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Further Reading

AGM-158 JASSM Program Developments

The origins of the Joint Air to Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM) may be traced to the late 1970s when the Air Force turned to a cruise missile instead of participating in the JTACMS missile. The cruise missile program became the Tri-Service Standoff Attack Missile (TSSAM), which was subsequently canceled because of technical difficulties and cost increases on the order of threefold. JASSM was a FY-96 new start follow-on weapon system to the canceled TSSAM. Price was expected to be under $500,000 in quantity, whereas the TASSM was targeted at $750,000 and was estimated to have increased to over $2 million per unit. Initially, the program entertained proposals from seven contractors. The build-up to the Request for Proposal release was a period of intense interaction between all contractors and the government team.

On June 17, 1996 Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition Arthur Money announced that Lockheed-Martin Integrated Systems, Orlando, Fla.; and McDonnell Douglas Aerospace, St. Louis, Mo., had been selected to compete in the Program Definition and Risk Reduction (PDRR) phase of the JASSM program. Lockheed-Martin Integrated Systems and McDonnell Douglas Aerospace were awarded cost plus fixed fee contracts totaling $237.4 million, and will compete in head to head competition over the next 24 months. At the end of this phase, the Department of Defense would select a single winning contractor to complete development and production of at least 2,400 JASSMs at a total program cost of approximately $3 billion.

The Air Force and Navy developed an aggressive acquisition approach that reflects the intent to develop, produce, and initially deploy JASSMs within five years, by 2001. To minimize overall program risk, JASSM leveraged off existing technologies, readily available components, and previous weapon system developments to the maximum extent possible. JASSM's acquisition approach was based on precepts of Acquisition Reform and the concept of Cost as an Independent Variable. Instead of mandating requirements supported by countless military specifications, the JASSM program has only three key performance parameters: range, missile mission effectiveness and carrier operability. All other requirements were tradable to obtain a missile below the threshold average unit price of $700,000 per missile. The JASSM requirements and cost goals evolved over the previous year in an unprecedented partnership with industry, the joint warfighters, and the Department of Defense Acquisition Community.

The Navy proposed to replace the joint program for JASSM with the Navy's SLAM-ER, prior to completion of the program definition and risk reduction phase for JASSM. The proposal was one of the program alternatives that was considered at the Milestone II review for entry of the JASSM program into engineering and manufacturing development in July 1998, evaluated the technical progress in the program and risk reduction phase, cost and operational effectiveness analysis, and other factors.

A downselect to one contractor for the engineering and manufacturing development and full-rate production phases occurred in April 1998 with the selection of Lockheed-Martin. EMD Objectives were to demonstrate through test and/or analysis that all requirements as stated in the contractor generated System Performance Specification, derived from Operational Requirements, are met, including military utility (operational effectiveness and suitability); demonstrate ability to deliver an affordable and producible system at or under the AUPP requirement; demonstrate all production processes; and produce production representative systems for operational test and evaluation, including combined development/operational test and evaluation.

JASSM is an OSD flagship program under Cost as An Independent Variable (CAIV). This allows the contractor to have maximum trade space to develop an affordable missile that met four Key Performance Parameters. Under CAIV, the program maintains a threshold Average Unit Procurement Price (AUPP) of $700,000 (BY95$) and an objective AUPP of $400,000 (BY95$). The Government is buying the JASSM system based on a contractor developed, government-approved System Performance Specification (SPS) which became contractually binding at downselect. The contractor assumes Total System Performance Reliability (TSPR) as defined in the SPS and warrants system performance for 15 years. Accordingly, the contractor is responsible not only for the design of the missile system, but also for planning and executing the Development Test and Evaluation (DT&E) program to verify the missile system performance. In its role as facilitator and advisor to the contractor, the Government formally arranges and funds the use of Government flight test support for DT&E. Although funded by the Government, flight test support funds are part of the negotiated commitment between the contractor and the Government ensuring the contractor is able to execute the DT&E program according to the scope of the EMD contract.

In December 1998 the development of JASSM was slowed, following concerns that the program's development schedule was "too aggressive." The engineering and manufacturing development (EMD) phase was extended from 34 to 40 months. Another reason given for the extended schedule was that the Theater Battle Management Core System, on which the JASSM was expected to rely, was not yet year 2000-compliant. The JASSMs, costing approximately $300,000 per unit, were tested beginning in February 1999 at Eglin Air Force Base and White Sands Missile Range.

