like to end up by saying one more thing.

Mr. DYMALLY. If I can reclaim my time, we took this country from the barrel of a gun from the British. I mean what is new?

But let me just say to the gentleman, every country in the world recognizes Angola but the United States and South Africa. By the way, we are in company with South Africa.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DYMALLY. I yield to the gentleman from Illinois.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I think the gentleman has hit on a great idea: Stop the arms and reduce the armaments inside the country. I am told the Cubans have left an awful lot of arms behind them.

Mr. DYMALLY. Indeed.

Mr. HYDE. They have a stockpile for 15 years. Let us get them out, have an internationally supervised ceasefire. We could do it tomorrow.

Mr. DYMALLY. So could I get a commitment from the gentleman that he will be on this floor today urging the United States Government to cease the arms flow while I join with the gentleman from California [Mr. Dellums] and urge the Russians to cease their arm flow.

Mr. HYDE. We can urge together, and I hope you are as successful as I am.

Mr. DYMALLY. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. Chairman, let me just say in conclusion that the Angolans have agreed to phase out the Cubans and about 80 percent have left. They have agreed with the United States to have an open market economy. They are working closely with the United Nations. They have refrained from bombing certain territories at the request of the U.S. Government. They have agreed to discontinue receiving aid from the Soviet Union. They are in support of the triple zero option proposal and, indeed, they have shown every bit of good faith in communications with Mr. Michel, with Mr. Foley, with the chairman of the Intelligence Committee, with the State Department, and others. They have done everything conceivable.

What we are asking to do is to stop the arms so that we can sit down and talk about peace. Let us save the children.

Mr. SMITH of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words and I rise in opposition to the amendment.

Mr. Chairman, we have a fascinating and a very relevant debate going on, and I want to thank the gentleman from California for having proposed this amendment in the first instance.

As someone who was a proponent of aid to the contras, but not until the President made it overt instead of covert, I understand what the gentleman is attempting to do, and I support him in attempting to have an overt discussion, which of course we are now having, even though this is covert aid. We are back in that mode again.

The problem with this is we are seeing the vestiges of two enormously compatible political philosophies fighting each other because on the one side the philosophy which governed the Government of Angola, the Marxist-Leninist theory, has crumbled in most places but Angola, and on the other side the Maoist theory of communism has been rejected by the leader of UNITA, or at least we think so, and we would like to hope so.

So here we have two places, one which is bankrupt because that on which it was founded is gone, and the other having rejected as bankrupt that which it originally believed in trying to get power in a country on a permanent basis.

We have been involved in that fight, so far on the side of the UNITA rebels. Would it be right for us to be involved in this fight? Yes, because we are trying in Angola, as in other places in Africa, to bring peace and democracy.

Is it right to do it overtly? Yes. We should not have covert operations if we believe in that which we are trying to achieve. We should be doing it out in the open, and it should be subject to debate.

The only real issue, procedurally, with the gentleman's amendment that can be legitimately attacked is the problem of the time frame. If this had been on the floor 6 months ago, I frankly probably would have been a supporter, because subsequent, had the amendment passed, we could have in fact had this discussion out in the open and made a decision to continue the aid or not to continue the aid.

But we are not faced with that. We are faced with the reality, because I subscribe to what the gentleman from Illinois has said with reference to what weaponry is available inside the country. I also subscribe to what the gentleman from California [Mr. Dymally] has said, because

there are children dying. It is a terrible shame, and I am not an African-American, and I would not like to see any more children die.

The problem is how do we stop it all, not piecemeal? How do we just stop it instead of slowing it down and another 15 years elapses before we have a conclusion?

We have all agreed, those proponents and those opponents of this amendment, that the parties have come much closer. Mr. Wolpe, chairman of the Africa Subcommittee, whose knowledge and intelligence and capability on this issue both sides support and commend, has said that on the one hand Dos Santos has said they want multiparty elections. Mr. Savimbi has said he wants a government to engage in negotiations to come to multiparty elections. We are really getting closer, if the pronouncements are to be believed.

The question is: Having come this close, having had pronouncements from both sides, having seen that the Soviet Union is enunciating, as the proponents of this amendment have said, that they are going to withdraw their support, having seen the Cubans are leaving Angola in large numbers due to what we have attempted to negotiate with them and the Soviet Union, is it now really, at this moment, right now, it is smart or precipitous to end the aid?

[TIME: 1810]

There really is not much more of a question here. Is it smart right now for furthering our foreign policy purposes to bring peace to Angola, to bring a multiparty election, no matter who wins? Because nobody here has talked about trying to influence the elections. No matter who wins, let the people of Angola make up their minds.

Or is it precipitous? Because once having removed that underpinning of support from Mr. Savimbi, we leave him in a terribly disadvantaged position, the person on whom we have pinned our hopes to bring the Dos Santos government to the table to negotiate those free, multiparty, open elections.

I watched last night on channel 3 here in Washington, if anybody else saw it, a small piece on the children in Africa including the children of Angola. The tragedy cannot be described from this well in adequate terms. To watch those children crawling because their legs have been blown off, you cannot describe it. You cannot, in good conscience.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Smith] has expired.

(By unanimous consent, Mr. Smith of Florida was allowed to proceed for 2 additional minutes.)

[Page: H10055]

Mr. SMITH of Florida. Mr. Chairman, you cannot, in good conscience, want this to continue, but the question resolves itself again.

If we now at this juncture, at this moment, cut it off, will we be confining scores, hundreds, thousands more of Angolan children, innocent children to the same fate as their older brothers and sisters? Or do we just give it that little bit extra and pray to God that we are doing the right thing?

Unfortunately, I must disagree with my very dear friend, and I want him to know that I am a very significant admirer of his capability and his intelligence, the gentleman from California [Mr. Dellums], it is not the right time. We have to give this last shot at it a chance to work, and it will not work, if we disable the one party right now.

But I will join with the gentleman, I tell him from this well, if we do this, defeat this gentleman's amendment and the Solarz amendment and 6 or 7 months from now we have gone nowhere and/or Mr. Savimbi does not live up to what he claims is his goal now, then I will join with the gentleman not only to make this overt, but, frankly, to end it.

I believe that at this moment we would be precipitous and acting against the interests of all of the people of Angola to leave Mr. Savimbi in a disadvantaged position, and that is, frankly, where I come down as an individual who cares about what happens for the future children of Angola.

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SMITH of Florida. I am happy to yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, first of all, let me compliment the gentleman for a very thoughtful presentation, clearly heartfelt.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Smith] has again expired.

(At the request of Mr. Dellums, and by unanimous consent, Mr. Smith of Florida was allowed to proceed for 2 additional minutes.)

Mr. DELLUMS. If the gentleman will yield further, Mr. Chairman, I understand the logic and the politics of the gentleman's statement.

First of all, I appeciate the fact that when the gentleman looks at our amendment he said, frankly, there is nothing wrong with the amendment except the issue of timing, because you know that this amendment raises the issue of process. It also raises the substantive question by inference as well.

The gentleman pointed out that if it had come 6 months ago, he and I may have been standing here advocating the very same position.

The problem is that the gentleman and I do not have control over the process here, and there are a lot of bills that come 6 months late, and that is a frustration that we all have, whether we are Republicans or Democrats, or wherever we fall on the scale. We have no control over that process.

But coming to the last point the gentleman made, he said, and he came down to the judgment, is it smart or is it precipitous, and he made the judgment that it is precipitous, and I respect that.

I do not challenge it, except simply to say that I come to a different conclusion. I come down saying it is not precipitous. I come down saying that I believe that it is smart.

We operate around here on the basis of sending signals, sending messages. The signal that I would like to see in this great Nation, is that by ending aid and coming forward in an open kind of fashion if, indeed, it is necessary, sends two messages. First, we believe in openness

and democratic principles, but more importantly, we are saying to the parties there that no longer will we support military involvement, come to the table and negotiate.

Finally, I would say that my colleague knows the tragedy of this discussion is covert aid. If it does not work, you can always go covert again, and maybe this time it would not be on the front page of the Wall Street Journal.

Mr. SMITH of Florida. Reclaiming my time, the gentleman is right as to the last point. They could always go covert again.

Frankly, it would not. We know the process, as well.

Secondarily, let me just say we can come to different conclusions, and while the gentleman and I agree completely on the South African issue, many of our colleagues disagree, and yet we turned out, I believe, to be right.

I do not condemn them for their belief, because I think they thought it might turn out a different way.

I believe, however, on this issue that the next few months is the turning point for the future of Angola, and we would be doing harm to American foreign policy.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Smith] has again expired.

(By unanimous consent. Mr. Smith of Florida was allowed to proceed for 1 additional minute.)

Mr. SMITH of Florida. We would be doing harm to American foreign policy, which has brought us to this point, as seemly as it may have been over that period of time, and no one can defend what has happened to the people and the children of Angola, but as seemly as it is, it has brought us to this point. It has brought us to both sides saying, `We are ready to negotiate multiparty elections.'

I do not believe at this point we should sacrifice that 15 years' worth of time and the money we have spent which pales in comparison to the blood and the loss that has been felt and sustained by the people of Angola. I believe we owe them that commitment to see it through a few months more, and hope to God that it works.

Mr. PAYNE of New Jersey. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of the amendment. I have listened very carefully, and there is not very much new that can be added to this discussion.

I simply, at times during the discussion, thought that I was back in 1952 at the hearings of the McCarthy era when we were trying to weed out the Red tide, or in 1960 when Mr. Nixon and Mr. Khrushchev and President Kennedy were arguing about burying democracy with communism. This is the only place I have heard from this antiquated discussion about the Communist threat of anywhere left in the United States other than here as we relate it to Angola.

It is really time to stop the disgraceful history of foreign military internvention in Angola. The Angolan people suffered 500 years of foreign colonial subjugation that denied them not only basic human rights, but attempted to deny them human dignity as well.

Portugal was the last European power to grant independence to its African colonies. Throughout the entire decolonization process the United States really did very little to help emerging nations in Africa and supported the colonialists from Europe because they were our NATO allies. The armed struggle against the Portuguese began in Angola in 1961 and lasted for 14 years. Unrest in Portugal provoked a coup d'etat in Lisbon in 1974 and the new government withdrew the support from its colonies in 1975, and withdrew from its colonies of Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde, and Angola.

The United States chose Holden Roberto and the National Front for the Liberation of Angola [FNLA] to support over the MPLA and UNITA, at that time. But here in 1990

we are still engaged in covert aid to Angola to the tune of $60 million, it is suggested, but at the same time, we are supporting UNHCR to care for Angolan refugees in Zambia. That makes no sense. We could take that $60 million and have it so for underdeveloped nations to help them with their economic development or for our domestic programs or even to reduce the debt as we have heard talked about so much during these part 3 of 4 days.

A disproportionate number of citizens, mostly women and children, have been maimed because of the tactics of land mines in Angola.

Last year Rev. Ben Chavis and the former medical director of the city of Newark, NJ, where I reside, Dr. Troutman, traveled to Angola and arranged for some children crippled by UNITA land mines to come to Newark to be fitted with artificial limbs at the University of Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey. There are currently 50,000 amputees, as we know.

[Page: H10056]
[TIME: 1820]

There are currently 50,000 amputees, as we know. But recently, at a hearing held in the Committee on Armed Services room, the Soviet Chief of Staff told Gen. Colin Powell that the Soviets were ready to cut off arms to Angola the next day, he said, if the United States was willing to stop its aid to UNITA.

Let me also make one thing clear, that the aid has not been grants to the Government of Angola. Weapons and arms have been purchased. They are not grants like we have been doing for UNITA. Therefore, I am strongly urging that at this time we cut off the aid. The people of the government have agreed to have the Cubans leave Angola. They have agreed to multinational parties. They have agreed to allow Mr. Savimbi to participate in the elections. They have agreed to have a market economy. They have agreed to recognize UNITA. I think that at this time we ought to end the aid. We should work toward having a settlement.

Finally, there has been talk about the suspension of discussions in Lisbon. The reason for suspension of discussion in Lisbon at this time between MPLA and UNITA is the Central Committee will be meeting in Angola on the 25th and 26th of this month, and they are in the process of discussing what is happening in Lisbon at the peace talks, and will immediately resume discussions in Lisbon after the party meets in Angola in the next few days. So this is not an attempt to end the discussion of peace talks in Angola and Lisbon, but I think that we should strongly support this resolution.

Mr. HOYER. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word. I will not take a full 5 minutes. I know all Members will be happy to hear that. I have a prepared statement that I have read and everything in it has been stated.

Clearly, this is a contentious issue. Just as clearly it is a serious issue. I rise in support of the amendment offered by the gentleman from California. As those Members on this floor know, the gentleman and I do not always agree on issues of international security. I tend, as he reminds me from time to time, to be more hawkish than he. However, as I have considered the issues relating to United States funding one side or the other in civil wars, in my observation, for example, in Nicaragua with respect to funding, the former Speaker of this House, Jim Wright was instrumental in bringing about a peaceful resolution. Subsequently a vote in Nicaragua which resulted in the victory of democracy, makes a persuasive argument that at some point in time withdrawing aid may, in fact, further the peace process in Angola.

I, therefore, rise in support of the amendment of the gentleman from California. I agree with him as well, and with others who have spoken eloquently on this floor, that it is time to give a chance to the innocent in Angola. I understand very well what the gentleman from Illinois says, that there is much wrong, perhaps on both sides. I also agree with my friend from Illinois very strongly that those who lead in the name of Communist dictatorships do not deserve the support and comfort of the United States, which believes that it is not in the best interests of the overwhelming majority of people. However, it has been my observation that we have supported this policy for some period of time, and the gentleman's amendment is worth a chance, in my opinion, worth a change in policy, reaching out to make a change which may well result in both sides moving. I hope that is the case.

  • Mr. Chairman, today I rise in support of the amendment offered by my colleagues, Congressmen Dellums, Dymally, and Hamilton, to prohibit covert aid in fiscal year 1991 to the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola more commonly known as UNITA. I commend them for their dedication and commitment in recognizing that the United States needs to change its policy toward Angola.
  • Mr. Chairman, the situation in Angola has generated a lot of debate and has proven to be an extremely contentious issue. There are those who believe that any group who claims to fight for democracy deserves our support and the lethal aid of this country despite the obvious fact that current U.S. policy has failed.
  • It has been 4 years since Congress sustained President Reagan's policy of giving covert lethal aid to the anti-government UNITA rebels. At that time the chairman of the Intelligence Committee, Mr. Hamilton, inserted language into the intelligence authorization bill prohibiting aid to the UNITA rebels unless it had been publicly debated and approved by Congress. Unfortunately, that language was stricken from the bill by those who felt the language restricted the authority of the President. I supported the committee chairman's language to restrict aid to UNITA then, and I support the language now.
  • The death toll in Angola as a result of the war and famine has now reached over 500,000. The United Nations estimates that close to 2 million people are at risk of starvation due to the conditions of war and the obstacles restricting food delivery and relief. In addition, Angola has the highest amputee rate in the world with over 50,000 amputees, mostly women and children who frequent UNITA's landmine target areas such as schools and agricultural areas. Surely this type of death and destruction is not what we should be financing.
  • Mr. Chairman, United States policy directed toward installing a democratic government in Angola has been unsuccessful. It is patently obvious that the cold war policy is outdated and the real impediment to achieving peace in Angola is the continuation of aid to the UNITA rebels. Last year UNITA's leader Jonas Savimbi violated the terms of the Gbadolite summit peace initiative and cease-fire agreement mediated by 18 African heads of state and the Organization of African Unity. Continuing aid to UNITA gives Savimbi absolutely no incentive to agree to any future cease-fire or peace agreements. In fact, some of the nations involved in negotiating the peace settlement maintain that UNITA is the principal obstacle to obtaining peace.
  • The Angolan Government has recently made significant progress toward improving relations with the United States and toward initiating peace; 38,000 of the Cuban troops stationed in Angola have been withdrawn and the remaining 12,000 are to be sent home in July. The Soviet Union has significantly reduced aid to the Angolan Government and has agreed to immediately halt aid when United States funds to UNITA are cut. In addition, Angola has taken steps to espouse a multiparty system and is offering concessions to UNITA to prepare for free and fair elections, the very same principles for which UNITA has supposedly been fighting for the past 16 years.
  • Mr. Chairman, Jonas Savimbi and his UNITA rebels have not demonstrated a willingness to negotiate for a peaceful resolution to this long and bloody conflict. It is time for the United States to realize that the only effective means to negotiate a settlement is for all parties involved to stop financing this carnage. How dare we ask our constituents to finance the atrocious and brutal crimes committed by Jonas Savimbi and UNITA to the tune of $60 to $80 million. I must quote the executive director of the Washington Office on Africa, Aubrey McCutcheon III: `If the United States would be so quick to rush money and weapons to continue a war against a country already agreeing to adopt both democracy and free enterprise, if the resulting war victims were white.' The answer, I think, is no. Mr. Chairman, I strongly urge my colleagues to support for the Dellums, Dymally, Hamilton amendment.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HOYER. I am happy to yield to the gentleman from Illinois.

Mr. HYDE. Will the gentleman tell me how, if we stopped aiding UNITA, that will move the Soviets to stop aiding the MPLA?

Mr. HOYER. Let me observe that I believe the Soviets have started to do that, No. 1. No. 2, I think the Soviets would very frankly, in my own view, like an excuse to stop sending money because they are getting dead flat broke as we all know. Their policies have radically changed.

I do not stand here as a proponent or apologist for policies of the United States that I do not agree with, but in point of fact we know there has been a very dramatic revolutionary change which was talked to by our President in his speech to this Congress earlier this year. In the State of the Union he said a revolutionary change had occurred.

Mr. HYDE. I agree, and Mr. Gorbachev won the Nobel Prize. No, if he would just quit sending armaments in the millions to the Najibullah government which Communists imposed on the Afghans, and stopped spending $500 million so far this year to the dos Santos Communist MPLA, we could have peace in a hurry.

[Page: H10057]

Mr. HOYER. Let me suggest to my friend from Illinois, with whom I have a great deal of respect and with whom I agree from time to time on a number of issues, let Members see what his response to this will be. Let Members see what the internal debate is on this when there is no longer the argument that they have to send money because the United States is sending money. I believe that that argument was certainly used with respect to Nicaragua. One that question, the gentleman and I probably disagree. As a matter of fact, I think that much of the buildup in Nicaragua was a result of the infusion of United States moneys. I know we disagree on that.

However, my suggestion is that the gentleman's amendment gives Members a chance to test that. We can always change. We are going to be back here in the short term, and we can change that policy if we are incorrect. However, I think it is time to give that alternative a chance.

  • Mr. WEISS. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of the Dymally-Dellums-Hamilton amendment to prohibit covert aid to the UNITA rebels in Angola.
  • This amendment would remove the mock secrecy which now shields our Angola policy from open public debate. We certainly don't call this policy covert because it's a secret. It has been openly acknowledged by two President and gleefully promoted by an entire squad of conservative cheerleaders. No, this policy is covert only in the sense that it is not subject to public scrutiny.
  • This amendment would force the issue out of the recesses of the covert budget, and move it into the light, where it can be openly discussed just like any other foreign policy proposal.
  • I am convinced that once U.S. support to UNITA is subjected to this kind of open congressional debate, it will collapse under its own weight.
  • The Reagan administration originally justified this policy by reference to the global cold war struggle with the Soviet Union. Now that this justification no longer makes sense, the Bush administration has shifted gears. They argue that military aid to UNITA will somehow promote democracy and national reconciliation in Angola.
  • Yet with our aid, UNITA has launched military attacks against medical facilities; has attempted to starve civilians in the areas it controls; and has used land mines which indiscriminately maim both children and adults. Can anyone truly believe that democracy and national reconciliation can be achieved through such means? I hope not.
  • Mr. Chairman, the Reagan doctrine did not make any sense when it was first concocted. Today, it looks like a stubborn dinosaur refusing to acknowledge that the world has changed.
  • Let's put this foolish policy behind us, and help the outdated Reagan doctrine join its namesake in retirement. I urge my colleagues to support the Dymally-Dellums-Hamilton amendment.
  • Mr. LAGOMARSINO. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the Dellums and Solarz amendments cutting off and restricting, respectively, aid to the anti-Communist UNITA forces in Angola. While I too would very much like to see the bloody civil war in Angola end through peaceful, negotiated means, I believe that will not occur if either of these well intentioned, but harmful amendments are adopted.
  • I agree that the world has undergone many incredible changes over the past year warranting changes in policy. Unfortunately, some places have yet to witness this new explosion of freedom and democracy. Angola is one of those still oppressed places.
  • Some claim our policy in Angola has not worked. They're wrong. They also said the same thing about our policy in Europe--which helped foster today's democratic revolutions--and Central America. History has proven time and again that only serious pressure forces Communist dictatorships to come to the negotiating table. Only serious pressures forces them to remain at the table and deal, and only serious pressure forces them to live up to the agreements they sign. Our support for UNITA provides that very necessary serious pressure.
  • Already, a lot of progress has been made in Angola. Under the sponsorship of the Portuguese, UNITA and the MPLA have met and have made considerable progress toward a cease-fire and free, democratic elections. Unfortunately, there is still a wing of the MPLA that believes UNITA can be militarily defeated and Angola can remain a repressive, one-party Communist state. They are looking for a sign of weakening support for UNITA and they will find it if we adopt either of these amendments. Once found, they will exploit it scuttling the efforts for a peaceful, negotiated settlement, thereby prolonging the bloodshed--just the opposite of what we claim we want.
  • Time is on our side. Unlike in the past, the Soviets are cooperating with us to achieve a peaceful, negotiated settlement. Yet, they do not fully control the Luanda government, meaning the MPLA, with its vast stockpiles of weapons, can still hold out for the military option some politbureau members want. It is key for us to keep UNITA strong and show that we back those struggling for freedom and democracy. We're almost there. Here in the last inning of the game we're winning is not the time to change strategy and risk a terrible loss. Let's finish the game. If these negotiations do fail and if the current Baker-Shevardnadze efforts are not successful, then and only then should we change our policy.
  • I am very strongly opposed to the Dellums amendment because it would give the MPLA everything its hardliners want and require nothing in the forms of freedom and democracy in return. I find it very strange that we are correctly willing to fight racial apartheid in South Africa, yet unwilling--as support for the Communist MPLA does--to fight economic and political apartheid in black African nations. With all of our support for freedom and democracy around the globe, I cannot believe that we're considering cutting off the chances for the Angolan people to achieve these basic human rights and condemning them to a gloomy, repressive future under harsh, Stalinist MPLA rule. That's what enactment of the Dellums-Dymally-Hamilton amendment would do.
  • We're on the verge of success, that means a cease-fire and free elections for the Angolan people who have been struggling hard at great sacrifice for this for the past 15 years. Let's not ruin this real possibility by adopting either of these amendments. I also welcome my colleagues to review the following letter I received from Secretary of State Baker which further reinforces in a very articulate and convincing way the dangers of these two amendments.
  • I urge my colleagues to vote for real peace in Angola and vote against both the Solarz and the Dellums-Dymally-Hamilton amendments.

The Secretary of State,
Washington, DC.

Hon. Robert J. Lagomarsino,
House of Representatives.

Dear Bob: You soon will be voting on H.R. 5422, the Intelligence Authorization Bill. As you probably know, several amendments are contemplated which, if enacted, would seriously hinder efforts to achieve a negotiated settlement to the conflict in Angola.

As you know, I am engaged in active diplomacy aimed at achieving a negotiated settlement. Foreign Minister Shevardnadze and I are seeking a negotiated settlement to the Angolan conflict. This is due in no small measure to Moscow's understanding, despite the enormous and continuing Soviet commitment to the Luanda regime, of American resolve on this issue. Likewise, some, but not all, MPLA leaders are beginning to realize that they cannot defeat UNITA militarily and must negotiate a settlement, despite the wishes of hardliners in Luanda who continue to seek a military solution. After four rounds of UNITA-MPLA direct talks facilitated by the Portuguese Government, our policy may be on the verge of success. For his part, Dr. Savimbi has been flexible and reasonable in his negotiating positions. Furthermore, he has been steadfast in his calls for free and fair multi-party elections in which UNITA is free to participate.

I firmly believe that Angola, like other regional conflicts, can be resolved through negotiations, if both sides have the incentive to talk and compromise. Our ongoing program is important to persuading the Angolan Government that a military solution to the conflict is not an option. I urge in the strongest possible way that you continue your solid support for this peace process by not endorsing legislative proposals which, although packaged as `compromises', actually would have the effect of undercutting those in the MPLA who want to negotiate and of strengthening the hand of the MPLA hardliners who want to continue the bloodshed.

Any imposition of conditional language will be taken by hardliners in Luanda as the ray of hope they have been looking for and long predicting. They will argue that the U.S. is preoccupied elsewhere, `short of breath,' and willing to pull the rug out from under UNITA--and that there is thus no need for negotiations. This will only lengthen Angola's tragic war.

My view boils down to this: All Savimbi wants is a ceasefire and the ability to compete in fair and free multiparty elections. Some in the MPLA seem willing to move toward this peaceful, democratic approach as well. A vote to amend the Intelligence Committee's Angola provisions is a vote against this democratic solution at the absolutely worst time--and would be a vote for more killing, more stalemate, and more suffering.

Therefore, I ask that you strongly oppose any efforts to amend the Intelligence Authorization Bill with respect to Angola.

Sincerely yours,
Jim Baker.

[Page: H10058]
  • Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the Dellums amendment. I believe, as a majority of the committee does, that the best way to support peace, security, and freedom in Angola is to remain firm in our support for Dr. Savimbi and his freedom fighters.
  • For many years, we have heard the argument that support for UNITA would make the peace process impossible in Angola. That argument has been proven thoroughly and decisively wrong. Our policy is working--now is not the time to reward the hard liners in the Communist MPLA government of Angola on the floor of the House.
  • As the Washington Post recently editorialized:
  • To pull the plug on a southern Africa policy that has succeeded in other aspects and now seems near succeeding in Angola is perverse.
  • There is no reason to vote against the bipartisan provisions in the bill before us--no reason other than undercutting the prospects for a cease-fire and free elections in Angola.
  • We have heard about allegations of human rights violations by UNITA but these allegations have been refuted by our own Intelligence Committee. We should not let the real issue be clouded by those who have always opposed UNITA.
  • Secretary of State Baker put it clearly in a letter to me this week:
  • A vote to amend the Intelligence Committee's Angola provisions is a vote against this democratic solution at the absolutely worst time.
  • I urge my colleagues to support peace and freedom in Angola, and oppose any amendments to the bill reported by the Intelligence Committee.
  • Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. Chairman, I rise today to express my strong opposition to reauthorizing covert assistance for the rebel movement in Angola. I believe that America's active involvement in this 15-year-old civil war has contributed to a prolonged conflict that has taken the lives of over 200,000 innocent Angolans. I believe that this policy is morally bankrupt, ineffective, and should be discontinued.
  • The United States has financially backed UNITA since the repeal of the Clark Amendment in 1985. When South Africa could no longer maintain its support for UNITA, the Reagan administration stepped in to coordinate a covert program to stem the Soviet and Cuban advantage in the region. Now, after 5 years of escalating this policy, the plan has yielded only entrenched civil war and economic disaster for all Angolans.
  • The nature of the conflict has since changed, making U.S. objectives less clear. To date, 80 percent of the Cuban troops have pulled out of Angola.
  • The Soviet Union has committed to eliminating all military aid to the MPLA government. And the MPLA government has obligated itself to real democratic reforms that would include UNITA as a viable political party.
  • Despite the ambiguities of our objectives, however, the administration has still insisted on an increase in covert assistance. Despite the fact that this war is responsible for the world's largest amputee population and the globe's most acute famine, Mr. Bush remains intent to continue this ideologically driven policy.
  • Mr. Chairman, this cold war knee-jerk reaction is archaic. Such a policy would only work against our long-term objectives in southern Africa, and against our human rights goals worldwide. It is a policy that is ethically wrong and one that should change.
  • The Dellums amendment, however, is consistent with Angola's progress toward peace. It would discontinue all lethal assistance to the rebels and eliminate any incentive they have developed to avoid any further negotiation. The amendments responds in kind to the Soviet's commitment to end arms shipments to the MPLA, and signals our commitment to a lasting peace. The Dellums amendment would bring the debate on aid into an open forum and force the President to deal with this matter squarely.
  • The American people have exhausted 5 years funding an unprincipled policy that has only worked to extinguish life in Angola. It is time that we support a policy that would work to preserve it.
  • I urge my colleagues to vote in favor of the Dellums' amendment and vote in favor of peace.
  • Mr. MOODY. Mr. Chairman, some speakers here today have told us: `Don't change United States policy in Angola--the Communist government is on the verge of collapse' or `Don't abandon the policy, it's about to succeed.' These are not credible statements. United States policy has been successful `only if one is wiling to close your eyes to 14 years of incalcuable of suffering in Angola.
  • Ask the Angolan children who have lost arms and legs by stepping on land mines that are placed along paths to the agricultural fields. Angola has the largest amputee population in the world. These children cannot tell you this policy is a success.
  • Ask the Angolan children who have lost both their parents in the war. This civil war has claimed 200,000 lives. They will not tell you current policy is a success.
  • The people of Angola have known only war for 29 years. First, the war was for independence from Portugal, then a factional conflict, then the 14-year war between the Government and UNITA. After these years of civil war, the Angolan people are deeply distrustful of both the Government and UNITA, and simply want peace. But they know it will not come easily. After 29 years, they know that more war and more foreign military aid is not the answer.
  • United States policy in Angola is not about to succeed. It is about to fail on a massive scale. Already 200,000 have died and many times that injured. Now 1.9 million people in Angola are at risk from the most severe famine in Africa, caused primarily by the lack of safe transport of foodstuffs due to the war. What is urgently needed to respond to the famine is a military cease-fire.
  • So the urgent question is how to best achieve a cease-fire. UNITA supporters make a paradoxical argument that the strongest pressure is on each side to reach a peace agreement by continuation of United States and Soviet aid. How can that be? Why do we think the fires of war would die as we continue to pour on gasoline? They wouldn't.
  • UNITA supporters make a second argument that a combined joint United States-Soviet cutoff would favor the Angolan Government over UNITA. How could that be? These are the same people who insist that the Soviets provide seven times the amount of United States aid. Why would a joint cutoff favor the Government? It wouldn't.
  • The real reason that UNITA supporters want to continue aid is because they think it will provide some military advantage that can be translated into bargaining leverage at the peace talks. As long as both sides in the war seek such leverage, there will be no peace. Both the Government and UNITA must abandon such tactics and commit themselves to a peace settlement. By cuting off United States and Soviet aid, we can strengthen the peace process.
  • In 1988, South Africa signed the Brazzaville accord and agreed to withdraw from Namibia and end lethal aid to UNITA. Since that time, the United States has filled the gap and become the principal sponsor of UNITA. According to a report of Africa Watch, causing incredible human suffering, both UNITA and the Angolan Government have engaged in gross violation of human rights. Under these conditions our country should not be funding either side in this way.
  • U.S. policy, in its current form does not promote peace. It is about funding, supplying, and conducting a war that has been waged largely against the civilian population of Angola. Today, we have an opportunity to end this policy. Please join me in supporting the Dellums amendment to end convert aid to UNITA or the Solarz amendment to condition it.

Excerpt of Report: `Angola, Violations of the Laws of War by Both Sides' by Africa Watch, Dated April 1989

Africa Watch finds that:

UNITA and Angolan government forces (FAPLA) have engaged in gross violations of the laws of war causing deaths, injuries and great hardships to the civilian population.

UNITA has systematically and indiscriminately planted contact antipersonnel land mines in eastern Angola. Many are buried in foot paths to the fields or sources of water. Many civilians have been killed or maimed as a result.

FAPLA has engaged in the indiscriminate use of land mines in northern Angola. Some of these mines have been planted in the fields, and civilians have been killed or mained as a result.

UNITA has avowedly taken hundreds of foreigners as hostages for the express purposes of extracting concessions or recognition from their government, or for the purpose of exchanging them for UNITA prisoners held by the Angolan government.

UNITA has captured thousands of civilians and conscripted them to serve as combatants or to engage in unpaid agricultural labor.

The Angolan government has forcibly displaced thousands of civilians, in part to deny UNITA a social base.

FAPLA has indiscriminately attacked and killed civilians in UNITA dominated areas and has destroyed their homes.

UNITA has indiscriminately and deliberately attacked and killed civilians in government controlled areas.

UNITA has attacked medical facilities and burned civilian homes.

UNITA has attempted to starve civilians by capturing or killing civilians who tended their fields, by mining foot paths to fields, by sabotaging road transportation to cut off foods supplies, by cutting off food supplies to a town to `soften' it for attack, and by stealing food from the fields.

FAPLA soldiers in eastern Angola have stolen food from the fields.

UNITA has restricted the movements of civilians in areas that it occupies, confiscated food from them, and forced them to do unpaid labor for UNITA. In areas UNITA has abandoned, its troops have threatened to kill peasants when it returned if they were found living with (that is, growing food for) FAPLA troops.

FAPLA has sought to control the movements of peasants in some areas through a system of `safe conduct' passes. In some cases, FAPLA has required peasants to be accompanied by its soldiers to the fields.

Some peasants have fled their land and homes and sought refuge across the border because they feared threats and interrogation by both sides.

[Page: H10059]
  • Mr. DORGAN of North Dakota. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the Dellums-Hamilton-Dymally amendment, which would end covert aid to the UNITA rebels in Angola. This is the key change which we must make to the intelligence authorization bill.
  • This amendment takes an important step toward crafting a more constructive policy toward Angola. I realize that my colleagues have widely differing views about the political issues in Angola, but I want to emphasize the humanitarian dimension of this debate. I support the amendment as a necessary measure to prevent further civil war, which endangers the delivery of food aid to millions of people now threatened by famine.
  • The United Nations estimates that 1.5 to 2 million Angolans will be threatened by famine in the next 6 months, the `hungry season' in southern Africa. The vulnerable populations are located in contested zones, as well as in areas controlled respectively by the MPLA Government of Angola and UNITA.
  • As usual, hunger knows no politics.

RESPONDING TO THE THREAT OF FAMINE

  • And responding to hunger should also put politics aside. That's what the House did last month when we passed a resolution calling on both adversaries in the Angolan civil war to put feeding hungry people above winning military battles. The measure urged both sides to cease hostilities and engage in meaningful peace negotiations.
  • That process is beginning to work. Through the good work of the Agency for International Development's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, the United Nations, and the Red Cross, food is beginning to reach hungry Angolans living in all food-short zones.
  • Now it's our turn to show some statesmanship ourselves.
  • Unless the United States can muster the kind of creative leadership that it has recently exercised in Europe, the Angolan civil war will rage on and famine will reap its grim reward. We need not and must not let this happen. Instead, we must work with the Soviet Union to obtain an immediate and mutual cutoff of military aid to our respective clients.
  • Some argue that we should do nothing and let the present negotiations take their course. I understand my colleagues' desire to see that the MPLA does not gain a tactical advantage. But people threatened by famine cannot be patient and neither should we. We have waited for 10 years for the present policy of covert aid to UNITA to bear fruit.