In 1998, the Joint Chiefs of Staff selected the Selective Availability Anti-Spoofing Module (SAASM) as the Global Positioning System (GPS) security architecture, with the mandate that as of 01 October 2006, all newly fielded military GPS systems will use SAASM-compliant Precise Positioning System (PPS) devices.

On April 01, 1999 Lockheed Martin Integrated Systems, Inc., Orlando, Fla., was awarded a $12,600,000 face value increase to a cost-plus-award-fee contract to provide for engineering and manufacturing development to incorporate the Selective Availability Anti-Spoofing Module to the Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM). This module will enhance the security of the missile's guidance system. The work will be performed at Lockheed Martin's plant in Orlando, Fla. (41%), and Raytheon Company's plant in Fullerton, Calif. (59%). The work is expected to be completed by April 2002. Contract funds will not expire at the end of the current fiscal year. The Air Armament Center, Eglin AFB, Fla., is the contracting activity (F08626-96/C-0002, P00047).

Following the FTV-1 failure/analysis and concerns with some subcontractor hardware deliveries, the EMD program went through a modification. An additional 10 months was added to EMD, which began in November 1998, and by 2000 was scheduled to run for 50 months, resulting in a one-year slip of IOT&E; Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) award was also moved 10 months from 3Q/01 to 1Q/02.

Low-rate initial production decision for JASSM was in the year 2000, with full-scale production scheduled to run from 2002 to 2009. Total missile production for the US Air Force was expected to be 2400 missiles. The total for the US Navy had not been determined at that time. The total program was valued at the time at approximately $3 billion.

The Air Force implemented a streamlined acquisition strategy that incorporates reforms intended to reduce time spent designing a weapon system by eliminating unneeded military standards and specifications, relying on mature technologies, and limiting changes in performance requirements. As a result, the Engineering Manufacturing Development 55-month timeframe for the JASSM program represented a substantial reduction from the historical average of 128 months for other programs. The JASSM's first missile was delivered from Lockheed Martin's production facility in Troy, Ala. in early April 2000.

Undersecretary of Defense Pete Aldridge gave the Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM) program the go-ahead for Low Rate Initial Production on 21 December 2001. This decision would give the Air Force combat capability on the F-16 and B-52 by 2003. This low-cost, high performance program came in below the objective unit cost of $400K in FY95 dollars. As a result, the Air Force increased its buy from 2400 to 3700 missiles over 13 years. The Air Force planned to make the decision for full-rate production in late 2003. The Navy planned to purchase 450 JASSMs at that time.

In July 2002 JASSM successfully demonstrated a state-of-the-art anti-jam GPS feature in a test from an F-16 aircraft at White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico. This test, DT-9A, was the first launch of a JASSM Block 1A missile that included Selective Availability Anti-spoofing Module (SAASM) technology. This component will be included in JASSM production vehicles made in Lot 2 in 2004. The upgraded anti-jam capability improves JASSM's performance in acquiring and tracking GPS signals in a jamming environment. Nulling enhances the missile's ability to ignore signal noise from multiple directions that might interfere with target navigation. Beam steering provides the additional benefit of focusing the reception pattern only in the direction of the GPS satellites. Lockheed Martin Systems Integration - Owego produces the digital, high anti-jam adaptive nulling and beam-steering GPS receiver.

The JASSM successfully cleared its test program and moved into production. The Air Force suspended testing of the JASSM for about three months after two consecutive failures during test shots on 10 October and 24 October 2002. The first consecutive missile failure in August 2002, was blamed on the Air Force launch crew. Prior to these three failures, JASSM had 12 development and two operational combat test flights successes.

On 14 November 2002 the quarterly Selected Acquisition Report said JASSM had slipped nine months and that its cost had gone from about $3.12 billion to $3.16 billion, and increase of $43.6 million, or 1.4 percent. The December 2002 SAR, released in April 2003, reported that program costs increased $887.6 million (+28.1%) from $3,163.2 million to $4,050.8 million, due primarily to a quantity increase of 6 developmental test/operational test missiles for JASSM-Extended Range (ER) (+$6.8 million) and 640 procurement missiles (from 3700 to 4340 missiles) (+$433.0 million). There were also increases for JASSM-ER development and additional capability engine/fuel costs (+$438.6 million).