CHANGING COURSE

  • Now it's time to change course.
  • I believe that ending covert aid entirely would enhance the prospects for peace and eliminate a major obstacle to the secure passage of food aid to all vulnerable Angolans. We ought to proceed to an unfettered debate on aid to UNITA and then decide in what context whether military aid in fact advances democracy, peace, and food security.
  • I likewise agree with our distinguished colleague and the former intelligence committee chairman, Lee Hamilton, that open debate must precede any decision about further aid to UNITA. And it is in that manner that we should assess Soviet intentions toward its own client.

WEIGHING THE RISKS

  • Admittedly, this approach carries the risk that we will not convince the Soviets to end aid to their MPLA client. But the greater risk is subjecting some 2 million Angolans to hunger or starvation. I submit that ending covert aid is a risk we must take.
  • Let's test the Soviet willingness to join us in a common search for peace and famine prevention--as we have in Ethiopia. Let's help advance a negotiated settlement to the Angolan civil war and prevent the scourge of another African famine.
  • Please support the Dellums-Hamilton-Dymally amendment.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from California [Mr. Dellums].

The question was taken; and the Chairman announced that the noes appeared to have it.

RECORDED VOTE

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.

A recorded vote was ordered.

The vote was taken by electronic device and there were--ayes 175, noes 246, not voting 12, as follows:

Roll No. 479

[Roll No. 479]
AYES--175
  • Ackerman
  • Alexander
  • Anderson
  • Annunzio
  • Anthony
  • Applegate
  • Atkins
  • AuCoin
  • Bates
  • Beilenson
  • Bennett
  • Berman
  • Bonior
  • Borski
  • Bosco
  • Boxer
  • Bruce
  • Bryant
  • Cardin
  • Carr
  • Clarke
  • Clay
  • Clement
  • Coleman (TX)
  • Collins
  • Condit
  • Conte
  • Conyers
  • Costello
  • Coyne
  • Crockett
  • de la Garza
  • DeFazio
  • Dellums
  • Dingell
  • Dixon
  • Donnelly
  • Dorgan (ND)
  • Downey
  • Durbin
  • Dwyer
  • Dymally
  • Early
  • Eckart
  • Edwards (CA)
  • Engel
  • Espy
  • Evans
  • Fazio
  • Feighan
  • Flake
  • Foglietta
  • Ford (MI)
  • Ford (TN)
  • Frank
  • Gejdenson
  • Gephardt
  • Gibbons
  • Glickman
  • Gonzalez
  • Gray
  • Hall (OH)
  • Hamilton
  • Hayes (IL)
  • Hefner
  • Hertel
  • Hoagland
  • Hochbrueckner
  • Hoyer
  • Jacobs
  • Johnson (SD)
  • Johnston
  • Jones (NC)
  • Jontz
  • Kanjorski
  • Kaptur
  • Kastenmeier
  • Kennedy
  • Kennelly
  • Kildee
  • Kleczka
  • Kostmayer
  • LaFalce
  • Leach (IA)
  • Lehman (CA)
  • Lehman (FL)
  • Levin (MI)
  • Levine (CA)
  • Lewis (GA)
  • Long
  • Lowey (NY)
  • Luken, Thomas
  • Manton
  • Markey
  • Martinez
  • Matsui
  • Mavroules
  • Mazzoli
  • McCloskey
  • McDermott
  • McHugh
  • McNulty
  • Mfume
  • Miller (CA)
  • Mineta
  • Mink
  • Moakley
  • Moody
  • Morrison (WA)
  • Mrazek
  • Murphy
  • Nagle
  • Neal (MA)
  • Neal (NC)
  • Nowak
  • Oakar
  • Oberstar
  • Obey
  • Olin
  • Owens (NY)
  • Owens (UT)
  • Pallone
  • Panetta
  • Payne (NJ)
  • Pease
  • Pelosi
  • Penny
  • Perkins
  • Poshard
  • Price
  • Rahall
  • Rangel
  • Richardson
  • Rostenkowski
  • Roybal
  • Russo
  • Sabo
  • Savage
  • Sawyer
  • Scheuer
  • Schneider
  • Schroeder
  • Schumer
  • Serrano
  • Sharp
  • Sikorski
  • Skaggs
  • Slattery
  • Slaughter (NY)
  • Smith (IA)
  • Solarz
  • Staggers
  • Stark
  • Stokes
  • Studds
  • Swift
  • Synar
  • Torres
  • Towns
  • Traficant
  • Traxler
  • Udall
  • Unsoeld
  • Valentine
  • Vento
  • Visclosky
  • Walgren
  • Washington
  • Waxman
  • Weiss
  • Wheat
  • Williams
  • Wolpe
  • Wyden
  • Yates
NOES--246
  • Andrews
  • Archer
  • Armey
  • Aspin
  • Baker
  • Ballenger
  • Barnard
  • Bartlett
  • Barton
  • Bateman
  • Bentley
  • Bereuter
  • Bevill
  • Bilbray
  • Bilirakis
  • Bliley
  • Boehlert
  • Boggs
  • Boucher
  • Broomfield
  • Browder
  • Brown (CO)
  • Buechner
  • Bunning
  • Burton
  • Bustamante
  • Byron
  • Callahan
  • Campbell (CA)
  • Campbell (CO)
  • Carper
  • Chandler
  • Chapman
  • Clinger
  • Coble
  • Coleman (MO)
  • Combest
  • Cooper
  • Coughlin
  • Courter
  • Cox
  • Craig
  • Crane
  • Dannemeyer
  • Darden
  • Davis
  • DeLay
  • Derrick
  • DeWine
  • Dickinson
  • Dicks
  • Dornan (CA)
  • Douglas
  • Dreier
  • Duncan
  • Dyson
  • Edwards (OK)
  • Emerson
  • English
  • Erdreich
  • Fascell
  • Fawell
  • Fields
  • Fish
  • Flippo
  • Frenzel
  • Frost
  • Gallegly
  • Gallo
  • Gaydos
  • Gekas
  • Geren
  • Gillmor
  • Gilman
  • Gingrich
  • Goodling
  • Gordon
  • Goss
  • Gradison
  • Grandy
  • Grant
  • Green
  • Guarini
  • Gunderson
  • Hall (TX)
  • Hammerschmidt
  • Hancock
  • Hansen
  • Harris
  • Hastert
  • Hatcher
  • Hefley
  • Henry
  • Herger
  • Hiler
  • Holloway
  • Hopkins
  • Horton
  • Houghton
  • Hubbard
  • Huckaby
  • Hughes
  • Hunter
  • Hutto
  • Hyde
  • Inhofe
  • Ireland
  • James
  • Jenkins
  • Johnson (CT)
  • Jones (GA)
  • Kasich
  • Kolbe
  • Kolter
  • Kyl
  • Lagomarsino
  • Lancaster
  • Lantos
  • Laughlin
  • Leath (TX)
  • Lent
  • Lewis (CA)
  • Lewis (FL)
  • Lightfoot
  • Lipinski
  • Livingston
  • Lloyd
  • Lowery (CA)
  • Machtley
  • Madigan
  • Marlenee
  • Martin (NY)
  • McCandless
  • McCollum
  • McCrery
  • McCurdy
  • McDade
  • McEwen
  • McGrath
  • McMillan (NC)
  • McMillen (MD)
  • Meyers
  • Michel
  • Miller (OH)
  • Miller (WA)
  • Molinari
  • Mollohan
  • Montgomery
  • Moorhead
  • Morella
  • Murtha
  • Myers
  • Natcher
  • Nelson
  • Nielson
  • Ortiz
  • Oxley
  • Packard
  • Parker
  • Parris
  • Pashayan
  • Patterson
  • Paxon
  • Payne (VA)
  • Petri
  • Pickett
  • Pickle
  • Porter
  • Pursell
  • Quillen
  • Ravenel
  • Ray
  • Regula
  • Rhodes
  • Ridge
  • Rinaldo
  • Ritter
  • Roberts
  • Robinson
  • Roe
  • Rogers
  • Rohrabacher
  • Ros-Lehtinen
  • Roth
  • Roukema
  • Rowland (GA)
  • Saiki
  • Sangmeister
  • Sarpalius
  • Saxton
  • Schaefer
  • Schiff
  • Schulze
  • Sensenbrenner
  • Shaw
  • Shays
  • Shumway
  • Shuster
  • Sisisky
  • Skeen
  • Skelton
  • Slaughter (VA)
  • Smith (FL)
  • Smith (NE)
  • Smith (NJ)
  • Smith (TX)
  • Smith (VT)
  • Smith, Denny (OR)
  • Smith, Robert (NH)
  • Smith, Robert (OR)
  • Snowe
  • Solomon
  • Spence
  • Spratt
  • Stallings
  • Stangeland
  • Stearns
  • Stenholm
  • Stump
  • Sundquist
  • Tallon
  • Tanner
  • Tauke
  • Tauzin
  • Taylor
  • Thomas (CA)
  • Thomas (GA)
  • Thomas (WY)
  • Torricelli
  • Upton
  • Vander Jagt
  • Volkmer
  • Vucanovich
  • Walker
  • Walsh
  • Watkins
  • Weber
  • Weldon
  • Whittaker
  • Whitten
  • Wise
  • Wolf
  • Wylie
  • Yatron
  • Young (AK)
  • Young (FL)
[Page: H10060]
NOT VOTING--12
  • Brennan
  • Brooks
  • Brown (CA)
  • Hawkins
  • Hayes (LA)
  • Lukens, Donald
  • Martin (IL)
  • Morrison (CT)
  • Rose
  • Rowland (CT)
  • Schuette
  • Wilson
[TIME: 1847]

Mrs. JOHNSON and Messrs. SKELTON, TORRICELLI, and GUARINI changed their vote from `aye' to `no.'

Mr. VALENTINE and Mr. PRICE changed their vote from `no' to `aye'.

So the amendment was rejected.

The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

Mr. BEILENSON. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that all debate on the Solarz amendment be limited to 40 minutes, with the time to be equally controlled and divided by the gentleman from New York [Mr. Solarz] and an opponent thereto.

Mr. Chairman, I also ask unanimous consent that all debate on the amendment of Mrs. Boxer be limited to 60 minutes, with the time to be equally divided and controlled by the gentlewoman from California [Mrs. Boxer] and an opponent thereto.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Coleman of Texas). Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from California?

Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Chairman, reserving the right to object, I do so only for the purpose of finding out what is going on. I cannot hear what is going on.

[TIME: 1850]

The CHAIRMAN. Will the gentleman from California [Mr. Beilenson] repeat his unanimous-consent request?

Mr. BEILENSON. In a sense, Mr. Chairman, there are two unanimous-consent requests.

The two unanimous-consent requests were for a total of 40 minutes on the amendment offered by the gentleman from New York [Mr. Solarz], the time to be equally divided and controlled by Mr. Solarz and opponent thereto; and a total of 60 minutes, 1 hour, on the amendment to be offered by the gentlewoman from California [Mrs. Boxer], the time to be equally divided, half of it to be controlled by a Member opposed.

Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Chairman, reserving the right to object, how much time did the gentleman from California [Mr. Beilenson] say on the amendment offered by the gentleman from New York [Mr. Solarz]?

Mr. BEILENSON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BURTON of Indiana. I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. BEILENSON. A total of 40 minutes, 20 on each side.

Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Chairman, I withdraw my reservation of objection.

Mr. MILLER of Washington. Mr. Chairman, reserving the right to object, I have an amendment at the desk, an amendment to the amendment offered by the gentleman from New York [Mr. Solarz].

Would the gentleman from Califorina [Mr. Beilenson] explain to me what time would be allotted to my amendment?

Mr. BEILENSON. Mr. Chairman , will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MILLER of Washington. I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. BEILENSON. Neither this gentleman, nor, I think, the gentleman from New York [Mr. Solarz] is aware of the gentleman's amendment.

Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Chairman will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MILLER of Washington. I yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Washington [Mr. Miller] for yielding.

Mr. Chairman, I was not aware that the gentleman from Washington [Mr. Miller] was going to proceed with his amendment. If he is, I would suggest that the unanimous-consent request be amended to provide that for the purpose of the amendment to be offered by the gentleman from Washington [Mr. Miller] to my amendment, perhaps 10 minutes be set aside for debate, 5 minutes on each side.

Mr. MILLER of Washington. Mr. Chairman, that would be satisfactory to me.

Mr. BEILENSON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MILLER of Washington. I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. BEILENSON. Mr. Chairman, I would so amend my unanimous-consent request.

Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Chairman, would the gentleman further yield?

Mr. MILLER of Washington. I yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. SOLARZ. That is 10 minutes in addition to the 40 minutes on the main amendment.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair needs to be clear about the time. The gentleman from California [Mr. Beilenson] will restate his unanimous consent request after withdrawing the one he has just offered. The Chair will recognize him for that purpose.

Mr. BEILENSON. Mr. Chairman, I think what the gentleman is requesting at this point is 40 minutes, the time to be equally divided on the amendment offered by the gentleman from New York [Mr. Solarz].

With an additional 10 minutes, that time to be equally divided on an amendment thereto to be offered by the gentleman from Washington [Mr. Miller]; and a total of 1 hour, the time to be equally divided on the amendment to be offered by the gentlewoman from California [Mrs. Boxer].

Mr. MILLER of Washington. Mr. Chairman, I withdraw my reservation of objection.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair would inquire whether or not the limitation would apply to the amendment of the gentlewoman from California [Mrs. Boxer] as well, and any amendments thereto.

Mrs. BOXER. Mr. Chairman, reserving the right to object, I would just like to ask if it is clear that the Boxer amendment would have 1 hour, 30 minutes to be controlled by me and 30 minutes to be controlled by a Member who opposes the Boxer amendment. Is that correct?

Mr. BEILENSON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield?

Mrs. BOXER. I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. BEILENSON. Mr. Chairman, that is what this gentleman said.

Mrs. BOXER. Mr. Chairman, that would be fine with the maker of the amendment if it is agreed to by the body.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair is attempting to ascertain whether or not there are any amendments to the amendment of the gentlewoman from California [Mrs. Boxer], and, if there are, whether or not that would be required to come out of that 1 hour.

Mr. BEILENSON. Mr. Chairman, we do not know of any amendments to the amendment of the gentlewoman from California [Mrs. Boxer]. Some of us hope there will be no amendments to Mrs. Boxer's amendment, but, if there were----

The CHAIRMAN. But if there were?

Mr. BEILENSON. Our unanimous-consent request would have to come out of the time of 1 hour.

Mrs. BOXER. Mr. Chairman, further reserving the right to object, because there are so many members who wish to speak on this side, I am having difficulty keeping it to 30 minutes, but I will absolutely do that. If there are additional amendments, I would appreciate it perhaps if we could suggest that amendments to the Boxer amendment be handled within 10 minutes, and I would make that unanimous-consent request.

Mr. BEILENSON. Mr. Chairman, I would second the request of the gentlewoman from California [Mrs. Boxer]. If there are amendments to her amendment, they should be given an additional 10 minutes, 5 minutes on each side.

The CHAIRMAN. To include all amendments?

Mr. BEILENSON. Each amendment to her amendment. We do not anticipate any such amendments.

Mrs. BOXER. Mr. Chairman, I withdraw my reservation of objection.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair understands the unanimous-consent request.

Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from California?

There was no objection.

[Page: H10061]

AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. SOLARZ

Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. Solarz: Page 25, after line 18, add the following:

TITLE VI--INCENTIVES FOR PEACE IN ANGOLA

SEC. 601. ENCOURAGING REDUCTIONS IN EXTERNAL ASSISTANCE TO PARTIES TO THE ANGOLAN CONFLICT.

(a) Prohibition on Assistance:

(1) Presidential certification.--If the Government of Angola expresses its willingness to accept a ceasefire and a political settlement to the conflict in Angola and proposes a reasonable timetable for free and fair multiparty national elections in which UNITA would be free to participate, the President shall promptly so certify to the appropriate committees.

(2) Assistance prohibited pursuant to certification or joint resolution: Except as provided in subsections (b), (c), and (d), if the President makes the certification described in paragraph (1) or if the Congress enacts a joint resolution declaring that the Congress has made the determination with respect to the Government of Angola that is described in that paragraph, then--

(A) intelligence community funds may not be obligated or expended during fiscal year 1991 for the acquisition of weapons, ammunition, or other lethal military equipment for the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola; and

(B) the United States shall suspend, or cause the suspension of, the delivery to UNITA of any weapons, ammunition, or other lethal military equipment acquired with any intelligence community funds that may have been previously expended, to the extent that the United States retains the ability to suspend such deliveries.

(b) Removal of Prohibition if the Government of Angola Is No Longer Pursuing a Political Solution: Except as provided in subsection (e), in the event the President has made the certification described in subsection (a)(1) or the Congress has enacted the joint resolution described in subsection (a)(2), subsection (a)(2) shall cease to apply if the President certifies to the appropriate committees that the Government of Angola is no longer willing to accept a ceasefire and a political settlement and is no longer proposing a reasonable timetable for free and fair multiparty national elections in which UNITA would be free to participate. A certification may be made under this subsection only during the 3-month period beginning on the date on which the President made his certification under subsection (a)(1) or the Congress enacted a joint resolution under subsection (a)(2), as the case may be.

(c) Conditions for Removal of Prohibition After 3 Months.--Should subsection (a)(2) become applicable pursuant a President certification under subsection (a)(1) or enactment of a joint resolution under subsection (a)(2) or (e), subsection (a)(2) shall cease to apply, subject to subsection (e), if the President certifies to the appropriate committees (after the end of the 3-month period specified in the last sentence of this subsection) that he has made the determinations required by both paragraphs (1) and (2), as follows:

(1) Determinations with regard to the government of angola.--A determination either--

(A) that the Government of Angola refuses to participate in good faith in negotiations for a ceasefire and a political settlement that includes a reasonable timetable for free and fair multiparty national elections in which UNITA would be free to participate;

(B) that--

(i) during the review period, the Soviet Union or other sources outside Angola sold or otherwise made available to the Government of
Angola additional, militarily significant amounts of weapons, ammunition, and other lethal military equipment, or

(ii) prior to the end of the review period, the Government of Angola had not ceased receiving militarily significant amounts of lethal military equipment that had previously been sold or otherwise made available by sources outside Angola; or

(C) that the Government of Angola or the Government of Cuba is not complying with its obligations under the Cuban Troop Withdrawal Agreement.

(2) Determinations with regard to unita.--A determination both--

(A) that UNITA has expressed its willingness to participate in good faith in negotiations for a ceasefire and a political settlement that includes a reasonable timetable for free and fair multiparty national elections; and

(B) that--

(i) sources outside Angola did not sell or otherwise make available to UNITA during the review period additional, militarily significant amounts of weapons, ammunition, and other lethal military equipment; and

(ii) prior to the end of the review period, UNITA had ceased receiving militarily significant amounts of lethal military equipment that had previously been sold or otherwise made available by sources outside Angola.
A certification may be made under this subsection only after the end of the 3-month period beginning on the date on which the President made his certification under subsection (a)(1) or the Congress enacted a joint resolution under subsection (a)(2), as the case may be; except that if the Congress enacts a joint resolution disapproving a certification submitted by the President under this subsection, the President may not make another certification under this subsection until after the end of the 3-month period beginning on the date of enactment of that joint resolution.

(d) Removal of Prohibition If There Is a Military Offensive Against Unita.--Subsection (a) and paragraphs (1) and (2) of subsection (f) shall cease to apply if the President certifies to the appropriate committees that--

(1) the Government of Angola has launched a military offensive that threatens the survival of UNITA, or

(2) there is clear and credible evidence of a military build-up by the Government of Angola that makes it likely that a military offense that would threaten the survival of UNITA will occur.

(e) Congressional Disapproval of Presidential Certifications.--If the Congress enacts a joint resolution disapproving a certification submitted by the President under subsection (b), (c), or (d), then subparagraphs (A) and (B) of subsection (a)(2) shall apply for the remainder of fiscal year 1991 unless the President subsequently makes a certification under subsection (c) or (d).

(f) Limitations on Amounts of United States Assistance:

(1) Assistance during first quarter of fiscal year.--Except as otherwise provided in this section, the aggregate amount of intelligence community funds that is obligated during the period beginning October 1, 1990, and ending December 31, 1990, for the acquisition of weapons, ammunition, or other lethal military equipment for UNITA may not exceed the amount which is 25 percent of the amount of any intelligence community funds allocated for that purpose during fiscal year 1990 or during fiscal year 1991, whichever is less.

(2) Assistance during first half of fiscal year.--Except as otherwise provided in this section, the aggregate amount of intelligence community funds that is obligated during the period beginning October 1, 1990, and ending March 31, 1991, for the acquisition of weapons, ammunition, or other lethal military equipment for UNITA may not exceed the amount which is 50 percent of the amount of any intelligence community funds allocated for that purpose during fiscal year 1990 or during fiscal year 1991, whichever is less.

(3) Assistance during entire fiscal year.--The aggregate amount of intelligence community funds that is obligated at any time during fiscal year 1991 for the acquisition of weapons, ammunition, or other lethal military equipment for UNITA may not exceed the amount of any intelligence community funds allocated for that purpose during fiscal year 1990.

(g) Reports on Military Assistance Deliveries, Commitments to Multiparty Democracy, and Compliance With Cuban Troop Withdrawal Agreement:

(1) In general.--On November 1, 1990, January 1, 1991, April 1, 1991, and July 1, 1991, the President shall submit to the appropriate committees a report--

(A) on the extent to which the Government of Angola is continuing to obtain militarily significant amounts of weapons, ammunition, and other lethal military equipment from foreign countries or other third parties;

(B) on the extent to which UNITA is continuing to obtain militarily significant amounts of weapons, ammunition, and other lethal military equipment from foreign countries or other third parties;

(C) on the extent to which the Government of Angola is willing to accept a ceasefire and a political settlement that includes a reasonable timetable for free and fair multiparty national elections in which UNITA would be free to participate;

(D) on the extent to which UNITA is willing to accept a ceasefire and a political settlement that includes a reasonable timetable for free and fair multiparty national elections; and

(E) on whether the Government of Angola and the Government of Cuba are complying with their obligations under the Cuban Troop Withdrawal Agreement.

(2) Certification to be included.--Unless the President has already made the certification described in subsection (a)(1) or the Congress has enacted a joint resolution described in subsection (a)(2), the President shall certify in each report submitted pursuant to paragraph (1) whether the Government of Angola has expressed its willingness to accept a ceasefire and a political settlement to the conflict in Angola and has proposed a reasonable timetable for free and fair multiparty national elections in which UNITA would be free to participate. If the President certifies pursuant to this paragraph that the Government of Angola has expressed such a willingness and proposed such a timetable, that certification shall be considered to be a certification under subsection (a)(1).

(3) Description of united states efforts.--The report required by paragraph (1) shall also describe the President's efforts--

(A) to obtain agreement by foreign countries and other third parties to terminate assistance to the Government of Angola and UNITA for the acquisition of militarily significant amounts of weapons, ammunition, and other lethal military equipment; and

(B) to encourage both the Government of Angola and UNITA to agree to a ceasefire and a political settlement that includes a reasonable timetable for free and fair multiparty national elections.

(4) Report with certification.--If the President makes a certifiction under subsection (a)(1), (b), (c), or (d), the President shall include with that certification a report containing the information specified in paragraphs (1) and (3) of this subsection and the justification for the President's certification.

(h) Definitions.--As used in this section--

(1) the term `appropriate committees' means the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;

(2) the term `intelligence community funds' means funds available to the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, or any other agency or entity of the United States involved in intelligence activities;

(3) the term `obligations under the Cuban Troop Withdrawal Agreement' means the obligations relating to the calendar for redeployment and withdrawal of Cuban troops as specified in the Agreement Between the Governments of the People's Republic of Angola and the Republic of Cuba for the Termination of the International Mission of the Cuban Military Contingent, signed at the United Nations on December 22, 1988;

(4) the term `review period' means the period beginning on the date the President makes a certification under subsection (a)(1) or a joint resolution is enacted under subsection (a)(2) or (e), as the case may be, and ending on the date on which the President makes a certification under subsection (c); and

(5) the term `UNITA' means the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola.

[Page: H10062]

Mr. SOLARZ (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the amendment be considered as read and printed in the Record.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from New York?

There was no objection.

PARLIAMENTARY INQUIRY

Mr. YATES. Mr. Chairman, I have a parliamentary inquiry.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman will state it.

Mr. YATES. Mr. Chairman, will the Chair repeat what the time limitations are?

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair would answer the parliamentary inquiry of the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Yates] by saying that the gentleman offering the amendment has 20 minutes, a Member opposed to the amendment has 20 minutes and, in the event of an amendment to the amendment, as expected by the gentleman from Washington [Mr. Miller], it will be permitted 10 minutes total time, 5 minutes on each side.

Mr. YATES. Mr. Chairman, is that true as well on the amendment of the gentlewoman from California [Mrs. Boxer]?

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair understands the inquiry of the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Yates] now is to relate to the amendment of the gentlewoman from California [Mrs. Boxer]. If offered, the gentlewoman's amendment would be permitted to be debated for 60 minutes, 30 minutes on each side.

The gentleman from New York [Mr. Solarz] is recognized for 20 minutes.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I would like to control the opposition time.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair will permit the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Hyde] to control 20 minutes. The gentleman from illinois will be recognized for 20 minutes following the yielding of time or the use of time by the gentleman from New York [Mr. Solarz].

Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Mr. Chairman, we have just gone through an interesting and illuminating debate on the amendment of the gentleman from California [Mr. Dellums] which has revealed the existence of significant divisions in the House over how best to advance fundamental American interests and ideals in Angola. On the one hand, there are those Members who clearly believe that the provisions of American assistance to UNITA is both inappropriate and even counterproductive. On the other, there are those Members who believe with equal conviction that the continuation of American assistance to UNITA is essential if we are going to bring about a negotiated settlement of the conflict in that country consistent with the aspirations of the Angolan people for genuine peace and democracy.

Mr. Chairman, my amendment is designed to create a consensus in the Congress to facilitate an end to the fighting and the holding of free and fair multiparty elections through a negotiated political settlement, and is based on the notion that we are always most effective abroad when we are united at home.

[TIME: 1900]

The amendment which I have offered has been cosponsored by the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. Wolpe], the gentleman from New Mexico [Mr. Richardson], and myself on our side of the aisle, and by the gentleman from New York [Mr. Green], the gentleman from Washington [Mr. Morrison], the gentleman from New York [Mr. Houghton], and the gentleman from New York [Mr. Gilman] on the other side of the aisle. It is, I believe, an amendment which most Members should be able to support, regardless of the position they took on the Dellums amendment.

Let me explain what this amendment is all about. The amendment would permit a continuation of any lethal aid we may be providing to UNITA, unless and until President Bush reports to the Congress that the MPLA has put forward a proposal for the holding, within a reasonable period of time, of multiparliamentary elections in which UNITA would be able to participate, and that the MPLA is also prepared in principle to accept a cease-fire.

In the event the President makes such a report to the Congress, any lethal aid we are providing to UNITA, not the relief aid, but lethal assistance only, would be suspended for a period of 3 months. At the end of 3 months, if the MPLA has reneged on its commitment to free and fair

elections, if the Cuban forces are not continuing to withdraw from Angola, and if the MPLA is still receiving arms from the Soviet Union, or from any other source, the prohibition on lethal aid to UNITA would be lifted and the lethal assistance could be provided.

Consequently, under the terms of this amendment, if the MPLA is unwilling to commit itself to a reasonable timetable for free and fair elections and a cease-fire, lethal aid can go forward. Mr. Savimbi will not have lost a cent, and there will be no prohibition on American assistance, even for 3 months. But if the MPLA does make that commitment, if the MPLA does agree to a cease-fire and a reasonable timetable for free and fair elections, which is exactly what Mr. Savimbi and Secretary of State Baker say is essential in order to get a negotiated settlement of the conflict, then the aid could be provided.

Now, what is wrong with this amendment? Someone objected on the grounds that if the MPLA makes a commitment to free and fair elections and a cease-fire and we prohibit lethal assistance to Mr. Savimbi, the MPLA might launch a major offensive to wipe UNITA out in the interim.

Not to worry, because the amendment provides that if there is a major offensive during the 3-month period when lethal aid is prohibited--if it is prohibited--the President can unilaterally provide lethal assistance to UNITA.

Another good friend on the other side of the aisle, the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. Burton], said `supposing they haven't launched a major offensive, but are stockpiling arms with which to launch a major offensive.'

Not to worry. We responded to his concerns and put in a provision which enables the President to provide lethal aid to UNITA even if they have not launched a major offensive against UNITA, if the MPLA is even stockpiling weapons for that purpose.

The main objection to this amendment insofar as I can understand it has been the argument advanced by the Department of State that the adoption of this amendment will somehow preclude or prevent a negotiated settlement of the conflict because it will play into the hands of the so-called hard liners within the MPLA who do not want a settlement.

Mr. Chairman, I would say to Members of the House that I do not know if there are hard liners and soft liners in Luanda, but let us assume for the purposes of this debate there are. I cannot for a moment conceive of how anybody can say that this amendment would play into the hands of the hard liners. If it plays into anyone's hands, it plays into the hands of the soft liners in the MPLA, because this amendment will enable the soft liners in the MPLA to say to the hard liners that if they want lethal American assistance to Savimbi to be prohibited, they have to agree to enable the government of Angola to put forward a proposal for free and fair elections within a reasonable period of time, which is exactly what the MPLA has so far not been willing to do.

If the members of the MPLA politburo can read English, or if they can read Portuguese, and I have here a Portuguese translation of my amendment, there is no risk whatsoever that the adoption of this amendment will play into the hands of the hard liners.

Mr. Chairman, I would like my friends on the other side of the aisle who may oppose this amendment to explain exactly how it would play into the hands of the hard liners, when what the amendment says is that if the hard liners want lethal aid to Savimbi prohibited, the way they can achieve it is to agree to put forward a proposal for free and fair elections within a reasonable period of time.

So I would say this amendment does just the opposite. I would say to Members in the House that after 15 years of civil war, after the death of over 200,000 Angolans directly, and up to half a million as a result of this conflict, after trying a cutoff in aid, as we did with the Clark amendment, and after trying several years of unrestricted aid, as we have been doing until now, the time has come for a somewhat different approach--an approach that is reasonable, an approach that is moderate, an approach which enjoys support on both sides of the aisle.

Mr. Chairman, if this amendment is adopted, we have very little to lose. But, potentially, we have a lot to gain. If the MPLA does not agree to a free and fair election within a reasonable period of time, lethal aid can be provided; Savimbi does not suffer a bit.

If they do agree to a timetable for free and fair elections, which is exactly what we want them to do, which is exactly what Mr. Savimbi said is needed in order to get a political settlement, we prohibit lethal assistance for 3 months--during which only nonlethal aid could continue. At the end of the 3 months, if there is an overall agreement, Savimbi does not need lethal assistance. If there is not an agreement and the MPLA is getting arms from the Soviet Union, or the Cubans are not withdrawing, or the MPLA has reneged on their commitment to free and fair elections, lethal aid can be provided.

The Soviet Union has said if we stop our military aid to Savimbi, they will stop their military aid to the MPLA. I should think that would be in everyone's interest.

We heard earlier in the debate from my good friend, the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Hyde], about how much assistance the Soviet Union is giving to the MPLA. He said $500 million last year.

I am not at liberty to disclose the amount of money there may be for UNITA in the classified section of this bill, but it is far, far less than what the Soviet Union is giving the MPLA.

So let us put the Soviets to the test. Let us put the MPLA to the test. I agree with my friends on the other side of the aisle that if this war is going to end, it will not be ended with a military victory by either side. The only way it will be ended is through a political settlement.

I say to my friends on the other side of the aisle that in order to end it with a political settlement, the MPLA is going to have to be much more specific than it has been on its willingness to have a free and fair election within a reasonable period of time.

Mr. Chairman, they have said they are ready for a multiparty election, but they have left it very vague when that election will be held. This amendment puts the spotlight right on Luanda. It says to the MPLA, if you want lethal assistance to Savimbi prohibited, come forward with a reasonable timetable.

Mr. Chairman, I think this is a moderate approach. It is a reasonable approach. I think it can bring us together. Let me say, in conclusion, we are always more effective abroad when we are united at home. This is the way to bring unity to the House, and I urge Members to support this amendment.

[Page: H10063]
[TIME: 1910]

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 4 1/2 minutes.

(Mr. HYDE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I am frank to confess that you need to be a Ph.D in astrophysics to understand the amendment of the gentleman from New York [Mr. Solarz]. This is the fourth version we have had to digest since he first offered it a few days ago, and it was turned down by the Intelligence Committee.

The Solarz language is a maze, and you have to, as I says be very gifted to under it. But the effect is very simple, a de facto cutoff in lethal aid to UNITA.

Mr. SOLARZ is enamored of the phrase `put the Soviets to the test.' God, why do they not put us to the test once in a while? Cut out aid to the Communists and see if we will. Let us try that for a change.

The gentleman from New York [Mr. Solarz], as a prognosticator, has not got a flawless record. I remember in 1976 when I was sitting around here in my first term, and I saw the gentleman from New York [Mr. Solarz] take the floor, and he said, and I have always carried it with me, in the car since then, he said, `I believe there are areas in the world in which we have a legitimate interest in curbing the spreading of Soviet influence, but I don't believe Angola is one of them.'

Here we are today, 15 years later, worrying about the Communists in Angola, because back then you said if we would stop aiding the faction of UNITA, the Communists would just go away. Well, they did not just away. They stayed there, and they stayed there, and they dug in so that we finally had to repudiate the Clark amendment, and here we are back again creating this maze, this Rubik's cube of foreign policy.

There are not any conditions the MPLA has to satisfy before the President is required to make a certification that will result in a cutoff at lethal aid. To satisfy the conditions under the Solarz amendment, the MPLA simply has to express, now get this, its `willingness' to accept a cease-fire and a political settlement.

Well, they have already said they are willing to, they just never get around to doing it. They have not done it, and they are not going to do it, and they canceled a meeting 2 days ago waiting to see how this vote turns out.

Let us put them to test. I am weary of putting the Soviets to the test. I am weary of putting the Sandanistas to the test. They are still flunking the test.

Now if the President refuses to certify that the MPLA has met the above conditions, then the Solarz amendment permits Congress to make the determination itself by passing a joint resolution. This is called the urge to regulate. This is called becoming the Secretary of State with a vengeance.

If I were to go through the qualifications and the pages in the Solarz amendment, Members would go to sleep, as some Members are already within my scan.

Let me just tell Members this: The Solarz amendment requires four Presidential reports, four, that must satisfy two pages of requirements. Now that is really astrophysics. I think that is incredible.

Someone once said the President and Mr. Baker have been doing pretty well in Europe, pretty well in foreign policy, pretty well in the Middle East, and pretty well around the world getting international cooperation. Let us let them do it. That is what their jobs are, and we have got enough to do over here worrying about the budget.

This is a complicated, Rube Goldberg, intrusive, unworkable plan that the gentleman from New York [Mr. Solarz] thinks we have to submit to. It is the fourth version we have had. I know there is a fifty lurking around somewhere.

But I just plead with Members, let us continue working with UNITA, and with the MPLA, with the Portuguese. Let us not change the equation. Let us not put the Soviets to the test. Let them put us to the test and withdraw all of the arms they have left there, take the Cuban arms out that are there, and say let us have peace. That could be done tonight.