JASSM began low rate initial production (LRIP) in FY02 with a buy of 76 missiles. Deliveries began in April 2003. In late March 2003 a JASSM was successfully launched from a B-52H aircraft and precisely navigated through its final development test at White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico. This flight test completed developmental testing and positioned the team for the recertification of JASSM for Independent Operational Test and Evaluation (IOT&E). This was the fourth JASSM Block 1A missile with the Selective Availability Anti-spoofing Module (SAASM) technology in an enhanced digital anti-jam Global Positioning System (GPS) receiver. The B-52 was the first aircraft to reach RAA (Required Assets Available) in September 2003, while B-2, B-1, and F-16 followed in FY04.

In December 2003 Pentagon Comptroller Dov Zakheim overturned a proposal from his staff, deciding to delay the Navy's production of the Lockheed Martin Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile. Navy JASSM production was to slip from FY '07 to FY '08 as a result of Zakheim's decision, which is recorded in program budget decision No. 702R2, which contains revisions, including additional decisions, made to the original PBD No. 702, which covers Navy programs. Zakheim's staff originally rejected the Navy's plan, saying the service had not justified the delay.

In July 2004 JASSM reached Full Rate Production. However, even as JASSM continued to hit milestones some challenges remained. Achieving demonstrated in-flight reliability turned out to be the biggest challenge in the transition from development to full rate production. To address these challenges, the program pulled together the experts from across industry and the Department of Defense to review plans and givefeedback to ensure the type of reliability growth needed to field large numbers of assets in the field. In late Summer/Fall 2004, OSD/Air Force convened an independent Reliability Enhancement Team (RET) to review JASSM processes and system engineering procedures, and to investigate reliability/quality initiatives. The Air Force implemented RET recommendations through a combination of detailed design analysis, production quality reviews, and comprehensive ground and flight testing.

The F-16 testing was moved to follow-on operational test and evaluation (FOT&E) due to lack of an operationally representative software and aircraft. FOT&E would evaluate F-16 operational JASSM capability and address outstanding issues from IOT&E. JASSM Key Performance Parameters were missile mission effectiveness (the ability to survive and kill a defined target set), interoperability, missile range, and aircraft carrier operability. The Joint Requirements Oversight Council approved moving the Carrier Operability Key Performance Parameter until after Milestone III due to funding limitations and F/A-18 E/F test aircraft availability.

The Air Force extensively tested the Joint Air to Surface Standoff Missile during 2005 after a break in testing. The JASSM team went back to prove the weapon could deliver on its promise. During flight tests in 2005 the weapon scored nine successes in 11 tests, followed by two more successful flights already in 2006. On the heels of those successes, the weapon finished the year strong reaching Initial Operational Capability on the B-52 and B-1. Approximately 360 missiles per year were planned for full-rate production.

The Navy funding only provided for unique testing for the Carrier Operability KPP and integration aboard the Navy F/A-18E/F including mission planning. Due to higher Navy prioriities and redundancy in mission, Navy participation in JASSM was terminated in FY05.

By 2006 more than 350 JASSMs had been delivered and were in the hands of the warfighter and ready for combat use around the world if called upon. By that time, the Air Force planned to buy 2,400 JASSMs and 2,500 JASSM-ERs with production extending through 2018.

On March 15, 2006 Lockheed Martin Missiles and Fire Control, Orlando, Fla., was awarded a $79,950,626 firm fixed price contract modification. This action provides for Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM) (AGM-158) Production Lot 5 for 70 production units, Lot 5 contractor engineering support and JASSM reliability enhancement efforts (includes 5 dedicated JASSM reliability test vehicles). At this time, total funds have been obligated. This work will be complete February 2008. The Headquarters Air Armament Center Center, Eglin Air Force Base, Fla., is the contracting activity (FA8682-04-C-0060/P00012).

JASSM Program Restructure

In April 2007 DOD reported to Congress that JASSM's cost had increased from $4.3 billion to $5.8 billion. JASSM was one of five programs that exceeded its original per-unit cost estimate by more than 50 percent in 2007, triggering Nunn-McCurdy review. By then, DoD already had about 600 of the missiles on hand, with plans to buy another 4,000. The primary drivers for the cost breach were the addition of 2,500 of the more expensive Extended Range variant (increasing total missile quantity from 2,400 to 4,900) and a reliability improvement program. As a result, even if JASSM performed successfully in its ground and flight tests, the program could not continue unless the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics certifies that it was essential to national security, no feasible alternatives exist, cost estimates were reasonable, and the program's management structure was adequate. The Under Secretary delayed certification pending the test results.

In test flights during April and May 2007, the program experienced four of four test failures, producing an overall missile reliability rate of less than 60 percent. During tests on 30 April and 01 May 2007, three of the missiles missed by up to 200 feet, and a fourth failed to detonate on impact, a repeat of a previously-experienced fuze failure. Developers blamed the misses on "GPS dropout" that compromised the missile's navigation system. The GPS receiver works with a very weak signal from fast-moving distant satellites, and some such dropouts are unavoidable. GPS dropout conditions may occur because of moving into an area with terrain blockage. At times there may be interference from other radio sources or even sunspot activity. When a GPS dropout does occur, navigation systems can give bad track. Following a GPS dropout, a receiver can require several seconds for reacquisition lock.

The program office developed a plan to solve the reliability problems by: (1) implementing a software change to the GPS receiver, (2) correcting a design flaw by moving a cable associated with the weapon's anti-spoofing capability farther away from the engine, and (3) reworking the software code for a key data processor. The program office planned a minimum of nine ground tests in late 2007 and early 2008 as well as a 16-shot test-flight program in the February through mid-March 2008 time frame. These tests were expected to verify the planned improvements to JASSM's reliability. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics would evaluate the test results.

Following the test failures, the Air Force officially halted procurement of JASSM missiles in July 2007. No additional procurement would occur until the reliability improvements had been demonstrated. Of the 942 missiles on contract as of March 2008 (Lots 1-6) from the total planned buy of 4,900 baseline and ER variants, 611 have been delivered. According to program officials, if the planned tests validated JASSM's reliability, the Air Force expected to restart procurement by renegotiating the Lot 7 buy.

The Government Accountability Office reported in a March 2008 assessment that the JASSM design was still not stable. The program office was not acquiring drawings, a measure of design stability, because the contractor had Total System Performance Responsibility wherein, according to program officials, the contractor guarantees the missile performance. Component problems supplied by sub-contractors include the missile's electrical systems, warhead, and power system, as well as its guidance kit and engine components.

The USAF responded to the GAO's assessment by reiterating that JASSM remained in the Nunn-McCurdy certification process. The Air Force added that previous independent reviews found reliability issues primarily driven by supplier quality control problems. It was further stated that significant progress had been made towards the resolution of the GPS issue and once corrective actions were validated and verified through continued testing they would be incorporated into additional JASSM test missiles.

During the first of three Product Upgrade Verification [PUV] tests on 31 October 2007 the JASSM flew successfully and detonated at the target. The second of three Product Upgrade Verification flight tests at White Sands Missile Range, NM, appears to have been an unqualified success. The 20 December 2007 test validated hardware and software changes to overcome the loss of the GPS navigation signal in flight, an anomaly that plagued the missile in the three flight tests in April 2007. Missile separation, control surface deployment, transition to stable flight, and engine start occurred nominally. GPS acquisition occurred on the expected timelines, overall navigation performance appeared nominal, and no GPS dropouts were noted. Accuracy against the target appears to have been spot on, and the impact resulted in a high order detonation. The third Product Upgrade Verification flight test was slated for January 2008 to evaluate corrective actions to the navigation anomaly encountered during the first half of the October 2007 flight test, and to test the missile in a GPS jamming environment. According to one report, these three PUV tests incorporated a new "Trimble-based GPS receiver" that will be used in production missiles starting with Lot 6, but this is not well attested.

As of late 2007 the Air Force planned to embark on a series of 16 flights, beginning in February 2008, to characterize the reliability of the missile, which remaine under scrutiny for faulty performance in earlier tests.

As of late April 2008 the third PUV test did not appear to have been conducted, nor had the series of 16 planned reliability flight tests started.

The Air Force FY 2009 Unfunded Requirements List [February 2008] included the JASSM Weapons Data Link (WDL). Funding of $23.9M would develops ASuW (attack capital ships at sea) capability for JASSM, with JASSM program recertification pending April 2008. Guidance and Control Engineering provide GNC and simulation support for FOC development activities including the development of a guidance concept that permits JASSM to meet ASUW and moving ground target requirements. This includes defining ISR and WDL requirements, designing a target track filter, updating mid-course guidance requirements, updating seeker search algorithm requirements, updating terminal guidance algorithms, developing detailed models for targets and updating 6DOF simulation routines. The 6DOF simulation changes will be incorporated into the End-to-End simulation and used to evaluate terminal guidance performance against three ship targets and one moving ground target. The HIL simulation will be updated to incorporate ASUW and moving ground target requirements and capabilities. The HIL will be used to verify OPF releases for MAS testing and production.