[Page: H10064]

Mr. McCURDY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HYDE. I yield to the gentleman from Oklahoma.

(Mr. McCURDY asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. McCURDY. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the Solarz amendment and I associate myself with the comments of the gentleman from Illinois.

Mr. HYDE. I am highly complimented, and I thank the gentleman.

Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to my very good friend from the other side of the aisle, the gentleman from New York [Mr. Houghton].

(Mr. HOUGHTON asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. HOUGHTON. Mr. Chairman, I am never sure what remarks do at this particular hour of the evening, whether it changes any minds or not. However, I want to tell Members how I feel about this amendment.

I think it is a good amendment. I think the time has come for a change, and I support it.

The arguments against are very persuasive. It is at a sensitive time, do not disrupt the talks, the United States and the U.S.S.R. have technical advisers there, so let things be as they are. I do not want to try to practice diplomacy without a license. However, the facts are these: The talks are not succeeding, and the reason is that there always is a fall-back position for one side or the other because they can get arms.

Another fact is the cold war is over. The military solution is stalemated. The United States and the U.S.S.R. both want to disengage, and the Angolan Government is ready to do a variety of things, agree to a cease-fire, a market economy, get rid of the Cubans, and have no new arms supplies coming from the Soviet Union.

So here comes the Solarz amendment, and it asks only two things. Just stop, and also have 3 months testing with a thing called a triple zero option. If the Government cheats, all bets are off. And even if the amendment passes, the President has the right to say no, I want to do another thing.

I have been around a long time, and I have never seen a deal like that. And do you know what, Mr. Savimbi has not either, and he was the one that agreed a few weeks ago that it was a good idea. Now he is gradually backing off because he not only wants to win, but he thinks he can win with a bigger score.

But you ask why is this good for us, why is this good for the United States, the paymaster? One thing is clear as we move through this crazy world of ours and some of the international negotiations in which we have been involved. You cannot shoot your way to the negotiating table. So if it was `yes' to Nicaragua, why can it not be `yes' to Angola?

I support the Solarz amendment.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Louisiana [Mr. Livingston].

(Mr. LIVINGSTON asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. LIVINGSTON. Mr. Chairman, this is not a compromise. It prompts a withdrawal of UNITA aid on the promise of a cease-fire and a negotiated settlement. Once promised, UNITA gets nothing more for 3 months, but the promise is hollow. The MPLA has $5 billion in oil revenues. They have gotten $500 million from the Soviets this year. They have a 15-year arms stockpile.

The UNITA people are already starving because of the refusal of the MPLA to distribute food, and the MPLA has promised a cease-fire and elections for years now. A 3-month hiatus or even a brief suspension of aid to UNITA will put UNITA at a significant disadvantage, making them horribly vulnerable to the wrongful intentions of the MPLA.

So this is a gamble. It is a dangerous gamble, and it is a cutoff of the aid which could kill UNITA.

Let us have a cease-fire, but let us have it now, not later. Let us have free and fair elections, but let us have them soon, not later.

Savimbi has already said he will go along with this, so why not the MPLA? Let us not gamble with a successful policy that we have implemented at this time.

The MPLA can end the war, today. We should not. Vote down the Solarz amendment.

Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the very distinguished gentlewoman from Connecticut [Mrs. Kennelly].

(Mrs. KENNELLY asked and was given permission to revise and extend her remarks.)

Mrs. KENNELLY. Mr. Chairman, in Angola, as in many parts of the world, the end of the cold war provides an opportunity to examine policies that have their roots in significantly different times. The Angolan civil war has been for far too long a test of wills between not only the immediate participants, but their respective backers as well. Over the course of two administrations, we have heard that United States support for UNITA was essential if Soviet expansionism was to be thwarted and a diplomatic settlement achieved.

Now, it seems to me, is the time to move beyond the military stalemate which exists on the battlefield and concentrate on the suddenly more promising arena of the negotiating table. Recent expressions by both the Government of Angola and UNITA give some cause for optimism that each side is prepared to rule out a military solution to the conflict. We should encourage those developments and the apparent willingness of the Soviets to play a more constructive diplomatic role on Angola by adopting a new approach in our own policy.

Such an approach is embodied in the Solar amendment which seeks to further a negotiated political solution without prejudicing the interests of either party. The amendment establishes a means by which to measure the professed desire of both UNITA and the Angolan Government for a peaceful settlement, and provides sufficient inducements to encourage good faith efforts to find the compromises necessary to work out a settlement. It is an evenhanded approach to a problem that has at least up to this point seemed to be beyond the ability of any of the interested parties to solve.

By turning the focus of the debate away from conflict and toward negotiation, the Solarz amendment can hasten the necessary process of national reconciliation in Angola. Millions of Angolans now face the threat of famine and the deprivation which accompanies it. Their needs cannot be addressed adequately until the fighting stops. Accomplishing that should be the primary goal of U.S. policy, and I believe the Solarz amendment would contribute to that result.

Mr. Chairman, Congress has been on the periphery of the Angolan debate for the last 5 years. It is time that the issue of U.S. policy in southern Africa was squarely presented to this body. The Solarz amendment provides an opportunity for a much needed discussion of this issue while at the same time seeking to sustain a commitment to the negotiating process on the part of the parties most directly concerned with the outcome of the Angolan civil war. I urge that the amendment be adopted.

[TIME: 1920]

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Colorado [Mr. Hefley].

Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Chairman, we have said everything I think that can be said on Angola this afternoon in the lengthy debate.

This is an important issue. The gentleman earlier in this afternoon said that this is not a laughing matter. Indeed, it is not a laughing matter. It is not a matter, either, of consideration about whether the cold war is over. That has been said a lot this afternoon.

These people are not interested at all in the cold war. They are interested in a very hot war that they are living through, and I think all of our goals are the same. We want the war to stop, and we want them to have freedom, and we want them to be able to go in a multiparty sense to the ballot box and to elect the people to represent them and govern them.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to discuss with the Members of the Chamber just for a few moments about what would happen if we cut off aid to UNITA. First and foremost, there would be no hope of a multiparty system and free and fair elections. The MPLA would then have the perfect reason to break off peace negotiations, because it would know that it could not win on the battlefield if aid to UNITA will be virtually helpless, and the MPLA would be able to strike with force ending all hope of democracy in Angola, and oppressive Marxist rule will continue to drive Angola toward ruin.

Some argue that if the Soviet Union would stop aid to the MPLA the United States would stop aid to the UNITA, and it would facilitate the peace talks. This is the farthest thing from the truth. I would only facilitate war for the same reasons mentioned earlier. UNITA's position would be immediately weakened while the MPLA has enough weapons and supplies stockpiled, and we have heard it over and over this afternoon, 15 years' supply to sustain the fighting for years.

The point is, cutting aid to UNITA is not the solution. We would be pulling the tug out from under any progress which has been made.

The only reason the MPLA and UNITA are at the talking table is because of the support we have given UNITA, Not because the MPLA has suddenly had a change of heart, and peace and democracy is sweeping in southern Africa, and it is because the MPLA cannot win while the U.S. supports UNITA.

The only victory is at the bargaining table.

[Page: H10065]

Mr. Chairman, I, too, would like to one day not have to send aid to UNITA. However, that aid must continue until there have been free and fair elections and peace and a multiparty system exists in Angola.

I strongly urge my colleagues to reject this proposal or any proposal which restricts or stops U.S. aid to UNITA. This is not the time to send a wishy-washy signal that UNITA's friend, the United States, is weak in our resolve to help.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. Burton].

Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time.

Mr. Chairman, I approached this debate with a little bit of trepidation, because I worked with my colleague from New York on the draft of the amendment, and we thought we might be able to get someplace on it, but, unfortunately, it did not work out.

Mr. Chairman, there was an article in the Washington Post, and the last part of the article said:

To pull the plug on a policy that was failing might be understandable. To pull the plug on a southern Africa policy that has succeeded in other aspects and now seems near succeeding in Angola is perverse.

I think that is a very important point to be made. The Angolan policy we have pursued is starting to bear fruit, and I think it is bad to change that policy right now when it appears as though we may be on the verge of an agreement.

The legislation the gentleman from New York [Mr. Solarz] has brought before us today is still a little bit ambiguous. When he says the Government of Angola expresses its willingness, that just is too vague in my view. If it said there is a definite time for a cease-fire, a definite time for elections, some kind of a definite timetable, it would have a lot more merit than the bill we have before us right now.

Let me just say this, and I think this is extremely important, I have seen a marked change in the attitude of the Government of Angola in the last year, the Communist government.

In the last year for the first time, I have seen the ambassador from Angola starting to come into the offices of members of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and members of the Intelligence Committee offices to talk about some kind of a conclusion to this terrible debacle over there. After that, I noticed the Ambassador came back a second time but this time he was with the Foreign Minister of Angola and one of the generals in charge of the conflict. So they started talking a little bit more about a solution rather than continued conflict.

Then most recently there was a television communication from the President, of Angola himself. Mr. dos Santos addressed a number of us in Congress and answered our questions.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Combest].

Mr. COMBEST. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time.

Very rapidly, what I would like to do is just address one specific part of a lot of the arguments against aid to UNITA for a number of years, and that has been the human rights violations that supposedly have occurred there.

To anyone who might be having their heart tugged by this issue, I want to mention as quickly as I can in a matter of 2 minutes some things that offset this. One of those is this picture which was made last week. It shows, as we all know, the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Hyde] here, along with two gentleman who supposedly were dead. These gentlemen happened to be very well alive, and either there has been a miracle that has taken place in the last few days or there were some gross inaccuracies in earlier reports.

There was an indication of burning of witches, people who, in fact, had been so-called dissidents who were declared as witches and burned. The individual who alleged that story recanted his allegations in a telephone interview in which he said he had never had eyewitness confirmations of any of his charges. He did see it happen and cannot say, `with my hand on my heart that that happened.' They were rumors of UNITA dissidents. `When you are a dissident, you believe anything.'

One other, I think, very important factor, Mr. Chairman, Savimbi has repeatedly welcomed international independent investigations into the country. Let me read from a letter that he wrote to the chairman of the Human Rights Watch:

UNITA regrets that your organization chose to issue a report concerning human rights in Angola without ever setting foot in the country. The MPLA regime refused to let representatives of your organization into its territory. However, Human Rights Watch never requested entry into free Angola and only informed UNITA of the human rights report a week before it was issued. Please accept this letter as a formal invitation for your organization to visit the area under UNITA's control in order to make conclusions more representative of the reality instead of focusing solely on two small towns and on people who do not live in the country.

Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from New Mexico [Mr. Richardson], my fellow member of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.

(Mr. RICHARDSON asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. RICHARDSON. Mr. Chairman, I am convinced that both sides, UNITA and the MPLA, want to work this thing out and want peace. This is the essence of the amendment. Congress suspends aid for 3 months, once the Luanda regime comes up with a realistic election proposal. There has to be incentive, but this is a stopgap solution.

What we have to look at is the longer range. Does it really make any sense to continue a program rooted in the strategic assumptions of a different era? Mr. Chairman, this approach is exactly the way we did the bipartisan agreement in Nicaragua with incentives for peace.

This amendment, modeled after the successful approach Congress took to the crisis in Nicaragua, applies incentives to cease hostilities to both parties involved in the Angolan conflict.

The amendment also builds on the developing cooperation with the Soviet Union. This cooperation led to the decolonization and independence of Namibia.

The war between the MPLA and UNITA has lasted over 15 years and taken the lives of some 200,000 people, many civilians not involved in the conflict.

Furthermore, the lives of nearly 2 million Angolans are threatened by drought. Relief shipments have been severely impeded by the civil war.

By creating an incentive program which encourages both sides of the conflict, and the United States and Soviets, to put down their weapons and pursue a cease-fire. This is the first step toward establishing a multiparty system and democracy in Angola.

While supporters of continued military aid argue that we must keep UNITA strong in order to reach an agreement/ignore that the amendment includes provisions to protect UNITA from an MPLA offensive. The amendment states that:

[Page: H10066]

Should an MPLA offensive, or the potential for an MPLA offensive, exist the President may pursue a lethal aid program for UNITA.

This amendment puts the onus on the Angolan Government. If they do not provide a timetable for settlement and negotiate in bad faith, our aid to UNITA would be unimpeded.

This amendment addresses the real and legitimate concerns of both sides of the issue. I urge its passage.

From the New York Times, Oct. 11, 1990

[FROM THE NEW YORK TIMES, OCT. 11, 1990]

Underwriting Angola's Agony

Angola's civil war lingers on, a stubborn relic of the cold war--despite efforts by Moscow and Washington to end it. Fifteen bloody years have claimed 200,000 lives. The warring camps say they're willing to submit to elections, but cannot agree on when and how. The least Congress can do is give President Bush the authority to suspend covert aid to Angola's rebels the moment Angola's Government fixes an election timetable.

This idea, advanced by Representative Stephen Solarz and six colleagues, gives both sides an incentive to bargain. It's vastly preferable to a Senate bill that simply authorizes continued aid to UNITA insurgents led by Jonas Savimbi. Even better would be an immediate suspension of aid, to be resumed only if the Angolan Government rejects a reasonable election timetable. Covert aid makes less and less sense, given the emerging prospects for peace in all of southern Africa.

A reluctant and divided Congress was persuaded to help Mr. Savimbi several years ago when the Soviet bloc was pouring huge amounts of aid into the Marxist Angolan regime. Angola's civil war was then entwined with a parallel struggle in Namibia involving insurgents and South African troops. Since then, however, Namibia has won its independence, a huge Cuban force in Angola has begun to withdraw and African mediators have pressed for a cease-fire and elections.

It's difficult to fix blame for the deadlock. Angola has offered to stop receiving all foreign military aid if the UNITA rebels do likewise, which may only be a feint. Mr. Savimbi contends he's eager to take part in elections. But negotiations have gone nowhere. Meantime, drought and war threaten to starve hundreds of thousands of Angolans, the voiceless victims of an increasingly pointless conflict.

As Mr. Solarz proposes, Congress can now suspend aid for three months once the Luanda regime comes up with a realistic election proposal. But this is at best a stopgap. Does it really make any sense to continue an aid program rooted in the strategic assumptions of a different era? This is the deeper question that Congress and the Administration have not yet begun to address.

[TIME: 1930]

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from California [Mr. Dreier].

(Mr. DREIER of California asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. DREIER of California. Mr. Chairman, it is very clear to me that this amendment is a real mistake. I have just come from a meeting with the Foreign Minister of Vietnam, Nguyen Co Thach, in which we talked about Cambodia. I cannot help but think about the events we are trying to bring about in Cambodia to have a supreme national council bring about free and fair elections. An article in the New York Times, written by the author of this amendment, talks about that situation, and I believe it relates very closely to Angola. He says:

Nor should we risk undermining the whole negotiating process at this delicate juncture by cutting off our nonlethal assistance to the non-Communist resistance. That would greatly diminish the pressure on the Vietnam and the Hun Sen government to make the concessions needed to achieve a settlement.

Also, Mr. Chairman, I think it is very important for Members, on October 19, in Luanda, the Deputy Foreign Minister, Venancio de Moura, announced UNITA-backed idea of establishing a multiparty system in Angola. It is very clear that full support to UNITA is absolutely essential if we are going to bring about a successful resolution to this crisis.

Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished and extremely able chairman of the Subcommittee on Africa, the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. Wolpe].

(Mr. WOLPE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. WOLPE. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of the Solarz amendment.

As I indicated earlier, during debate over the Dellums-Dymally-Hamilton amendment, U.S. assistance to Jonas Savimbi is a tragically misguided policy, grounded in anachronistic cold war mythology. It adds significantly to Angola's staggering human misery, indulges the worst militaristic tendencies of UNITA, and reinforces widely shared suspicions that the true aim of United States policy is not the promotion of a pluralist, multiparty democracy in Angola, but rather the armed overthrow of the Angolan Government and the installation of a substitute regime; namely, that of Jonas Savimbi.

Mr. Chairman, U.S. policy must change. If Congress cannot at this moment put a complete halt to assistance to UNITA, then Congress should condition that assistance in the way that my colleague, Congressman Solarz, proposes. Only by pursuing a new, far more evenhanded policy offering carrots and sticks to both warring parties will United States policy truly begin to advance the peace process in Angola.

Mr. Chairman, the administration, in opposing the Solarz amendment, has turned to a familiar, conveniently timed argument to justify unconditional military support of Jonas Savimbi, at a reported level of $60 million in fiscal year 1991.

We are told by Secretary Baker, Assistant Secretary Cohen, and others that, as a function of United States diplomacy, United States cooperation with the Soviets, and administration resolve in supporting UNITA militarily, negotiations between UNITA and the Angolan Government are now at the edge of a major breakthrough.

This is an unconvincing line of reasoning.

Sixteen months ago, at the time of the Gbadolite summit, when the relevant committees in Congress questioned why, in a post-cold-war era, the administration should unconditionally support UNITA, high-ranking State Department officials argued: `The policy is working. Give us time. Don't force us to change course now. In just a short period, this war will be brought to a negotiated conclusion.' Those were the words of the administration then, they are the same words used today.

What resulted from giving the administration the benefit of the doubt?

Savimbi walked out of the peace process initiated at Gbadolite. The war resumed, with large scale military actions undertaken by both sides. The senseless killing and suffering of innocent Angolans continued. Famine created by protracted war and drought only worsened, to the point where almost 2 million Angolans will soon be at risk of starvation. In the meantime, the administration rejected repeated Soviet overtures to the administration to begin mutual cutbacks in external military flows to their respective clients.

Mr. Chairman, the truth of the matter is that while there has been some limited, recent advance in negotiations between the Angolan Government and UNITA, it is a very incomplete progress which falls far short of a major breakthrough. And what progress has taken place has occurred

despite the narrow approach of the administration.

The Angolan Government and UNITA have met, face-to-face, in four rounds of exploratory talks. Yet the most important factor promoting these negotiations is not United States aid to UNITA; it is that the Angolan Government and UNITA have lost much of their external military support in the last 2 years.

The Angolan Government has witnessed the withdrawal of three quarters of its Cuban forces; all will have departed by June 1991. In addition, Soviet military aid has dropped from an estimated $1.4 billion in 1988 to $500 million in 1990.

UNITA has lost almost all of its South African aid, which up to April 1989 exceeded $200 million annually, more than three times the reported size of the United States program. Nor can UNITA relay any longer on South African forces to intervene directly in Angola on its behalf.

But despite these changes, the Angolan Government and UNITA still remain mired in profound distrust and bitterness. The Angolan Government resists recognizing UNITA and presenting a timetable for elections, for its fears that UNITA, with the military backing of the administration, is not truly prepared to lay down its arms and reach a nonmilitary, negotiated settlement. UNITA, for its part, resists agreeing to a cease-fire, for it fears that the Angolan Government, with continued Soviet military backing, is not truly serious about recognizing UNITA and agreeing to free and fair elections.

In the midst of this deadlock, the Angolan Government and UNITA each continue to rely overwhelmingly upon military might, in the vain hope that by bludgeoning the other side through one more round of fighting, it can improve its military position before compromising politically. Tragically, continued external military flows only feed this terrible dynamic.

Mr. Chairman, some dramatic step is required to push UNITA and the Angolan Government out of their deadlock. This war has gone on too long. Angola has experienced enough weapons, enough ammunition, enough senseless death and suffering.

UNITA's President Savimbi has openly said that UNITA is prepared to cease fighting, if the Angola Government recognizes UNITA and presents a reasonable timetable for multiparty elections. The Angolan Government has indicated it is willing to move in the direction demanded by UNITA, if it has a reasonable hope that UNITA will turn away from warfare. Fair enough. Let's force each party to live up to its commitments, by adopting the Solarz amendment.

If we adopt the Solarz amendment, we will test the true intentions of UNITA and the Angolan Government, while also testing the Soviets' openly expresed desire to cooperate with the United States in ending all external military flows to Angola.

If we do not adopt the Solarz amendment, more time will pass, more opportunities for United States-Soviet collaboration will pass by, and I fear that, this time next year, we will again hear how close we are to a breakthrough and a final settlement.

I urge support for the Solarz amendment.

[Page: H10067]

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. McEwen].[H17OC0-T1]{H10067}McEwen.

Mr. McEWEN. Mr. Chairman, I would especially like to express my admiration for the chairman of the Committee on Intelligence, the gentleman from California [Mr. Beilenson], and our ranking member, the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Hyde], as well as our previous chairman from Cleveland, and the members that serve on this committee because they do our country a great service.

There is a reason why the Committee on Intelligence rejected this amendment, and there is a reason why the Washington Post editorialized it. It is because it is a very pernicious amendment. It tells Members that we should have put in a government that is Marxist oriented, and that it will behave well.

Let me share with Members what the makers of this amendment told Members previously, because we have history. In 1974 when the FNLA supported by the Chinese, and the MPLA then supported by the Soviet Union, and UNITA, supported by the democracy of the world were about to close in one the capital, this Congress at just about Christmastime 1975 passed an amendment that cut off all aid to the freedom forces when they were within sight of the lights of Luanda, the capital city. Then we came back in January to make this amendment permanent, and the mover of the amendment said:

The real issue is not whether we withdraw from the world but whether we choose to involve ourselves in what is in essence a tribally based struggle, the outcome of which is ultimately unrelated to our own national security.

We are told that, if the MPLA is triumphant in Angola, it will result in the establishment of a Soviet satellite in that area, but the fact is that the tides of nationalism run far stronger in Africa than the imperatives of ideology. Having just managed to extricate themselves from the clutches of the Portuguese, the Angolans are most unlikely to submit themselves to the domination of the Soviets. Even if the MPLA is triumphant--and that is something nobody can be sure of--the Russians are unlikely to have any more influence in Angola than they now have in Mozambique, in Algeria, or in Egypt. And these are countries where they spent substantially more money than they are now spending in Angola.

I believe there are areas in the world in which we have a legitimate interest in curbing the spreading of Soviet influence, but I do not believe Angola is among them.

Mr. Speaker, we are also told that a triumph by the MPLA would result in the establishment of a Soviet naval base in South West Africa. According to these diplomatic Dr. Strangeloves, the establishment of such a naval facility in Angola or South West Africa would give the Russians the capacity effectively to interdict any shipping emanating from the Persian Gulf and destined for the east coast of the United States or for Western Europe. But the fact is that the place to establish such a blockage is at the exit of the Persian Gulf, in the Indian Ocean, rather than in the wideopen sea lanes of the Atlantic Ocean.

Let me share something. We should cut off aid to the freedom forces because it can only serve to, only seek to force the MPLA to seek assistance from the Soviet Union, if we will withdraw our aid from the freedom forces, they would not do that. We have history to tell Members what the result has been.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. Skelton].

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment of the gentleman from New York. While I believe that his intentions are good, this amendment is quite complicated, and it would end up sending a wrong signal to the wrong people.

In short, Mr. Chairman, it would hinder efforts to achieve a negotiated settlement in Angola, and that is really what we want to achieve. The recent record at the negotiating table shows that UNITA has been negotiating in good faith and has sought three basic objectives: explicit mutual recognition between itself and the ruling MPLA government; and a reversable commitment by both sides to internationally supervised multiparty elections; and a cease-fire.

UNITA has made the following concessions in its efforts to resolve the conflict in Angola. It has recognized the Marxist regime, the MPLA has the Government of Angola and has recognized the country's president, and it has called for elections to be held by late 1991, and has accepted the MPLA position that the current government should remain in power until elections are held.

Further, it has reduced the pace of fighting on the part of its forces, in an effort to promote a cease-fire. By contrast, Mr. Chairman, the MPLA response to UNITA's concessions has been less than encouraging. While the Government of Angola has made some concessions in the four rounds of peace talks that have taken place thus far this year, it has done only so in general terms. It has been unwilling to recognize UNITA as a legitimate political party or to make a commitment to holding elections on a specific date. That is terribly important for Members to remember.

One hopeful development in the negotiations concerns the role that the United States and the Soviet Union have assumed as observers of the negotiations. This addition to the talks, moderated by the Portuguese Government, should help push the negotiations forward. Indeed, Dr. Leonid Fituni, of the Institute for African Studies for the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences has written that expectations in Luanda are mounting that there will be a workable agreement with UNITA by January 1991. Elsewhere, the Angolan Government has finally agreed to allow an international relief effort through Namibia to assist drought victims in southern Angola. For this decision, UNITA has actually congratulated the MPLA for having collaborated in this humanitarian operation.

American policy, Mr. Chairman, in southern Africa has shown results over the past few years. Namibia is independent. The Cubans have started going home. Negotiations between the two sides in Angola are finally making progress. The amount of aid has served the crucial purpose of reinforcing the military stalemate, and making possible negotiations aimed at a political settlement.

Now is not the time to change a policy that is on the verge of attaining its objectives in Angola. Placing conditions on the one side that has shown flexibility and a willingness to compromise in the ongoing negotiations is simply wrong and even perverse.

Let me quote from a letter that Secretary of State Baker sent a number of us about the issue before us today. He writes:

[Page: H10068]

. . . Some, but not all, MPLA leaders are beginning to realize that they cannot defeat UNITA militarily and must negotiate a settlement, despite the wishes of hardliners in Luanda who seek a military solution. . . . . legislative proposals . . . packaged as `compromises', actually would have the effect of undercutting those in the MPLA who want to negotiate and of strengthening the hand of the MPLA hardliners who want to continue the bloodshed.

Secretary Baker further notes that:

Any imposition of conditional language will be taken by hardliners in Luanda as the ray of hope they have been looking for and long predicting.

I hope the Members of this body will see fit to hold to the course that the intelligence committee, with all the facts at its disposal, chose to chart. I respectfully ask you, my colleagues, to vote down the Solarz amendment.

[TIME: 1940]

The policy is working. We should remember it is working and to put it off track would be a disservice to both parties.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 1/2 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Shuster].

Mr. SHUSTER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. SHUSTER. Mr. Chairman, consider this very possible scenario. First the MPLA expresses a willingness--that is the word--willingness to hold elections and have a cease-fire.

Second, the President complies with this amendment, if it were to be passed, and cuts off lethal aid.

Third, the MPLA waits 2 months and then launches a massive offensive against UNITA.

Our dear colleague tells us not to worry. If that were to occur, we can resume aid, but Mr. Chairman, those of us who have been on the Intelligence Committee have had a lot of experience with the problems of starting and stopping and starting again the resupply of aid. We have had experience with it in Central America. We have had experience with it for years in Afghanistan and we have had experience with it in Africa.

I can tell you categorically, and I do not believe any of my colleagues will disagree with this, that once you stop aid, it takes weeks, if not months, to restart that aid.

We could find ourselves in a situation where the MPLA was overrunning UNITA, where UNITA was facing defeat and we would be too little, too late, and we would see the forces of freedom defeated by this Marxist government in Angola.

Now, our friends tell us, well, the Soviets say they will stop aid if we stop aid. Well, that is nice, but that is something for our Secretary of State and Secretary Shevardnadze to negotiate. Let us not play Secretary of State here in the Congress. Let us let that be negotiated, if indeed that is a possibility.

And most of all, let us remember the words that I quoted earlier tonight of Felix Dzerzhinsky, the founder of the KGB, who said:

The West are wishful thinkers. We will give them what they want to think.

Let us not be conned by the Communists in Angola. Let us recognize that it is easy for them to make promises in order to get their way. Let us support UNITA. Let us support Jonas Savimbi until and unless we see that there are firm commitments to free and fair elections, firm commitments to a cutoff of the war, firm commitments to a cease-fire. By doing that we will be supporting freedom and opposing Marxist dictatorship in Africa.

Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Chairman, for the purpose of concluding this debate, I yield the remaining time to the very distinguished gentleman from California [Mr. Beilenson], the chairman of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.

(Mr. BEILENSON asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. BEILENSON. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the Solarz amendment.

Reports of progress in the negotiations between UNITA and the Government of Angola provide some reason for optimism that a political settlement of the Angolan civil war may be possible in the near future. I believe that it is time to capitalize on both the spirit of compromise recently evidenced in these negotiations, and the apparent willingness of the Soviet Union, to play a more positive role in resolving the Angolan issue.

I personally favor a policy which combines an incentive for the Government of Angola to agree to the essentials for peace--the adoption of a cease-fire, and a commitment to a timetable for multiparty elections--with appropriate protection for the position of UNITA. Neither side gains an advantage for delay under such an approach, while each is rewarded for constructive efforts to achieve a political settlement.

Mr. Chairman, we have accomplished much of what we set out to do in Angola. The withdrawal of Cuban troops is on schedule, and the Soviets are showing an interest in disengaging from their costly support of the Government in Luanda.

We need to encourage the process of national reconciliation so that the urgent needs of the people of Angola, especially those threatened with famine, can be addressed. That country has been ravaged by civil war for 15 years now. Its people are tired of the fighting, its economy destroyed by it.

It is time for us to help end the war, and to help Angola fulfill its potential to become one of the most economically healthy countries of Africa. It has oil, coffee, diamonds, timber, and fish. What it needs to have is peace.

I believe that the Solarz amendment provides a positive framework for encouraging a peaceful resolution of the Angola conflict, and I support it.

The CHAIRMAN. All time has expired on the Solarz amendment.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Washington [Mr. Miller].

AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. MILLER OF WASHINGTON TO THE AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. SOLARZ

Mr. MILLER of Washington. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment to the amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. Miller of Washington to the amendment offered by Mr. Solarz: On page 1, on line 10, after `participate,' insert the following: `and is no longer receiving aid from the Soviet Union,'.

Mr. MILLER of Washington. Mr. Chairman, first of all, let me say that I have the greatest respect for my distinguished colleague, the gentleman from New York, and I respect what he is trying to do to encourage the peace process in Angola, but I believe there is one very serious flaw in his approach.

The Solarz amendment provides for a cutoff of United States aid if the Angolan Government express a willingness to agree to a cease-fire and agrees to a timetable for a political settlement and elections; however, Soviet military aid continues--that is the flaw.

The result of the Solarz amendment is that the Soviet Union, which has pumped in and continues to pump in at least 10 times as much military aid as the United States, will continue its military aid, while the United States will stop its military aid.

We do want to encourage negotiations and elections. However, as I look back on the last several years of our negotiations with the Soviet Union, where we have achieved some significant arms reduction agreements, they did not come about Mr. Chairman, through the United States agreeing or saying we would unilaterally make reductions or concessions. They came about because the two nations put into effect agreements.

It is for that reason that I offer the amendment to the Solarz amendment to make sure that not only are we on the way to a cease-fire and a political settlement with elections in Angola, but that we are on the way to ending military aid, that is ending military aid by the Soviet Union at the same time as the United States is agreeing to cut off military aid.

[Page: H10069]

Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MILLER of Washington. I am happy to yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding to me, because I think we may be able to find a basis to come together on this amendment.

In the gentleman's amendment, when the gentleman refers to aid from the Soviet Union, do I take it to mean the gentleman is referring to lethal military assistance?

Mr. MILLER of Washington. Referring to military aid, that includes equipment, weapons, ammunition, and military advisors.

Mr. SOLARZ. The gentleman is not referring to nonmilitary assistance?

Mr. MILLER of Washington. No.

Mr. SOLARZ. Let me ask the gentleman one other question, if he will yield further.

Mr. MILLER of Washington. I yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. SOLARZ. In the event we were to accept the gentleman's amendment as he has explained it, would the gentleman from Washington be prepared to join the gentleman from New York [Mr. Green], the gentleman from New York [Mr. Gilman], and the gentleman from New York [Mr. Houghton] in supporting the main amendment?

Mr. MILLER of Washington. I would be prepared to if the amendment was accepted with the interpretation and explanation that I have given. If we can get the Soviet Union to stop sending military equipment, ammunition, weapons, and to withdraw their military advisers, then along with getting the willingness for a cease-fire and a political settlement and fair elections, I think then we are on the way to encouraging a truly peaceful fair and democratic settlement in Angola.

[TIME: 1959]

Mr. SOLARZ. If the gentleman will yield further--and I thank him for his explanation and constructive efforts to improve the amendment--I say to my good friend from the State of Washington that just as we accepted some suggestions by the gentleman from California [Mr. Lagomarsino], to broaden the base of support for the amendment, just as we accepted a suggestion from the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. Burton] to broaden the base of support for the amendment, so too will we accept the amendment offered by my very good friend, the gentleman from the State of Washington [Mr. Miller] to further broaden the base of support for the amendment.

I only hope that when the vote comes on the final amendment, that my very good friend from the State of Washington will be able to bring some of his other friends on that side of the aisle along with him.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Washington [Mr. Miller] has expired.

The gentleman from New York [Mr. Solarz] is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. SHUSTER. Mr. Chairman, I believe the gentleman from New York [Mr. Solarz] supports the amendment. So should the 5 minutes not go to some Member who might oppose the amendment?

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, should not a Member in opposition to the amendment be given the 5 minutes?

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Hyde] is recognized for 5 minutes.

There was no objection.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I yield to my colleague, the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. Burton].

Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Chairman, I would like to say I know my colleague from Washington is well intentioned and his amendment on the surface has merit. The problem I have with the amendment is that it is a Trojan horse. It is going to make a resolution which is going to cause much, much mischief and problems for the resolution of this conflict to look a little better.

So I just say to my colleagues that I think that the path we are on toward peace in Angola is a path that should not be deviated from at this particular point. If this amendment makes this legislation look better and entices some of my colleagues to vote for it and it passes, then I think it is going to cause real problems for the peace process.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for his contribution.

Mr. Chairman, I want to go on record in the strongest terms as opposing this well-intentioned amendment because there are so many things wrong with it. It does not say one thing about 1,200 Soviet personnel who are now moving to the front lines. It does not say anything about Cuban weapons which are in abundance there. It does not say anything about the stockpile already in place, 15 years' worth of it. It does not say anything about who is going to monitor whether the Soviets are receiving aid. Are we going to get onsite inspection? Will the United Nations be there?

The problem with this is that it ought to be part of a comprehensive cease-fire with monitors in place so we will know it is being honestly lived up to. Once more, it is `trust me, trust me.'

Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Shuster].

Mr. SHUSTER. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Chairman, I simply concur with the gentleman's point. This is one more complexity added to an already vague and complex amendment. It does nothing to cure the situation. I imagine it might pass by voice vote here. But the real issue is the Solarz amendment, with or without this amendment.

Mr. Chairman, the Solarz amendment, with or without this amendment, should be defeated.

Mr. HYDE. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. Chairman, this is whipped cream over shaving cream; it does not taste very good. It looks all right, but there is no way to monitor it. It does not demand a cease-fire, it just says they are no longer receiving aid.

How are we going to find out? From their representative at the United Nations?

The State Department says at this critical stage of negotiations, when our policy appears to be on the verge of success, any change in our policy would send the wrong signal to all the parties, including the Portuguese mediators, and probably prolong the conflict rather than bring it to a peaceful conclusion.

Mr. Chairman, I yield to my friend, the gentleman from Washington, well-intentioned, but misguided though he be.

Mr. MILLER of Washington. Mr. Chairman, I thank my well-intentioned, albeit perhaps misguided colleague, for yielding, but two responses.

The gentleman raises the question of advisers. In the definition of aid and in the colloquy that we just had, I explained and the other side accepted that aid included not only weapons, ammunition and equipment, but the advisers that the gentleman is talking about.

Second, the gentleman said how will it be monitored? If you look at the Solarz amendment, the title of this paragraph is `Presidential Certification.' The President of the United States, our President, the friend of my distinguished colleague, the gentleman from Illinois, has to certify that this has happened. I call that pretty good monitoring.

Mr. HYDE. If the gentleman is through, does the gentleman mean the President is going to go over there in Air Force One and land in Luanda and see if the Soviets are still sending military aid?

The gentleman has something that looks nice, but it sends the wrong signal at the wrong time, and it is a terrible mistake and I am sorry that the gentleman offered it.[H17OC0-T2]{H10070}ffered it.

The CHAIRMAN. All time has expired.

The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Washington [Mr. Miller] to the amendment offered by the gentleman from New York [Mr. Solarz].

The amendment to the amendment was agreed to.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from New York [Mr. Solarz], as amended.

The question was taken; and the Chairman announced that the noes appeared to have it.

[Page: H10070]

RECORDED VOTE

Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.

A recorded vote was ordered.

The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 213, noes 200, not voting 20, as follows:

Roll No. 480

[Roll No. 480]
AYES--213
  • Alexander
  • Anderson
  • Andrews
  • Annunzio
  • Anthony
  • Applegate
  • Aspin
  • Atkins
  • AuCoin
  • Bates
  • Beilenson
  • Bennett
  • Berman
  • Bilbray
  • Boehlert
  • Boggs
  • Bonior
  • Borski
  • Boucher
  • Boxer
  • Brown (CA)
  • Bruce
  • Bryant
  • Buechner
  • Bustamante
  • Campbell (CO)
  • Cardin
  • Carper
  • Carr
  • Chapman
  • Clarke
  • Clay
  • Clement
  • Coleman (TX)
  • Collins
  • Condit
  • Conyers
  • Costello
  • Coyne
  • de la Garza
  • DeFazio
  • Dellums
  • Derrick
  • Dicks
  • Dingell
  • Dixon
  • Donnelly
  • Dorgan (ND)
  • Downey
  • Durbin
  • Dwyer
  • Dymally
  • Dyson
  • Early
  • Eckart
  • Edwards (CA)
  • Engel
  • Espy
  • Evans
  • Fazio
  • Feighan
  • Flake
  • Foglietta
  • Frank
  • Frenzel
  • Frost
  • Gaydos
  • Gejdenson
  • Gephardt
  • Gibbons
  • Gilman
  • Glickman
  • Gonzalez
  • Gordon
  • Grandy
  • Gray
  • Green
  • Guarini
  • Hall (OH)
  • Hamilton
  • Hayes (IL)
  • Hefner
  • Henry
  • Hertel
  • Hoagland
  • Hochbrueckner
  • Horton
  • Houghton
  • Hoyer
  • Jacobs
  • Johnson (SD)
  • Johnston
  • Jontz
  • Kanjorski
  • Kaptur
  • Kastenmeier
  • Kennedy
  • Kennelly
  • Kildee
  • Kleczka
  • Kolter
  • Kostmayer
  • LaFalce
  • Leach (IA)
  • Leath (TX)
  • Lehman (CA)
  • Lehman (FL)
  • Levin (MI)
  • Levine (CA)
  • Lewis (GA)
  • Lipinski
  • Long
  • Lowey (NY)
  • Luken, Thomas
  • Machtley
  • Manton
  • Markey
  • Martinez
  • Matsui
  • Mavroules
  • Mazzoli
  • McCloskey
  • McDermott
  • McHugh
  • McMillen (MD)
  • McNulty
  • Mfume
  • Miller (CA)
  • Miller (WA)
  • Mineta
  • Mink
  • Moakley
  • Moody
  • Morella
  • Morrison (WA)
  • Mrazek
  • Murphy
  • Nagle
  • Natcher
  • Neal (MA)
  • Neal (NC)
  • Nowak
  • Oakar
  • Oberstar
  • Obey
  • Ortiz
  • Owens (NY)
  • Owens (UT)
  • Pallone
  • Panetta
  • Patterson
  • Payne (NJ)
  • Payne (VA)
  • Pease
  • Pelosi
  • Penny
  • Perkins
  • Pickett
  • Poshard
  • Price
  • Pursell
  • Rahall
  • Rangel
  • Richardson
  • Rostenkowski
  • Roybal
  • Russo
  • Sabo
  • Sangmeister
  • Sawyer
  • Scheuer
  • Schneider
  • Schroeder
  • Schumer
  • Serrano
  • Sharp
  • Shays
  • Sikorski
  • Skaggs
  • Slattery
  • Slaughter (NY)
  • Smith (IA)
  • Smith (VT)
  • Solarz
  • Spratt
  • Staggers
  • Stallings
  • Stokes
  • Studds
  • Swift
  • Synar
  • Tanner
  • Tauke
  • Torres
  • Towns
  • Traficant
  • Traxler
  • Udall
  • Unsoeld
  • Vento
  • Visclosky
  • Volkmer
  • Walgren
  • Walsh
  • Washington
  • Waxman
  • Weiss
  • Wheat
  • Williams
  • Wise
  • Wolpe
  • Wyden
  • Yates
NOES--200
  • Archer
  • Armey
  • Baker
  • Ballenger
  • Barnard
  • Bartlett
  • Barton
  • Bateman
  • Bentley
  • Bereuter
  • Bevill
  • Bilirakis
  • Bliley
  • Broomfield
  • Browder
  • Brown (CO)
  • Bunning
  • Burton
  • Byron
  • Callahan
  • Campbell (CA)
  • Chandler
  • Clinger
  • Coble
  • Combest
  • Conte
  • Cooper
  • Coughlin
  • Courter
  • Cox
  • Craig
  • Crane
  • Dannemeyer
  • Darden
  • Davis
  • DeLay
  • DeWine
  • Dickinson
  • Dornan (CA)
  • Douglas
  • Dreier
  • Duncan
  • Edwards (OK)
  • Emerson
  • English
  • Erdreich
  • Fascell
  • Fawell
  • Fields
  • Fish
  • Flippo
  • Gallegly
  • Gallo
  • Gekas
  • Geren
  • Gillmor
  • Gingrich
  • Goodling
  • Goss
  • Gradison
  • Grant
  • Gunderson
  • Hall (TX)
  • Hammerschmidt
  • Hancock
  • Hansen
  • Harris
  • Hastert
  • Hatcher
  • Hefley
  • Herger
  • Hiler
  • Holloway
  • Hopkins
  • Hubbard
  • Huckaby
  • Hughes
  • Hunter
  • Hutto
  • Hyde
  • Inhofe
  • Ireland
  • James
  • Jenkins
  • Johnson (CT)
  • Jones (GA)
  • Jones (NC)
  • Kasich
  • Kolbe
  • Kyl
  • Lagomarsino
  • Lancaster
  • Lantos
  • Laughlin
  • Lent
  • Lewis (CA)
  • Lewis (FL)
  • Lightfoot
  • Livingston
  • Lloyd
  • Lowery (CA)
  • Madigan
  • Martin (NY)
  • McCandless
  • McCollum
  • McCrery
  • McCurdy
  • McDade
  • McEwen
  • McGrath
  • McMillan (NC)
  • Meyers
  • Michel
  • Miller (OH)
  • Molinari
  • Mollohan
  • Montgomery
  • Moorhead
  • Murtha
  • Myers
  • Nelson
  • Nielson
  • Oxley
  • Packard
  • Parker
  • Parris
  • Pashayan
  • Paxon
  • Petri
  • Pickle
  • Porter
  • Quillen
  • Ravenel
  • Ray
  • Regula
  • Rhodes
  • Ridge
  • Rinaldo
  • Ritter
  • Roberts
  • Robinson
  • Roe
  • Rogers
  • Rohrabacher
  • Ros-Lehtinen
  • Roth
  • Roukema
  • Rowland (GA)
  • Saiki
  • Sarpalius
  • Savage
  • Saxton
  • Schaefer
  • Schiff
  • Schulze
  • Sensenbrenner
  • Shaw
  • Shumway
  • Shuster
  • Sisisky
  • Skeen
  • Skelton
  • Slaughter (VA)
  • Smith (FL)
  • Smith (NE)
  • Smith (NJ)
  • Smith (TX)
  • Smith, Denny (OR)
  • Smith, Robert (NH)
  • Smith, Robert (OR)
  • Snowe
  • Solomon
  • Spence
  • Stangeland
  • Stearns
  • Stenholm
  • Stump
  • Sundquist
  • Tallon
  • Tauzin
  • Taylor
  • Thomas (CA)
  • Thomas (GA)
  • Thomas (WY)
  • Torricelli
  • Upton
  • Valentine
  • Vander Jagt
  • Vucanovich
  • Walker
  • Watkins
  • Weber
  • Weldon
  • Whittaker
  • Whitten
  • Wolf
  • Wylie
  • Yatron
  • Young (AK)
  • Young (FL)
NOT VOTING--20
  • Ackerman
  • Bosco
  • Brennan
  • Brooks
  • Coleman (MO)
  • Crockett
  • Ford (MI)
  • Ford (TN)
  • Hawkins
  • Hayes (LA)
  • Lukens, Donald
  • Marlenee
  • Martin (IL)
  • Morrison (CT)
  • Olin
  • Rose
  • Rowland (CT)
  • Schuette
  • Stark
  • Wilson
[TIME: 2016]

The Clerk announced the following pairs:

On this vote:

Mr. Ackerman for, with Mr. Marlenee against.

Mr. RHODES and Mr. HALL of Texas changed their vote from `aye' to `no.'

So the amendment, as amended, was agreed to.

The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MRS. BOXER

Mrs. BOXER. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mrs. Boxer: Page 25, after line 18, insert the following new title:

TITLE VI--OVERSIGHT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

SEC. 601. CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT.

(a) In General.--Section 501 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413) is amended to read as follows:

`CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

`Sec. 501. (a) The President shall ensure that the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives (hereinafter in this title referred to as the `intelligence committees') are kept fully and currently informed of the intelligence activities of the United States, including any significant anticipated intelligence activities, as required by this title, except that--

`(1) nothing contained in this title shall be construed as requiring the approval of the intelligence committees as a condition precedent to the initiation of intelligence gathering activities. Initiation of covert actions shall require prior approval of the intelligence committees; and

`(2) nothing contained in this title shall be construed as conferring on the President any of the powers enumerated in the Constitution as reserved to the Congress, particularly the power to declare war, Const. Art. I, Sec. 8, Cl. 11; to raise and support military forces, Const. Art. I, Sec. 8., Cl. 12; to appropriate funds, Const. Art. I, Sec. 9., Cl. 7; nor as limiting the foreign policy powers enumerated in the Constitution as reserved to the President, particularly the power to act as Commander in Chief of the armed forces once Congress has declared war, Const. Art. II, Sec. 2., Cl. 1; and the power to make treaties, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, Const. Art. II, Sec. 2., cl. 2.

`(b) The President, upon being made aware of any allegations of illegal intelligence activity, shall immediately report such allegations to the intelligence committees and keep the intelligence committees informed of the ongoing investigations into such activities, such reports to encompass any measures taken to prevent a recurrence of such illegal activity, including the reporting of such activity to the Department of Justice for prosecution.

`(c) The President and the intelligence committees shall each establish procedures as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this title, including procedures to ensure that each is kept fully and currently informed of intelligence activities.

`(d) The House of Representatives and the Senate, in consultation with the Director of Central Intelligence, shall each establish, by rule or resolution of such House, procedures to ensure that all members of the Congress are informed regarding intelligence activities to the extent consistent with the need to protect from unauthorized disclosure classified information and information relating to intelligence sources and methods furnished to the intelligence committees or to Members of Congress under this title. In accordance with such procedures, each of the intelligence committees shall promptly call to the attention of its respective House, or to any appropriate committee or committees of its respective House, any matter relating to intelligence activities requiring the attention of such House or such committee or committees.

`(e) As used in this section, the term `intelligence activities' includes `covert actions', as defined in section 503(e).'

(b) Information Required To Be Disclosed; Findings: The National Security Act of 1947 is amended--

(1) by redesignating sections 502 and 503 as sections 505 and 506, respectively; and

(2) by inserting after section 501 the following:

[Page: H10071]

`REPORTING INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

`Sec. 502. To the extent consistent with due regard for the protection from unauthorized disclosure of classified information relating to sensitive intelligence sources and methods, the President shall--

`(1) keep the intelligence committees fully and currently informed of all intelligence activities which are the responsibility of, are engaged in by, or are carried out for or on behalf of the United States Government, including any significant anticipated intelligence activity and significant failures; and

`(2) furnish the intelligence committees any information or material concerning intelligence activities which is within their custody or control and which is requested by either of the intelligence committees in order to carry out its authorized responsibilities.

`APPROVAL AND REPORTING OF COVERT ACTIONS

`Sec. 503. (a) In setting forth the procedures regulating covert actions, this title shall not be construed as authorizing the use of covert operations as a routine means of conducting foreign policy or achieving foreign policy objectives.

`(b) The President may not conduct covert actions without prior approval by the intelligence committees, except as set forth in subsection (c)(6).

`(c) Approval of a covert action by the intelligence committees shall be predicated on the following:

`(1) The preparation of and delivery to the intelligence committees by the President of a written finding establishing that the covert action is necessary to meet an extraordinary threat to the national security of the United States and detailing the covert action proposed, the purposes of the action, the means by which the action is intended to be carried out, and the Federal agency, agencies, or personnel to be used in the covert action.

`(2) The covert action does not propose, intend, or otherwise include the use of any third party to fund or conduct the operation, be such third party a foreign country or any agent thereof, private contractor, or other entity which is not an element of the United States Government.

`(3) The covert action does not propose, intend, or otherwise include the use of any department, agency, or entity of the United States Government other than United States intelligence agencies, the Department of Defense, and Federal law enforcement agencies.

`(4) The covert action does not propose, intend, or otherwise result in the influencing of United States political processes, public opinion, policies, or media.

`(5) The covert action does not propose, intend, or
otherwise include actions which violate the Constitution of the United States, any treaties, such as the United Nations Charter, which under the Constitution are the Supreme Law of the Land, Const. Art. VI, cl. 2, or any statutes of the United States.

`(6) The approval by the intelligence committees of each covert action must be obtained in writing before the covert action can commence, except that the President may under extraordinary and emergency conditions, when time is of the essence, initiate a covert action prior to receiving approval from the intelligence committees, but such covert action shall cease within 48 hours of initiation unless express written approval of the covet action is given by the intelligence committees pursuant to such procedures as the intelligence committees may adopt to ensure a prompt response in such circumstances.

`(d) The President shall--

`(1) keep the intelligence committees fully and currently informed of the status of all covert actions which are carried out for or on behalf of the United States Government, including significant failures;

`(2) furnish to the intelligence committees any information or material concerning covert actions which is in the possession, custody, or control of the executive branch and which is requested by either of the intelligence committees; and

`(3) ensure that the intelligence committees are notified within 24 hours of any significant change in a previously approved covert action, including any change in the nature or scope of the threat which the covert action was designed to counter.

`(e) As used in this section, the term `covert action' means an activity or activities conducted by the United States Government to meet an extraordinary threat to the national security of the United States so that the role of the United States Government is not intended to be apparent or acknowledged publicly, but does not include--

`(1) activities to protect United States citizens from imminent bodily harm or from being seized or held as a hostage;

`(2) activities the primary purpose of which is to acquire intelligence, traditional counterintelligence activities, traditional activities to improve or maintain the operational security of the United States Government programs, or administrative activities;

`(3) traditional diplomatic or military activities or routine support to such activities;

`(4) traditional law enforcement activities conducted by the United States Government law enforcement agencies or routine support to such activities; or

`(5) activities to provide routine support to the covert activities (other than activities described in paragraph (1), (2), (3), or (4)) of other United States Government agencies abroad.

`PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION

`Sec. 504. Any person who knowingly initiates or participates in a covert action in violation of this title shall be guilty of a felony punishable by up to 20 years in Federal prison, a fine of $100,000, or both.'.

(c) Availability of Funds Subject to Congressional Approval.--Section 505 of the National Security Act of 1947, as designated by subsection (b)(1), is amended--

(1) by striking out `501' in subsection (a)(2) and inserting in lieu thereof `503'; and

(2) by adding at the end thereof the following new subsection:

`(d) No appropriated funds may be obligated or expended, or may be directed to be obligated or expended, for any covert actions, as defined in section 503(e), until such time as the intelligence committees have given express written approval of the covert action in accordance with section 503(c).'.

Mrs. BOXER (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the amendment be considered as read and printed in the Record.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentlewoman from California?

There was no objection.

POINT OF ORDER

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I make a point of order against the Boxer amendment.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman will state his point or order.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I make a point of order that the amendment violates clause 7 of rule XVI which states, in pertinent part, `* * * no motion or proposition on a subject different from that under consideration shall be admitted under color of amendment.' The proposed amendment is not germane to the bill because it deals with matters beyond the scope of the bill's provisions and the amendment includes matters within the jurisdiction of committees of the House not reporting the bill under consideration.

Mr. Chairman, the amendment is not germane, and consequently violates clause 7 of rule XVI in the following specific respects:

First, the bill authorizes funds for a limited number of executive departments or their subcomponents specified in section 101 of the bill and makes a few very modest changes in the statutory authorities of only a few of those agencies.

The amendment would enact a comprehensive scheme of oversight and reporting requirements for all U.S. intelligence activities which are engaged in by any U.S. Government agency, not just those covered by the bill, as well as by third parties outside of the U.S. Government. (Amndt: p. 4, lines 6-12.)

In this regard, I call attention to a ruling by the Chair on September 27, 1967 (113 Con. Rec. Page 26957) cited in section 798f of the Rules and Practice of the House of Representatives. That ruling states that, `To a bill limited in its applicability to certain departments and agencies of government, an amendment applicable to all departments and agencies is not germane.'

Second, the only provision of the bill addressing congressional oversight of intelligence is section 503. That provision is limited to oversight related only to one specific and narrow class of intelligence activities, and that is commercial cover activities to provide security only for intelligence collection. Moreover, section 503 of the bill applies only to elements of one executive department, the Defense Department, and the provision expires at the end of 5 years.

The amendment goes far beyond that one new and specifically limited oversight subject in the bill. The amendment provides for a comprehensive oversight system for intelligence activities of the U.S. Government in general, and in some cases the role of outside third parties. The amendment is also not limited in duration, as is section 503 of the bill, but is broader because it would enact a permanent statutory change. In these regards, the amendment is not germane because it is more general in nature than the only provision of the bill which deals with one particular and narrow class within the general subject of intelligence oversight reporting.

The amendment further requires, as part of its oversight scheme, that the House and Senate establish certain procedures by adopting internal rules or resolutions, matters not dealt with in any form by the bill. (Amndt: p. 3, lines 4-18.)

Third, the amendment is not germane because its text consists entirely of provisions repealing or amending sections of two statutes not amended or addressed by the bill under consideration.

The amendment extensively amends title V of the National Security Act of 1947, codified in title 50 of the United States Code, and repeals section 662 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, codified in title 22 of the United States Code. The bill does not amend either of those statutes, and indeed, does not amend any part of title 22 of the United States Code.

Section 799 of the Rules and Practice of the House of Representatives cites a ruling by the Chair on May 11, 1976 that, `Generally to a bill amending one existing law, an amendment changing the provisions of another law * * * is not germane.' Precedents cited in sections 33.1 and 33.3 of chapter 28 of Procedures in the U.S. House of Representatives, 97th Congress, 4th Edition (Deschler and Brown) support this principle with which the proposed amendment is inconsistent.

Furthermore, chapter 28, section 33.14 of Deschler and Brown's Procedures in the U.S. House of Representatives, 97th Congress, 4th edition cites a precedent from a ruling of March 7, 1974 (120 Cong. Rec. 5653, 5654. 93rd Cong. 2nd Sess.) that, `An amendment repealing existing law has been held not germane to a bill not amending that law.' In proposing to repeal a section of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, a statute not amended by the bill, the proposed amendment is not germane. (Amndt: p. 1, lines 3-4.)

Fourth, the amendment is not germane because it fails the test of committee jurisdiction under section 798c of the Rules and Practice of the House of Representatives by including matters within the jurisdiction of committees not reporting the bill, the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Rules.

The amendment would repeal section 662 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. That act is within the jurisdiction of the Foreign Affairs Committee. (Amndt: p. 1, lines 3-4.)

The amendment also would require the House (and one of its committees) to establish certain internal procedures by the adoption of House rules or resolutions. Such matters are within the jurisdiction of the Committee on Rules. (Amndt: p. 3, lines 4-18.)

Fifth, the amendment (at p. 8, lines 8-12) would create a penal offense, whereas the pending bill does not deal with or create any criminal offenses. In addition the committees reporting the bill do not have jurisdiction to consider such matters. In that regard, I would call the attention of the Chair to a precedent of the House, rulings by the Chairman of the Committee of the Whole, Mr. Forand on April 7, 1960. In those rulings, the Chair sustained points of order against two amendments to a pending amendment in the nature of a substitute to a bill relating to employment of retired officers by Defense contractors reported from the Armed Services Committee. Those points of order were sustained by the Chair, which ruled that the substitutes dealt with the imposition of criminal penalties, a matter not dealt with in the proposition being amended. Further, the Chair ruled that the substitutes' imposition of criminal penalties was a matter outside the jurisdiction of the committee which had reported the pending bill [Armed Services] and, if offered as a separate bill, would have to be referred to the Committee on the Judiciary.

For all the reasons given and in light of the precedents cited, the amendment is not germane, and therefore it violates clause 7 of rule XVI. I insist upon my point of order, Mr. Chairman.

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The CHAIRMAN (Mr. Nelson of Florida). Does the gentlewoman from California wish to be heard on the point of order?

Mrs. BOXER. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman repeat what he just said, please?

Mr. Chairman, I would say to the gentleman from Illinois that he has certainly gone to great pains to study this bill, and I am greatly complimented. I would say to the House that his amendment has been drafted with germaneness in mind by the legislative counsel. It mirrors essentially a Senate bill, the intelligence bill, section 7, which has gone forward.

It deletes any reference to, for example, the Foreign Assistance Act. Since the date it was printed in the Record, we deleted that reference.

We feel it is absolutely germane. We feel that there are other provisions in the bill, for example on page 26 and page 33 that talk about permanent changes in law, and we would say that this is absolutely germane.

My goodness, we are talking about covert activities, and certainly the Intelligence Committee, and it is hard for me to believe that someone could say that a discussion of covert activities in this particular amendment would not be germane to the intelligence authorization bill.

Mr. BEILENSON. Mr. Chairman, may I be recognized very briefly?

The CHAIRMAN. Does the gentleman from California wish to be heard on the point of order?

Mr. BEILENSON. He does, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from California is recognized.

Mr. BEILENSON. Mr. Chairman, I just want to be heard very, very briefly on the point of order.

I recognize the right of the gentleman, of course, to make this point of order and, in fact, I do not know how the Chair will rule on the precedents which the gentleman from Illinois has cited. I would only ask that in its ruling the Chair consider the fact that there are already provisions in the bill which do broaden its scope.

Take into consideration the fact that the gentlewoman from California [Mrs. Boxer] has amended her amendment this very day, I think in a good faith effort to try to assure its germaneness. And I would also urge that the desire of many Members to debate the issue raised by the amendment be noted.

There is not agreement in the House that the amendment would result in an improvement in the existing system of intelligence oversight. I believe, however, that the amendment's consideration would offer an opportunity to the Intelligence Committee to correct many of the misconceptions that have been raised recently in the role Congress plays in monitoring activities of the intelligence agencies, and I would hope that the ruling of the Chair would in some way acknowledge the value of that kind of debate.

I thank the Chair.

The CHAIRMAN (Mr. Nelson of Florida). Are there other Members who wish to be heard on the point of order?

The Chair is prepared to rule.

Although the bill does not amend the National Security Act of 1947, neither does it confine itself to authorities and activities of the intelligence community. In addition to the changes in permanent law already noted, at section 503 the bill inserts new provisions in title 10 of the United States Code--relating to the Armed Forces--to ensure congressional oversight of activities of the Department of Defense in commercial cover of intelligence operations.

Thus, the subject matter of the amendment--the relationship between the executive branch and the Congress with respect to the authorities and activities of the intelligence community--is one of the diverse topics already addressed in the bill.

Accordingly, the point of order is overruled.

The gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Hyde] makes the point of order that the amendment offered by the gentlewoman from California is not germane to the bill. The amendment adds a new title and must be germane to the bill as a whole, as amended.

The bill authorizes funding for the intelligence community for 1 fiscal year and makes several, diverse changes in permanent law relating to sundry authorities of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of Defense. For example, the bill makes changes in the CIA retirement and disability system; it authorizes the Secretary of Defense to permit components of DOD to charge the CIA the same rate for airlift services that they would charge another component of DOD: and it authorizes the Secretary of Defense to withhold certain geodetic products from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act. In addition, the bill, as perfected, includes the amendment recommended by the Committee on Armed Services directing the Secretary of Defense to provide Members of Congress access to a classified report of the Defense Intelligence Agency assessing efforts to account for military personnel listed as prisoners of war or missing in action.

The amendment at the desk does not repeal the Hughes-Ryan law, but does amend title V of the National Security Act of 1947--relating to accountability for intelligence activities. Among other things, it assigns to the President several responsibilities of the type that the existing act assigns to lower officials, such as the Director of Central Intelligence.

[Page: H10073]
[TIME: 2030]

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, may I ask one question?

Mr. Chairman, I did not hear that part, what the Chair read about the criminal penalties that she inserts in the law, and my point that that should go to the Committee on the Judiciary, that it is certainly beyond the scope of our bill.

I must have missed that. How did the Chair rule on that, sir?

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair thinks that the bill, as presented and amended contains provisions within several committee jurisdictions. Therefore the amendment need not meet a strict jurisdictional test. Accordingly, the Chair rules that the point of order is overruled.

Mr. HYDE. I thank the Chair.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentlewoman from California [Mrs. Boxer] will be recognized for 30 minutes, and the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Hyde] will be recognized for 30 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from California [Mrs. Boxer].

Mr. BEILENSON. Mr. Chairman, this gentleman is opposed to the gentlewoman's amendment and asks that he control the 30 minutes in opposition.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from California [Mr. Beilenson] will be recognized for 30 minutes.

Mrs. BOXER. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 6 minutes.

Mr. Chairman, I want to thank the Chair for upholding the germaneness of this amendment, and I want to thank the very gracious chairman of the Intelligence Committee who oppose this amendment but yet fought hard for my right to offer it.

Mr. Chairman, my amendment gives the Intelligence Committees of Congress a more important role in covert activity decisions by requiring their approval before a covert activity is undertaken. In doing so, this amendment protects the American people from the possible abuses of an all-too-powerful or overreaching executive branch.

I would like to read to my colleagues from the Senate Committee on Intelligence report on the Iran-Contra affair. This is the Senate and the House committee report, starting on page 11.

Findings and conclusions: The common ingredients of the Iran/Contra policies were secrecy, deception, and disdain for the law. A small group of senior officials believed that they alone knew what was right. They viewed knowledge of their actions by others in the Government as a threat to their objectives. They told neither the Secretary of State, the Congress, nor the American people of their actions. When exposure was threatened, they destroyed official documents, and they lied to Cabinet officials, to the public, and to elected representatives in Congress.

Going on, I go on to page 12:

The United States simultaneously pursued two contradictory foreign policies, a public one and a secret one.

And, further,

The Iran-Contra affair was characterized by pervasive dishonesty and inordinate secrecy. Secrecy became an obsession. Congress was never informed of the Iran or Contra covert actions.

Mr. Chairman, they go on to say, and, Mr. Chairman, I know it is hard to relive some of the horrors of the Iran-Contra scandal, but I think it is important, because it really is what my amendment addresses.

Further, on page 16 of the report:

Covert operations of this Government should only be directed and conducted by the trained professional services that are accountable to the President and to Congress. Such operations should never be delegated as they were here to private citizens in order to evade governmental restrictions.

And, finally, the committee ends in this way:

The President is the principal architect of foreign policy in consultation with the Congress. The policies of the United States cannot succeed unless the President and the Congress work together.

Mr. Chairman, we must learn from the history of the Iran-Contra scandal lest we see it repeated over and over again. We read in this report that keeping secrets from our Intelligence Committees is wrong, that asking private parties who can oftentimes be crooked or greedy or worse is wrong, that consultation with our Intelligence Committees is correct, that checks and balances are correct, that Congress, working with the President, not just being a rubberstamp, is correct.

This Congress is a great institution. Are we unwieldy at times? Yes. Are we contentious at times? Absolutely.

But this is the House of the people, and the people count on us, expect us to make policy through our committee system to check the unbridled power of the executive.

I think it is important that you know that this bill that is before us is silent on the whole area of covert activities. However, the Senate has an entire section spelling out the way covert activities would be authorized, and it is very important that we speak out on this issue my colleagues, because pretty soon they are going to go to conference, and if we have not discussed this, then neither the gentleman from California [Mr. Beilenson] nor the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Hyde] nor any of the conferees will know how we feel.

Section 7 in the Senate bill say that covert activities can be carried out for virtually any foreign-policy objective at all, and all that is necessary is notification by the President to the committees, but there is a loophole in this notification process. On a rare occasion, and I put quotes around rare because those are the words, if the President cannot notify Congress before the covert activity begins, he must do so in a timely manner.

`Timely' is not defined in the Senate bill. Conceivably it would be a week. It could be a month. Maybe it could even be a year. So, in essence, the role of Congress in a covert action is limited to notification by the President to the intelligence committees, a written rationale for the action which is important and, in certain cases, no notification until the President thinks it is timely.

[TIME: 2040]

The Senate language would allow all agencies of government to participate in covert activities, as well as foreign countries and other third parties.

Members, I ask, have we learned anything from the Iran-Contra scandal? Have we not learned that the Congress was kept totally in the dark? Have we not learned that when funding for the Contras was banned by the Congress, people in the Reagan-Bush administration turned to third parties such as Iranian arms merchants and other foreign nationals, to accomplish their secret plan?

I believe the American people should insist on the checks and balances of a stronger congressional role. The need to know that this Congress through our Intelligence Committees is not only notified but consulted.

(By unanimous consent Mrs. Boxer was allowed to proceed for 2 additional minutes.)

Mrs. BOXER. That the Congress is not only told but is asked. They need to know that covert activities will take place not as an ordingary part of foreign policy, but when our national security absolutely demands it. They need to know that third parties and other nations will not be carrying out our covert policies. And most of all, they have to know and feel confident that their tax dollars are being spent wisely, not on some secret plan hatched in the dark recesses of their Government, or worse, in the dark recesses of some privately run CIA operation.

Let me tell Members what the Boxer amendment does not do. It does not affect intelligence gathering operations or stop Members from getting the intelligence operation on a Qadhafi or a Saddam Hussein. It does not prevent Members from consulting with foreign countries about covert actions, and it does not prevent foreign countries from paralleling our cover actions. It certainly does not require any consultation for hostage rescue.

What it does, very clearly my friends, is say that this Congress, through its intelligence committees, need to play a role of approval. We have a loophole. If there is an emergency, we give the administration 48 hours to come forward before that approval is given. I urge this body to learn from history, to stand up for the American people and their right to a fair and just Government, to make sure that a tyrannical few cannot undermine the greatest Nation on Earth.

We are a Government of laws, not of men and women. Therefore, we must write laws that protect our people from the abuse of power. Nothing less than their freedom is at stake.

Members, if we are here for anything, it is to protect the freedom of the people we represent. I urge support of the Boxer amendment.

[Page: H10074]

Mr. BEILENSON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to our distinguished ranking member, the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Hyde].

(Mr. HYDE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I have heard Iran-Contra since 1986, and I thought Congress did pretty well. We had a House Special Investigating Committee, and boy, did we have investigators. The Senate had a Special Investigating Committee, and did they have counsel and investigators. We spent the summer with hearings. We subpoenaed everybody, all records. We granted immunity to everybody in town. Testify, go before the public.

Then we got a special prosecutor, I guess independent counsel is what he is called. I do not know what counsel he made except prosecute, indict, and he did; 28 million dollars' worth. He got a couple of people. Not enormously big fish, but he has gotten them. The others, he had gotten one on appeal, the other one got reversed, but we have had the newspapers. We have had Congress. We have

had the courts. We have had all sorts of investigations, and an election has intervened in between them. A couple of elections as a matter of fact.

I hope we have learned the lessons of Iran-Contra. I hope we have drawn conclusions from the that Congress should not be lied to. There is a penalty paid for lying, if a person is not granted immunity first by Congress. And then life goes on. But, no, it does not.

Mrs. Boxer has brought out of the bowels of the Cristic Institute this complicated amendment which says, as a matter of fact, no covert actions, ever, regardless of special circumstances involving sensitivity and risk to life without prior notice to Congress. Do Members know how we can keep a secret? Don't Members know our lips are sealed? Members never find out the next day in the Washington Post or the New York Times what is going on.

Members have never. Why? Our battle plans are not revealed. What our submarines are doing, what we are doing in the Philippines, they never find that out. We are tight as a drum. I am proud of that fact. We do not even need an oath of secrecy in the Committee on Intelligence. We do not even take an oath of secrecy. We are honor-bound not to leak, and we do not live by the press release or by being stroked by the media. Not at all. `What did you do today? How much are you giving Angola? We know it, we just want to confirm it. We heard it from the other side' and on and on and on, but I am digressing.

The gentlewoman from California has imposed an enormous power that I stand in awe of. She has rewritten the Constitution. Now get this; she says, `Nothing contained in this title shall be construed as conferring on the President any of the powers enumerated in the Constitution as reserved to the Congress.' I will buy that, particularly the power to declare war. I will buy that.

Now she goes on and she says, `nor as limiting the foreign policy powers enumerated in the Constitution as reserved to the President, particularly the power to act as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, once Congress has declared war.' She phases in the Presidential constitutional power as Commander-in-Chief to only be effected after Congress has declared war. That is wonderful if we can do it. Whoever drafted this has, as I say, broad scope, is a visionary, and has rewritten the Constitution to suit himself.

Covert actions, they have redefined covert action, too. So it takes a Philadelphia lawyer to understand what is covert and what is not.

Now, hostage rescues are no longer covert, so the President can do that and not have to confer with Members. They say, great secret keepers in advance. That is fine. Now, if a third country ever wants to work with the United States, if we need to get help from somebody else, no can do under her bill.

It is just a terrible imposition, a terribly inflexible, dangerous, unrealistic rule that she is imposing. It is one last dying gasp for those people who died very hard over Iran-Contra, and never did get to Ronald Reagan, but nunc pro tunc, as the lawyers say, now for then.

We have this amendment. I hope this is defeated. We have crippled the State Department. We have crippled the CIA enough tonight, and let Members not put the lid on the coffin.

Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mrs. BOXER. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 10 seconds to say to the gentleman that I find it amazing that it is inflexible and dangerous to give the Intelligence Committees more power.

Mr. Chairman, I yield 4 minutes to the senior member of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. Kastenmeier].

(Mr. KASTENMEIER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. KASTENMEIER. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentlewoman for yielding me this time.

I rise in support of the Boxer amendment. I cannot say that it is technically legal or parliamentarily perfect or not, nor can I say that the chances of it ultimately becoming law are more than very slight. However, it does one thing. It does get to the heart of the matter. Even more so than the 3 hours that we spent on Angola, because it is a question, the principle involved here. The question of policy is so profound, so significant, that really all other questions we have debated today pale in comparison.

It has to do with the relevancy, really, of the Committee on Intelligence, raised by the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Hyde] earlier. How relevant is our committee? It has to do with whether or not Congress can make any meaningful contribution in terms of national security or international security questions. What is our limitation?

Now, I say this, knowing that since I have been on the Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on Intelligence has been operating in a number of years under what I consider superb chairmanship, including the gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Boland, the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. Hamilton], the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Stokes], and now my colleague, the gentleman from California [Mr. Beilenson]. That is not the problem. The problem is our constitutional limitation, our total inability to do anything more than to listen up in room H-405. When proposals are made by the executive branch, you listen to them. We cannot speak of them. We cannot effectively challenge them. There is no vote, normally, on those propositions, and there is no third-party interest.

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Except in the most rare instances, we hear from the intelligence agencies only and the executive branch on these proposals.

There are ways, it has been pointed out, that could be challenged. We could, and it was once done by a former Member, Mr. Boland, challenge Central American policy; very painful, very difficult, once in recent years.

We can with this particular vehicle, the authorization bill which contains money, although we customarily as you know do not, we can challenge certain policies. Today we have in two or three particulars, mostly by Members not now members of the Itelligence Committee.

Iran-Contra, cited by the gentlewoman from San Francisco, is very much in point. We have seen Judge Walsh give up the prosecution this last week. We have seen little come of it because the juxtaposition of the executive branch and the Congress is at a terrible disadvantage to the Congress. We literally have been unable, we cannot even get a suitable notice provision out of Iran-Contra. The gentleman from New York [Mr. McHugh] has worked desperately hard for 3 years, frustrated at every point, to get a notice provision. You would think we could at least get that out of the scandal of the executive branch in terms of a national security question, and we cannot.

So I say a vote for the gentlewoman's amendment is a vote for a new look at how Congress and the executive branch can handle intelligence in the 1990's.

Mr. BEILENSON. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume. I rise in opposition to the gentlewoman's amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I understand the desire of my colleagues, the gentlewoman from California [Mrs. Boxer] and those who support her amendment to ensure the congressional oversight of intelligence activities is as strong as possible. That is a goal which the members of the Intelligence Committee share. In fact, it was the primary reason for the creation of these committees 13 years ago.

Congress currently has in place effective tools for conducting oversight of the operation of our intelligence activities. These tools which are applicable to covert action programs, as well as to all other intelligence activities, include regular monitoring by the intelligence Committee of the conduct of ongoing programs and the exercise by our committee and the Committee on Appropriations of the power of the purse.

One of the results of the Intelligence Committee's use over the past few years of the authority it has over funding decisions has been a significant reduction in the amount of money available to initiate covert actions, which I believe has had the effect of ensuring a much more judicious approach in decisions by the President as to when to apply that particular foreign policy tool.

Obviously, improvements could be made in the congressional oversight system, and our committees regularly engage in working with the administration and with the Senate to develop changes on which both branches of Congress can agree.

As I mentioned in my opening remarks on the bill itself some several hours ago, I expect that this year that process will produce some badly needed improvements both in quantity and quality of the information given to Congress when it is notified of the initiation of a covert action. Those improvements include requirements that findings be in writing, that they be contemporaneous with the decision to initiate a covert action, and that they clearly specify if the involvement of non-U.S. Government third parties and agencies other than the intelligence agencies is contemplated. These changes will not satisfy everyone, especially those who have reservations about the wisdom of covert action programs under any circumstances, but they are precisely the procedural changes recommended by the Iran-Contra committees. That is what they recommnded. They did not recommend the provisions in the amendment of the gentlewoman from California [Mrs. Boxer].

The provisions they recommended are in the Senate bill and will, I hope and trust, be approved by the conference committee between our two Houses in the near future, and I believe that they represent the most that can be achieved, certainly this year.

The question for me on an effort like the amendment before us is whether it will facilitate efforts by the Intelligence Committee to enhance oversight of the intelligence community. I have concluded that for a number of reasons the amendment will likely have the opposite effect.

First, of course, the amendment seeks to provide Congress with a prior approval authority for covert actions, an authority that would be exercised by the intelligence committees of each House. Either committee could prevent a covert action from being implemented by refusing to approve it.

In light of the Supreme Court's decision in the Chadha case, the constitutionality of the creation of what effectively would be a one-House veto procedure is highly doubtful.

Second, the confrontation with the administration that the amendment's quantification of timely notice is certain to provoke will not be resolved, in my judgment, in favor of the Congress. I can tell the Members from firsthand experience that the Bush administration, like the Reagan and the Carter administrations before it, is unwilling to have the concept of timely notice expressed in terms of hours or days. That is unfortunate, in this gentleman's options, but it is true. That unwillingness is based on a strongly held view of the interpretation of the constitutional powers of the President.

We are not going to change the President's interpretation of his powers by an action we take on this floor.

I therefore believe strongly that this amendment, even if we approve it here, cannot eventually be enacted into law, and I fear that the consequences of putting forth a position on this issue which does not succeed legislatively will be to jeopardize the progress which we have made, incrementally perhaps, but progress nonetheless in ensuring that Congress plays an ever increasingly effective role in overseeing covert action.

I want to try, if it is at all possible for me to do so to my friends over here especially, to provide some assurance to Members of Congress and to the public about the special nature and quality of our system of intelligence oversight. We have an extraordinary system of legislative oversight and review in this country. The United States is unique among the world's democracies in that we require that the Congress be kept fully and currently informed, Mr. Chairman, about intelligence activities, including, of course, covert actions. Congress has the right to know everything--everything about the way in which intelligence programs are pursued, and we do. We are supplied the details of not only the operational aspects of all these programs, but their budgets as well. That is not true in any other country of the world, in any other democracy of the world.

I had the opportunity on two recent occasions to visit just a few months ago with Members of Parliament from both Canada and Great Britain who serve on their intelligence oversight committees, and I was interested to learn, amazed if I may say so, to find out that they are not permitted to know how much money they themselves are voting for intelligence activities in their own country, nor are they told what those activities are, and they, I may say, in turn were astonished to find out that we do know those things.

One of the English gentlemen, in fact, turned to me and said:

You mean do they ever tell you any of their secrets? They don't tell us any. Every time we raise a question in Parliament, the Minister intercedes and says, I am sure the Right Honorable gentleman does not want to ask that question. I will be happy to talk to him about it later.

My response is that there are no secrets, no secrets at all from the Intelligence Committees of this Congress, of the Senate or the House. We are told all these things.

Let me say also that our system of oversight, whether the subject is covert action or other intelligence activities and, of course, the latter are by far the majority of the activities which we have oversight over. There are not many covert activites. Most are quite small. Most are relatively benign. I do not think Members would be offended by them if they knew about them. It is intended to be a consultative one.

The administration, often in the person of the Director of Central Intelligence, comes to our committee on a regular basis every few weeks and more often if necessary, often, more often to let us know of plans to initiate programs and also to keep us apprised of the status of existing programs.

In turn, we let the administration know what we think about those programs, both old ones and the new ones.

I can recall instances in which expressions of concern by our committees on the House side or on the Senate counterpart led to a decision by the President not to initiate particular programs, including, Mr. Chairman, covert actions.

Obviously, there is a relationship between an administration's recognition of the fact that the power of the purse resides in the Congress and its willingness to pay more than lip service to the process of consultation.

There is also a connection between the willingness of an administration to be cooperative with the intelligence oversight committees and the degree of trust which exists between the parties.

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We are constantly working to improve both cooperation and trust, and I want the Members to know, Members should know and members of the public should know that the current administration shares our goals with respect to those particular matters and we are likely, I believe, it is true in fact we have a higher level, a greater amount of mutual trust now than there has been at any time in 13 or more years that these committees have been in existence and have had relationships with one Chief Executive or another.

While I applaud the intent of the gentlewoman from California [Mrs. Boxer], I do not believe her amendment is either necessary, nor will it achieve her goal. It may well make the intelligence oversight system less effective than it is now.

I cannot support her effort. I urge Members to vote to defeat the gentlewoman's amendment.

Mrs. BOXER. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 15 seconds.

Mr. Chairman, I must say to my dear friend that I think he is probably the best chairman I have ever seen and I trust him, and think the important thing is that we are a government of laws, not people, and I think that the people in 1986 thought they knew everything about what was going on. They were lied to. That is why I think it is more important to know exactly what is happening, but also to play an affirmative role in that.

That is the purpose of the Boxer amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 1/2 minutes to my dear friend, the gentleman from New York [Mr. Weiss].

(Mr. WEISS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. WEISS. I thank the distinguished gentlewoman from California for yielding time to me, and I want to commend her for undertaking to raise this issue in the manner in which she has.

I must say that I am somewhat distressed on hearing the gentleman from Illinois. It seems to me that he really demonstrates a lack of confidence in our democracy, in our representative form of government.

Yes, it is possible that this is not the most iron-clad body, although historically what leaks have taken place have come not from the Congress, they have come from the executive branch of the Government, and that has happened consistently.

Nor do I understand his suggestion that in some fashion people do not have to tell us the truth--unless they are given immunity in advance. The gentleman knows that it is impossible for anyone to claim that he or she gets immunity from lying to Congress. There is no such immunity granted.

We expect witnesses who take the oath before us, who appear before us, to tell the truth. That is their obligation under the law.

Mr. Chairman, the Iran-Contra scandal taught us many important lessons. We learned, for example, about the hazards of excessive secrecy, and about the dangers of government-sanctioned lies. Above all, we learned--or we should have learned--that congressional oversight of covert actions is the best way to avoid a repeat performance.

The Reagan administration plotted and carried out the Iran-Contra caper in secret. Through calculated distortions, misleading half truths, and deliberate lies, the President's men led our Nation down a path that sorely damaged our reputation, our credibility and indeed violated our constitutional framework.

The only sure way to avoid a repretation of the Iran-Contra affair would be to eliminate covert actions altogether. But if we can not do that, we must, at least, ensure that such actions are strictly limited and scrupulously monitored by Congress.

That is why we need the Boxer amendment

The amendment states that covert operations can be undertaken only in response to extraordinary threats to our national security. Second, it requires the administration to notify Congress and seek prior approval of covert activities. And third, it prohibits third-party foreign countries and private contractors from participating in American covert operations.

While the Boxer amendment sets a strict set of oversight regulations, it also allows the administration flexibility to respond to emergency situations quickly. It permits the notification procedures to be waived for hostage rescue missions, and it allows a 48-hour delay in the requirements in cases of dire emergencies.

Mr. Speaker this amendment will help to ensure that the crucial lessons of the Iran-Contra affairs are not forgotten. I urge my colleagues to support the Boxer amendment.

Mr. BEILENSON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 6 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from New York. [Mr. McHugh], the chairman of our subcommittee on legislation.

(Mr. McHUGH asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. McHUGH. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment with some reluctance, because I know that the author of the amendment, the gentlewoman from California [Mrs. Boxer] and her supporters have as their purpose strengthening congressional oversight.

I certainly applaud that intent and I share that goal. But I think there really are a number of very practical problems with the amendment as presented.

First of all, in section 503(c)(1) and section 503(e) of the amendment it is required that a covert action to be lawful must be designed to meet an extraordinary threat to the security of the United States or must be designed to protect U.S. citizens from imminent bodily harm or from being seized or held as hostages

These are important purposes, and a covert action should be legitimate for these purposes. However, I think the definition is much too restrictive.

I think many of us can envision covert actions that would serve U.S. interests, but could be deemed unlawful if this amendment were to become law.

Let me cite a hypothetical situation to make point. Let us suppose, hypothetically, that there is a foreign country in which a totalitarian regime completely suppresses democratic expression. Let us suppose, further, that this country is located in an area of vital interest to the United States. Let us suppose, finally, that there is a small dissident group within that country that has come together to promote political change, democratic reforms, and more free expression.

The President of the United States might well determine, with the concurrence of the intelligence committee, that it would be in the interest of the United States and the people of that country to provide some aid and assistance to this dissident group. It might be financial assistance, technical assistance, training, office equipment, or other types of aid designed to enable these dissidents to promote their reforms within that country.

Under the definition proposed by this amendment, that type of assistance could not be provided covertly. If it were provided overtly, it might represent a real threat to the very lives of the dissidents we were attempting to help.

One need not go back in history very far to appreciate that in Eastern Europe, an area of vital interest to the United States, these very circumstances existed. And while this is just a hypothetical case, I think we can appreciate that in other parts of the world a similar situation could pertain.

So this is an example, for me at least, of where limiting covert actions to the description in the amendment would be unwise.

A second problem I find with the definition is that under no circumstances could a covert action employ a third party.

Let us take the example I used just a moment ago. Let us suppose that the President determined that it would be better for the United States and the dissident group in question not to use American agents to go into this country, but rather to use expatriates from that country who had left the country earlier, who were citizens of that country and willing to take the risk of going back in to help that small dissident group get organized.

Under this amendment, as I read it, we could not use those expatriates--they could be third parties in this covert operation. I think that would be unfortunate.

Finally, I think the gentlewoman probably inadvertently broadens under her amendment the agencies that could be used for covert actions. In section 503(c)(3) she suggests, at least implicitly, that Federal law enforcement agencies could be used in covert operations. That is not permitted now in covert operations abroad, and I cannot believe it is the intent of this House or perhaps even the gentlewoman, the author of the amendment, to permit that. However, it would be permitted if this amendment became law.

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Mrs. BOXER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. McHUGH. I yield to the gentlewoman from California [Mrs. Boxer].

Mrs. BOXER. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Chairman, I have to say to the gentleman that in his hypotheticals I come to a completely different conclusion. If the fact the President found in this hypothetical country that there was a threat to our national security, let us say we did business there, our citizens were there, he could absolutely, absolutely, find that a convert activity would be appropriate.

Mr. McHUGH. I respond to the gentlewoman that under her language the President would have to determine that the covert action was designed to meet `an extraordinary threat' to the U.S. national security.

In the hypothetical which I have described, we are talking about a situation where a small group of dissidents has the opportunity to open up the political system. We are responding in that hypothetical with a covert operation to assist them in that purpose. It is not a covert operation designed to meet an extraordinary threat to the security of the United States.

And for that reason I think it would not be permissible under the gentlewoman's amendment.

Mrs. BOXER. Mr. Chairman, I would say to the gentleman if the President found that the government they would like to see overthrown, quote unquote, or could be a threat, he could find that. Also, he would use expatriates, if they were employed by this Government.

[TIME: 2110]

The thing is we do not want to have three agents running around, as far as the agency is concerned; in the said amendment any agency would be used in ours. We limit it to law enforcement agencies and intelligence gathering agencies.

Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from California [Mr. Edwards], the senior member of the California delegation and a very important member of the Committee on the Judiciary.

Mr. EDWARDS of California. Mr. Chairman, I approach the subject this evening from the vantage point of being chairman of a subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary that for many years has had jurisdiction oversight and budget over the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and I am fairly well acquainted with the problems of oversight and administration of an investigative organization. At this particularly time in history we are very fortunate. We have really not only a splendid head of the CIA and of the FBI, but we also have extraordinarily talented members, especially the chairman and the ranking Republican of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. That it is why everything is working rather well right now, and thiat is in essence a testimony to the gentleman from California [Mr. Beilenson], my friend. Of course it works well when we have the kind of committee that we have now.

However, Mr. Chairman, we are not going to always have that kind of a committee, and historically we have not had that kind of a committee. I have been here a long time. The gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. Kastenmeier] has been here a long time.

Our founders did not contemplate government by men. They contemplated and put into the Constitution governing by laws. And it is a very untrustworthy system and a dangerous system which says, `You can be pals and insist that they tell you what they're doing,' and so forth, and that is not the way it is going to work. I assure my colleagues that we never know who we are going to get as head of the FBI or the CIA.

Mr. Chairman, I could go on for hours. All of my colleagues could.

In the 1970's we had so many scandals that we had to have select committees, select committees at great expense with special counsels, the Church committee in the Senate and the Pike committee in the House. The report was so scandalous when it came out and the House was so shocked that we voted not even to release it because we were so ashamed of what was going on with the intelligence agencies. That was what happened in the 1970's.

Just the other day I read a report of the Arms Control and Foreign Policy Caucus that was issued back in 1984, and it described seven covert actions for a number of years, since I just cannot tell my colleagues in how many countries' covert actions had been going on with the CIA. Do my colleagues want to know something? Practically all of them had been very, very unsuccessful. They would have been much better had they not happened at all.

Just think of Iran. We ended up with the Ayatollah Khomeini because of our covert actions in putting the Shah into power.

I want to recommend very strongly the amendment of the gentlewoman from California [Mrs. Boxer] be accepted. It is a sound amendment putting the intelligence committee where our founders wanted it to be. We are talking about war-making powers here. Remember that. We are not talking about surveillance. We have no problem with surveillance. We are talking about action powers, war-making powers. They belong in the Congress. They do not belong in the President's office.

Mr. Chairman, I list below some of the covert actions of past years, together with the consequences of them. As you can see, they in most cases they were failures.

[H17OC0-T]{H10078}Date
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Date         Country            Brief Description of Covert Operations                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     Update                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
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1953         Iran               CIA covert operations and financing, masterminded by Kermit Roosevelt, succeeded in overthrowing popular but left-leaning Premier Mohammed Mossadegh, and in installing to power Shah Reza Pahlavi                                                                                                                                                                                                                         The Shan ruled for 26 years, when popular discontent, religious fanatacism and political upheaval against U.S. domination forced the Shah's exile, and replaced him with Ayatollah Khomeini.                                                                                                                                             
1953         Philippines        Under CIA auspices, Col. Edward Lansdale went to the Philippines in the early 1950's to aid in the defeat of local communist guerillas (the Huks), and to help engineer the 1953 election of President Magasaysay                                                                                                                                                                                                          Magsaysay, a progressive, was killed in a plane crash in 1957. After several moderate leaders intervened, Ferdinand Marcos was elected in 1965. He declared martial law in 1972.                                                                                                                                                         
1954         Guatemala          The CIA is generally perceived and credited with masterminding and financing the coup which ended 10 years of progressive governments which had sought to promote labor unions, social measures, and land reform (a majority of the land was owned by the United Fruit Company.) The CIA's rebels attacked from Honduras, and with the help of the Army, forced the President from office and set up a military government Political confusion and instability has continued since the 1950's, with both army and civilian governments in power. Since 1970, the government has been run by military leaders, amidst charges of fraudulent elections. The most recent coup d'etat (this month) raises further questions about the future of US-Guatemalan relations.
1950's       China              The CIA supported, on its own and in cooperation with Chiang-Kai-shek, guerilla operations against China. Operations were reduced or eliminated after the shooting down in 1954 of two agents Richard Fecteau and John Downey                                                                                                                                                                                              Para-military operations against China were short-lived and without positive result. President Nixon visited China in 1972, paving the way to full diplomatic relations.                                                                                                                                                                 
1955         Vietnam            Agents had been present in Vietnam through the early 1950's, although not in paramilitary operations. Col. Lansdale (see above) is generally credited with eliminating the political rivals of Ngo Dinh Diem, and designing the election ballots which elected him in 1955                                                                                                                                                 Diem's victory and tenure lasted approximately eight years (see Covert Operations, 1963.)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
1958         Indonesia          CIA agents and operatives sought to overthrow the government of President Sukarno; operations included B-26 bombing missions in support of insurgents on Sumatra                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           Sukarno solidified power by defeating the insurgents, and balancing the Army and the Communist Party. He was replaced in 1965 by President Suharto.                                                                                                                                                                                      
1959-64      Tibet              After the Chinese take-over of Tibet and the escape of the Dalai Lama to exile in India, the CIA secretly trained and equipped his troops, also in exile in India, for operations against the Chinese in Tibet                                                                                                                                                                                                             Several raids into Tibet did yield the capture of important Chinese documents, but the Chinese hold over Tibet remains today. Serious destabilization efforts were abandoned by 1964.                                                                                                                                                    
1960         Guatemala          While training Cuban exiles for the CIA's planned overthrow of Castro, the CIA used Guatemalan territory as its `jumping off point' for the Cuban operation. When a rebellion grew against the Guatemalan government, the CIA sent in B-26's to crush the insurgency and to ensure the secrecy of its operations                                                                                                           As noted above, Guatemala remains one of the most repressive nations in Central America, and continues to experience violence.                                                                                                                                                                                                           
1960         Congo              Two CIA officials were dispatched to assassinate Congolese leader Lumumba, who had threatened to bring the Congo under Soviet influence after independence. This particular attempt was never made, but Lumumba was killed in 1961 by the orders of CIA-supported Congolese officials                                                                                                                                      Civil disorder, along with a secession movement by the Katanga province, followed in 1961. After UN troops restored order and a coalition government was formed and then deposed, President Mobutu took over.                                                                                                                            
Early 1960's Laos               One of the largest secret operations in CIA history was the `secret war' in Laos. Some 50 CIA agents and hired contractors recruited over 35,000 Meo and other Lao tribesmen into a secret `L'Armee Clandestine,' and financed some 17,000 Thai mercenaries, to oppose communism in Indochina                                                                                                                              The war in Laos eventually lost its `secret' nature, but the country remained a battleground between the U.S. and Vietnam for years. Vietnamese-supported forces eventually prevailed. Even now, turmoil continues amidst charges of the use of chemical weapons in Laos.                                                                
1961         Dominican Republic Dictator Trujillo was shot to death by Dominicans who had received weapons and support from the CIA, according to the Senate Select Committee report                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       Efforts at economic development in the early `60's came to a halt in 1965, when President Johnson sent in U.S. troops. The peaceful transfer of power in 1978 to President Guzman has resulted in some progress in promoting civil and political rights, but poverty and unemployment remain.                                            
1961         Cuba               The Bay of Pigs operation against Castro, which had entailed massive planning, training and financing, is generally regarded as the CIA's most notable failure                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             The Bay of Pigs operation resulted in the departure of Allen Dulles as CIA director, and continued deterioration of US-Cuban relations.                                                                                                                                                                                                  
1961-67      Congo              After Lumumba's death, the CIA sought to influence politics with payments to candidates. By 1964, CIA B-26 aircraft were in bombing missions, with Cuban pilots on contract to the CIA                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     President Mobutu's takeover, with CIA help, has lasted through the present, although charges of corruption and excessive authoritarianism recurrently threaten stability.                                                                                                                                                                
1963         Vietnam            President Diem, elected in 1955 with CIA help, was overthrown and assassinated by a military coup about which the CIA knew, but in which they did not participate, according to the Senate Select Committee                                                                                                                                                                                                                Diem was replaced by President Thieu and Gen. Ky, who remained in power until the communist takeover in 1975.                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
1960-65      Cuba               The CIA concocted `at least eight plots' according to the Senate Committee, to assassinate Castro, involving exotic devices such as poison pens, pills and cigars, and powder designed to make Castro's beard fall out--thus `ruining his charismatic image.' Sabotage raids against oil refineries and other industrial targets also existed in the early '60's                                                           all the assassination and covert plots failed, and Castro's image and standing in the Third World was enhanced, in the eyes of many.                                                                                                                                                                                                     
Mid-1960's   Peru               According to at least one former CIA agent, the CIA, at the request of the Peruvian government facing guerilla insurrection, financed construction of a major military installation in the jungle, furnished helicopters, arms and other equipment, and provided training of forces by Green Berets on loan from the Army                                                                                                  The Peruvian guerillas were defeated by a government generally regarded as an oligarchy. In 1968, a coup installed a `revolutionary government of the armed forces,' which has since become more moderate.                                                                                                                               
1965         Vietnam            In a disinformation (but not paramilitary) campaign, according to a recent Washington Post story, the CIA allegedly planned to `con' public opinion by taking communist-made weapons from CIA warehouses, planting them in a Vietnamese battle, and calling in reporters to see the captured weapons as proof of communist weapons in South Vietnam                                                                        This particular plan was not implemented in 1965, but the ex-agent making the claim in the Post suggested that the same concept might be being used in El Salvador today.                                                                                                                                                                
1960's       Vietnam            CIA involvement in Vietnam continued with development and implementation of the Phoenix Program, which allegedly `neutralized' (killed) some 20,000 Viet-Cong                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              The Phoenix Program apparently ended by 1970, but the war continued until the communist takeover in 1975.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
1963-73      Chile              For ten years, `extensive and continuous' CIA covert action aimed at influencing Chile's elections and overthrowing the government of popularly elected Salvador Allende. Although there were no paramilitary operations, some $3 million went into the 1964 election, resulting in the presidency of Eduardo Frei, and some $8 million opposed Allende after his 1970 election                                            Allende's overthrow and death resulted in the succession of Gen. Pinochet in a military junta government.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
1967         Bolivia            The CIA provided aid to Bolivian President Barrientos to deal with rebel guerilla forces soon discovered to be being led by Che Guevara                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    Che Guevara was killed by Bolivian forces. Barrientos' death in a plane crash was followed by two leftist military governments, and then by other military leaders.                                                                                                                                                                      
1972-75      Iraq               At the request of the Shah of Iran, the CIA provided arms to Kurdish rebels fighting for autonomy in Iraq                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  Iranian and US aid apparently ended in 1975; but the Kurds are generally perceived today as a potentially de-stabilizing element in Iran, Iraq and Turkey.                                                                                                                                                                               
1974-76      Angola             Covert activities during transition to independence sought to help two factions. One of these factions, headed by Jonas Savimbi, is still seeking power.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   Overt Cuban involvement helped shift the balance from South African and CIA-backed forces, and the Clark Amendment ended covert U.S. activities. Angola's government is now officially Marxist, but allows U.S. businesses to operate in its country.                                                                                    
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Mr. BEILENSON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 30 seconds to the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Hyde].

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from California [Mr. Beilenson] for yielding.

I just want to say to my dear friend, the gentleman from California [Mr. Edwards], that my recollection of the reason we got the Ayatollah Khomeini was because of some of his liberals hounding the Shah out of the country and his dreaded Savak. We were treated to speeches ad nauseam about how horrible the Shah was, and we did not give much thought about who would succeed the Shah, as so often happens. So, it was not the CIA that put the ayatollah in. I think it was the liberals in the Congress.

Mr. EDWARDS of California. Mr. Chairman, I would just point out to the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Hyde], my friend, that it was the people of Iran, not the Congress, that got rid of the Shah.

Mr. BEILENSON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from Louisiana [Mr. Livingston].

(Mr. LIVINGSTON asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. LIVINGSTON. Mr. Chairman, this is an unnecessary and harmful amendment. Two years ago the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence held hearings on H.R. 4822, the 48-hour bill, and heard a great deal of testimony on both sides of this issue at that time. One of the things which struck me then is the practical difficulties that an amendment like this will cause for our covert activities, which comprise a small, but very important part of our intelligence activities.

There are some very serious constitutional concerns that a number of expert witnesses brought to our attention during the committee hearings, but for the moment, I would like to focus in on the practical problems that would arise should this bill become law.

Former intelligence officials in both Democrat and Republican administrations told the committee that the Iran-Contra affair was an aberration--that the failure was in the people running the program rather than in the process itself.

They pointed out that the then 48-hour and now 24-hour notice periods could potentially increase the danger to the lives of our foreign operatives and would have a chilling effect on the cooperation that we have come to expect from our allies.

Covert operations are an important part of our effort to protect the national security interests of the United States. The majority of the witnesses that we heard who support this legislation do not believe we should be engaging in coert activities at all. If this amendment becomes law they may get their wish.

Our allies would become increasingly reluctant to cooperate with us if they felt that the information would be broadcast to too many people, and future administrations would think twice about engaging in any covert activity unless they felt that there was a consensus among all of the Members that must be notified. That's a bad way to do business.

But the amendment of the gentlewoman from California [Mrs. Boxer] even goes further to prevent the use of covert third parties in this amendment.

Although I am very concerned about the practical difficulties that will cause, and equally taxing problem is the constitutional impact of this legislation.

Scholars and, for that matter, officials of both branches argue about the constitutional prerogatives of the executive and the legislative branches. But this amendment's rigid procedural constraints and micromanagerial rules in the guise of oversight create conditions of permanent constitutional conflict that will be harmful to the spirit of cooperation that must exist between future administrations and Congress.

It is a serious mistake to build into the statutory structure of executive-legislative branch relations a permanent invitation to disagreement and controversy.

We need to think about whether in our zeal to extend the boundaries of congressional oversight we are actually harming our national security interests.

During the Carter administration, the drafters of the current law recognized that there were legitimate interests of both the executive and legislative branches that needed to be protected. President Carter experienced that at least once. They realized that cooperation between the branches was necessary in order to have both effective oversight and a useful intelligence program.

So they did not try to overregulate the intelligence functions of the administration. In effect, they opted for pragmatic ambiguity instead of statutory micromanagement.

There is not doubt that the Reagan administration was less than cooperative in this regard during the Iran-Contra affair, but it paid dearly, and the new administration made a major effort to install corrective procedures. We should allow enough time to see whether those new rules work, especially in this age of danger posed by the likes of Saddam Hussein.

At this point there is no reason to bind this administration with an unworkable and unnecessary statutory formula that guarantees conflict between the branches, and I urge my colleagues to defeat this amendment.

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Mrs. BOXER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to my good friend, the gentleman from California [Mr. Dellums].

Mr. DELLUMS. I thank the gentlewoman for yielding.

Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the Boxer amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I was elected to Congress in 1970. In 1974, I wrote the Omnibus Intelligence Control Act, which was introduced and reintroduced for a number of years. The main purpose of this legislation was to reign in control of the U.S. intelligence apparatus. Central to that theme was and is the elimination of covert activity as an instrument of foreign policy.

Further, during my service on the House Select Committee on Intelligence that the gentleman from California [Mr. Edwards] alluded to, that investigated intelligence abuses 15 years ago, I received chilling documentation on the dangers and disastrous effects of American covert activities.

The American people expect and I believe deserve the implementation of a foreign policy which is based on humane principles and democratic ideals. Such policies can only be formulated in the full light of public debate, and implemented under the scrutiny of open congressional oversight.

Mr. Chairman, since 1947 our military and foreign policy has existed under the heavy influence of our national security apparatus.

I oppose the destabilization of foreign governments through the actions of covert operatives. I favor international movements for democratization, which are fueled by the power of the idea, for which we in this body stand as an example.

I oppose so-called guerrilla movements operating under the rubric of `freedom fighters,' whose aim is to overthrow foreign nations on behalf of the American people, using American tax dollars, without the knowledge of the American people.

Mr. Chairman, it is with great pride that I rise in support of the Boxer amendment. The amendment to the intelligence authorization bill offered by the distinguished gentlewoman from California [Mrs. Boxer] is a reasonable and measured response to recent efforts to further codify the national security approach to foreign policy. I applaud her efforts and urge Members to support her amendment.

Mr. BEILENSON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Kansas [Mr. Glickman].

(Mr. GLICKMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. GLICKMAN. Mr. Chairman, as a general rule, I do not like covert actions. They go beyond traditional information gathering to affirmative types of conduct, influencing types of conduct. But sometimes they are necessary. This amendment unnecessarily complicates, restricts, and confuses a process that is working well now and will prevent some covert actions that might be necessary for America's national security.

Not only that, the amendment may put U.S. citizens in jeopardy. Let me give Members an example.

The Boxer amendment says that one cannot use any third parties, foreign country or agent thereof, private contractor, or other entity which is not an element of the U.S. Government in these covert actions.

One of the keys in any covert action is for a person to be unattributed. If the Boxer amendment were adopted, it might mean you would have to use U.S. citizens in circumstances where their lives would be directly in jeopardy, where in urgent circumstances an unattributed foreign national may be utilized. If you would use foreign nationals in some of those certain circumstances, it could be done safely and in the better interest of the United States of America.

With respect to the issue of congressional oversight, not only is the oversight process therein working well, but Congress has the ultimate power, the power of the purse, the power of funding these actions. We have, and we will, and we should stop funding if they are not working well.

I would just say that the challenges to this country in the future are unknown. We are moving into an arena where terrorism, economic threats and other uncertain challenges to this country are very great indeed. Our congressional job in intelligence is to do proper oversight, but not to cut off in advance a lot of activities which may be necessary in a most uncertain world.

Because of that, I would urge Members to vote down the Boxer amendment. I know it is well-intentioned, but it is not in the best interest of this country.

Mrs. BOXER. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 5 seconds, only to say to the gentleman, you can use foreign nationals, as long as you hire them so that the Federal Government, when we do something, takes responsibility.

Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to my dear friend, the gentlewoman from California [Ms. Pelosi].

Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentlewoman for recognizing me and commend her for introducing this important amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the Boxer amendment to H.R. 5422, the intelligence authorization bill, which would ensure that U.S. intelligence activities are carried out within the boundaries of the constitution and under the purview of congressinal intelligence committees. I commend my colleague, Congresswoman Boxer, for offering this important amendment.

Mr. Chairman, the Iran-Contra scandal demonstrated that Congress must take a strong role in the oversight of United States intelligence activities and United States-sponsored covert action. To prevent abuses within the intelligence community, the House and Senate Select Committees on Intelligence must serve as an informed watchdog over United States covert actions. In addition, the intelligence community must know clearly what they can and cannot do. The Boxer amendment would set up a system of checks and balances to monitor and, if appropriate, stop covert action and establish explicit prohibitions on activities which may result in another ill-conceived covert operation.

The Boxer amendment would require prior approval by the House and Senate intelligence committees for covert actions except in extraordinary emergencies when Congress would have to be consulted within 24 hours. It would also limit the definition of covert action to extraordinary threats to national security and prohbiit the use of third parties in covert actin. The Boxer amendment would not inhibit the ability of the President to carry out foreign policy or compromise the need to maintain classified information.

Mr. Chairman, I urge an aye vote on the Boxer amendment.

[Page: H10081]

Mr. BEILENSON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes and 30 seconds to the gentleman from Nebraska [Mr. Bereuter], another valued member of our commitee.

(Mr. BEREUTER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)0

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the Boxer amendment. I think it is interesting and somewhat telling that senior members, former members, and former chairmen and ranking members of the Committee on Intelligence, are not here supporting this amendment. Neither are junior members of the House Select Committee on Intelligence, like this member.

Mr. Chairman, the fact of the matter is that the oversight process is working very well today. There are many constitutional problems with the Boxer amendment before us today. However, I will only focus on a few of the procedural difficulties created by it.

Mr. Chairman, if you take a look at section 503(c)(1), for example, the covert operations would be restricted to those that create `an extraordinary threat to the national security.'

Covert operations should not be and are not engaged in lightly, but this new very high threshold, I suggest, would extraordinarily limit and inappropriately limit the United States in its covert activities and in its ability to protect our national interest.

Section 503(c)(2), actually would prohibit the United States from engaging in covert operations with an ally, a country like Great Britain or Canada. That is an extraordinary limitation on our ability to conduct covert activities. That is an extraordinary limitation that should not be acceptable.

The gentleman from New York [Mr. McHugh], has already pointed out what was, undoubtedly, an inadvertent, enlargement of those Federal agencies that now can be involved in covert operations. The Federal Bureau of Investigation, is prohibited from that kind of activity abroad, but would seem to be so authorized under the Boxer amendment.

I would like to go to section 503(c)(4). It reads:

The covert action does not propose, intend or otherwise result in the influencing of the United States political proceesses, public opinion, policies, or media.

Certainly that is probably not the intent, but a covert activity abroad could well have an impact upon the media here. To set this kind of limitation simply is unworkable in its results. The possibility of being charged with illegal activity that inadvertently resulted would place a chilling effect in otherwise legitimate and necessary covert operations conducted abroad.

Mr. Chairman, finally I would like to make these points in response to what has been said here earlier. Even as a junior Member of the House Select Committee on Intelligence I have felt I have had some real impact along with fellow Members in changing or stopping suggested covert operations. It is not true that Members simply sit in the select committee and listen and can have no impact upon it.

Mr. Chairman, I am also in fundamental disagreement with the statement here a few minutes ago that covert operations in general do not work. There is an record of extraordinary success. You only hear about those that are problematic. We ought not advance the Boxer amendment. For these and many other reasons I urge Members to defeat it.

[TIME: 2130]

Mrs. BOXER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes and 50 seconds to the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Durbin].

Mr. DURBIN. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if our Founding Fathers returned to modern America which aspect of constitutional interpretation they would find more surprising?

I suspect it might be article 1, section 8, clause 11. In that clause the Committee of Detail in our first constitutional convention vested in the Congress the power to declare war. As we learned from the Federalist Papers, the framers did not want the wealth and blood of our Nation committed by the decision of a single individual, so they concluded that the potentially momentous consequences of initiating war should only be called up by the concurrence of the President and both Houses of Congress.

Now, through the Second World War the Congress either declared war or ratified a President's declaration of war. But the so-called police action in the Korean conflict and the Vietnam war avoided the clear intent of the war powers clause. Americans fought and died in protracted conflicts without any specific congressional declaration.

The negative national reaction to the Vietnam experience led Congress to enact the War Powers Act over President Nixon's veto. It was designed to tighten the constitutional requirement of a congressional declaration of war, and to spell out in more specific terms the circumstances which would require congressional action.

Most would agree the War Powers Act has had limited utility. Efforts to enforce it through the courts have fallen short. In fact, even Congress for political and philosophical reasons has been reluctant to assert the war powers delegation of power in the Constitution. One need only considers the fact that today, 200,000 Americans are in Saudi Arabia with little more than a vague resolution from this House of Representatives. We have fallen short of the constitutional dictates, even when it comes to today's situation in the Persian Gulf.

The amendment before us addresses an important aspect of this debate, and that is the appropriate role of Congress in convert action. Just what is convert action? It is the instrument of America's national security policy. The term itself almost defies simple definition. But it is described as an activity conducted by the U.S. Government to meet an extraordinary threat. It can include paramilitary action under current law, and its commission can be delegated to third parties and other nations. It can be used to strengthen or to destabilize governments and political forces in foreign nations.

With the resources and prestige of the United States, the power and scope of covert action is substantial. It can define or defy our stated national security policy. It can lead us to war.

Let me just say in very quick conclusion that some may argue that congressional approval is too uncertain. In fact, I am a little bit surprised that my colleague from Illinois has such a low opinion of some of his colleagues on the Intelligence Committee when it comes to harboring the secrets that are shared with them. I honestly believe the men and women serving on that committee are respected and that they are bipartisan in their approach to issues of national security.

I sincerely hope that every Member will support the amendment of the gentlewoman from California.

Mr. BEILENSON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from California [Mr. Dornan], the only Member from California who is speaking on this side of this matter, and who is a very valued member of the committee.

Mr. DORNAN of California. Mr. Chairman, I thank my excellent chairman for the time and point out that having been appointed to replace the chair held by our current Secretary of Defense, Richard Cheney, I am the most junior member of the committee.

I would like to point out that our 51st President, our Chief Executive, President Bush, has more experience in intelligence than any of the other 40 gentleman who have held that Presidential position. And he would certainly veto the intelligence authorization if it contained the gentlewoman's language.

It is clearly unconstitutional under both the Chadha and Bowsher rulings.

But let me point out just one illustrative example. If Saddam Hussein were to be so bold as to have the bravado to travel to Amman, Jordan, and to meet with people, and to arouse the citizenry there, and we found out about it 24 or 48 hours out, and the only asset we had there was a British helicopter to use our people to snatch him and put him on a British helicopter and get him out of there and bring him to an atrocities trial which the President wants, the gentlewoman's amendment would preclude our doing that, and possibly, hopefully, would save tens of thousands of lives if Desert Shield turns into action.

[Page: H10082]

Mrs. BOXER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Oregon [Mr. DeFazio].

(Mr. DeFAZIO asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.).

Mr. DeFAZIO. Mr. Chairman, to the prior speaker I would say he has not read the amendment thoroughly. That is not true. That would be an extraordinary circumstance for which an exception could be taken.

There is always a fraction between a constitutional, political system which requires the active consent of the governed, in this case the elected representatives of the governed, the Intelligence Committee and the Members of Congress, an inherently antidemocratic national security system built on secrecy and nonaccountability.

There is a delicate balance to be struck here, and the committee bill would benefit by strengthening the checks and balances. This amendment does not deal with routine intelligence gathering, only covert actions.

This bill requires prior approval by the Intelligence Committee, with an exception for extraordinary circumstances, which have been mentioned by numerous Members here tonight, and in every one of these cases an exception could be allowed.

Only intelligence agencies and the Department of Defense and Federal law enforcement agencies could undertake these activities. I do not think that is a restriction that this body should be concerned with. No third parties. No foreign countries, private contractors like we had in Iran-Contra.

Do we learn from experience? I have a quote here from the report on the Iran-Contra scandal.

The confusion, deception, and privatization which marked the Iran-Contra affair were the inevitable products of an attempt to avoid accountability. Congress, the Cabinet, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff were denied information and excluded from the decisionmaking process. Democratic procedures were disregarded.

Lee Hamilton said:

In the final analysis, it's a question of balance. We must balance the harm that may result from the disclosure of a secret against the value of consultation and independent advice for the President prior to the initiation of a covert action.

I urge my colleagues to vote in support of the Boxer amendment.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentlewoman from California [Mrs. Boxer] has 2 3/4 minutes remaining, and the gentleman from California [Mr. Beilenson] has 1 minute remaining. The gentleman from California, being chairman of the committee, has the right to close debate.

Mrs. BOXER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Evans] and I retain the three-quarters of a minute to make my closing remarks.

Mr. EVANS. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the amendment offered by the gentlewoman from California.

The abuses and excesses of our intelligence community in running covert operations are legendary. The Iran-Contra scandal was only the latest in a string of misadventures that stretch all around the world. From attempting to overthrow governments in Central America to selling arms to Iranian religous fanatics. Quite often our country's covert operations have disgraced this Nation. It is time we reformed our Nation's intelligence community and restored our Nation's reputation as a country that respects the rule of law.

The Boxer amendment would go a long way in reaching this goal. The amendment would essentially give Congress the oversight role it deserves over covert operations. It would require that our Intelligence Committees approve any covert operations. The bill would also prohibit foreign countries and private contractors from funding and participating in covert operations. Finally, it would allow covert actions only for extraordinary threats to our national security.

Besides making important reforms, I believe the amendment also sends a vital and timely message to the world that we are finally trying to control a part of our foreign policy that has consistently flouted international law. In light of our determined efforts to force Iraq to follow the norms of international law, this is especially important. I urge my colleagues to vote for the amendment.

[TIME: 2140]

Mrs. BOXER. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself three-fourths of a minute, the remainder of my time.

Mr. Chairman, I would say to my friend, the gentleman from California, under my amendment we could use a British helicopter to nab Saddam Hussein, and the President can go forward for 48 hours without having to get the approval of the committees in an emergency.

Mr. Chairman, my amendment is not rigid. It simply gives more power to this body in behalf of the American people to be a check and a balance on an executive branch that could get out of hand.

Sure, everything is going fine now. I am happy to hear it. I am delighted. I hope it continues. It is going fine until the next scandal.

Let us not have another scandal. Let us support this amendment. I think that would give us, in an institutional form, the way for these Intelligence Committees, not only to be bystanders, not only to be notified, but to give their assent to covert activities in behalf of this Congress and in behalf of the American people.

I thank the Chair for his generosity, and I thank my dear friend, the chairman of the committee, the gentleman from California [Mr. Beilenson], for his dignity and his support of my being allowed to bring this amendment forward.

Mr. BEILENSON. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from California [Mr. Dreier].

(Mr. DREIER of California asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. DREIER of California. Mr. Chairman, I am submitting for the Record an article that was written in 1985 by Daniel Schorr which clearly outlines the fact that Members of Congress do leak information to the press.

From the Washington Post, Nov. 14, 1985

[FROM THE WASHINGTON POST, NOV. 14, 1985]

Cloak-and-Dagger Relics

(BY DANIEL SCHORR)

If the investigation ordered by President Reagan were to identify an official of the executive branch as having disclosed information about the anti-Qaddafi operation to The Washington Post, that person could be prosecuted for espionage. This is the result of the precedent set when Samuel Loring Morison, former Navy intelligence analyst, was convicted under the 1917 Espionage Act for having provided three classified satellite photographs of a nuclear-powered Soviet aircraft carrier to Jane's Fighting Ships.

The problem becomes stickier, however, if it turns out to be a congressional source. On one occasion, in 1975, the Justice Department threatened to withhold classified information from the House intelligence committee if the material was not protected from disclosure. But it has never been suggested that a member of Congress could be disciplined other than by Congress itself.

This is relevent because (I don't think that I am baring any great journalistic secrets) the exposure of covert intelligence operations is frequently a form of congressional whistle-blowing. A leak often occurs when a clandestine plan runs into substantial opposition during a briefing for congressional committees.

For example, in 1974 the Nixon-Kissinger plan to undermine Chile's President Salvador Allende leaked to the press (Seymour Hersh of the New York Times) at a time when it was a subject of intense criticism by some members of Congress.

In 1975, the CIA's support of the anticommunist faction in Angola (also a Kissinger project) was disclosed after it became an issue in the House Foreign Affairs Committee. The late Rep. Leo Ryan, a member of that committee, told me in an interview at the time that he could condone such a leak if it was the only way to block an ill-conceived operation.

Ryan was subsequently the author, with Sen. Harold Hughes, of legislation that banned CIA involvement in Angola. (That provision was recently repealed.)

To minimize damaging leaks, the congressional leadership eventually agreed to restrict briefings on covert operations to the Senate and House intelligence committees. That did not, however, solve the problem.

In 1983, Sen. Barry Goldwater, then chairman of the intelligence committee, put on the public record the CIA-organized mining of Nicaraguan harbors with a letter to CIA Director William Casey objecting to the operation. (That letter became a prime exhibit in Nicaragua's complaint to the International Court of Justice.) Sen. Jesse Helms was charged with--but denied--having revealed CIA covert aid to the election campaign of El Salvador's President Jose Napoleon Duarate.

Libya's Muammar Qaddafi has been the subject of a previous leak. In August 1981, Newsweek reported that opposition had developed in the House intelligence committee during a briefing on a plan to destabilize the Qaddafi regime. The Reagan administration denied the existence of any such plan. There followed a scare over reported Libyan `hit squads' out to murder President Reagan. Intelligence officials now believe there were no such `hit squads'--that the whole thing was a hoax meant to put Reagan on notice that plotting against a president could be a two-way street.

That has apprently not deterred the president from approving one more plan to undermine Qaddafi. Once again the leak occurred shortly after briefings in the congressional intelligence committee.

By law, the administration must give timely notice to Congress of plans for covert operations. The intelligence committees and their staffs are supposed to respect the secrecy of the information. But, in an era when covert aid to Nicaraguan contras is openly debated, the old-style clandestine operation may be a thing of the past.

It may be time to consign the cloak and dagger to a museum. anyway, the cloak.

[Page: H10083]

Mr. BEILENSON. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from California [Mr. Lagomarsino].

(Mr. LAGOMARSINO asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong opposition to the Boxer amendment. I am very concerned about how it might affect our POW-MIA's in Southeast Asia.

  • Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong opposition to the Boxer amendment. While it may sound good to some, this amendment would cripple our intelligence system and capabilities. At at time when we need effective intelligence the most in dealing with Saddam Hussein and the crisis in the gulf, this amendment would undercut allied cooperation, tie the President's hands and benefit no one except Saddam Hussein and other terrorists around the globe.
  • Some have claimed that the Iran-Contra affair exemplified the need for new restrictions on American intelligence and convert activities. However, the Boxer amendment is akin to using a hand grenade to kill a mosquito. The House and Senate Intelligence Committees have added some new measures and checks on the system through this intelligence bill before us today. The problems that some have highlighted in today's debate are addressed through this intelligence bill without the Boxer amendment. The Boxer amendment goes much, much further effectively eliminating the President's capabilities as commander-in-chief. It is a disastrous amendment which, I believe, is unconstitutional as it directly contradicts article II, section 2 of our Constitution conferring to the President the power of commander-in-chief.
  • The Boxer amendment requires prior approval by the two Select Intelligence Committees for any and all covert activities. Interestingly, all intelligence officials of recent administrations, both Republican and Democrat--that means the liberal Carter administration--alike, fully oppose this provision. In other words, any time any emergency happens, the President cannot respond without congressinal approval. That means if on Christmas Day when Members of Congress are at home or abroad or wherever, if an emergency situation arose--Iraq invades Kuwait, Qaddaffi orders the bombing of a club filled with American GI's, Shiite terrorists suicide bomb the Marine headquarters in Beirut, a TWA jet filled with American tourists is hijacked and taken to Lebanon--the President could not take convert action, like mounting a rescue operation until, in essence, Congress said OK. By then, it could be too late perhaps costing many innocent American lives.
  • The Boxer amendment does allow for a tiny bit of leeway in a few emergency situations, including some ill-defined hostage rescues. However, even this activity--say a rescue--must be terminated, even if it is underway, if the Intelligence Committees--not just one but both--have not given their written approval. That's ridiculous.
  • As chairman of the House POW-MIA task force, I am concerned about how the Boxer amendment could complicate the already complex POW-MIA situation. While we currently have no concrete, verifiable information that American servicemen are being held against their will in Southeast Asia, based on the information we do have, our Government has refused to rule out this sad possibility. This issue is a highest national priority of the United States and the President has publicly stated he is ready to take whatever action is necessary based on any intelligence findings. If we find POW's the President should be able to take whatever action is necessary right away to bring them home, not wait for Congress to gather, agree and approve it. By then it could be too late. What a tragedy. Yet, the Boxer amendment could require this or at least impose similar
  • difficulties or at least deter us from taking appropriate action.
  • The Boxer amendment also prohibits foreign countries from participating in covert actions. This could be very dangerous. During the seizure of our Embassy in Iran in 1979, some Americans managed to escape to the Canadian Embassy which was not occupied. Through covert actions with the Canadians, we were able to get these Americans home. The Boxer amendment could have a chilling effect on such cooperation. Even if the amendment waives this prohibition for actions involving hostages, foreign governments would still refuse to help for fear of this sensitive information being disclosed to Congress at the time. The Canadians, in 1979, made withholding information at that time about their involvement a condition for their participation. Instead of trusting Congress--which is filled with leaks--these foreign allies might just not help us.
  • Take today's Persian Gulf situation. Let's assume we want to get into Iraq and poke around--gather intelligence and so on. I don't know if we are doing this or not and if I did know I obviously wouldn't say. But hypothetically, it's not too hard to imagine that other countries may somehow be involved, providing a jumpoff base or transit point or some sort of assistance. That would be prohibited by the Boxer amendment. That's foolish and dangerous.
  • In addition, there are times when we may want to contract out covert activities. Remember, covert activities aren't the sinister, secret wars some erroneously have claimed. They include simple information gathering. We should not rule out any options under any conditions. For example, it appears to me that the Boxer amendment would prohibit contracting with a private satellite owner whose land-mapping satellite happens to be over Iraq--particularly if informaion from that satellite is used for some other covert action. We hurt only ourselves and jeopardize our forces in the gulf.
  • Take the case of Lebanon where Americans are easily recognizable and, in some parts, prime targets for assassination and kidnaping. We may want to contract out to someone else to poke around for us for both political and security reasons. Again, I don't know if we're dong this or not, but it is within the realm of possibilities. Not if we enact the Boxer amendment.
  • Finally, the Boxer amendment requires the President to provide the committees with 24 hours' notice whenever he or she is contemplating--that's right, just thinking--about a covert activity or military action which has not been subject to prior approval. How is Congress supposed to supervise the President's thought processes? This is not detailed in the Boxer amendment. As our colleague Jerry Solomon has asked, `Just how seriously must he contemplate something before checking in with the thought police on Capitol Hill?' I certainly hope we have a huge room filled with analysts continuously contemplating options to whatever emergency contingency our Nation may face. As Ben Franklin said an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure. Must all these contemplations be run through Congress even though they will probably never be used or even reach the second stage of consideration? I do not believe the Intelligence Committees could handle this much information or really needs to.
  • What if the President is walking Millie late one Saturday night and he contemplates his options and possible actions with regard to the Persian Gulf. According to the Boxer amendment, he must provide
  • both Intelligence Committees within 24 hours--that's by Sunday evening--with his thoughts or else he breaks the law. Why can't this wait until Monday morning? Seriously, these may seem like trivial examples, but they are quite real and they underscore the great flaws with the ill-conceived Boxer amendment.
  • Clearly, the Boxer amendment would effectively terminate all of our policies in the Persian Gulf and our intelligence operations around the globe--operations designed to protect America's national security interests. Many of our allies who are working with us in the gulf and elsewhere have indicated they would case cooperation if this amendment were enacted into law.
  • The intelligence system isn't broken. It has worked well for many years now. Some recent incidents, like Iran-Contra, Have highlighted the need to refine some parts of it. The intelligence bill before us does what is needed without ruining our basic intelligence structure and jeopardizing our real national security responsibilities. Frankly, if the Intelligence Committee thought the Boxer amendment was such a good idea, I believe it would have incorporated such provisions into the committee's bill. Note the committee--which is controlled by liberal Democrats--did not.
  • The Boxer amendment is a good reason for the President to veto the bill. It's a very bad amendment based on flawed judgment and with everything happening in the gulf, the timing of this measure is extremely poor. I urge my colleagues to defeat this amendment.[H17OC0-T4]{H10084}amendment.
[Page: H10084]

Mr. BEILENSON. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the remainder of my time.

Mr. Chairman, in closing just very briefly, let me reiterate the arguments I made at the outset that the gentlewoman's proposal is: First, unconstitutional; second, it cannot become law. No President would sign it into law; third, it is unnecessary. The committee is doing well now the job that it is charged to do of oversight of intelligence operations.

It would not have prevented Iran-Contra. The people there did not comply with the law that was in existence at that time. If this law were in existence, they would not have complied with it either.

It would not have stopped Nicaragua. In fact, the committee, in effect, approved of the Nicaraguan involvement, the covert action by voting for funding for that operation year after year until finally under Mr. Boland they stopped doing it. So it would not have affected either of those kinds of situations.

I urge my colleagues to support the committee and oppose this gentlewoman's amendment.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentlewoman from California [Mrs. Boxer].

The question was taken; and the chairman announced that the noes appeared to have it.

RECORDED VOTE

Mrs. BOXER. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.

A recorded vote was ordered.

The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 70, noes 341, not voting 22, as follows:

Roll No. 481

[Roll No. 481]
AYES--70
  • Anderson
  • AuCoin
  • Bates
  • Bennett
  • Bonior
  • Bosco
  • Boxer
  • Bruce
  • Bryant
  • Clay
  • Collins
  • Conyers
  • DeFazio
  • Dellums
  • Dorgan (ND)
  • Downey
  • Durbin
  • Dymally
  • Edwards (CA)
  • Evans
  • Flake
  • Foglietta
  • Gibbons
  • Gonzalez
  • Hayes (IL)
  • Hertel
  • Hochbrueckner
  • Jacobs
  • Johnson (SD)
  • Jontz
  • Kastenmeier
  • Lehman (FL)
  • Lewis (GA)
  • Lowey (NY)
  • Markey
  • Martinez
  • McCloskey
  • McDermott
  • Mfume
  • Miller (CA)
  • Mineta
  • Mink
  • Moody
  • Mrazek
  • Murphy
  • Oakar
  • Owens (NY)
  • Panetta
  • Payne (NJ)
  • Pelosi
  • Perkins
  • Rangel
  • Roybal
  • Savage
  • Scheuer
  • Schroeder
  • Serrano
  • Stark
  • Stokes
  • Swift
  • Torres
  • Towns
  • Traficant
  • Unsoeld
  • Washington
  • Weiss
  • Wheat
  • Wolpe
  • Wyden
  • Yates
NOES--341
  • Alexander
  • Andrews
  • Annunzio
  • Anthony
  • Applegate
  • Archer
  • Armey
  • Aspin
  • Atkins
  • Baker
  • Ballenger
  • Barnard
  • Bartlett
  • Barton
  • Bateman
  • Beilenson
  • Bentley
  • Bereuter
  • Berman
  • Bevill
  • Bilbray
  • Bilirakis
  • Bliley
  • Boehlert
  • Borski
  • Boucher
  • Broomfield
  • Browder
  • Brown (CA)
  • Brown (CO)
  • Buechner
  • Bunning
  • Burton
  • Bustamante
  • Byron
  • Callahan
  • Campbell (CA)
  • Campbell (CO)
  • Cardin
  • Carper
  • Carr
  • Chandler
  • Chapman
  • Clarke
  • Clement
  • Clinger
  • Coble
  • Coleman (TX)
  • Combest
  • Condit
  • Conte
  • Cooper
  • Costello
  • Coughlin
  • Cox
  • Coyne
  • Craig
  • Crane
  • Dannemeyer
  • Darden
  • Davis
  • DeLay
  • Derrick
  • DeWine
  • Dickinson
  • Dicks
  • Dingell
  • Dixon
  • Donnelly
  • Dornan (CA)
  • Douglas
  • Dreier
  • Duncan
  • Dwyer
  • Dyson
  • Early
  • Eckart
  • Edwards (OK)
  • Emerson
  • Engel
  • English
  • Erdreich
  • Espy
  • Fascell
  • Fawell
  • Fazio
  • Feighan
  • Fields
  • Flippo
  • Frank
  • Frenzel
  • Frost
  • Gallegly
  • Gallo
  • Gaydos
  • Gejdenson
  • Gekas
  • Gephardt
  • Geren
  • Gillmor
  • Gilman
  • Gingrich
  • Glickman
  • Goodling
  • Gordon
  • Goss
  • Gradison
  • Grandy
  • Grant
  • Green
  • Guarini
  • Gunderson
  • Hall (OH)
  • Hall (TX)
  • Hamilton
  • Hammerschmidt
  • Hancock
  • Hansen
  • Harris
  • Hastert
  • Hatcher
  • Hefley
  • Hefner
  • Henry
  • Herger
  • Hiler
  • Hoagland
  • Holloway
  • Hopkins
  • Horton
  • Hoyer
  • Hubbard
  • Huckaby
  • Hughes
  • Hunter
  • Hutto
  • Hyde
  • Inhofe
  • Ireland
  • James
  • Jenkins
  • Johnson (CT)
  • Johnston
  • Jones (GA)
  • Jones (NC)
  • Kanjorski
  • Kaptur
  • Kasich
  • Kennedy
  • Kennelly
  • Kildee
  • Kleczka
  • Kolbe
  • Kolter
  • Kostmayer
  • Kyl
  • LaFalce
  • Lagomarsino
  • Lancaster
  • Lantos
  • Laughlin
  • Leach (IA)
  • Leath (TX)
  • Lehman (CA)
  • Lent
  • Levin (MI)
  • Levine (CA)
  • Lewis (CA)
  • Lewis (FL)
  • Lightfoot
  • Lipinski
  • Livingston
  • Lloyd
  • Long
  • Lowery (CA)
  • Luken, Thomas
  • Lukens, Donald
  • Machtley
  • Madigan
  • Manton
  • Marlenee
  • Martin (NY)
  • Matsui
  • Mavroules
  • Mazzoli
  • McCandless
  • McCollum
  • McCrery
  • McCurdy
  • McDade
  • McEwen
  • McGrath
  • McHugh
  • McMillan (NC)
  • McMillen (MD)
  • McNulty
  • Meyers
  • Michel
  • Miller (OH)
  • Miller (WA)
  • Moakley
  • Molinari
  • Mollohan
  • Montgomery
  • Moorhead
  • Morella
  • Morrison (WA)
  • Murtha
  • Myers
  • Nagle
  • Natcher
  • Neal (MA)
  • Neal (NC)
  • Nelson
  • Nielson
  • Nowak
  • Oberstar
  • Obey
  • Olin
  • Ortiz
  • Owens (UT)
  • Oxley
  • Packard
  • Pallone
  • Parker
  • Parris
  • Pashayan
  • Patterson
  • Paxon
  • Payne (VA)
  • Pease
  • Penny
  • Petri
  • Pickett
  • Pickle
  • Porter
  • Poshard
  • Price
  • Pursell
  • Quillen
  • Rahall
  • Ravenel
  • Ray
  • Regula
  • Rhodes
  • Richardson
  • Ridge
  • Rinaldo
  • Ritter
  • Roberts
  • Robinson
  • Roe
  • Rogers
  • Rohrabacher
  • Ros-Lehtinen
  • Rose
  • Rostenkowski
  • Roth
  • Roukema
  • Rowland (GA)
  • Russo
  • Sabo
  • Saiki
  • Sangmeister
  • Sarpalius
  • Sawyer
  • Saxton
  • Schaefer
  • Schiff
  • Schneider
  • Schulze
  • Schumer
  • Sensenbrenner
  • Sharp
  • Shaw
  • Shays
  • Shumway
  • Shuster
  • Sikorski
  • Sisisky
  • Skaggs
  • Skeen
  • Skelton
  • Slattery
  • Slaughter (NY)
  • Slaughter (VA)
  • Smith (FL)
  • Smith (IA)
  • Smith (NE)
  • Smith (NJ)
  • Smith (TX)
  • Smith, Denny (OR)
  • Smith, Robert (NH)
  • Smith, Robert (OR)
  • Snowe
  • Solarz
  • Solomon
  • Spence
  • Spratt
  • Staggers
  • Stallings
  • Stangeland
  • Stearns
  • Stenholm
  • Studds
  • Stump
  • Sundquist
  • Synar
  • Tallon
  • Tanner
  • Tauke
  • Tauzin
  • Taylor
  • Thomas (CA)
  • Thomas (GA)
  • Thomas (WY)
  • Torricelli
  • Traxler
  • Udall
  • Upton
  • Valentine
  • Vander Jagt
  • Vento
  • Visclosky
  • Volkmer
  • Vucanovich
  • Walgren
  • Walker
  • Walsh
  • Watkins
  • Waxman
  • Weber
  • Weldon
  • Whittaker
  • Whitten
  • Wise
  • Wolf
  • Wylie
  • Yatron
  • Young (AK)
  • Young (FL)
NOT VOTING--22
  • Ackerman
  • Boggs
  • Brennan
  • Brooks
  • Coleman (MO)
  • Courter
  • Crockett
  • de la Garza
  • Fish
  • Ford (MI)
  • Ford (TN)
  • Gray
  • Hawkins
  • Hayes (LA)
  • Houghton
  • Martin (IL)
  • Morrison (CT)
  • Rowland (CT)
  • Schuette
  • Smith (VT)
  • Williams
  • Wilson
[TIME: 2201]

Mr. ESPY and Mr. HEFNER changed their vote from `aye' to `no.'

Mr. SCHEUER changed his vote from `no' to `aye.'

So the amendment was rejected.

The result of the vote was announced as bove recorded.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there further amendments to the bill?

If not, under the rule, the Committee rises.

Accordingly, the Committee rose, and the Speaker pro tempore [Mr. Gephardt] having assumed the chair, Mr. Nelson of Florida, Chairman of the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, reported that the Committee having had under consideration the bill (H.R. 5422) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1991 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the U.S. Government, the intelligence community staff, and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes, pursuant to House Resolution 487, he reported the bill back to the House with sundry amendments adopted by the Committee of the Whole.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under the rule, the previous question is ordered.

Is a separate vote demanded on any amendment?

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I demand a separate vote on the so-called Solarz amendment, as amended.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is a separate vote demanded on any other amendment?

If not, the Chair will put them en gros.

The amendments were agreed to.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Clerk will report the amendment on which a separate vote has been demanded.

The Clerk read as follows:

[Page: H10085]

Amendment: Page 25, after line 18, add the following:

TITLE VI--INCENTIVES FOR PEACE IN ANGOLA

SEC. 601. ENCOURAGING REDUCTIONS IN EXTERNAL ASSISTANCE TO PARTIES TO THE ANGOLAN CONFLICT.

(a) Prohibition on Assistance.--

(1) Presidential certification.--If the Government of Angola expresses its willingness to accept a ceasefire and a political settlement to the conflict in Angola and proposes a reasonable timetable for free and fair multiparty national elections in which UNITA would be free to participate, and is no longer receiving aid from the Soviet Union, the President shall promptly so certify to the appropriate committees.

(2) Assistance prohibited pursuant to certification or joint resolution.--Except as provided in subsections (b), (c), and (d), if the President makes the certification described in paragraph (1) or if the Congress enacts a joint resolution declaring that the Congress has made the determination with respect to the Government of Angola that is described in that paragraph, then--

(A) intelligence community funds may not be obligated or expended during fiscal year 1991 for the acquisition of weapons, ammunition, or other lethal military equipment for the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola; and

(B) the United States shall suspend, or cause the suspension of, the delivery to UNITA of any weapons, ammunition, or other lethal military equipment acquired with any intelligence community funds that may have been previously expended, to the extent that the United States retains the ability to suspend such deliveries.

(b) Removal of Prohibition if the Government of Angola is No Longer Pursuing a Political Solution.--Except as provided in subsection (e), in the event the President has made the certification described in subsection (a)(1) or the Congress has enacted the joint resolution described in subsection (a)(2), subsection (a)(2) shall cease to apply if the President certifies to the appropriate committees that the Government of Angola is no longer willing to accept a ceasefire and a political settlement and is no longer proposing a reasonable timetable for free and fair multiparty national elections in which UNITA would be free to participate. A certification may be made under this subsection only during the 3-month period beginning on the
date on which the President made his certification under subsection (a)(1) or the Congress enacted a joint resolution under subsection (a)(2), as the case may be.

(c) Conditions for Removal of Prohibition After 3 Months: Should subsection (a)(2) become applicable pursuant a President certification under subsection (a)(1) or enactment of a joint resolution under subsection (a)(2) or (e), subsection (a)(2) shall cease to apply, subject to subsection (e), if the President certifies to the appropriate committees (after the end of the 3-month period specified in the last sentence of this subsection) that he has made the determinations required by both paragraphs (1) and (2), as follows:

(1) Determinations with regard to the government of angola: A determination either--

(A) that the Government of Angola refuses to participate in good faith in negotiations for a ceasefire and a political settlement that includes a reasonable timetable for free and fair multiparty national elections in which UNITA would be free to participate;

(B) that--

(i) during the review period, the Soviet Union or other sources outside Angola sold or otherwise made available to the Government of Angola additional, militarily significant amounts of weapons, ammunition, and other lethal military equipment, or

(ii) prior to the end of the review period, the Government of Angola had not ceased receiving militarily significant amounts of lethal military equipment that had previously been sold or otherwise made available by sources outside Angola; or

(C) that the Government of Angola or the Government of Cuba is not complying with its obligations under the Cuban Troop Withdrawal Agreement.

(2) Determinations with regard to unita: A determination both--

(A) that UNITA has expressed its willingness to participate in good in negotiations for a ceasefire and a political settlement that includes a reasonable timetable for free and fair muliparty national elections; and

(B) that--

(i) sources outside Angola did not sell or otherwise make available to UNITA during the review period additional, militarily significant amounts of weapons, ammunition, and other lethal military equipment; and

(ii) prior to the end of the review period, UNITA had ceased receiving militarily significant amounts of lethal military equipment that had previously been sold or otherwise made available by sources outside Angola.
A certification may be made under this subsection only after the end of the 3-month period beginning on the date on which the President made his certification under subsection (a)(1) or the Congress enacted a joint resolution under subsection (a)(2), as the case may be; except that if the Congress enacts a joint resolution disapproving a certification submitted by the President under this subsection, the President may not make another certification under this subsection until after the end of the 3-month period beginning on the date of enactment of that joint resolution.

(d) Removal of Prohibition If There Is a Military Offensive Against UNITA: Subsection (a) and paragraphs (1) and (2) of subsection (f) shall cease to apply if the President certifies to the appropriate committees that--

(1) the Government of Angola has launched a military offensive that threatens the survival of UNITA, or

(2) there is clear and credible evidence of a military build-up by the Government of Angola that makes it likely that a military offense that would threaten the survival of UNITA will occur.

(e) Congressional Disapproval of Presidential Certifications: If the Congress enacts a joint resolution disapproving a certification submitted by the President under subsection (b), (c), or (d), then subparagraphs (A) and (B) of subsection (a)(2) shall apply for the remainder of fiscal year 1991 unless the President subsequently makes a certification under subsection (c) or (d).

(f) Limitations on Amounts of United States Assistance:

(1) Assistance during first quarter of fiscal year: Except as otherwise provided in this section, the aggregate amount of intelligence communty funds that is obligated during the period beginning October 1, 1990, and ending December 31, 1990, for the acquisition of weapons, ammunition, or other lethal military equipment for UNITA may not exceed the amount which is 25 percent of the amount of any intelligence community funds allocated for that purpose during fiscal year 1990 or during fiscal year 1991, whichever is less.

(2) Assistance during first half of fiscal year: Except as otherwise provided in this section, the aggregate amount of intelligence community funds that is obligated during the period beginning October 1, 1990, and ending March 31, 1991, for the acquisition of weapons, ammunition, or other lethal military equipment
for UNITA may not exceed the amount which is 50 percent of the amount of any intelligence community funds allocated for that purpose during fiscal year 1990 or during fiscal year 1991, whichever is less.

(3) Assistance during the entire fiscal year: The aggregate amount of intelligence community funds that is obligated at any time during fiscal year 1991 for the acquisition of weapons, ammunition, or other lethal military equipment for UNITA may not exceed the amount of any intelligence community funds allocated for that purpose during fiscal year 1990.

(g) Reports on Military Assistance Deliveries, Commitments to Multiparty Democracy, and Compliance with Cuban Troop Withdrawal Agreement:

(1) In general: On November 1, 1990, January 1, 1991, April 1, 1991, and July 1, 1991, the President shall submit to the appropriate committees a report--

(A) on the extent to which the Government of Angola is continuing to obtain militarily significant amounts of weapons, ammunition, and other lethal military equipment from foreign countries or other third parties;

(B) on the extent to which UNITA is continuing to obtain military significant amounts of weapons, ammunition, and other lethal military equipment from foreign countries or other third parties;

(C) on the extent to which the Government of Angola is willing to accept a ceasefire and a political settlement that includes a reasonable timetable for free and fair multiparty national elections in which UNITA would be free to participate;

(D) on the extent to which UNITA is willing to accept a ceasefire and a political settlement that includes a reasonable timetable for free and fair multiparty national elections; and

(E) on whether the Government of Angola and the Government of Cuba are complying with their obligations under the Cuban Troop Withdrawal Agreement.

(2) Certification to be included: Unless the President has already made the certification described in subsection (a)(1) or the Congress has enacted a joint resolution described in subsection (a)(2), the President shall certify in each report submitted pursuant to paragraph (1) whether the Government of Angola has expressed its willingness to accept a ceasefire and a political settlement to the conflict in Angola and has proposed a reasonable timetable for free and fair multiparty national elections in which UNITA would be free to participate. If the President certifies pursuant to this paragraph that the Government of Angola has expressed such a willingness and proposed such a timetable, that certification shall be considered to be a certification under subsection (a)(1).

(3) Description of united states efforts: The report required by paragraph (1) shall also describe the President's efforts--

(A) to obtain agreement by foreign countries and other third parties to terminate assistance to the Government of Angola and UNITA for the acquisition of militarily significant amounts of weapons, ammunition, and other lethal military equipment; and

(B) to encourage both the Government of Angola and UNITA to agree to a ceasefire and a political settlement that includes a reasonable timetable for free and fair multiparty national elections.

(4) Report with certification: If the President makes a certification under subsection (a)(1), (b), (c), or (d), the President shall include with that certification a report containing the information specified in paragraphs (1) an (3) of this subsection and the justification for the President's certification.

(h) Definitions: As used in this section--

(1) the term `appropriate committees' means the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;

(2) the term `intelligence community funds' means funds available to the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, or any other agency or entity of the United States involved in intelligence activities;

(3) the term `obligations under the Cuban Troop Withdrawal Agreement' means the obligations relating to the calendar for redeployment and withdrawal of Cuban troops as specified in the Agreement Between the Governments of the People's Republic of Angola and the Republic of Cuba for the Termination of the International Mission of the Cuban Military Contingent, signed at the United Nations on December 22, 1988;

(4) the term `review period' means the period beginning on the date the President makes a certification under subsection (a)(1) or a joint resolution is enacted under subsection (a)(2) or (e), as the case may be, and ending on the date on which the President makes a certification under subsection (c); and

(5) the term `UNITA' means the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola.

[Page: H10086]

Mr. HYDE (during the reading). Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the amendment be considered as read and printed in the Record.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Illinois?

There was no objection.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the amendment.

The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that the noes appeared to have it.

Mr. VOLKMER. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 207, nays 206, not voting 21, as follows:

Roll No. 482

[Roll No. 482]
YEAS--207
  • Alexander
  • Anderson
  • Andrews
  • Annunzio
  • Anthony
  • Applegate
  • Aspin
  • Atkins
  • AuCoin
  • Bates
  • Beilenson
  • Bennett
  • Berman
  • Bilbray
  • Boggs
  • Bonior
  • Borski
  • Bosco
  • Boucher
  • Boxer
  • Brown (CA)
  • Bruce
  • Bryant
  • Bustamante
  • Cardin
  • Carper
  • Carr
  • Chapman
  • Clarke
  • Clay
  • Clement
  • Coleman (TX)
  • Collins
  • Condit
  • Conyers
  • Costello
  • Coyne
  • DeFazio
  • Dellums
  • Derrick
  • Dicks
  • Dingell
  • Dixon
  • Dorgan (ND)
  • Downey
  • Durbin
  • Dwyer
  • Dymally
  • Dyson
  • Early
  • Eckart
  • Edwards (CA)
  • Engel
  • Espy
  • Evans
  • Fazio
  • Feighan
  • Flake
  • Flippo
  • Foglietta
  • Foley
  • Frank
  • Frost
  • Gaydos
  • Gejdenson
  • Gephardt
  • Gibbons
  • Gilman
  • Glickman
  • Gonzalez
  • Gordon
  • Grandy
  • Gray
  • Green
  • Guarini
  • Hall (OH)
  • Hall (TX)
  • Hamilton
  • Hayes (IL)
  • Hefner
  • Hertel
  • Hoagland
  • Hochbrueckner
  • Houghton
  • Hoyer
  • Jacobs
  • Johnson (SD)
  • Johnston
  • Jontz
  • Kanjorski
  • Kaptur
  • Kastenmeier
  • Kennedy
  • Kennelly
  • Kildee
  • Kleczka
  • Kolter
  • Kostmayer
  • LaFalce
  • Leach (IA)
  • Leath (TX)
  • Lehman (CA)
  • Lehman (FL)
  • Levin (MI)
  • Levine (CA)
  • Lewis (GA)
  • Lipinski
  • Long
  • Lowey (NY)
  • Luken, Thomas
  • Machtley
  • Manton
  • Markey
  • Martinez
  • Matsui
  • Mavroules
  • Mazzoli
  • McCloskey
  • McDermott
  • McHugh
  • McMillen (MD)
  • McNulty
  • Mfume
  • Miller (CA)
  • Miller (WA)
  • Mineta
  • Mink
  • Moakley
  • Moody
  • Morella
  • Morrison (WA)
  • Mrazek
  • Murphy
  • Nagle
  • Natcher
  • Neal (MA)
  • Nowak
  • Oakar
  • Oberstar
  • Obey
  • Ortiz
  • Owens (NY)
  • Owens (UT)
  • Pallone
  • Panetta
  • Patterson
  • Payne (NJ)
  • Payne (VA)
  • Pease
  • Pelosi
  • Penny
  • Perkins
  • Pickett
  • Poshard
  • Price
  • Rahall
  • Rangel
  • Richardson
  • Rose
  • Rostenkowski
  • Roybal
  • Russo
  • Sabo
  • Sangmeister
  • Savage
  • Sawyer
  • Scheuer
  • Schneider
  • Schroeder
  • Schumer
  • Serrano
  • Sharp
  • Shays
  • Sikorski
  • Skaggs
  • Slattery
  • Slaughter (NY)
  • Smith (IA)
  • Solarz
  • Spratt
  • Staggers
  • Stark
  • Stokes
  • Studds
  • Swift
  • Synar
  • Tauke
  • Torres
  • Torricelli
  • Towns
  • Traficant
  • Traxler
  • Udall
  • Unsoeld
  • Vento
  • Visclosky
  • Volkmer
  • Walgren
  • Washington
  • Waxman
  • Weiss
  • Wheat
  • Wise
  • Wolpe
  • Wyden
  • Yates
  • Yatron
NAYS--206
  • Archer
  • Armey
  • Baker
  • Ballenger
  • Barnard
  • Bartlett
  • Barton
  • Bateman
  • Bentley
  • Bereuter
  • Bevill
  • Bilirakis
  • Bliley
  • Boehlert
  • Broomfield
  • Browder
  • Brown (CO)
  • Buechner
  • Bunning
  • Burton
  • Byron
  • Callahan
  • Campbell (CA)
  • Campbell (CO)
  • Chandler
  • Clinger
  • Coble
  • Combest
  • Conte
  • Cooper
  • Coughlin
  • Cox
  • Craig
  • Crane
  • Dannemeyer
  • Darden
  • Davis
  • DeLay
  • DeWine
  • Dickinson
  • Donnelly
  • Dornan (CA)
  • Douglas
  • Dreier
  • Duncan
  • Edwards (OK)
  • Emerson
  • English
  • Erdreich
  • Fascell
  • Fawell
  • Fields
  • Gallegly
  • Gallo
  • Gekas
  • Geren
  • Gillmor
  • Gingrich
  • Goodling
  • Goss
  • Gradison
  • Grant
  • Gunderson
  • Hammerschmidt
  • Hancock
  • Hansen
  • Harris
  • Hastert
  • Hatcher
  • Hefley
  • Henry
  • Herger
  • Hiler
  • Holloway
  • Hopkins
  • Horton
  • Hubbard
  • Huckaby
  • Hughes
  • Hunter
  • Hutto
  • Hyde
  • Inhofe
  • Ireland
  • James
  • Jenkins
  • Johnson (CT)
  • Jones (GA)
  • Jones (NC)
  • Kasich
  • Kolbe
  • Kyl
  • Lagomarsino
  • Lancaster
  • Lantos
  • Laughlin
  • Lent
  • Lewis (CA)
  • Lewis (FL)
  • Lightfoot
  • Livingston
  • Lloyd
  • Lowery (CA)
  • Lukens, Donald
  • Madigan
  • Marlenee
  • Martin (NY)
  • McCandless
  • McCollum
  • McCrery
  • McCurdy
  • McDade
  • McEwen
  • McGrath
  • McMillan (NC)
  • Meyers
  • Michel
  • Miller (OH)
  • Molinari
  • Mollohan
  • Montgomery
  • Moorhead
  • Murtha
  • Myers
  • Nelson
  • Nielson
  • Olin
  • Oxley
  • Packard
  • Parker
  • Parris
  • Pashayan
  • Paxon
  • Petri
  • Pickle
  • Porter
  • Pursell
  • Quillen
  • Ravenel
  • Ray
  • Regula
  • Rhodes
  • Ridge
  • Rinaldo
  • Ritter
  • Roberts
  • Robinson
  • Roe
  • Rogers
  • Rohrabacher
  • Ros-Lehtinen
  • Roth
  • Roukema
  • Rowland (GA)
  • Saiki
  • Sarpalius
  • Saxton
  • Schaefer
  • Schiff
  • Schulze
  • Sensenbrenner
  • Shaw
  • Shumway
  • Shuster
  • Sisisky
  • Skeen
  • Skelton
  • Slaughter (VA)
  • Smith (FL)
  • Smith (NE)
  • Smith (NJ)
  • Smith (TX)
  • Smith, Denny (OR)
  • Smith, Robert (NH)
  • Smith, Robert (OR)
  • Snowe
  • Solomon
  • Spence
  • Stallings
  • Stangeland
  • Stearns
  • Stenholm
  • Stump
  • Sundquist
  • Tallon
  • Tanner
  • Tauzin
  • Taylor
  • Thomas (CA)
  • Thomas (GA)
  • Thomas (WY)
  • Upton
  • Valentine
  • Vander Jagt
  • Vucanovich
  • Walker
  • Walsh
  • Watkins
  • Weber
  • Weldon
  • Whittaker
  • Whitten
  • Wolf
  • Wylie
  • Young (AK)
  • Young (FL)
NOT VOTING--21
  • Ackerman
  • Brennan
  • Brooks
  • Coleman (MO)
  • Courter
  • Crockett
  • de la Garza
  • Fish
  • Ford (MI)
  • Ford (TN)
  • Frenzel
  • Hawkins
  • Hayes (LA)
  • Martin (IL)
  • Morrison (CT)
  • Neal (NC)
  • Rowland (CT)
  • Schuette
  • Smith (VT)
  • Williams
  • Wilson
[TIME: 2224]

Mr. HENRY changed his vote from `yea' to `nay.'

Mr. FLIPPO and Mr. SAVAGE changed their vote from `nay' to `yea.'

The SPEAKER. On this vote the yeas are 206, and the nays are 206.

The Chair votes `aye.'

The yeas are 207.

So the amendment was agreed to.

The SPEAKER. The question is on the engrossment and third reading of the bill.

PARLIMENTARY INQUIRY

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I have a parliamentary inquiry.

The SPEAKER. The gentleman will state it.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, as I understood it, the vote was by electronic device. I did not see you vote by electronic device. You had announced the vote, Mr. Speaker. You passed the vote.

The SPEAKER. The gentleman will suspend while the Chair explains the result of the vote.

The Chair's vote is entered into the electronic system upon the announcement of the Chair of his vote and prior to the announcement of the final result.

The Chair's vote is entered into the system at the time of the Chair's announced vote, the Chair will advise the gentleman.

Mr. HYDE. Once more this evening, I thank the Chair.

The SPEAKER. The question is on the engrossment and third reading of the bill.

The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, was read the third time, and passed, and a motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

[Page: H10087]

Mr. BEILENSON. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to take from the Speaker's table the Senate bill (S. 2834) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1991 for the intelligence activities of the United States Government, the Intelligence Community Staff, and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes, and ask for its immediate consideration.

The Clerk read the title of the Senate bill.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from California?

There was no objection.

The Clerk read the Senate bill, as follows:

S. 2834


Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That this Act may be cited as the `Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991'.

TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
There are authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 1991 the amounts referred to in section 102 for the conduct of the intelligence activities of the following elements of the United States Government:

(1) the Central Intelligence Agency;

(2) the Department of Defense;

(3) the Defense Intelligence Agency;

(4) the National Security Agency;

(5) the Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, and the Department of the Air Force;

(6) the Department of State;

(7) the Department of the Treasury;

(8) the Department of Energy; and

(9) the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

SEC. 102. CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS.
(a) The amounts authorized to be appropriated by section 101, and the authorized personnel ceilings as of September 30, 1991, for the conduct of the intelligence activities of the elements listed in such section, are those specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations to accompany ( ) of the One Hundred First Congress. Such Schedule of Authorizations shall be considered to be a part of this Act, and any limitation, requirement, or condition contained in such Schedule pertaining to the amount specified for any project, program, or activity shall be considered to be a part of this Act.
(b) Such Schedule of Authorizations shall be made available to the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives, and the President. The President shall provide for suitable distribution of the Schedule, or of appropriate portions of the Schedule, within the executive branch of the Government.

SEC. 103. PERSONNEL CEILING ADJUSTMENTS.
The Director of Central Intelligence may authorize employment of civilian personnel in excess of the numbers authorized for fiscal year 1991 under sections 102 and 202 of this Act if he determines that such action is necessary to the performance of important intelligence functions, except that such number may not, for any element of the Intelligence Community, exceed 2 percent of the number of civilian personnel authorized under such sections for such element. The Director of Central Intelligence shall promptly notify the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate whenever he exercises the authority granted by this section.

TITLE II--INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY STAFF

SEC. 201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
There are authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Staff for fiscal year 1991 $28,900,000, of which amount $6,580,000 shall be available for the Security Evaluation Office of the Central Intelligence Agency.

SEC. 202. AUTHORIZATION OF PERSONNEL END-STRENGTH.
(a) Authorized Personnel Level: The Intelligence Community Staff is authorized 240 full-time personnel as of September 30, 1991, including 50 full-time personnel who are authorized to serve in the Security Evaluation Office of the Central Intelligence Agency. Such personnel of the Intelligence Community Staff may be permanent employees of the Intelligence Community Staff or personnel detailed from other elements of the United States Government.
(b) Representation of Intelligence Elements: During fiscal year 1991, personnel of the Intelligence Community Staff shall be selected so as to provide appropriate representation from elements of the United States Government engaged in intelligence activities.
(c) Reimbursement: During fiscal year 1991, any officer or employee of the United States or a member of the Armed Forces who is detailed to the Intelligence Community Staff from another element of the United States Government shall be detailed on a reimbursable basis, except that any such officer, employee, or member may be detailed on a nonreimbursable basis for a period of less than one year for the performance of temporary functions as required by the Director of Central Intelligence.

SEC. 203. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY STAFF ADMINISTERED IN SAME MANNER AS CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.
During fiscal year 1991, activities and personnel of the Intelligence Community Staff shall be subject to the provisions of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.) and the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403a et seq.) in the same manner as activities and personnel of the Central Intelligence Agency.

TITLE III--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

SEC. 301. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
There are authorized to be appropriated for the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund for fiscal year 1991 $164,600,000.

TITLE IV--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ADMINISTRATIVE PROVISIONS

SEC 401. ELIMINATION OF 15-YEAR CAREER REVIEW FOR CIARDS AND FERS SPECIAL CATEGORY PARTICIPANTS.
Section 203 of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act of 1964 for Certain Employees (50 U.S.C. 403 note) is amended--

(1) by striking out the last sentence thereof; and

(2) by adding at the end thereof the following new sentences: `Any officer or employee who elects to accept designation as a participant entitled to the benefits of the system shall remain a participant of the system for the duration of his or her employment with the Agency. Such election shall be irrevocable except as, and to the extent, provided in section 301(d) of this Act and shall not be subject to review or approval by the Director.'.

SEC. 402. QUALIFYING PERIOD FOR CIA FORMER SPOUSE.
Section 204(b)(4) of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act of 1964 for Certain Employees (50 U.S.C. 403 note) is amended by inserting before the period at the end thereof the following: `during the participant's service as an employee of the Central Intelligence Agency'.

SEC. 403. SELECTION BETWEEN CIARDS ANNUITY AND OTHER SURVIVOR ANNUITIES.
Section 221(g) of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act of 1964 for Certain Employees (50 U.S.C. 403 note) is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new paragraph:
`(3) A surviving spouse who married a participant after his retirement shall be entitled to a survivor annuity payable from the fund under this title only upon electing this annuity instead of any other survivor benefit to which he or she may be entitled under this or any other retirement system for Government employees on the basis of a marriage to someone other than the participant.'.

SEC. 404. SURVIVOR ANNUITIES UNDER CIARDS FOR SPOUSES OF REMARRIED, RETIRED PARTICIPANTS.
(a) Calculation of Reduction in Annuities: Section 221(n) of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act of 1964 for Certain Employees (50 U.S.C. 403 note) is amended by inserting `or elected under section 226(e)' after `(unless such reduction is adjusted under section 222(b)(5)'.
(b) Election of Reduction in Annuity: Section 226 of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act of 1964 for Certain Employees (50 U.S.C. 403 note) is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new subsection:
`(e) Upon a remarriage occurring on or after the date of enactment of this subsection to a spouse other than the spouse at the time of retirement, a retired participant whose annuity was not reduced (or was not fully reduced) to provide a survivor annuity for the participant's spouse or former spouse as of the time of retirement may irrevocably elect, by means of a signed writing received by the Director within one year after such remarriage, a reduction in the retired participant's annuity for the purpose of providing an annuity for such retired participant's spouse in the event such spouse survives the retired participant. The reduction shall be effective the first day of the month which begins nine months after the date or remarriage. For any remarriage that occurred before the date of enactment of this subsection, the retired participant may make such an election within two years after such date. To the greatest extent practicable, the retired participant shall pay a deposit under the same terms and conditions as those prescribed for retired employees under the Civil Service Retirement and Disability System under section 8339(j)(5)(C)(ii) of title 5, United States Code. A survivor annuity elected under this subsection shall be treated in all respects as a survivor annuity under section 221(b).'.
(c) Conforming Amendment: Section 226(d) of such Act is amended by striking out `This' and inserting in lieu thereof `Subsections (a) through (c) of this'.

SEC. 405. RESTORATION OF CERTAIN FORMER SPOUSE BENEFITS AFTER DISSOLUTION OF REMARRIAGE.
(a) Section 224(b)(1) of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act of 1964 for Certain Employees (50 U.S.C. 403 note) is amended by inserting before the semicolon `, except that, if such survivor annuity is terminated because of remarriage, such annuity shall be restored at the same rate commencing on the date such remarriage is dissolved by death, annulment, or divorce'.
(b) Section 225(b)(1) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1964 for Certain Employees (50 U.S.C. 403 note) is amended by inserting before the semicolon `, except that the entitlement of a former spouse to benefits under this section shall be restored at the same rate commencing on the date such remarriage is dissolved by death, annulment, or divorce'.

(c) Section 16(c) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403p(c)) is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new paragraph:
`(3) A former spouse who is not eligible to enroll in a health benefit plan under this section because of remarriage before the age of 55 shall be restored to such eligibility on the date such remarriage is dissolved by death, annulment, or divorce.'.
(d) The amendment made by this section shall take effect on October 1, 1990, and no benefit shall be payable before such effective date.
(e) Any new spending authority (within the meaning of section 401(c) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974) provided pursuant to the amendments made by this section shall be effective for any fiscal year only to such extent or in such amounts as are provided in appropriation Acts.

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SEC. 406. CONFORMING CIARDS TO THE CIVIL SERVICE RETIREMENT SYSTEM.
Section 292 of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act of 1964 for Certain Employees is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new subsection:
`(c) Notwithstanding section 4(h) of the Civil Service Retirement Spouse Equity Act of 1984 (Public Law 98-615), Executive Order No. 12684 of July 27, 1989 (insofar as it conforms the Central Intelligence Agency Disability and Retirement System to the Civil Service Retirement System by lowering the remarriage age regarding the termination of surviving spouses' annuities from 60 to 55) shall be given effect as of its date of issuance.'.

SEC. 407. TREATMENT OF CERTAIN ALIEN EMPLOYEES IN HONG KONG.
(a) Authority: In applying the proviso of section 7 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, in the case of an alien described in subsection (b), the Director may charge the entry of the alien against the numerical limitation for any fiscal year (beginning with fiscal year 1991 and ending with fiscal year 1996) notwithstanding that the alien's entry is not made to the United States in that fiscal year so long as such entry is made before the end of fiscal year 1997.
(b) Eligible Aliens: An alien eligible under subsection (a) is an alien who--

(1) is an employee of the Foreign Broadcast Information Service in Hong Kong; or

(2) is the spouse or child of an alien described in paragraph (1) if accompanying or following to join the alien in coming to the United States.

TITLE V--DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ENHANCEMENTS

SEC. 501. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COVER SUPPORT AUTHORITY.
(a) In General: Chapter 21 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new chapter:

`CHAPTER 22--SECURITY SUPPORT FOR DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

` 431. Authority for certain commercial activity
`The Secretary of Defense, consistent with this chapter, may carry out certain commercial activities as may be necessary for the purpose of providing security for the conduct of intelligence collection activities undertaken by the Department of Defense. Such activities shall be carried out only with the approval of the Director of Central Intelligence and, to the extent such activities take place within the United States, shall also be coordinated with and, where appropriate, be supported by, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

` 432. Use and disposition of funds
`Proceeds generated by a commercial activity carried out under this chapter may be used to offset necessary and reasonable expenses arising from that activity and shall be kept to the minimum necessary to operate such activity in a secure manner. Any proceeds in excess of those required for this purpose shall be deposited, as often as may be practicable, into the Treasury of the United States as miscellaneous receipts. The disposition of such proceeds shall be audited at least annually by the organization assigned auditing responsibility by the head of the military department or defense agency for the commercial activity concerned.

`433. Relationship with other Federal laws
`(a) Except as provided by subsection (b), commercial activities conducted pursuant to this chapter shall be carried out in accordance with applicable Federal law.
`(b) Whenever the Secretary of Defense, an official of no lower rank than an Assistant Secretary of Defense who is designated by the Secretary for this purpose, or the head of a military department certifies that, in connection with the establishment or operation of a commercial activity pursuant to this chapter, compliance with Federal laws or regulations pertaining to the management and administration of Federal agencies would create an unacceptable risk of compromise of authorized intelligence collection activities, he may authorize the establishment and operation of such activities, notwithstanding such laws or regulations, to the extent necessary to prevent the disclosure of the commercial activity concerned as an instrumentality of the United States Government, except that such certification and authorization shall be in writing and shall specify the Federal laws or regulations for which compliance by the commercial activity concerned is not required consistent with this section.
`(c) As used in this section, the phrase `Federal laws and regulations pertaining to the management and administration of Federal agencies' means only the following--

`(A) Federal laws and regulations pertaining to the receipt and use of appropriated and nonappropriated funds;

`(B) the acquisition or management of property or services;

`(C) information disclosure, retention, and management;

`(D) the employment of personnel;

`(E) payments for travel and housing;

`(F) the establishment of legal entities or government instrumentalities; and

`(G) foreign trade or financial transaction restrictions that would reveal the commercial activity as an activity of the United States Government.

`434. Reservation of defenses and immunities
`Commercial activity undertaken pursuant to this chapter, including the submission to judicial proceedings of any State, shall not constitute a waiver of the defenses and immunities of the United States.

` 435. Restrictions
`(a) No corporation, partnership, or other legal entity may be established to carry out commercial activities pursuant to this chapter except with the approval of the Secretary of Defense or the Deputy Secretary of Defense. Such approval may not be delegated.
`(b) Nothing in this chapter authorizes the conduct of any intelligence activity which is not otherwise authorized by law or Executive order.
`(c) Personnel conducting commercial activity authorized by this chapter may only engage in those activities in the United States necessary to support intelligence activities abroad.
`(d) A citizen of the United States or an alien admitted to permanent residence in the United States may not be employed by, or assigned or detailed to perform operational, managerial, or supervisory duties for, an entity engaged in commercial activity authorized by this chapter unless that person has been informed of the purpose of such activity.

` 436. Regulations, oversight, and legal review
`The Secretary of Defense shall issue regulations to implement the authority contained in this chapter within 180 days of its date of enactment. Copies of such regulations shall be provided to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives prior to their issuance. Such regulations shall be consistent with this chapter and shall, at a minimum--

`(1) specify all officials authorized to approve commercial activities pursuant to this chapter and, where a determination is required pursuant to section 433(b) only the officials specified by such section may approve the establishment or operation of the commercial activity concerned;

`(2) designate a single office within the Defense Intelligence Agency to implement, and maintain accountability for, all activities authorized pursuant to this chapter;

`(3) require prior legal review of all commercial activities authorized pursuant to this chapter; and

`(4) provide for appropriate internal audit controls and oversight for such activities.

`437. Reports to Congress
`(a)(1) The Secretary of Defense shall ensure that the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives (hereafter in this chapter referred to as `the intelligence committees') are kept fully and currently informed of actions taken pursuant to this chapter, including any significant anticipated activity to be authorized pursuant to this chapter.
`(2) For purposes of paragraph (1), the Secretary of Defense shall provide all such committees with prior notice of the establishment of any corporation, partnership, or other legal entity.
`(b) Not later than November 1 of each year, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the committees described in subsection (a) a report on all commercial activity undertaken pursuant to this chapter during the previous fiscal year. Such report shall include a description of any exercise of the authority provided by section 433(b) to the Secretary of Defense, or other authorized officials, as well as a description of any expenditure of appropriated or nonappropriated funds made pursuant to this chapter.

` 438. Definitions
`As used in this chapter--

`(1) the term `commercial activities' means activities conducted in a manner consistent with prevailing commercial practice and includes--

`(A) the acquisition, use, sale, storage, and disposal of goods and services;

`(B) entering into employment contracts, leases, and other agreements for real and personal property;

`(C) depositing funds into and withdrawing funds from domestic and foreign commercial businesses or financial institutions; and

`(D) acquiring licenses, registrations, permits, and insurance; and

`(2) the term `intelligence activities' means the collection of foreign intelligence and counterintelligence information.
(b) Clerical Amendments: The tables of chapters at the beginning of subtitle A of title 10, United States Code, and at the beginning of part I of subtitle A of such title, are each amended by inserting after the item relating to chapter 21 the following new item:

`22. Security Support for Department of Defense Intelligence Activities 431.'.

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SEC. 502. POST-EMPLOYMENT ASSISTANCE FOR CERTAIN NSA EMPLOYEES.
The National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 402 note) is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new section:
`Sec. 17. (a) Notwithstanding any other law, the Director of the National Security Agency may use appropriated funds to assist employees who have been in sensitive positions who are found to be ineligible for continued access to Sensitive Compartmented Information and employment with the Agency, or whose employment has been terminated--

`(1) in finding and qualifying for subsequent employment,

`(2) in receiving treatment of medical or psychological disabilities, and

`(3) in providing necessary financial support during periods of unemployment,
if the Director determines that such assistance is essential to maintain the judgment and emotional stability of such employee and avoid circumstances that might lead to the unlawful disclosure of classified information to which such employee had had access. Assistance provided under this section for an employee shall not be provided any longer than five years after the termination of the employment of the employee.
`(b) The Director of the National Security Agency shall report annually to the Appropriations Committees of the Senate and House of Representatives, the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives with respect to any expenditure made pursuant to this section.'.

SEC. 503. REIMBURSEMENT RATE FOR CERTAIN AIRLIFT SERVICES.
(a) Authority: The Secretary of Defense is authorized to grant the use of the Department of Defense reimbursement rate for military airlift services provided by the Department of Defense to the Central Intelligence Agency, if the Secretary of Defense determines that those military airlift services are provided for activities related to national security objectives.
(b) Definition.--For purposes of subsection (a), the term `Department of Defense reimbursement rate' means the rate of reimbursement charged by the Department of Defense to the military departments.

TITLE VI--DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY PERSONNEL AUTHORITY

SEC. 601. EXCEPTED POSITIONS FROM THE COMPETITIVE SERVICE.
Section 621 of the Department of Energy Organization Act (42 U.S.C. 7231) is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new subsection:
`(f) All positions in the Department which the Secretary determines are devoted to intelligence or intelligence-related activities of the United States Government are excepted from the competitive service, and the individuals who occupy such positions as of the date of enactment of this Act shall, while employed in such positions, be exempt from the competitive service.

TITLE VII--OVERSIGHT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

SEC. 701. REPEAL.
Section 662 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2422) is hereby repealed.

SEC. 702. CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT.
(a) In General: Section 501 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413) is amended to read as follows:

`CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT


`Sec. 501. (a) The President shall ensure that the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the Permanent Select Committee of the House of Representatives (hereafter in this title referred to as the `intelligence committees') are kept fully and currently informed of the intelligence activities of the United States, including any significant anticipated intelligence activities, as required by this title, except that--

`(1) nothing contained in this title shall be construed as requiring the approval of the intelligence committees as a condition precedent to the initiation of such activities; and

`(2) nothing contained in this title shall be construed as a limitation on the power of the President to initiate such activities in a manner consistent with his powers conferred by the Constitution.
`(b) The President shall ensure that any illegal intelligence activity is reported to the intelligence committees, as well as any corrective action that has been taken or is planned in connection with such illegal activity.
`(c) The President and the intelligence committees shall each establish procedures as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this title.
`(d) The House of Representatives and the Senate, in consultation with the Director of Central Intelligence, shall each establish, by rule or resolution of such House, procedures to protect from unauthorized disclosure all classified information and all information relating to intelligence sources and methods furnished to the intelligence committees or to Members of Congress under this title. In accordance with such procedures, each of the intelligence committees shall promptly call to the attention of its respective House, or to any appropriate committee or committees of its respective House, any matter relating to intelligence activities requiring the attention of such House or such committee or committees.
`(e) As used in this section, the term `intelligence activities' includes `covert actions', as defined in subsection 503(e).'.
(b) Information Required To Be Disclosed; Findings: The National Security Act of 1947 is amended--

(1) by redesignating sections 502 and 503 as sections 504 and 505, respectively; and

(2) by inserting after section 501 the following:

`REPORTING INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES OTHER THAN COVERT ACTIONS


`Sec. 502. To the extent consistent with due regard for the protection from unauthorized disclosure of classified information relating to sensitive intelligence sources and methods or other exceptionally sensitive matters, the Director of Central Intelligence and the heads of all departments, agencies, and other entities of the United States Government involved in intelligence activities shall--

`(1) keep the intelligence committees fully and currently informed of all intelligence activities, other than covert actions, as defined in subsection 503(e), which are the responsibility of, are engaged in by, or are carried out for or on behalf of, any department, agency, or entity of the United States Government, including any significant anticipated intelligence activity and significant failures; and

`(2) furnish the intelligence committees any information or material concerning intelligence activities other than covert actions which is within their custody or control and which is requested by either of the intelligence committees in order to carry out its authorized responsibilities.

`PRESIDENTIAL APPROVAL AND REPORTING COVERT ACTIONS


`Sec. 503. (a) The President may authorize the conduct of covert actions by departments, agencies, or entities of the United States Government only when he determines that such activities are necessary to support the foreign policy objectives of the United States and are important to the national security of the United States, which determination shall be set forth in a finding that shall meet each of the following conditions:

`(1) Each finding shall be in writing, unless immediate action by the United States is required and time does not permit the preparation of a written finding, in which case a written record of the President's decision shall be contemporaneously made and shall be reduced to a written finding as soon as possible but in no event more than 48 hours after the decision is made.

`(2) A finding may not authorize or sanction covert actions, or any aspect of such activities, which have already occurred.

`(3) Each finding shall specify each and every department, agency, or entity of the United States Government authorized to fund or otherwise participate in any significant way in such activities, except that any employee, contractor, or contract agent of a department, agency, or entity of the United States Government (other than the Central Intelligence Agency) directed to participate in any way in a covert action shall be subject to the policies and regulations of the Central Intelligence Agency, or to written policies or regulations adopted by such department, agency, or entity, governing such participation.

`(4) Each finding shall specify whether it is contemplated that any third party which is not an element, contractor, or contract agent of the United States Government, or is not otherwise subject to United States Government policies or regulations, will be used to fund or otherwise participate in any significant way in the covert action concerned or be used to undertake the covert action concerned on behalf of the United States.

`(5) A finding may not authorize any action intended to influence United States political processes, public opinion, policies, or media.

`(6) A finding may not authorize any action which violates the Constitution of the United States or any statutes of the United States.
`(b) To the extent consistent with due regard for the protection from unauthorized disclosure of classified information relating to sensitive intelligence sources and methods, or other exceptionally sensitive matters, the Director of Central Intelligence and the heads of all departments, agencies, and other entities of the United States Government involved in a covert action shall--

`(1) keep the intelligence committees fully and currently informed of all covert actions which are the responsibility of, are engaged in by, or are carried out for or on behalf of, any department, agency, or entity of the United States Government, including significant failures; and

`(2) furnish to the intelligence community any information or material concerning covert actions which is in the possession, custody, or control of any department, agency, or entity of the United States Government and which is requested by either of the intelligence committees in order to carry out its authorized responsibilities.
`(c)(1) Except as provided by paragraphs (2) and (3), the President shall ensure that any finding approved, or determination made, pursuant to subsection (a) shall be reported to the intelligence committees before the initiation of the activities authorized.
`(2) On rare occasions, the President may direct that covert actions be initiated before reporting such actions to the intelligence committees. On such occasions, the President shall fully inform the intelligence committees in a timely fashion and shall provide a statement of the reasons for not giving prior notice.

`(3) If the President determines it is essential to meet extraordinary circumstances affecting vital interests of the United States, the President may limit the reporting of findings or determinations pursuant to paragraphs (1) and (2) to the chairmen and ranking minority members of the intelligence committees, the Speaker and Minority Leader of the House of Representatives, and the Majority and Minority leaders of the Senate. In any such case, the President shall provide a statement of the reasons for limiting access to such findings or determinations in accordance with this subsection.
`(4) In each case reported pursuant to paragraph (1), (2), or (3), a copy of the finding, signed by the President, shall be provided to the chairman of each intelligence committee.
`(d) The President shall ensure that the intelligence committees or, if applicable, the Members of Congress specified in subsection (c)(3) are notified of any significant change in a previously approved covert action, or any significant undertaking pursuant to a previously approved finding, in the same manner as findings are reported pursuant to subsection (c).
`(e) As used in this section, the term `covert action' means an activity or activities conducted by an element of the United States Government to influence political, economic, or military conditions abroad so that the role of the United States Government is not intended to be apparent or acknowledged publicly, but does not include--

`(1) activities the primary purpose of which is to acquire intelligence, traditional counterintelligence activities, traditional activities to improve or maintain the operational security of the United States Government programs, or administrative activities;

`(2) traditional diplomatic or military activities or routine support to such activities;

`(3) traditional law enforcement activities conducted by United States Government law enforcement agencies or routine support to such activities; or

`(4) activities to provide routine support to the overt activities (other than activities described in paragraph (1), (2), or (3)) of other United States Government agencies abroad.'.
(c) Availability of Funds Subject to Findings: Section 504 of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended by subsection (b)(2), is further amended--

(1) by striking out `501' in subsection (a)(2) and inserting in lieu thereof `503'; and

(2) by adding at the end thereof the following new subsection:
`(d) No funds appropriated for, or otherwise available to, any department, agency, or entity of the United States Government, may be obligated or expended, or may be directed to be obligated or expended, for any covert action, as defined in section 503(e), unless and until a Presidential finding required by section 503(a), has been signed or otherwise issued in accordance with that section.'.

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TITLE VIII--GENERAL PROVISIONS

SEC. 801. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR INCREASES IN EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS AUTHORIZED BY LAW.
There are authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 1991 such additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for increases in salary, pay, retirement, and other benefits for Federal employees which are authorized by law.[H17OC0-T5]{H10090}by law.

MOTION OFFERED BY MR. BEILENSON

Mr. BEILENSON. Mr. Speaker, I offer a motion.

The Clerk read as follows:

Mr Beilenson moves to strike out all after the enacting clause of the Senate bill, S. 2834, and insert in lieu thereof the text of the bill, H.R. 5422, as passed, as follows:
That this Act may be cited as the `Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991.'

TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 1991 for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the following elements of the United States Government;

(1) The Central Intelligence Agency.

(2) The Department of Defense.

(3) The Defense Intelligence Agency.

(4) The National Security Agency.

(5) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, and the Department of the Air Force.

(6) The Department of State.

(7) The Department of the Treasury.

(8) The Department of Energy.

(9) The Federal Bureau of Investigation.

(10) The Drug Enforcement Administration.

SEC. 102. CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS.

The amounts authorized to be appropriated under section 101, and the authorized personnel ceilings as of September 30, 1991, for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the elements listed in such section, are those specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations prepared by the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence to accompany (H.R. 5422) of the One Hundred First Congress. That Schedule of Authorizations shall be made available to the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and House of Representatives and to the President. The President shall provide for suitable distribution of the Schedule, or of appropriate portions of the Schedule, within the Executive Branch.

SEC. 103. PERSONNEL CEILING ADJUSTMENTS.

The Director of Central Intelligence may authorize employment of civilian personnel in excess of the numbers authorized for fiscal year 1991 under sections 102 and 202 of this Act when he determines that such action is necessary for the performance of important intelligence functions, except that such number may not, for any element of the Intelligence Community, exceed two percent of the number of civilian personnel authorized under such sections for such element. The Director of Central Intelligence shall promptly notify the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate whenever he exercises the authority granted by this section.

TITLE II--INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY STAFF

SEC. 201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

There are authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Staff for fiscal year 1991 $27,900,000.

SEC. 202. AUTHORIZATION OF PERSONNEL END STRENGTH.

(a) The Intelligence Community Staff is authorized 240 full-time personnel as of September 30, 1991. Such personnel of the Intelligence Community Staff may be permanent employees of the Intelligence Community Staff or personnel detailed from other elements of the United States Government.

(b) During fiscal year 1991, personnel of the Intelligence Community Staff shall be selected so as to provide appropriate representation from elements of the United States Government engaged in intelligence and intelligence-related activities.

(c) During fiscal year 1991, any officer or employee of the United States or a member of the Armed Forces who is detailed to the Intelligence Community Staff from another element of the United States Government shall be detailed on a reimbursable basis, except that any such officer, employee or member may be detailed on a nonreimbursable basis for a period of less than one year for the performance of temporary functions as required by the Director of Central Intelligence.

SEC. 203. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY STAFF ADMINISTERED IN SAME MANNER AS CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

During fiscal year 1991, activities and personnel of the Intelligence Community Staff shall be subject to the provisions of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.) and the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403a et seq.) in the same manner as activities and personnel of the Central Intelligence Agency.

TITLE III--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM AND RELATED PROVISIONS

SEC. 301. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

There are authorized to be appropriated for the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund for fiscal year 1991 $164,600,000.

SEC. 302. CIA FORMER SPOUSE QUALIFYING TIME.

Section 204(b) of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act of 1964 for Certain employees (50 U.S.C. 403 note) is amended by inserting before the period at the end of paragraph (4) `during the participant's service as an employee of the Central Intelligence Agency'.

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SEC. 303. ELIMINATION OF 15-YEAR CAREER REVIEW FOR CERTAIN CIA EMPLOYEES.

Section 203 of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act of 1964 for Certain Employees (50 U.S.C. 403
note) is amended by striking out the second sentence and inserting in lieu thereof the following: `Any officer or employee who elects to accept designation as a participant entitled to the benefits of the system shall remain a participant of the system for the duration of his or her employment with the Agency. Such election shall be irrevocable except as and to the extent provided in section 301(d) of this Act and shall not be subject to review or approval by the Director.'.

SEC. 304. SURVIVOR ANNUITIES UNDER CIARDS FOR CERTAIN POST-RETIREMENT SPOUSES.

(a) Computation of Annuities for Other Than Former Spouses.--Section 221(n) of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act of 1964 for Certain Employees (50 U.S.C. 403 note) is amended by inserting `or elected under section 226(e)' after `(unless such reduction is adjusted under section 222(b)(5))'.

(b) Survivor Annuities.--Section 226 of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act of 1964 for Certain Employees (50 U.S.C. 403 note) is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:

`(e) Upon remarriage occurring on or after the date of the enactment of this subsection to a spouse other than the spouse at the time of retirement, a retired participant whose annuity was not reduced (or was not fully reduced) to provide a survivor annuity for the participant's spouse or former spouse as of the time of retirement may irrevocably elect by means of a signed writing received by the Director within one year after such remarriage, a reduction in the retired participant's annuity for the purpose of providing an annuity for such retired participant's spouse in the event such spouse survives the retired participant. The reduction shall be effective the first day of the month nine months after the date of remarriage. For remarriages that occurred prior to the date of the enactment of this subsection, the retired participant may make such an election within two years after the date of the enactment of this subsection. The retired participant, to the greatest extent practicable, shall pay a deposit under the same terms and conditions as those prescribed for retired employees under the Civil Service Retirement and Disability System under section 8339(j)(5)(C)(ii) of title 5, United States Code. A survivor annuity elected under this subsection shall be treated in all respects as a survivor annuity under section 221(b).'.

SEC. 305. REDUCTION OF REMARRIAGE AGE.

(a) Reduction of Remarriage Age for Survivor and Retirement Benefits.--The Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act of 1964 for Certain Employees (50 U.S.C. 403 note), is amended--

(1) in section 221--

(A) in subsections (b)(1)(A) and (b)(3)(C), by striking out `age 60' each place it appears and inserting in lieu thereof `age 55'; and

(B) in subsection (g)(1), by striking out `age sixty' each place it appears and inserting in lieu thereof `age 55';

(2) in section 222--

(A) by striking out `60 years of age' each place it appears in subsections (a)(2), (a)(3)(A), and (b)(2) and inserting in lieu thereof `55 years of age'; and

(B) by striking out `age 60' each place it appears in subsections (b)(3), (b)(5)(A), (c)(3)(C), (c)(3)(D), and (c)(4) and inserting in lieu thereof `age 55'; and

(3) in section 232(b)(1), by striking out `attaining age sixty' in the last sentence and inserting in lieu thereof `attaining age 55'.

(b) Effective Date of Amendments.--(1) The amendments made by subsection (a) relating to widows or widowers shall apply in the case of a surviving spouse's remarriage occurring on or after July 27, 1989, and with respect to periods beginning after such date.

(2) The amendments made by subsection (a) relating to former spousers shall apply with respect to any former spouse whose remarriage occurs after the date of enactment of this Act.

SEC. 306. ELECTION BETWEEN CIARDS ANNUITY AND OTHER SURVIVOR ANNUITIES.

Section 221(g) of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act of 1964 for Certain Employees is amended by adding at the end the following paragraph:

`(3) A surviving spouse who was acquired after the participant's retirement shall be entitled to a survivor annuity payable from the fund under this title only upon electing this annuity instead of any other survivor benefit to which he or she may be entitled under this or any other retirement system for Government employees on the basis of a marriage to someone other than the participant.'.

SEC. 307. RESTORATION OF FORMER SPOUSE BENEFITS AFTER DISSOLUTION OF REMARRIAGE.

(A) Survivor Annuity.--Section 224 of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act of 1964 for Certain Employees (50 U.S.C. 408 note), is amended--

(1) in subsection (b)(1) after `fifty-five' by inserting `, except that the entitlement of the former spouse to such a survivor annuity shall be restored on the date such remarriage is dissolved by death, annulment, or divorce';

(2) in subsection (c)(1)(B) after `fifty-five' by inserting `, except that the entitlement of the former spouse to such a survivor annuity shall be restored on the date such remarriage is dissolved by death, annualment, or divorce'; and

(3) by adding at the end thereof the following new subsection:

`(e) Notwithstanding subsection (c)(2)(A) of this section, the thirty-month application requirement for a survivor annuity under this section to be payable shall not apply in cases in which a former spouse's entitlement to such a survivor annuity is restored under subsection (b)(1) or (c)(1)(B) of this section.'.

(b) Retirement Benefits.--Section 225 of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act of 1964 for Certain Employees (50 U.S.C. 403 note), is amended--

(1) in subsection (c)(1)(B)(i) by inserting `, except that the entitlement of the former spouse to benefits under this section shall be restored on the date such remarriage is dissolved by death, annulment, or divorce' after `fifty-five years of age';

(2) in subsection (b)(1) after `fifty-five' by inserting `, except that the entitlement of the former spouse to benefits under this section shall be restored on the date such remarriage is dissolved by death, annulment, or divorce';

(3) by redesignating subsection (e) as subsection (f); and

(4) by adding after subsection (d) the following new subsection (e):

`(e) Notwithstanding subsection (c)(4)(A) of this section, the thirty-month application requirement for benefits under this section to be payable shall not apply in cases in which a former spouse's entitlement to such benefits is restored under subsection (b)(1) of (c)(1)(B) of this section.'.

(c) Health Benefits.--Section 16(c) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403a et seq.) is amended by adding after paragraph (2) the following new paragraph:

`(3)(A) A former spouse who is not eligible to enroll or to continue enrollment in a health benefits plan under this section solely because of remarriage before age fifty-five shall be restored to such eligibility on the date such remarriage is dissolved by death, annulment, or divorce.

`(B) A former spouse whose eligibility is restored under subparagraph (A) may, under regulations which the Director of the Office of Personnel Management shall prescribe, enroll in a health benefits plan is such former spouse--

`(i) was an individual referred to in paragraph (1) and was an individual covered under a benefits plan as a family member at any time during the 18-month period before the date of dissolution of the marriage to the Agency employee or annuitant; or

`(ii) was an individual referred to in paragraph (2) and was an individual covered under a benefits plan immediately before the remarriage ended the enrollment.'.

(d) Effective Date: The amendments made by this section shall take effect October 1, 1990. No benefits provided pursuant to the amendments made by this section shall be payable with respect to any period before such effective date.

(e) Compliance With Budget Act: Any new spending authority (within the meaning of section 401(c) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974) provided pursuant to the amendments made by this section shall be effective for any fiscal year only to such extent or in such amounts as are provided in advance in appropriation Acts.

TITLE IV--GENERAL PROVISIONS

SEC. 401. INCREASE IN EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS AUTHORIZED BY LAW.

Appropriations authorized by this Act for salary, pay, retirement, and other benefits for federal employees may be increased by such additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for increases in such compensation or benefits authorized by law.

SEC. 402. RESTRICTION ON CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

The authorization of appropriations by this Act shall not be deemed to constitute authority for the conduct of any intelligence activity which is not otherwise authorized by the Constitution or laws of the United States.

SEC. 403: BUY-AMERICAN REQUIREMENT.

(a) Determination by the Director: If the Director, with the concurrence of the United States Trade Representative and the Secretary of Commerce, determines that the public interest so desires, the Director is authorized to award to a domestic firm a contract that, under the use of competitive procedures, would be awarded to a foreign firm, if--

(1) the final product of the domestic firm will be completely assembled in the United States;

(2) when completely assembled, not less than 51 percent of the final product of the domestic firm will be domestically produced; and

(3) the difference between the bids submitted by the foreign and domestic firms is not more than 6 percent. In determining under this subsection whether the public interest so requires, The Director shall take into account United States international obligations and trade relations

(b) Limited Application: This section shall not apply to the extent to which--

(1) such applicability would not be in the public interest;

(2) compelling national security considerations require otherwise; or

(3) the United States Trade Representative determines that such an award would be in violation of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade or an international agreement to which the United States is a party.

(c) Limitation: This section shall apply only to contracts made related to the issuance of any grant made under this Act for which--

(1) amounts are authorized by this act (including the amendments made by this act) to be made available; and

(2) solicitation for bids are issued after the date of the enactment of this Act.

(d) Report to Congress: The Director shall report to the Congress on contracts covered under this section and entered into with foreign entities in fiscal years 1990 and 1991 and shall report to the Congress on the number of Contracts that meet the requirements of subsection (a) but which are determined by the Unied States Trade Representative to be in violation of the General Agreement or an international agreement to which the United States is a party. The Director shall also report to the Congress on the number of contracts covered under this Act (including the amendments made by this Act) and awarded based upon the parameters of this section.

(e) Definitions: For purposes of this section--

(1) Secretary: The term `Director' means the Director of Central Intelligence.

(2) Domestic Firm: The term `Domestic Firm' means a business entity that is incorporated in the United States and that conducts business operations in the United States.

(3) Foreign Firm: The term `foreign firm' means a business entity not described in paragraph (2).

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TITLE V--DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE PROVISIONS

SEC. 501. REIMBURSEMENT RATE FOR CERTAIN AIRLIFT SERVICE.

(a) The Secretary of Defense is authorized to grant the use of the Department of Defense reimbursement rate for military airlift services provided by the Department of Defense to the Central Intelligence Agency if the Secretary of Defense determines that such services are provided in support of authorized intelligence activities.

(b) As used in subsection (a), the term `Department of Defense reimbursement rate' means the amount charged a component of the Department of Defense by another component of the Department of Defense.

SEC. 502. PUBLIC AVAILABILITY OF MAPS, ETC., PRODUCED BY DEFENSE MAPPING AGENCY.

(A) In General.--(1) Chapter 167 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new section.

`2796. Maps, charts, and geodetic data: public availability; exceptions

`(a) The Defense Mapping Agency shall offer for sale maps and charts at scales of 1:500,000 and smaller, except those withheld in accordance with subsection (b) or those specifically authorized under criteria established By Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and in fact properly classified pursuant to such Executive order.

`(b)(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Secretary of Defense may withhold from public disclosure any geodetic product in the possessionof, or under the control of, the Department, of Defense--

`(A) that was obtained or produced, or that contains information that was provided, pursuant to an international agreement that restricts disclosure of such
product or information to government officials of the agreeing parties or that restrict use of such product or information to government purposes only;

`(B) that contains information that the Secretary of Defense has determined in writing would, if disclosed, reveal sources and methods used to obtain source material for production of the geodetic product; or

`(C) that contains information that the Director of the Defense Mapping Agency has determined in writing would, if disclosed, reveal military operational or contingency plans.

`(2) In this subsection, the term `geodetic product' means any map, chart, geodetic data, or related product.

`(c)(1) Regulations to implement this section (including any amendments to such regulations) shall be published in the Federal Register for public comment for a period of not less than 30 days before they take effect.

`(2) Regulations under this section shall address the conditions under which release of geodetic products authorized under subsection (b) to be withheld from public disclosure would be appropriate--

`(A) in the case of allies of the United States; and

`(B) in the case of qualified United States contractors (including contractors that are small business
concerns) who need such products for use in the performance of contracts with the United States.'.

(2) The table of sections at the beginning of such chapter is amended by adding at the end the following new item:

`2796. Maps, charts, and geodetic data: public availability; exceptions.'.

(b) Deadline for Initial Regulations: Regulations to implement section 2796 of title 10, United States Code, as added by subsection (a), shall be published in the Federal Register for public comment in accordance with subsection (c) of that section not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.

SEC. 503. USE OF COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES AS COVER SUPPORT FOR INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE.

(a) In General: Chapter 21 of title 10, United States Code, is amended--

(1) by inserting after the chapter heading the following:

`Subchapter

Sec.

`I. General Matters

421

`II. Intelligence Commercial Activities

431

`SUBCHAPTER I--GENERAL MATTERS';


and

(2) by adding at the end the following:

`SUBCHAPTER II--INTELLIGENCE COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES

`431. Authority to engage in commercial activities as security for defense intelligence collection activities.

`432. Use, disposition, and auditing of funds.

`433. Relationship with other Federal laws.

`434. Reservation of defenses and immunities.

`435. Limitations.

`436. Regulations, internal oversight, and legal review.

`437. Congressional oversight.

`431. Authority to engage in commercial activities as security for defense intelligence collection activities

`(a) Authority: The Secretary of Defense, subject to the provisions of this subchapter, may authorize elements of the Department of Defense to engage in such commercial activities as may be necessary for the purpose of providing security for the conduct of authorized intelligence collection activities abroad undertaken by the Department of Defense. The authority of the Secretary under the preceding sentence may not be delegated. No commercial activities may be conducted pursuant to this subchapter after September 30, 1995.

`(b) Interagency Coordination and Support: Any such activity shall--

`(1) be coordinated with, and (where appropriate) be supported by, the Director of Central Intelligence; and

`(2) to the extent the activity takes place within the United States, be coordinated with, and (where appropriate) be supported by, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

`(c) Definitions: In this subchapter:

`(1) The term `commercial activities' means activities that are conducted in a manner consistent with prevailing commercial practice. Such term includes--

`(A) the acquisition, use, sale, storage and disposal of goods and services;

`(B) entering into employment contracts and leases and other agreements for real and personal property;

`(C) depositing funds into the withdrawing funds from domestic and foreign commercial businesses or financial institutions;

`(D) acquiring licenses, registrations, permits, and insurance; and

`(E) establishing corporations, partnerships, and other legal entities.

`(2) The term `intelligence collection activities' means the collection of foreign intelligence and counterintelligence information.

`432. Use, disposition, and auditing of funds

`(a) Use of Funds.--Funds generated by a commercial activity authorized pursuant to this subchapter may be used to offset necessary and reasonable expenses arising from that activity. Use of such funds for that purposes shall be kept to the minimum necessary to operate the activity concerned in a secure manner. Any funds generated by the activity in excess of those required for that purpose shall be deposited into the Treasury as miscellaneous receipts. The Secretary of Defense shall ensure that such deposits are made as often as may be practicable.

`(b) Audits: (1) The Secretary of Defense shall assign an organization with the Department of Defense to have auditing responsibility with respect to activities authorized under this subchapter.

`(2) That organization shall audit the use and disposition of funds generated by any commercial activity authorized under this subchapter not less often than anually. Upon the completion of any such audit, the Secretary shall promptly notify the intelligence committees (as defined in section 437(d) of this title) of the results of the audit.

433. Relationship with other Federal laws

`(a) In General.--Except as provided under subsection (b), a commercial activity conducted pursuant to this subchapter shall be carried out in accordance with applicable Federal law.

`(b) Authorization of Waivers When Necessary To Maintain Security.--(1) If the Secretary of Defense determines, in connection with the establishment or operation of a commercial activity pursuant to this chapter, that compliance with the provisions of certain Federal laws and regulations pertaining to the management and administration
of Federal agencies would create an unacceptable risk of compromise of an authorized intelligence collection activity, the Secretary may, to the extent necessary to prevent the disclosure of the commercial activity concerned as an instrumentality of the United States, authorize the establishment and operation of the activity notwithstanding those laws or regulations.

`(2) Any determination and authorization by the Secretary under paragraph (1) shall be certified by the Secretary in writing and shall include a specification of the laws or regulations for which compliance by the commercial activity concerned is not required consistent with this section.

`(3) The authority of the Secretary under paragraph (1) may only be delegated to the Deputy Secretary of Defense, an Under Secretary of Defense, or an Assistant Secretary of Defense.

`(c) Federal Laws and Regulations.--For purposes of this section, Federal laws and regulations pertaining to the management and administration of Federal agencies are those Federal laws and regulations pertaining to the following:

`(1) The receipt and use of appropriated and non-appropriated funds.

`(2) The acquisition or management of property or services.

`(3) Information disclosure, retention, and management.

`(4) The employment of personnel.

`(5) Payments for travel and housing.

`(6) The establishment of legal entities or government instrumentalities.

`(7) Foreign trade or financial transaction restrictions that would reveal the commercial activity as an activity of the United States Government.

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`434. Reservation of defenses and immunities

`Commercial activity undertaken pursuant to this subchapter, including the submission to judicial proceedings of a State, shall not constitute a waiver of the defenses and immunities of the United States.

`435. Limitations

`(a) Lawful Activities.--Nothing in this subchapter authorizes the conduct of any intelligence activity that is not otherwise authorized by law or Executive order.

`(b) Domestic Activities.--Personnel conducting commercial activity authorized by this subchapter may only engage in those activities in the United States to the extent necessary to support intelligence activities abroad.

`(c) Supply to Department of Defense.--Commercial activity may not be undertaken within the United States for the purpose of providing goods or services to the
Department of Defense, other than as may be necessary to provide security for the activities subject to this subchapter.

`(d) United States Persons: (1) In carrying out a commercial activity authorized under this subchapter, the Secretary of Defense may not permit an entity engaged in such activity to employ a United States person in an operational, managerial, or supervisory position, and may not assign or detail a United States person to perform operational, managerial, or supervisory duties for such an entity, unless that person is informed in advance of the intelligence security purpose of that activity.

`(2) In this subsection, the term `United States person' means an individual who is a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted to the United States for permanent residence.

436. Regulations, internal oversight, and legal review

`The Secretary of Defense shall prescribe regulations to implement the authority provided in this subchapter. Such regulations shall--

`(1) specify all officials authorized to approve commerical activities under this subchapter;

`(2) designate a single office within the Department of Defense to implement, and to maintain accountability for, all activities authorized under this subchapter;

`(3) require that each commercial activity proposed to be authorized under this subchapter be subject to legal review before the activity is authorized; and

`(4) provide for appropriate internal audit controls and oversight for such activities.

`437. Congressional oversight

`(a) Proposed Regulations: Copies of regulations proposed to be prescribed under section 436 of this title (including any proposed revision to such regulations) shall be submitted to the intelligence committees not less than 30 days before they take effect.

`(b) Current Information: The Secretary of Defense shall ensure that the intelligence committees are kept fully and currently informed of actions taken pursuant to this subchapter, including any significant anticipated activity to be authorized pursuant to this subchapter. The Secretary shall promptly notify the committees whenever a corporation, partnership, or other legal entity is established under this subchapter.

`(c) Annual Report: Not later than January 15 of each year, the Secretary shall submit to the intelligence committees a report on all commercial activities authorized under this subchapter that were undertaken during the previous fiscal year. Such report shall include (with respect to the fiscal year covered by the report)--

`(1) a description of any exercise of the authority provided by section 433 of this title to the Secretary of Defense;

`(2) a description of any expenditure of funds made pursuant to this subchapter (whether from appropriated or nonappropriated funds); and

`(3) a description of any actions taken with respect to audits under section 432 of this title to implement recommendations or correct deficiencies identified in such audits.

`(d) Intelligence Committees Defined.--In this section, the term `intelligence committees' means the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.'.

(b) Effective Date.--The Secretary of Defense may not authorize an activity under section 431 of title 10, United States Code, as added by subsection (a), until the later of--

(1) the end of the 90-day period beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act; or

(2) the effective date of regulations first prescribed under section 436 of such title, as added by subsection (a).

SEC. 504. DISCLOSURE TO MEMBERS OF CONGRESS OF CLASSIFIED DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY REPORT RELATING TO MILITARY PERSONNEL LISTED AS PRISONER, MISSING, OR UNACCOUNTED FOR.

The Secretary of Defense shall provide to any Member of Congress, upon request, full and complete access to the classified report of the Defense Intelligence Agency commonly known as the Tighe Report, relating to efforts by the Special Office for Prisoners of War/Missing in Action of the Defense Intelligence Agency to fully account for United States military personnel listed as prisoner, missing, or unaccounted for in military actions. The Secretary may withhold from disclosure under the preceding sentence any material that in the judgment of the Secretary would compromise sources and methods of intelligence.

TITLE VI--CAMBODIAN NONCOMMUNIST RESISTANCE

SEC. 601. RESTRICTIONS ON ASSISTANCE FOR THE CAMBODIAN NONCOMMUNIST RESISTANCE FORCES.

(a) Restrictions.--Funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act may be obligated and expended for assistance for the Cambodian noncommunist resistance forces only as follows:

(1) Any such assistance shall be limited to nonlethal assistance.

(2) Any such assistance shall be consistent with section 906 of the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985 (relating to the prohibition on assistance to the Khmer Rouge).

(3) Any funds to be made available for such assistance shall be allocated for that purpose within 30 days after date of enactment of this Act.

(4) Within 30 days after the conclusion of a comprehensive political settlement involving the 4 Cambodian factions, the unexpended balance of the funds allocated for assistance for the Cambodian noncommunist resistance pursuant to paragraph (3) shall be transferred to such agency of the United States Government as the President may designate. The President may not designate an intelligence agency for purposes of this paragraph. Such funds shall be expended in ways that are consistent with the comprehensive political settlement.

(5) After funds are transferred pursuant to paragraph (4) funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act (and any other funds available to any intelligence agency during fiscal year 1991 may not be obligated or expended by any intelligence agency for assistance for the Cambodian noncommunist resistance forces.

(b) Relation to Foreign Assistance Funds: Funds made available for assistance for the Cambodian noncommunist resistance forces pursuant to this section are in addition to any funds that are made available for assistance for the Cambodian noncommunist resistance forces under the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1991.

(c) Intelligence Sharing and Collection: Subsection (a) does not apply with respect to intelligence sharing or intelligence collection.

(d) Definition of Intelligence Agency: As used in this section, the term `intelligence agency' means any agency within the intelligence community, within the meaning of section 3.4(f) of Executive Order 12333 (December 4, 1981).

TITLE VII--INCENTIVES FOR PEACE IN ANGOLA

SEC. 701. ENCOURAGING REDUCTIONS IN EXTERNAL ASSISTANCE TO PARTIES TO THE ANGOLAN CONFLICT.

(a) Prohibition on Assistance:

(1) Presidential certification: If the Government of Angola expresses its willingness to accept a ceasefire and a political settlement to the conflict in Angola and proposes a reasonable timetable for free and fair multiparty national elections in which UNITA would be free to participate, and is no longer receiving aid from the Soviet Unions, the President shall promptly so certify to the appropriate committees.

(2) Assistance prohibited pursuant to certification or joint resolution: Except as provided in subsections (b), (c), and (d), if the President makes the certification described in paragraph (1) or if the Congress enacts a joint resolution declaring that the Congress has made the determination with respect to the Government of Angola that is described in that paragraph, then--

(A) intelligence community funds may not be obligated or expended during fiscal year 1991 for the acquisition of weapons, ammunition, or other lethal military equipment for the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola; and

(B) the United States shall suspend, or cause the suspension of, the delivery to UNITA of any weapons, ammunition, or other lethal military equipment acquired with any intelligence community funds that may have been previously expended, to the extent that the United States retains the ability to suspend such deliveries.

(b) Removal of Prohibition if the Government of Angola Is No Longer Pursuing a Political Solution: Except as provided in subsection (e), in the event the President has made the certification described in subsection (a)(1) or the Congress has enacted the joint resolution described in subsection (a)(2), subsection (a)(2) shall cease to apply if the President certifies to the appropriate committees that the Government of Angola is no longer willing to accept a ceasefire and a political settlement and is no longer proposing a reasonable timetable for free and fair multiparty national elections in which UNITA would be free to participate. A certification may be made under this subsection only during the 3-month period beginning on the date on which the President made his certification under subsection (a)(1) or the Congress enacted a joint resolution under subsection (a)(2), as the case may be.

(c) Conditions for Removal of Prohibiton After 3 Months: Should subsection (a)(2) become applicable pursuant a President certification under subsection (a)(1) or enactment of a joint resolution under subsection (a)(2) or (e), subsection (a)(2) shall cease to apply, subject to subsection (e), if the President certifies to the appropriate committees (after the end of the 3-month period specified in the last sentence of this subsection) that he has made the determinations required by both paragraphs (1) and (2), as follows:

(1) Determinations with regard to the government of angola: A determination either--

(A) that the Government of Angola refuses to participate in good faith in negotiations for a ceasefire and a political settlement that includes a reasonable timetable for free and fair multiparty national elections in which UNITA would be free to participate;

(B) that--

(i) during the review period, the Soviet Union or other sources outside Angola sold or otherwise made available to the Government of
Angola additional, militarily significant amounts of weapons, ammunition, and other lethal military equipment, or

(ii) prior to the end of the review period, the Government of Angola had not ceased receiving militarily significant amounts of lethal military equipment that had previously been sold or otherwise made available by sources outside Angola; or

(C) that the Government of Angola or the Government of Cuba is not complying with its obligations under the Cuban Troop Withdrawal Agreement.

(2) Determinations with regard to unita.--A determination both--

(A) that UNITA has expressed its willingness to participate in good faith in negotiations for a ceasefire and a political settlement that includes a reasonable timetable for free and fair multiparty national elections; and

(B) that--

(i) sources outside Angola did not sell or otherwise make available to UNITA during the review period additional, militarily significant amounts of weapons, ammunition, and other lethal military equipment; and

(ii) prior to the end of the review period, UNITA had ceased receiving militarily significant amounts of lethal military equipment that had previously been sold or otherwise made available by sources outside Angola.
A certification may be made under this subsection only after the end of the 3-month period beginning on the date on which the President made his certification under subsection (a)(1) or the Congress enacted a joint resolution under subsection (a)(2), as the case may be; except that if the Congress enacts a joint resolution disapproving a certification submitted by the President under this subsection, the President may not make another certification under this subsection until after the end of the 3-month period beginning on the date of enactment of that joint resolution.

(d) Removal of Prohibition If There Is a Military Offensive Against UNITA.--Subsection (a) and paragraphs (1) and (2) of subsection (f) shall cease to apply if the President certifies to the appropriate committees that--

(1) the Government of Angola has launched a military offensive that threatens the survival of UNITA, or

(2) there is clear and credible evidence of a military build-up by the Government of Angola that makes it likely that a military offense that would threaten the
survival of UNITA will occur.

(e) Congressional Disapproval of Presidential Certifications: If the Congress enacts a joint resolution disapproving a certification submitted by the President under subsection (b), (c), or (d), then subparagraphs (A) and (B) of subsection (a)(2) shall apply for the remainder of fiscal year 1991 unless the President subsequently makes a certification under subsection (c) or (d).

(f) Limitations on Amounts of United States Assistance.--

(1) Assistance during first quarter of fiscal year.--Except as otherwise provided in this section, the aggregate amount of intelligence community funds that is obligated during the period beginning October 1, 1990, and ending December 31, 1990, for the acquisition of weapons, ammunition, or other lethal military equipment for UNITA may not exceed the amount which is 25 percent of the amount of any intelligence community funds allocated for that purpose during fiscal year 1990 or during fiscal year 1991, whichever is less.

(2) Assistance during first half of fiscal year.--Except as otherwise provided in this section, the aggregate amount of intelligence community funds that is obligated during the period beginning October 1, 1990, and ending March 31, 1991, for the acquisition of weapons, ammunition, or other lethal military equipment for UNITA may not exceed the amount which is 50 percent of the amount of any intelligence community funds allocated for that purpose during fiscal year 1990 or during fiscal year 1991, whichever is less.

(3) Assistance during entire fiscal year.--The aggregate amount of intelligence community funds that is obligated at any time during fiscal year 1991 for the acquisition of weapons, ammunition, or other lethal military equipment for UNITA may not exceed the amount of any intelligence community funds allocated for that purpose during fiscal year 1990.

(g) Reports on Military Assistance Deliveries, Commitments to Multiparty Democracy, and Compliance with Cuban Troop Withdrawal Agreement:

(1) In general.--On November 1, 1990, January 1, 1991, April 1, 1991, and July 1, 1991, the President shall submit to the appropriate committees a report--

(A) on the extent to which the Government of Angola is continuing to obtain militarily significant amounts of weapons, ammunition, and other lethal military equipment from foreign countries or other third parties;

(B) on the extent to which UNITA is continuing to obtain militarily significant amounts of weapons, ammunition, and other lethal military equipment from
foreign countries or other third parties;

(C) on the extent to which the Government of Angola is willing to accept a ceasefire and a political settlement that includes a reasonable timetable for free and fair multiparty national elections in which UNITA would be free to participate;

(D) on the extent to which UNITA is willing to accept a ceasefire and a political settlement that includes a reasonable timetable for free and fair multiparty national elections; and

(E) on whether the Government of Angola and the Government of Cuba are complying with their obligations under the Cuban Troop Withdrawal Agreement.

(2) Certification to be included.--Unless the President has already made the certification described in subsection (a)(1) or the Congress has enacted a joint resolution described in subsection (a)(2), the President shall certify in each report submitted pursuant to paragraph (1) whether the Government of Angola has expressed its willingness to accept a ceasefire and a political settlement to the conflict in Angola and has proposed a reasonable timetable for free and fair multiparty national elections in which UNITA would be free to participate. If the President certifies pursuant to this paragraph that the Government of Angola has expressed such a willingness and proposed such a timetable, that certification shall be considered to be a certification under subsection (a)(1).

(3) Description of united states efforts.--The report required by paragraph (1) shall also describe the President's efforts--

(A) to obtain agreement by foreign countries and other third parties to terminate assistance to the Government of Angola and UNITA for the acquisition of militarily significant amounts of weapons, ammunition, and other lethal military equipment; and

(B) to encourage both the Government of Angola and UNITA to agree to a ceasefire and a political settlement that includes an reasonable timetable for free and fair multiparty national elections.

(4) Report with certification.--If the President makes a certification under subsection (a)(1), (b), (c), or (d), the President shall include with that certification a report containing the information specified in paragraphs (1) and (3) of this subsection and the justification for the President's certification.

(h) Definitions.--As used in this section--

(1) the term `appropriate committees' means the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;

(2) the term `intelligence community funds' means funds available to the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, or any other agency or entity of the United States involved in intelligence activities;

(3) the term `obligations under the Cuban Troop Withdrawal Agreement' means the obligations relating to the calendar for redeployment and withdrawal of Cuban troops as specified in the Agreement Between the Governments of the People's Republic of Angola and the Republic of Cuba for the Termination of the International Mission of the Cuban Military Contingent, signed at the United Nations on December 22, 1988;

(4) the term `review period' means the period beginning on the date the President make a certification under subsection (a)(1) or a joint resolution is enacted under subsection (a)(2) or (e), as the case may be, and ending on the date on which the President makes a certification under subsection (c); and

(5) the term `UNITA' means the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola.

The motion was agreed to.

The Senate bill was ordered to be read a third time, was read the third time, and passed, and a motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

[Page: H10095]

END



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